Chinese ASAT Likely Made Massive Debris
posted Thursday January 18, 2007 under china, outer-space by jeffreyAviation Week now has the story—with pretty much the same details that I’ve been hearing. FY-1C was struck by a direct ascent ASAT launched from Xichang Space Center at 5:28 p.m. EST on January 11. The satellite was approximately 850 km in altitude and 4 deg. west of the Xichang Satellite Launch Center.
The NSC has confirmed the test:
“The U.S. believes China’s development and testing of such weapons is inconsistent with the spirit of cooperation that both countries aspire to in the civil space area,’’ National Security Council spokesman Gordon Johndroe said. “We and other countries have expressed our concern regarding this action to the Chinese.”
Using a ground-based medium-range ballistic missile, the test knocked out an aging Chinese weather satellite about 537 miles above the earth on January 11 through “kinetic impact,” or by slamming into it, Johndroe said.
Aviation Week has also confirmed that “intelligence agencies had been expecting some sort of test that day” which is totally evident from the number and dates of the observations in the SPACETRACK catalog.
The catalog also shows that the Chinese have made a god awful mess—we now have 40 pieces of debris (lettered E-AM) with more no doubt likely to appear. David Wright has a comment on the previous post that observes:
My colleague Wang Ting and I have been writing a paper on debris production by kinetic-energy ASATs. If this satellite in fact was destroyed by colliding with another object at high speed, here is what you would expect, based on the NASA breakup model and Wang Ting’s calculations of orbital lifetimes.
The FY-1C satellite appears to be 750 kg and was orbiting at about 850 km in a sun-synchronous orbit. According to the NASA model, if the satellite collided at orbital speed with an object having a mass of more than about 1 kg, that collision would completely fragment the satellite into debris particles. This breakup would lead to nearly 800 debris fragments of size 10 cm or larger, nearly 40,000 debris fragments with size between 1 and 10 cm, and roughly 2 million fragments of size 1 mm or larger. Roughly half of the debris fragments with size 1 cm or larger would stay in orbit for more than a decade.
In case you are wondering, KE ASAT program officers in the US have estimated that they conduct an on-orbit demonstration for about $60 million (an amount that would cover two flight-test vehicles and one spare). [see: Kerry Gildea, “Possible Funding Boost In FY ’04 Budget Could Lead To KE-ASAT Flight Test,” Defense Daily 216 (Dec. 17, 2002).]
Of course, we canceled that program for reasons that are all too obvious at this point: A hit-to-kill ASAT creates all kinds of debris that might threaten to make collateral damage of our own satellites—something that then-Commander of Space Command, General Ralph Eberhart explained in 2001:
If the United States starts “blowing up things in space” the collateral damage may be too high, Eberhart said at a Defense Writers Group breakfast. For example, while trying to take out an enemy satellite capability, a KE-ASAT could inflict damage on U.S. satellites or other commercial satellites, he explained.
Also, Eberhart said he would rather employ satellite disruption tactics that are “temporary and reversible as opposed to blowing it up.”
[Kerry Gildea, “Space Command Chief Questions Value of KE-ASAT,” Defense Daily, 29 March, 2001.]
This raises an interesting public policy question because we are so much more dependent on commercial and military satellites that the ASAT options available to us are much more complicated than those available to the Chinese. This is a race that favors them, unfortunately.
I should close by noting that I don’t believe the Chinese ASAT program can, legitimately, be depicted as a response to US capabilities—and there is no excuse for creating so much debris in orbit. As Theresa Hitchens, Michael Katz-Hyman and I argued in “U.S. Space Weapons: Big Intentions, Little Focus,” US ASAT programs have been mostly talk:
From analyzing current Pentagon budget documentation, we conclude that, for the moment, support for “space superiority” and “space control” systems remains largely rhetorical with little actual udgetary support. The Bush administration has expressed interest in these new military missions in outer space…. However, this interest has not yet been reflected in budget requests.
[snip]
The Pentagon is not at least in the unclassified budget actively developing capabilities, such as new ground- or air-launched ASATs, that might be seen in a relatively short time.
Of course, that rhetoric, often phrased as “keeping our options open,” had an opportunity cost in terms of forgoing the opportunity to negotiate verifiable restrictions on anti-satellite testing—an opportunity that now seems closed for the forseeable future.
