In two recent posts—Iran’s ‘Big Gains’ at Natanz and More on Iran’s ‘Big [Hairy] Gains’ At Natanz—I have taken issue with a story by David Sanger in the New York Times that “all the centrifuges [at Natanz] appeared to be enriching uranium and running smoothly…”
One aspect of my objection was the Sanger took a quote by IAEA DG ElBaradei out of context in order to give the (false) impression that the IAEA Director-General was confirming the details of the short-notice inspection.
I now have the full text of the two confirmed quotes by ElBaradei:
We believe they pretty much have the knowledge about how to enrich. From now on, it is simply a question of perfecting that knowledge. People will not like to hear it, but that’s a fact.
Quite clearly suspension is a requirement by the Security Council, and I would hope the Iranians would listen to the world community. But from a proliferation perspective, the fact of the matter is that one of the purposes of suspension— keeping them from getting the knowledge—has been overtaken by events. Until all outstanding verification issues are clarified, and the Agency is able to verify the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program, the focus should be to stop them from going to industrial scale production, to allow us to do a full-court-press inspection and to be sure they remain inside the treaty.
It is my understanding that Sanger did get the quotes (Heinrich at Reuters had described them as “released”), but that they were general in nature and not related to the content of the short-notice inspection.
Sanger did, in my opinion, take the ElBaradei quote out of context.
What Was ElBaradei Trying To Say?
Lost in the hullabaloo is why ElBaradei is making a distinction between “the knowledge about how to enrich” and “perfecting that knowledge.”
This is a political distinction that creates room for compromise, such as on whether the West should offer Iran a multinational consortium to enrich uranium on Iranian soil as Geoff Forden and John Thomson propose.
I blogged in October about my hypothesis that compromise on Iran comes down to a judgment about how much Iran can learn on its own:
Ultimately, these kind of deals come down to a sort of theoretical trade-off. There are two ways to make it “hard” for Iran to build a bomb: One way is to restrict Iran’s access to information and technology; the other is to propose monitoring and verification efforts to make any decision to move toward a bomb a very public decision.
Neither offers a guarantee—the 2002 revelation of Iran’s clandestine centrifuge program demonstrates both that controlling technology is difficult and that, even with lots of warning, we might not be able to stop a country like Iran. As we try to decide how much enrichment work we can accept in Iran and under what safeguards (or monitoring, really), we can imagine a hypothetical policymaker with an indifference curve that defines the rate at which she is willing to allow Iran access to enrichment technology in exchange for better capabilities to monitor Iran’s activities.
As Iran’s scientists learn more about centrifuges, we need to learn more about Iran’s scientists.
The Forden and Thomson proposal reflects a judgement that Iran is going to learn lots about centrifuges—and they’ve got 164 reasons to think so. Gaining as much access as possible, therefore, is worth—to Forden and Thomson—letting Iran have really awesome (although black boxed) centrifuges just kind of hanging around (under reasonable safeguards). For others, no amount of monitoring will make it okay for Iran to have a centrifuge plant on its soil.
You can see, I think, a different willingness to trade in Matthew Bunn’s proposal to allow Iran to conduct certain activities under a suspension and the response by David Albright and Jackie Shire, driven by different assessments of how much Iran is likely to learn anyway.
Anyway, at that time Iran had a couple hundred centrifuges, not in excess of a thousand. Not surprisingly, as Iran has built more centrifuges, the “zero enrichment” crowd has dwindled.
Even Western diplomats are beginning to think about arrangements that would accept enrichment in Iran, as Daniel Dombey and Roula Khalaf reported in The Financial Times:
“We can be imaginative and flexible in terms of exploring where negotiations might go,” a senior British official said. He argued that an offer the world’s big powers made to Iran last year was only the starting point for discussion and could be repackaged.
Last year’s offer, made by the permanent five members of the United Nations Security Council and Germany, proposed that an international consortium based in Russia enrich all the uranium for Iran’s nuclear programme. Tehran has rejected this, although it says it would be willing for an international consortium to enrich uranium within Iran itself.
The official said such a suggestion could be discussed within the negotiations. “No doubt they would put the idea of a consortium inside Iran on the table,” he said.
Anyway, in my opinion, ElBaradei is drawing a line between knowing how to enrich and perfecting that knowledge to create space for a compromise that allows Iran, the United States and Europe a face-saving way to stop short of 54,000 centrifuges spinning at Natanz without going to war.
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From the BBC:
“International efforts to halt Iran’s uranium enrichment programme have been “overtaken by events”, the head of the UN’s nuclear agency has said.
IAEA Director General Mohammed ElBaradei said Tehran now possessed “the knowledge about how to enrich”.
IN AN INTERVIEW WITH THE NEW YORK TIMES, he said the focus should now be on trying to stop Iran from going to industrial-scale production.” [emphasis mine]
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6657243.stm
— abcd · May 16, 10:25 AM ·
Yup, we figured that out.
It is my understanding that Sanger did get the quotes directly, but that they were general in nature and not related to the content of the short-notice inspection.
— Jeffrey Lewis · May 16, 10:41 AM ·
The proposal of a multinational consortium to enrich uranium on Iranian soil was put forth repeatedly by the Iranians – including by Ahmadinejad himself during his speech to the UN in late 2005 – and by Bruno Pellaud “expert committee” of the IAEA in 2004 – but has been dismissed offhand by the Bush administration which still insists that there should be not a single spinning centrifuge in Iran and that Iranians should remain ignorant of nuclear technology. In fact all of Iran’s offers – which have included placing caps on enrichment and allowing greater inspections than legally required – have been similarly dismissed offhand, raising the suspicion that such a ridiculously inflexible demand and the whole nuclear issue is just a convenient pretext for a conflict with Iran.
— hass · May 16, 01:25 PM ·
The demand by the UN Security Council and the IAEA Board of Governors, that Iran verifiably suspend all enrichement and reprocessing (ENR) activities until Iran cooperates fully such that the IAEA is actually able to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activiites, is not ridiculous. Iran violated Article III of the NPT and its INFCIRC/153 comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA by concealing—for nearly twenty years—a host of undeclared nuclear materials and activities. Right now, no one knows definitively whether or not Iran possesses undeclared nuclear materials and activities. Iran should do all it can to enable the IAEA to clear up and verify definitively the “undeclared” issue. Instead, Iranian hard-liners continue to obstruct.
