Russian officials have again questioned the future of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty or just INF. In March 2005, Jeffrey blogged about a feeler from Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov to then-SECDEF Rumsfeld about possible Russian withdrawal from the INF Treaty. The details of the exchange are not clear, but Jeffrey pointed to reporting in Russian press speculating that Rumsfeld may have initiatied that conversation.

Now, in his speech to the Munich Conference on Security Policy, Vladimir Putin publicly suggested reconsidering INF:

In connection with this I would like to recall that in the 1980s the USSR and the United States signed an agreement on destroying a whole range of small- and medium-range missiles but these documents do not have a universal character.

Today many other countries have these missiles, including the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, India, Iran, Pakistan and Israel. Many countries are working on these systems and plan to incorporate them as part of their weapons arsenals. And only the United States and Russia bear the responsibility to not create such weapons systems.

It is obvious that in these conditions we must think about ensuring our own security.

Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, speaking on the sidelines of the Munich conference, also raised the issues of countries “near our borders” with “such missiles” including China (which Putin omitted) and stating that “only two countries don’t have the right to have them – Russia and the United States … That cannot go on forever.”

Asked specifically about INF, Ivanov said, “I meant what I said. The treaty is simply a cold war vestige and we are concerned.”

A few days earlier, Ivanov made similar comments, telling Duma deputies in Moscow that signing INF was “the gravest mistake.”

While these statements do not express a direct linkage, Russian officials seem to raise objections to INF at the same time they voice strong opposition to US plans to deploy missile defense interceptors and radars in Eastern Europe.

Nikolai Sokov wonders in WMD Insights whether Ivanov and other genuinely favor withdrawal or are “simply using it as a bargaining chip vis-à-vis the United States and NATO to gain concessions on other issues” such as missile defense deployments.

Sentiments in favor of withdrawal from INF have been building within the Russian military establishment and, more importantly, expressed in public comments by Ivanov and other high level officials—mostly in March 2005 and summer/fall 2006. (Ivanov may have mentioned INF withdrawal as early as in Fall 2004, see page 7.)

I am not sure what to think about what seems like an elevation of the INF withdrawal discussion to a higher level. Is Russia emphasizing it now as an example of an “asymmetric” response to US missile defense plans? Or have they moved closer to an actual plan for withdrawal? Right now I am leaning towards the former.

While Russia may indeed be considering INF withdrawal, highlighting it in this context relects political posturing. At the same time as attacking the US for behaving like a sole superower, Putin brings up the INF, a treaty where Russia has equal superower status to the US. It is a convenient way to remind that Russia is the only state which can equal the US in the nuclear arena. Putin and Ivanov may also be suggesting that US plans which do not take Russia’s concerns into account, or where Russia is not consulted as they feel it should be (namely, on the missile defense deployments), can be met with a similar unilateral attitude on the Russian side.