Sorting out my accumulated junk that has, for the past few years, been slowly mouldering in my dad’s attic, I recently found my copy of Peter Hennessy’s brilliant The Secret State, a political history of British nuclear policy during the first half of the Cold War.
In one memorable section (particularly relevant given recent revelations about British nukes and bicycle locks), Hennessy addresses one of the problems that the British government had to deal with when Polaris SSBNs were introduced. If the UK is effectively destroyed by a pre-emptive nuclear attack, it might be impossible to order a retaliatory strike.
Deterrence therefore requires that British submarines are able to launch a counter-strike without specific authorization from the PM (I presume the same is true for US SSBNs but have never seen it discussed). The question that confronted British policy makers was therefore:
…‘How could the submarine Commander persuade himself that an attack had happened?’ He can scour the airwaves for anything being broadcast but cannot radio out seeking instructions for fear of giving their position away to enemy hunter-killer submarines. How could he be sure that the UK had suffered a catastrophic nuclear assault without an authenticated message from a bunker-protected premier or designated deputy? One of the very last tests—over several days—is that the BBC Radio 4’s Today programme has been silenced (a pleasing last touch of national identity, in every sense, I have always thought).
(If you’re not British, it might be helpful for me to add that Today is a very long-running morning radio news programme and something of a national institution. Coincidentally, it had some fun this morning with Tony Blair’s appearance on President Bush’s Christmas video.)
Anyway, having assured himself of the UK’s demise, the submarine Commander then opens the PM’s orders which are kept in a safe. Indeed, one of the first duties of any new PM is to write new orders, which are delivered to the submarines by the most senior civil servant in the country, the Cabinet Secretary (the old orders being burnt). The contents of the orders are never revealed but a “veteran nuclear planner” has told Hennessy that
…it can instruct one of four things:
1: Put yourself under the command of the United States, if it is still there.
2: Make your way to Australia, if it is still there.
3: Get on with it and take out Moscow [or the capital of whichever country has initiated the attack].
4: Use your own judgement.I have heard senior Royal Navy figures who have been fully indoctrinated into the end-of-the-world drills suggest that (4) is a real possibility even if the envelope contained (3).
Speaking of Australia, I leave for there tomorrow, so my rate of posting might slow for a bit. If I sound smug about spending two and half weeks Down Under, we’ll it’s probably because I am.
Nice piece, especially the bit about the Today Program, although the question of false broadcasts and how the skipper would know that Australia/America really were gone might be quite a problem. Also, it seems quite right and proper that the submarine commander should use his own judgment, I think most people understand the purpose of our nuclear arsenal as deterring attack, once the UK has been destroyed that purpose has already failed and the point of retaliatory strikes becomes moot.
There is also, of course, the question of which radio broadcast a United States Navy skipper would use to satisfy himself that America really had been destroyed – may I suggest Kasey Kasem’s American top 40?
I can just imagine what the Chinese equivalent of those orders will be. The difference is the orders will be for the land as well as sea based forces.
1. Use your own judgment.
2. Take out whoever is responsible (Japan, Taiwan, US, etc.)
The difference is I suspect the Chinese nuclear forces have the authority (whether formally or not) to act on their own if they are attacked.
Chinese forces have very different conceptions of command and control than US/European forces.
(4) Would probably be it regardless since the Sub Captain would likely be the highest ranking member of the UK government left alive.
@Lao Tao Ren
I sure home that doesn’t mean that Chinese sub commanders have to listen into China Radio International to see if Beijing has had its ducks roasted, CRI has to be the lousiest channel around – even if its news program can occasionally be a source of considerable amusement!
People are kind of given to thinking of the Chinese having the same kind of top-down mentality that the stereotyped product of a communist state is supposed to have, but this isn’t true all the way and may not be true in this case. Many veterans of the Korean war remarked on how soldiers in the PLA (whoops! that should be CPVA) knew far more about their plan of action and general situation than their counterparts in the UN forces. All the same, giving 2nd artillery commanders authority to launch on their own judgement sounds far fetched (if only by a little bit).
Jeffrey – you’re the expert on this, what do you reckon?
To anybody’s who’s listened to it, the Today programme would be rather difficult to fake successfully for long…
As to option [3], from my reading of the book I thought the root of the issue was that the PM could only authorise the release of the weapons, rather than order it. The background to this being the Royal Prerogative/fact that PM is not head of the armed services, therefore can-not give orders directly.
WRT option 3, I assume everyone is familiar with On The Beach?In any case, New Zealand is probably a safer option. It’s more likely to still be there, for a start.
Seriously, is there any point giving any order other than “use your judgment”?
Robert: presumably the distinction is that option 4 is “use your own judgement, you’re on your own” whilst the others are “[you’re going to use your own judgement anyway but we suggest you] do X”
@FOARP: if the UK were destroyed, retaliation would not be moot at all. Whoever destroyed the UK should pay a heavy price for his acts; indeed, his destruction should be assured.
Of course, the most important thing is that potential aggressors should never believe that retaliation would not be inevitable and annihilating.
FORAP:
I was hoping to defer to Jeffery on this before I answered, but I fear he has been hijacked and pouched by some wayward Kangaroo, or he is busy hugging Kola Bears (or worst). Them Aussies can grow on him…
In the history of China, it is not at all far fetched to see local Military commanders take considerable initiative on their own, even with a valid central authority and certainly once central authority has ceased to function or withered.
That authority can take the form of doing what is right for their geographic region by their own judgment, forming alliances of convenience with other groups / regions, to, in some cases, reaching for the empire and installing themselves as the new emperor, or accepting the authority of the new invader / emperor.
The authority to act on their own may not be given explicitly per se, but IMHO, it is presumed given Chinese history and traditions.
A good way to understand the differences in authority and power is to read up on the classic: Asian Power and Politics: The cultural dimensions of Authority, by Lucian W. Pye. Pye’s central point is that Asian conceptions of power and authority are fundamentally different than western concepts, leading to different expectations from authority.
If history is a guide, the next invader of China (and based on history, there will be another), will, after defeating the forces of a sufficient portion of the empire, end up with most of the nation in their hands but ‘rebels’ holding out on the periphery for generations.
In the mean time, the invaders find themselves absorbed by the vastness of the civilization, and in time, become sinolized by the immense power of assimilation that China has over every outside force that came in.
I may be old fashioned, but I don’t believe that a 2nd Artillery commander would act much different than these historical precedents.