— Anon · May 16, 02:24 PM ·
The fact is, with the knowledge, they can go on building and operating centerfuge cascades covertly, regardless an enrichment agreement with the West. The genie is out of the bottle folks, and Iran has zero interest in giving up something they have coveted for decades.They are on the cusp of being able to join a very exclusive club, not to mention possessing a huge deterrent to attack. Who really believes Iran would let it’s avowed enemies have the bomb, but give it up themselves? No chance.
I’d challenge anyone to the notion that Iran will have tested a weapon before the end of 2010 (unless they are thwarted by military or covert actions).
For those in power, the most dangerous time in Iran’s nuclear history is now.Once the arsenal is in place, they can rest assured they won’t be invaded for fear of nuclear retaliation.N. Korea was isolated, but not attacked. The same levers cannot be applied to Iran.
— j house · May 16, 02:58 PM ·
Nonsense – Iran’s breaches of safeguards have been verified by the IAEA to have been unrelated to any weapons program, and the IAEA has certified that there is no evidence of a nuclear weapons program in Iran. WHile the IAEA has said that it cannot verify the absence of “undeclared” activities, the same applies several other countries. The illegal demand for suspension of enrichment has no relationship to any previous breaches of safeguards which, according to the IAEA, have been or are being remedied. Note that other countries which have violated safeguards such as South Korea and Egypt have not been similarly treated either.
— hass · May 16, 03:23 PM ·
With respect, Hass, I counter that your claim—that it is “illegal” for the UN Security Council and IAEA Board of Governor to demand that Iran suspend all enrichment and reprocessing activities, and enable the IAEA Secretariat to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities—is unwarranted. The UN Charter and the IAEA Statute empower respectively these institutions with the appropriate legal authority.
Moreover, it’s cynical and disingeuous of you to imply that South Korea and Egypt’s compliance issues and in any way equivalent to Iran’s noncompliance issues.
To begin with, the magnitude and scope of the ROK and Egypt’s safeguards violations pale in comparison to Iran’s decades-long concealment. Compare (1) The scope of South Korea and Egypt’s previously undeclared nuclear activities pale in comparison to the scope of Iran’s. Compare the substance of IAEA DG reports for Korea (GOV/2004/84) and for Egypt (GOV/2005/9) with those for Iran, (inter alia, IAEA DG reports GOV/2003/40, GOV/2003/63, GOV/2003/75, GOV/2004/83, GOV/2005/67.)
Moreover, South Korea differs significantly from Iran in that the ROK did not just sign, but also ratified the Additional Protocol. (See http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sg_protocol.html) Seoul therefore facilitated and substantially empowered the IAEA Secretariat’s verification activities.
Finally, in investigating the respective state histories of formerly undeclared nuclear materials and activities, DG ElBardei and the IAEA Secretariat view the cooperation of South Korea (since 2004) and Egypt (since 2005) as satisfactory; in sharp contrast, they view Iran’s cooperation (since 2003) as most unsatisfactory. (See IAEA DG reports on Iran, op. cit., esp. GOV/2005/67.)
— Anon · May 16, 04:18 PM ·
The IAEA board never demanded Iran suspend enrichment, but said, and this is from memory, that Iran should take voluntary and non-legally binding steps to create an atmosphere of confidence. Creating that atmosphere “required” a suspension and other things such as ratifying the additional protocols and making information and people available to the IAEA beyond the requirements of the additional protocols.
The word “required” taken out of the express context of the IAEA board’s statements was used as the basis for the UN Security Council demands.
The UN Security Council does have the right to do whatever it wants, including demand the that the US ratify NAFTA or Kyoto global warming or any other treaty.
While legal, the demand that a sovereign nation ratify a treaty, such as that Iran ratify the additional protocols, which is now a full fledged Article 7 demand is at least very unusual if not unprecedented.
On the other hand, ignoring UN resolutions on the grounds that they infringe on national sovereignty is routine, as when the United States invaded Iraq in defiance of the resolution US accepted months earlier that said further action would require a new resolution.
The scope of Iran’s actual safeguards violations is actually far smaller than South Korea’s. South Korea created weapons grade material.
Iran did not disclose the building of the Natanz facility from its planning over 20 years ago, but was not required to do so until six months before introducing nuclear material. Iran complied with this requirement.
South Korea had a full fledged weapons program, but also had an ally in the United States instead of an enemy. South Korea today is nuclear capable and under IAEA supervision.
Iran has offered to accept a similar arrangement and indicated that it would ratify the Additional Protocols as part of an agreement towards that end.
In what is clearly a double-standard, and therefore clearly contrary to the NPT’s language of non-discrimination, an arrangement like South Korea’s is not acceptable for Iran – because of the threat the United States and the West believes a nuclear-capable Iran (like South Korea) would pose to Israel.
— arnold evans · May 16, 06:03 PM ·
And what about that interesting German proposal being bandied about to allow Iran to establish a multinational fuel center? Too restrictive for Iran ever to agree? “A host country would have to be willing to cede administration and sovereign rights
over a certain area yet to be defined to the IAEA, and to sign an agreement to that end.
The IAEA would be given the right to exercise controls over low-enriched uranium
(LEU) exported from this area, as well as all the rights necessary to construct, run and
monitor a uranium-enrichment plant (including safety and safeguards monitoring).”
— Debra Decker · May 16, 11:23 PM ·
Iran did suspend its program for about 2 years during the course of the Paris Agreement, and implemented the Additional Protocol inspections (and more) and after 2000 man-hours of inspections the IAEA still found no secret weapons program – instead the IAEA has publicly complained that US leads on Iran have turned out to be bogus. And what did Iran get as a result? An illegal demand that the temporary suspension become permanent.
As for the legal issue, we’ve discussed this before. By the explicit terms of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement and the IAEA statute, the only time that the UNSC can get involved is if there’s diversion of fissile material for military use – and the IAEA has said there has been no such diversion. Period. The UN Charter does not give the UNSC the right to unilaterally declare a treaty right such as the NPT to be inapplicable to a country – quite the opposite, the UN Charter requires that treaties be implemented without discrimination. In fact, Iran’s rights under Article IV of the NPT were violated when Iran’s attempts to develop the fuel cycle in cooperation with the IAEA were frustrated by illegal US pressure in 1983.
South Korean violations included uranium enrichment to 77%, plutonium extraction and the manufacture of uranium metal. This occurred over 20 years and was finally (partially) disclosed in 2004.