Noah Shachtman at DefenseTech has a post arguing that current options to prevent an ASAT attack are not likely to protect US satellite capabilities.
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— Jeffrey Lewis · Jan 18, 02:17 PM ·
I don’t see how China’s pursuit of a messy ASAT option that we spurned favors them.
Won’t they encounter the same problems our ASAT geeks predicted in the long term? Testing may not have an immediate impact on their smaller space capability, but won’t it hobble their plans to expand satellite constellations above the Middle Kingdom?
— Robot Economist · Jan 18, 03:44 PM ·
Jeffrey: any idea what strategic value this has for China? If they plan to use these with any regularity, won’t it threaten their own burgeoning space program (satellites for third world nations, man on the moon, etc.)? And in a major conflict, how many US satellites would they have to destroy to seriously hamper the US?
— davesgonechina · Jan 18, 03:59 PM ·
A much better article (as opposed to the AP report in the NY Times) is now up on the Washington Post website:
Chinese Satellite Test Draws Sharp Protest From Other Nations
By Marc Kaufman and Dafna Linzer
Washington Post Staff Writers
Thursday, January 18, 2007; 2:46 PM
The Chinese military used a ground-based missile to hit and destroy one of its aging satellites orbiting more than 500 miles in space last week, an apparent test of anti-satellite technology that raised concerns about a possible arms race in space and drew sharp protests from other space-faring nations.
The satellite-destroying test is believed to be the first of its kind in two decades by any nation, and experts say it dramatically illustrates Chinese capabilities in space and their willingness to face the certainty of broad international criticism.
“The U.S. believes China’s development and testing of such weapons is inconsistent with the spirit of cooperation that both countries aspire to in the civil space area,” National Security Council spokesman Gordon Johndroe said today. “We and other countries have expressed our concern regarding this action to the Chinese.”
In addition to introducing a renewed military dimension to space, the destruction of the Chinese satellite created a large “debris cloud” that can seriously damage other satellites in nearby orbit, and possibly even spaceships passing through the region on their way to the moon or beyond.
Analysts said that based on computer models, as many as 300,000 pieces of debris may have been created with the explosion. While many will be very small, they said, hundreds will be large enough to create potentially serious problems.
Both the United States and the former Soviet Union tested anti-satellite technology in the 1980s, and the United States shot down one of its orbiting satellites in 1985. Partially as a result of the debris problem, both sides stopped the practice.
The Chinese test, which was first reported online by the magazine Aviation Week and Space Technology, comes at a time of heightened tensions between the United States and China regarding space. China is leading an effort in the United Nations to set up an international conference that would address what many consider to be an imminent space arms race. The United States, however, has been the one space-faring nation to oppose the idea, arguing that it wasn’t needed because there is no arms race in space.
The Bush Administration also released a National Space Policy last fall that strongly asserted an American right to defend itself in space against any actions it considered hostile.
The United States military is especially dependent on space-based satellites for navigation, communications and missile guidance, while the American economy could also be broadly damaged by any disruptions of communications, weather and other satellites. Some in the administration believe this has made the nation especially vulnerable to attack, and has led them to propose efforts to develop ways to defend satellites in space.
The issue of possible hostilities in space became more real in August when National Reconnaissance Office Director Donald M. Kerr told reporters that a U.S. satellite had recently been “painted,” or illuminated, by a ground-based laser in China. The United States did not make any formal protest of that event, but it did today regarding the latest Chinese action.
Johndroe of the NSC said that the Chinese satellite was destroyed using a ground-based medium-range ballistic missile, which slammed into the object 537 miles above earth on Jan. 11. He said that Australia and Canada have already lodged protests as well, and that Britain, South Korea and Japan were expected to follow suit.
“In my view, the Chinese are sending a strong signal here,” said Jeffrey Kueter, president of the George C. Marshall Institute, a nonprofit space and defense think tank in Washington. “They’re saying they can hold our space-based, war-fighting capability at risk, and are putting into doubt our ability to challenge them. They’re a rising space competitor.”
Keuter said the test makes it essential for the United States to get more serious about developing technology to defend against satellite attacks.