As I mentioned previously, the Lawyers Committee for Nuclear Policy has already addressed these issues- if you have a complaint, I suggest contacting them:
“From the Lawyer’s Committee on Nuclear Policy:
“The resolution also refers to the fact that the IAEA has not yet been able to determine the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in Iran. However, the IAEA certifies the absence of undeclared nuclear activities only for states that implement the Additional Protocol…. which is presently true for Iran, is also true for 40 other states including Canada, the Czech Republic, and South Africa… For some it is tempting to declare, based on the inability of the IAEA to presently draw a conclusion on the absence of nuclear activities, that Iran continues to operate concealed facilities and that any such facilities must be for a military program. But the IAEA has cautioned that the lack of a conclusion does not imply suspicion of undeclared nuclear materials and activities, as the matter is frequently spun in the media and by some governments.” (Lawyer’s Committee on Nuclear Policy, Commentary on Resolution 1696 – http://www.lcnp.org/disarmament/iran/UNSCres-jul06.htm)
But then again, facts are such inconvenient things . . .
— hass · May 16, 11:42 PM ·
I get that you’re enamoured of your Photoshop plugins, but you’ve made El-Baradei look like he has psoriasis..
— Gridlock · May 17, 05:05 AM ·
Debra, if we absolutely must go the route of a multinational fuel center, then the more restrictive, the better. On that note, the German proposal is a step (or a stumble) in the right direction.
Hass, I’m going to start calling you “Snail,” because your mind moves slowly, and leaves a murky trail that muddies and obscures whatever issues it tries to go over.
You insist on claiming the explicit word of Iran’s comprehensive safeguards agreement provides no legal grounds for Security Council referral. To support your view, you absurdly cite the LCNP, the words and views of which have absolutely no legal force whatsoever, while fully avoiding the actual words of Iran’s CSA and related IAEA documents, which do have legal force.
As someone who purports to understand international law, you ought to know what does—and what does not—constitute primary sources of law for international treaty interpretation! (Hint: The primary sources of law aren’t NGO opinions…)
1. Article 19 of Iran’s CSA (INFCIRC/214) says:
“If the [IAEA] Board [of Governors], upon examination of relevant information reported to it by the Director General, finds that the Agency IS NOT ABLE TO VERIFY that there has been no diversion of nuclear material REQUIRED TO BE SAFEGUARDED under this Agreement, to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, it may make the reports provided for in paragraph C of Article XII of the Statute of the Agency (hereinafter referred to as “the Statute”) and may also take, where applicable, the other measures provided for in that paragraph [e.g., UNSC referral]. In taking such action the Board shall take account of the degree of assurance provided by the safeguards measures that have been applied and shall afford the Government of Iran every reasonable opportunity to furnish the Board with any necessary reassurance” [emphases added].
The threshold is not evidence of diversion, as you claim. Article 19 explicitly says that the threshold is the Agency’s INABILITY to verify the absence of diversion. This makes sense because the primary objective of IAEA safeguards is not merely to detect, but also to deter, diversions to weapons-activities or unknown purposes.
(a) It is important to add that, in February 1992, the BoG affirmed that the CSA’s objective of detecting, and deterring, the diversion of nuclear material from “peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown” applies not only “to nuclear material declared by a State,” but also to “any nuclear material [and related activities] subject to safeguards that SHOULD HAVE been declared” [See The Safeguards System of the International Atomic Energy Agency at http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/safeg_system.pdf].
2. As DG ElBaradei and the IAEA Secretariat continue to reiterate, most recently in GOV/2007/8:
“The Agency REMAINS UNABLE … to make further progress in its efforts to verify fully the past development of Iran’s nuclear programme and certain aspects relevant to its scope and nature. Hence, the Agency IS UNABLE to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities [i.e., material and activities which SHOULD HAVE BEEN DECLARED] in Iran unless Iran addresses the long outstanding verification issues through the implementation of the Additional Protocol (which it signed on 18 December 2003, but has not yet brought into force) and the required transparency measures” [GOV/2007/8, para. 27, emphasis added].
Note ElBaradei’s point about the AP—while it hasn’t entered into force for Iran, it has for the ROK. That distinction is hugely important, because the AP empowers the IAEA Secretariat to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities.
3. Given what DG ElBaradei and the IAEA Secretariat have described as “the existence in Iran of activities undeclared to the Agency for 20 years” [ibid., para. 29], if the IAEA remains UNABLE “to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities” in Iran, then the Agency remains UNABLE to verify that all of the “nuclear material [and related activities] required to be safeguarded” under Iran’s CSA have been fully declared to the IAEA, and thus remains UNABLE “to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be [declared to the IAEA and] safeguarded under this Agreement, to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices” or to purposes unknown (INFCIRC/214, art. 19).
Iran’s case therefore meets standard for referral to the UNSC articulated by article 19 of its CSA.
With respect, Hass, I submit that the legal reasoning here is obvious enough that even someone lik you ought to be able to grasp it.
— Anon · May 17, 02:04 PM ·
Arnold, what the ROK did was flat-out wrong, and I’m personally glad that they, at least, are owning up to what it did, e.g, the AVLIS experiments.
By the way, let’s be clear about the Agency’s findings w.r.t. to AVLIS in GOV/2004/84:
“b. The amount of nuclear material used as feedstock in the enrichment experiments was 3.5 kg of natural uranium (NU) metal;
“c. The AVLIS experiments had achieved an AVERAGE enrichment level of 10.2% U-235 and up to 77% U-235, and had produced 200 mg of enriched uranium…” (para. 12, emphasis added);
and
“As a result of its verification activities at the KAERI site in Daejeon since August 2004, the Agency’s assessment confirms the statement by the ROK that: (i) the AVLIS experiments were laboratory-scale; and (ii) the amounts of uranium involved and the enriched uranium produced were relatively small. The levels of enrichment reported by the ROK are consistent with the Agency’s calculations based on computational modelling of the experimental configuration declared by the ROK. The Agency’s preliminary sample results, from the product provided by the ROK, show that the average uranium enrichment level was about 10%” (para. 16).
I’m also glad that the ROK not only verfiably suspended their AVLIS program at laboratory-scale, but also—and this is something that significantly distinguishes the ROK from Iran—legally enabled the IAEA to perform more fully its safeguards and verification mission by signing and ratifying the Additional Protocol, and by cooperating (so far) to the IAEA Secretariat’s satisfaction.
In contrast, Iran has not ratified the AP. Unlike the ROK, it wants (if we’re lucky) to be bribed into ratifying the AP. Moreover, you seem to imply that Iran’s violations of its obligations under Article III of the NPT and its CSA with the IAEA are relatively harmless? Iran’s violations are not limited to a failure to disclose Natanz planning for twenty years, but also a host of other undeclared nuclear materials and activities.
For example, Arnold, you’re omitting that Iran, between 1999 and 2002, tested centrifuges at a Kalaye Electric Company facility—and undeclared facility, mind you—by using undeclared nuclear material that it had imported in 1991. You’re also omitting Iran’s undeclared import of natural uranium metal in 1994, and its undeclared transfer and use of this material in laser enrichment experiments, which produced enriched uranium.
GOV/2005/67 lists Iran’s failures in full:
“a. Failure to report:
”(i) the import of natural uranium in 1991, and its subsequent transfer for further processing;
”(ii) the activities involving the subsequent processing and use of the imported natural uranium, including the production and loss of nuclear material where appropriate, and the production and transfer of waste resulting therefrom;
”(iii) the use of imported natural UF6 for the testing of centrifuges at the Kalaye Electric Company workshop in 1999 and 2002, and the consequent production of enriched and depleted uranium (DU);
”(iv) the import of natural uranium metal in 1993 and its subsequent transfer for use in laser enrichment experiments, including the production of enriched uranium, the loss of nuclear material during these operations and the production and transfer of resulting waste;
”(v) the production of UO2, UO3, UF4, UF6 and ammonium uranyl carbonate (AUC) from imported depleted UO2, depleted U3O8 and natural U3O8, and the production and transfer of resulting wastes; and
”(vi) the production of natural and depleted UO2 targets at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre (ENTC) and their irradiation in the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), the subsequent processing of those targets, including the separation of plutonium, the production and transfer of resulting waste, and the storage of unprocessed irradiated targets at the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre (TNRC).
“b. Failure to declare:
”(i) the pilot enrichment facility at the Kalaye Electric Company workshop; and
”(ii) the laser enrichment plants at TNRC and the pilot uranium laser enrichment plant at Lashkar Ab’ad.
“c. Failure to provide design information, or updated design information, for:
”(i) the facilities where the natural uranium imported in 1991 (including wastes generated) was received, stored and processed (the Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratories at TNRC (JHL); TRR; ENTC; waste storage facility at Esfahan and Anarak);
”(ii) the facilities at ENTC and TNRC where UO2, UO3, UF4, UF6 and AUC from imported depleted UO2, depleted U3O8 and natural U3O8 had been produced;
”(iii) the waste storages at Esfahan and at Anarak, in a timely manner;
”(iv) the pilot enrichment facility at the Kalaye Electric Company workshop;
”(v) the laser enrichment plants at TNRC and Lashkar Ab’ad, and locations where resulting wastes had been processed and stored, including the waste storage facility at Karaj; and
”(vi) TRR, with respect to the irradiation of uranium targets, and the facility at TNRC where plutonium separation had taken place, as well as the waste handling facility at TNRC.
“d. Failure on many occasions to cooperate to facilitate the implementation of safeguards, as evidenced by extensive concealment activities” (para. 4).
All of this, plus the Iran’s refusal to ratify the AP, and the IAEA’s continuing inability to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities in Iran.
— Anon · May 17, 03:44 PM ·
I’m noticing a language-creep from “materials” which is required by Iran’s safeguard agreement to “materials and activities” which as a non-enforcer of the additional protocols, Iran has no legal responsibility to provide, which is not part of Iran’s safeguard agreement and which cannot form the legal basis for a referral to the UNSC.
Now South Korea is nuclear capable, and could in theory force the IAEA out and build a weapon in short order. This has been the case from before its NPT violations were exposed, it was the case through all of the investigations and it continues to be the case until the present. South Korea has signed and ratified the AP, which is important to you.
You cannot say that the United States treated South Korea’s violations, which include the actual production of near-weapons grade material in a way comparable to how it treated Iran.
A security council resolution demanding that South Korea’s nuclear industry be entirely shut down for the indeterminate duration of negotiations would have been more justified on any legal or technical grounds in Korea’s case than it was in Iran’s case.
The difference is that for political reasons, the United States and Europe discriminate between a potential nuclear capability of Iran and the far greater nuclear capability of Korea. That is as flagrant a violation the language and spirit of the NPT as is possible.
Iran is willing to be “bribed” into ratifying the AP in exchange for not being prevented from gaining the same capability South Korea has.
It can’t be the case that South Korea is justified and Iran is not. South Korea would not have ratified the Additional Protocols if they could be used to enforce a permanent renunciation of its right to either enrich or reprocess nuclear material under IAEA control and permanent renunciation of accessing that technology.
The US and Europe are, contrary to the letter of the NPT, applying a discriminatory denial of technology to Iran.
— arnold evans · May 17, 10:35 PM ·
Anon, you’re being intentionally abtuse about Article 19.
See, the IAEA has certified that 1- that ALL DECLARED NUCLEAR MATERIAL & THAT WAS REQUIRED TO BE SAFEGUARDED HAS BEEN ACCOUNTED FOR, and 2- there has been no diversion of fissile material for non-peaceful uses.
Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute is available online at
http://www.iaea.org/About/statute_text.html and it sets out the requirements for compliance, specifically “accounting referred to in sub paragraph A-6 of this article”
Paragraph A-6 of Article XII, in turn, states that inspectors are to be sent to account for fissionable materials and ensure none have been diverted for a
“military purpose”.
The IAEA did send these inspectors to Iran – many many times. El-Baradei
confirmed in Paragraph 52 of his November 2003 report that “to date, there is no evidence that the previously undeclared nuclear material and activities referred to above were related to a nuclear weapons
programme.” And again, after extensive inspections, El-Baradei wrote Paragraph 112 of his November 2004 report that “all the declared nuclear material in Iran
has been accounted for, and therefore such material is not diverted to prohibited activities.”
In short, inspections happened as required, all the nuclear material was accounted for, and no diversion of fissile material to a “military purpose”
was found.
The IAEA has indeed stated that it can’t verify the absence of undeclared activities, but that’s the case with about 40 other countries too – including a few European countries. The IAEA has also said that verifying the absence of undeclared material takes time – in the case of Japan, it took three years. It is not a violation of the IAEA statute, nor is Iran in any way obligated to go beyond its existing safeguards agreements to allay such accusations.
NEvertheless, even though it was not obligated to, Iran did voluntarily implement the Additional Protocol and allowed inspections that go beyond even the Additional Protocol, and still no evidence of such activities has turned up.
— hass · May 17, 11:53 PM ·
Incidentally, I received an email stating that regarding the assertion that the IAEA it is not yet in a position ‘to conclude that there are
no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran’: forty-five other countries are in the same category as Iran, including fourteen nations in Europe.
Can someone here verify this?
— hass · May 18, 12:40 AM ·
The Diane Rehm show on NPR today had David Sanger on, who discussed his article including the El Baradai quotes:
http://www.wamu.org/programs/dr/07/05/18.php#13189
— Andy · May 18, 02:09 PM ·
Arnold, to be clear: I understand that CSAs (in contrast to the AP) focus on IAEA safeguards and verification activities on nuclear materials, but you must recognize that the Agency actually does have legal authority to deal with nuclear facilities and activities to the extent that nuclear materials—not only those materials which a State declared, but also those which it should have declared, but failed to—lead it there.
What disturbs me about your reply, howsoever, is that it sounds like you’re arguing that the IAEA’s discovery of a State’s possession of undeclared, clandestine nuclear facilities and activities [i.e., those facilities and activities that fall into a nexus with nuclear materials, such as by involving such materials], and that State’s obstruction of the IAEA Secretariat’s investigation, provide no legal grounds for UNSC referral? If so, that’s patently absurd, and contrary to both the spirit and the letter of the relevant law.
Moreover, I don’t understand why denigrate the AP. You don’t think that if Iran (like the ROK) legally empowers through the AP’s ratification the IAEA Secretariat to engage in activities to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities, and if the IAEA Secretariat does make such a verification in light of Iran’s still not-fully-explained-or-understood history of concealment, that would be insignificant?
If you cannot at all distinguish between the cooperative way in which the ROK has handled its violations (e.g., by signing the AP and cooperating with the IAEA Secretariat), and the uncooperative way in which Iran has handled its violations (e.g., by not doing what the ROK did), then we have little common ground on which to continue a discussion.
Hass, I really don’t understand why you’re trying to hide behind the IAEA Statute, when what matters here, in the first, is Iran’s CSA, especially the specific wording in para. 19, which explicitly cites as a condition for UNSC referral the Agency’s inability to verify the absence of diversion of materials that are declared or should have been declared, but are not (i.e., materials “required to be safeguarded”).
I don’t at all disagree with you that from 2003 or so onward, the IAEA Secretariat has apparently accounted for all of Iran’s DECLARED nuclear materials. Declared nuclear materials aren’t at issue, howsoever.
What is at issue, is that (a) Iran had undeclared nuclear materials, activities and facilities for two decades, all of which, to the extent they fall within the nexus of nuclear materials, should have been declared, but weren’t; (b) Iran failed to cooperate with the IAEA Secretariat’s verification activities, which sought to deal with that shrouded history, and ensure that the absence of undeclared nuclear materials, or activities and facilities related to these materials; and© Iran has even at times obstructed the Agency’s verification activities.
The IAEA’s continuing inability to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials, activities and facilities, esp. in light of Iran’s history of concealment: (a) clearly places Iran in a category different from States that have signed the AP, as well as other States which haven’t signed the AP, but are in good standing; and (b) constitutes noncompliance, esp. because of Iran’s obstructionism.
— Anon · May 18, 03:32 PM ·
I have not seen language in the CSA about either a nexus of activities and material, or authority that extends “whereever undeclared materials lead” the IAEA.
As of today there is no indication that there are any materials that are undeclared. And no indication that there has been any diversion of any material that has been or should be declared to any military purpose.
There are many countries in which the IAEA is not able to verify that there are no undeclared materials. Maybe most countries. The referral of Iran on that basis was a discriminatory political decision. I’ll come back to this.
Saying that “materials” expands into a “nexus of materials and activities” and “inability to verify” forms a basis for referral effectively transforms Iran’s CSA (and nearly every other non-nuclear state’s CSA) into the AP. If there was not a strong argument that the CSAs were not to be read that way, the AP would never have had to be written.
Onto the AP. The AP is a voluntary treaty extension. Iran’s refusal to ratify is like the US refusal to ratify Kyoto. A fully sovereign matter, in no way illegal, and while we’d rather see them ratify, not ratifying is not a punishable offense by any stretch of the imagination.
Iran’s failure to provide the IAEA information beyond what is required by the treaties Iran has ratified also cannot neutrally be called obstructionism.
Enough of this though because it is evasive and a little dishonest to avoid the real issue of contention in Iran’s nuclear program.
The US and Europe have created a new category that has no basis in either the NPT or the AP, that Iran must not be “nuclear capable”.
If the US and Europe had attempted to put Korea into this category, Korea would have done what Iran is doing, restrict its cooperation to the limit of its legal obligations until this discriminatory policy has been abandoned. You would be calling this South Korea’s “obstructionism”.
You have to say either:
a) I do not believe it is discriminatory or contrary to the NPT to say Iran must not have technology that would give it break out capacity.
(This has been the US position since the Iranian revolution but was not the US position when Iran was ruled by the Shah, so this position is independent of any declared or undeclared materials. It is also clearly not the US position with respect to South Korea, Taiwan or Romania, which makes applying it to Iran’s current regime discriminatory.)
Or you can say:
b) A discriminatory policy is being applied against Iran.
After openly addressing the concept that technology that Korea and other NPT signatories are able to have should or should not be denied Iran, then we can discuss whether the referral is the neutral application of the NPT that Iran ratified or if it is a politically discriminatory abuse of the IAEA and UN Security Council to accomplish political goals of the US.
I understand your position to be:
“I believe Iran, under its current leadership should not have access to technology Brazil, Japan and South Korea have access to. I don’t believe or I don’t care that this position is discriminatory. Conveniently for my position, Iran has not verified that there are no undeclared materials that should have been reported (even though the instrument that clearly requires this is not in force over Iran, and many other countries in this situation are ignored) so now the US gets to use the Security Council to advance a policy the I would want to pursue anyway.”
If the above is not your position, please correct me before we go further.
If that is your position, then the second part serves the first, but our real argument is over the first part.
— arnold evans · May 19, 02:21 PM ·
Let’s grant that a discriminatory policy is being applied against Iran though it’s clearly the same policy with different resolutions for wholly different levels of “rule bending (as noted earlier by the ROKs AP compliance with respect to a lab-scale prog).” Does that give Iran a pass? Why can’t Iran do what the ROK has done? Why won’t they?
Motive is something we should all consider. It’s clear the West and Iran are both behaving in their usual manner but to expect US policy, at least, towards an Iranian nuclear program to be anything but discriminatory is unrealistic and it doesn’t excuse Iran’s behavior to present. As well it is not the driving force behind this entire “nuclear crisis,” that would be continued Iranian malfeasance.
The arguments from both sides about ROK non-compliance are interesting but they’re beside the point. Unless your point is that Iran get it’s spot in the club it’s just a distraction.
I got pulled over once
My friend never gets pulled over
I shouldn’t have to pay this ticket
QED
— spacemanafrica · May 19, 06:32 PM ·
Well, I said this earlier:
The US and Europe have created a new category that has no basis in either the NPT or the AP, that Iran must not be “nuclear capable”.
If the US and Europe had attempted to put Korea into this category, Korea would have done what Iran is doing, restrict its cooperation to the limit of its legal obligations until this discriminatory policy has been abandoned. You would be calling this South Korea’s “obstructionism”.
It is far from clear, in fact it is not true, that the same policy is being applied to different levels of rule bending, and in fact South Korea, which actually has produced near-weapons grade material using a process that could actually fuel a weapon as part of an actual weapons research program reached a far greater level of rule bending.
Lastly, since I’m back I want to discuss anon’s earlier characterization of Iran’s CSA as effectively being the Additional Protocols. (Are you the previous anon?)
The IAEA has never been able to certify that Iran has no undeclared nuclear material, just as it has not for the vast majority of countries.
By anon’s reading of the Iran’s CSA upthread, Iran signing the CSA was a license for the US to bring Iran to the security council at any time after the CSA was ratified. In fact, any country with a similar CSA could be referred to the Security Council at any time by that reading. Of course that reading is nonsense.
So what does “material that should have been declared” mean? It means material that actually exists. Material that the IAEA actually knows about that should have been declared. There is no material that actually exists that should have been declared that has possibly been diverted to weapons purposes in Iran, and the IAEA has certified that.
The IAEA has not certified that there are no undeclared nuclear enrichment related program activities, but that is an AP requirement and the AP is simply not in force in Iran.
Iran’s CSA does not permit a referral for the non-certification of non-diversion of material that exists only in the imagination of some in the United States government – if it did, Iran should have been referred on day one.
Yes, it is true that the US and Europe are applying a discriminatory policy against Iran. Iran has said more than once that if the US and Europe apply a policy that is less discriminatory – not even non-discriminatory – Iran would ratify the AP and go beyond the AP in its cooperation with the IAEA as the IAEA has requested.
Because of that, the key issue in this conflict really is this discriminatory notion of a new class of nations that are “nuclear capable” that has no basis in the NPT, the AP or any agreement any relevant nation has ratified; that the US and Europe are admittedly by you illegally attempting to prevent Iran from entering. I’d say all of the other issues being brought up are the distraction.
— arnold evans · May 19, 11:42 PM ·
The point isn’t that Iran should be given a free pass as was S, Korea – the point is that the legal standard is the same as that applied to S Korea.
— hass · May 20, 02:00 AM ·
Arnold, to be frank, you need to spend more time reading carefully the model comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA or INFCIRC/153), or other documents, such as “Safeguards System of the International Atomic Energy Agency” (SS-IAEA) .
Nuclear materials constitute the starting point of IAEA safeguards (INFCIRC/153, para. 33-34). You know this.
Throughout its main text, the model CSA uses the phrase, “nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement” (ibid., para. 7, passim). This phrase refers not only to materials that a State has declared to the IAEA, but also to materials that a State should have declared to the IAEA, yet failed to declare. SS-IAEA notes that the IAEA Board of Governors affirmed this definition of “nuclear materials subject to safeguards under this Agreement”: “Each of these [comprehensive safeguards] agreements, concluded along the lines of INFCIRC/153 (Corrected), requires a State to accept Agency safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of the State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere” (SS-IAEA, para. 11) ... In February 1992, the Board of Governors affirmed that the scope of such comprehensive safeguards agreements was NOT LIMITED to nuclear material declared by a State BUT INCLUDED any nuclear material subject to safeguards that should have been declared” (ibid., para. 13, emphasis added).
To understand fully how “nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement” relate to nuclear activities, you must recognize that the model CSA identifies three classes of activities in which a State uses nuclear materials: either
(a) in non-proscribed “peaceful nuclear activities within [the State’s] territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere” (ibid., para. 1); or
(b) in “non-proscribed military activit[ies that] will not be in conflict with an undertaking the State may have given and in respect of which Agency safeguards apply…” (ibid., para. 14[a]), such as in nuclear propulsion within a military naval vessel; or
(c) in expressly proscribed non-peaceful or military activities, in particular, “the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices OR FOR PURPOSES UNKNOWN” (ibid., para. 28, emphasis added).
In each of the three classes of nuclear activities, the model CSA legally requires a State to declare these nuclear materials to the IAEA. In class (a), the State is supposed to make declarations to the IAEA, which the Agency’s secretariat accounts for and verifies (ibid., paras. 7, 31-32, passim); in class (b), the State still is supposed to make declarations to the IAEA, after having first concluded an agreement with the Agency on how to deal with these materials when they are used in legitimate, non-proscribed military activities, and when they cease to be used in such activities and become again subject to safeguards; and in class©, the State either made declarations to the IAEA as required, then diverted material from declared material balance areas either at declared facilities or declared locations-outside-facilities (LOFs) to “the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown” (ibid., para. 28); or it failed to make the required declarations, and at a minimum diverted material to “purposes unknown,” if not “the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices” (ibid., para. 28). By the way, Iran’s two decades of concealment falls, at the very least, into class©.
Paragraphs 42-48 of INFCIRC/153 describe the nexus that nuclear material creates for facilities (which have a specific definition under the model CSA, which you’re capable of looking up); and paragraphs 49-50, for LOFs. I’m not going to go into detail because you can read this for yourself. Note that undeclared nuclear material definitionally implies the existence of undeclared facilities or LOFs, which is why the IAEA DG’s reports to the Board discuss such reporting failures.
I must say, I find this paragraph particularly obtuse:
> Saying that “materials” expands into a “nexus
> of materials and activities[,]” and “inability
> to verify” forms a basis for referral effectively
> transforms Iran’s CSA (and nearly every other non-
> nuclear state’s CSA) into the AP. If there was not
> a strong argument that the CSAs were not to be read
> that way, the AP would never have had to be written.
You fundamentally misunderstand what the AP is designed to do. The IAEA’s legal responsibility over undeclared nuclear materials, and over any undeclared activities, facilities or LOFs that involve such undeclared materials, does not emanate from the AP, but rather from the model CSA itself. (See above.) Moreover, as Table A-1 of the SS-IAEA outlines, the CSA does actually provide the Agency with an incomplete ability to carry out that responsibility. The AP goes further by allowing a State to legally provide the IAEA with what the Secretariat views as a fuller ABILITY—e.g., through greater access to information and physical sites—to carry out that responsibility, and verify the absence of undeclared nuclear material, activities, facilities, LOFs, etc.
Indeed, the SS-IAEA notes that, ”[F]or States with a comprehensive safeguards agreement alone, although the Agency HAS THE LEGAL AUTHORITY to verify possible undeclared activities, ITS ABILITY to discover such activities IS LIMITED. The additional information and complementary access provided for under additional protocols ARE INTENDED TO INCREASE THAT ABILITY and thus enable safeguards implemented under a comprehensive safeguards agreement with an additional protocol in force to provide credible assurance of the absence of such activities.” (SS-IAEA, para. 13, emphasis added).
You add:
> As of today there is no indication that there
> are any materials that are undeclared. And no
> indication that there has been any diversion of
> any material that has been or should be declared
> to any military purpose.
Prior to 2003, there was few if any indications that there were undeclared nuclear material activities in Iran. We know now, howsoever, that there were undeclared nuclear materials, activities and facilities in Iran. What’s at issue w.r.t. Iran is Iran’s obstructionism, the IAEA’s consequent inability to fully comprehend Iran’s history of concealment, and the IAEA’s continuing inability to verify the absence of undeclared materials, activities, facilities, LOFs, etc.
> There are many countries in which the IAEA is
> not able to verify that there are no undeclared
> materials. Maybe most countries. The referral of
> Iran on that basis was a discriminatory political
> decision.
I agree that there are many States in which the IAEA is not able to verify the absence of undeclared materials. But in how many of those States has the IAEA discovered the previous existence of “nuclear material subject to safeguards that should have been declared,” but was not declared? Are you suggesting that States that have violated their NPT and IAEA safeguards obligations ought not to be treated differently that States in good standing w.r.t. the Secretariat’s safeguarding and verification activities? A current theme throughout your writing is that Iran’s history of concealment, whatever the intentions behind this history of behavior, is harmless and irrelevant. Are you going so far so to suggest that Iran never violated these obligations to begin with?
You mis-state my position. My position is essentially (a). The NPT’s Article IV certainly doesn’t obligate supplier States to do anything stupid. And I’m appalled at how you just plain don’t get what the AP is really about, and that you don’t get that Iran’s history of concealment places it in a category different from other States that haven’t ratified the AP, but are in good standing.
Moreover, I think you do great violence to the debates within the USG in the mid and late 1970s over US nuclear commerce with the Shah. Yes, Uncle Sam signed up to export nuclear goods to the Shah (nice one, Henry K.), but after the Fri Study of ‘76 and other intense internal battles, President Ford soundly deferred Enrich. N Repro. (ENR) exports, and by so doing, killed the deal with the Shah on nonpro grounds. Carter’s policy was schizophrenic: on the one hand, Carter made the deferral of ENR, and esp. repro., indefinite, but on the other hand, Carter ignored this deferral when he verbally promised the Shah resurrect nuclear coop. (If you have access to the Declassified Document Reference System, look up document numbers CK3100503536, and CK3100505018, and read just what Carter did. The docs are just awful.)
— Anon · May 20, 07:00 AM ·
Anon:
First is the US and European position that Iran must not be nuclear capable discriminatory? The rest of the discussion flows from that.
“Spacemanafrica” admits that it is discriminatory. He goes so far as to say it is unrealistic to expect the US to stop being discriminatory. The NPT requires the US and Europe to stop being discriminatory.
You, anon, seem that you would rather ignore the issue. It is an important issue to ignore once it has been brought up.
The US was willing to give the Shah nuclear capability (after intense debate) and is willing to go along with S. Korea, Taiwan and Brazil though those states are known to have had weapons research programs that conducted nuclear weapons experiments on greater scales than Iran.
Iran has indicated that it will ratify and fully implement the AP once its NPT-guaranteed right to reach the same technological status as South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil and Romania is affirmed by the US and Europe.
You seem to want to skip over that, and then brand Iran’s reasonable refusal to go beyond its treaty responsibilities until this discrimination has been ended as obstructionism or malfeasance.
The current theme throughout my writing is that Iran’s violations are less severe than other violations that were not referred and what you are calling Iran’s obstructionism is a reasonable response to US and European discrimination that is contrary to the express terms of the NPT.
There is no indication that Iran would not be as open as South Korea if, as the NPT requires, Iran is offered a nuclear program like South Korea’s.
As I wrote earlier, South Korea would not be open if it was treated the way Iran is treated.
There were four parts in my previous understanding of your position – I’ll now modify them to the best of my understanding based on your last comment:
I believe Iran, under its current leadership should not have access to technology Brazil, Japan and South Korea have access to.
You reaffirm this saying supplier states do not have to do anything stupid, like stupidly implementing a treaty they negotiated apparently in bad faith and then ratified.
I don’t believe or I don’t care that this position is discriminatory.
You skip over this, but by doing so you indicate that you agree with it.
Conveniently for my position, Iran has not verified that there are no undeclared materials that should have been reported (even though the instrument that clearly requires this is not in force over Iran, and many other countries in this situation are ignored)
Iran has tied its further cooperation beyond the letter of its CSA to its being treated non-discriminatorily. I consider that a reasonable tie, I guess you do not.
so now the US gets to use the Security Council to advance a policy the I would want to pursue anyway.
Using the Security Council to enforce the discriminatory and contrary to NPT position that Iran must not be nuclear capable is a pretty extreme abuse of the Council. I guess you disagree.
I’ll directly answer this question:
Are you suggesting that States that have violated their NPT and IAEA safeguards obligations ought not to be treated differently that States in good standing w.r.t. the Secretariat’s safeguarding and verification activities?
I am suggesting that Iran should be treated as Romania, Brazil, South Korea and Taiwan are. Previous violations do not put states into a category (that according to the US, Iran has been in since its revolution, long before any violations) that they cannot be nuclear capable.
If that is accepted, Iran should, and has indicated that it will, go beyond its reporting requirements to answer any unresolved questions about its nuclear programs.
Until that is accepted, Iran is in the same state as most other nations: All material that is known to exist that should have been declared, whether declared at the time or not, is known and certified not to have been diverted to any military program.
The voluntary instrument that allows the IAEA, after some time, to certify that it has reached a level of confidence that there are no unknown materials or activities has not been ratified by Iran and is not in force. Iran’s refusal to act otherwise and to even go beyond the AP is not malfeasance, obstructionism, immoral, illegal or a violation of the NPT.
— arnold evans · May 20, 08:36 AM ·
Good God, Arnold, I’m glad that you appear to have conceded, however implicitly, the claims about the responsibilities of the IAEA that emanate from the model comprehensive safeguard agreements CSAs—e.g., safeguarding nuclear materials, and the nexus of activities, facilities and locations-outside-facilities (LOFs) connected to such materials, whether declared or undeclared.
Writing out what you should have been able to read and infer for yourself w.r.t. the CSAs and additional protocol (AP), while fun, was frankly exhausting. That is the reason, and the only reason, why I glossed refuting your claim about discrimination against Iran, and briefly stated my position.
To address the specific language, which you oh-so-cleverly are trying to force feed into my mouth.
> I believe Iran, under its current leadership should
> not have access to technology Brazil, Japan and South
> Korea have access to.
I believe that States, which have failed to take actions as required by their CSAs; which have concealed nuclear materials and related activities, facilities and LOFs related to such materials from the IAEA Secretariat; which the IAEA Secretariat views as having failed to cooperate fully, especially in light of a history of concealment; and which the IAEA Board of Governors (BoG) has found to be in noncompliance with Article III of the NPT and IAEA CSAs—such States should be treated differently than other States in good standing, and can and should be denied sensitive nuclear technologies by supplier States, and be required to suspend the acquisition or use of such technologies by the IAEA BoG or UN Security Council, until such States have taken, without delay, actions that: “the Board, upon report of the Director General, decides that an action [or actions] by the State is essential and urgent in order to ensure verification that nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices” or purposes unknown” (INFCIRC/153, para. 18).
Iran, which failed to take make required declarations related to nuclear materials, activities, facilities and LOFs; which concealed such things for nearly two decades; which the IAEA Secretariat views as having failed to cooperate fully and transparently, especially in light of its history of concealment; and which the BoG found to be in noncompliance—is such as State.
> Conveniently for my position, Iran has not verified
> that there are no undeclared materials that should
> have been reported (even though the instrument that
> clearly requires this is not in force over Iran, and
> many other countries in this situation are ignored)
> so now the US gets to use the Security Council to
> advance a policy the I would want to pursue anyway.”
Crucial to my position, the IAEA remains unable to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials, and related activities, facilities and LOFs, in Iran, a State which is in noncompliance with Article III of the NPT, and its CSA with the Agency.
Equally crucial to my position, the IAEA DG reports on Iran—as Messrs. Pierre Goldschmidt (former IAEA D-DG) and George Perkovich have reminded us—provide evidence suggesting that Iran has not fulfilled its undertakings not only under Article III, but also under Article II of the NPT. In particular, the DG Reports have stated, inter alia:
* “Iran was in possession of a document, provided by intermediaries, describing the procedures for the casting of enriched and depleted uranium metal into hemispheres related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon components” (GOV/2006/15, para. 20).
* “Since 2004, the Agency has been awaiting additional information and clarifications related to efforts made by the Physics Research Center (PHRC), which had been established at Lavisan-Shian [to “support and provide scientific advice and services to the Ministry of Defence,” according to the same IAEA DG report], to acquire dual use material and equipment that could be used in uranium enrichment and conversion activities” (GOV/2006/15, para. 33)
* In February 2006, the IAEA DG Report discussed alleged studies related to “high explosive testing and to the design of a missile re-entry vehicle, all of which could have a military nuclear dimension…” (GOV/2006/27, para. 27).
In light of these and other facts and circumstances, IAEA DG ElBaradei has reported several times, “The Agency is not at this point in time in a position to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran …. because of the inadequacy of information available on its centrifuge enrichment programme, the existence of a generic document related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon components, and the lack of clarification about the role of the military in Iran’s nuclear programme, including, as mentioned above, about recent information available to the Agency concerning alleged weapon studies that could involve nuclear material” (GOV/2006/15, para. 53).
These and other facts and circumstances differentiate Iran from States that have and have not signed the AP, but are in good standing; or from States that are not completely in good standing, but have signed the AP, and thus fully provided the IAEA Secretariat with the ability to carry out its responsibilities w.r.t. the verification of the absence of undeclared nuclear materials, and related activities, facilities and LOFs. For such a noncompliant State, different treatment, such as unilateral and multilateral efforts to deny Iran sensitive nuclear technologies, is not discriminatory, bujt rather is merited because—given Iran’s history of concealment, given other information in IAEA DG Reports alleging a lack of Iran’s fulfillment of Article II, given Iran’s obstructive noncooperation with the IAEA Secretariat, and given Iran’s unwillingness to sign the AP—the existence of such undeclared materials, and related activities, facilities and LOFs, would constitute, by definition, diversion of such things from peaceful uses at least to “purposes unknown” (once again), if not also to “nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices” (INFCIRC/153, para. 19).
Finally, I think that the failure of Arnold to carefully read the model CSA, the AP, and the IAEA DG’s reports; his consequent inability to verify the difference between Iran’s noncompliant actions (some of which are potentially violative of Article II), and those of other States in good standing, or have taken clear steps to put them in better standing; and his sophist attempts to cram words into my mouth—classify him under the category of “ajor-may ouchebag-day.”
— Anon · May 20, 12:01 PM ·
Hey, Anon. Take a break from baiting Arnold and Hass and send me note.
— Jeffrey Lewis · May 20, 01:51 PM ·
I started a response. There was nothing in it that is not in my previous comments so I’ve deleted it. Consider my comment at 8:36am a response to anon’s comment at 12:01pm.
— Arnold Evans · May 20, 03:42 PM ·