Michael Krepon, president emeritus of the Henry L. Stimson Center, another non-profit involved with security issues in Washington, called the Chinese test a likely—and unfortunate—response to American space policies.
“The Chinese are telling the Pentagon that they don’t own space,” he said. “We can play this game, too, and we can play it dirtier than you.”
Krepon said the Chinese test “blows a hole through the Bush administration reasoning behind not talking to anybody about space arms control—that there is no space arms race. It looks like there is one at this point.”
Rep. Edward Markey (D-Mass.) said the Chinese action makes it essential that the administration begin negotiations to stop any possible space arms race.
“The Chinese anti-satellite test is terrible news for international stability and security, and could presage the dawn of a new arms race—this time in space,” Markey said. “American satellites are the soft underbelly of our national security, and it is urgent that President Bush move to guarantee their protection by initiating an international agreement to ban the development, testing, and deployment of space weapons and anti-satellite systems.”
— J · Jan 18, 04:17 PM ·
There is a much deeper message than just this one ASAT test.
The chinese defense establishment is working on a range of weapons systems and capabilities made possible by the rapidly growing economy, the opening / openess of their system to the world, and the relatively low cost of basic R&D, technicians, facilities, etc. mixed with the normal ambitions and motives inherent in any system.
The question is NOT whether they will develop capabilites that are potentially threatening and dangerous, but WHAT capabilities they will acquire.
For example, it is almost certain that they are working on DNA based bioweapons, genetically modified bugs / viruses, and other military applications of biotech.
The even bigger question is WHAT will be their intent once they have the ability to deploy?
In the case of nuclear weapons, they acquired the capability, built a small deterrent force, and have been content to sit on that even as that deterrent became vulnerable to both a nuclear as well as a conventional first strike.
Now that they have a rudimentary ASAT capability, does it mean they will go and field a range of ASATs? Maybe?
What credibility does the US have to protest the test when they themselves, (and the Soviets) both tested such weapons? Thirty years passed since these tests were first conducted—- both nations could have used this “window” to hammer out an international agreement to limit / ban / precisely this type of ASAT tests that risk polluting space for a range of civilian usages.
The history of arms control is replete with examples of controls being outrun by new technologies: The efforts to ban the crossbow only led to even more terrible firearms, the effort to limit battleships led to the development of more effective aircraft carriers, and the effort to ban nuclear / space based weapons is likely to lead to the same.
Perhaps it is time for the world security establishment to, for once, sit down and ask whether they should be talking arms control not about the present generation of weapons, but ones that are in the pipeline?
ASATs and biowarfare agents would probably be two great places to start talking to the Chinese.
Let’s call them on their responsibilities and obligations as a growing near superpower.
It is not that hard to do, when so many vital interest of the chinese (like not having their own satellites brought down by debris) can be engaged.
It is time to talk treaty.
— Smith · Jan 18, 07:32 PM ·
Before China conducted this active test, they undoubtedly conducted preliminary tests, such as firing the booster, testing the guidance system, etc. That is how the US tested its F-15 ASAT, with shots against empty space.
So China has had this program for some time, and it has been in development for some time. I have no good data on how long it takes them to develop new systems, but anecdotal data on their jet fighter and manned spaceflight programs indicate that they are slow at technology development.
If all of that is true, then they have had this weapons system in development for many years. That implies that their position at PARO was simply a ruse, or at least a propaganda ploy—pretend to be interested in a space weapons ban while secretly developing space weapons.
Given all of that, then what value is space arms control? There is no way to verify it until an active test is actually conducted, right?
— Dwayne Day · Jan 18, 10:01 PM ·
Dr. Jeffrey – I know you’re a public policy guy, but I have been trying to figure out the performance specs on this kill vehicle.
It travelled 500mi up and 250mi over, making a flight path of about 600mi. Doesn’t this mean we’re looking at a kill vehicle that would have to have a minimum effective surface-to-surface range of about 1200mi?
I only bring this up because I imagine the Chinese used one of their MRBMs/IRBMs as a technological base for their system. Do you think we’re looking at something based on the DF-21 or DF-3?
I wonder what will happen if it turns out one of these missiles was the kill vehicle. Will China start increasing its meager arsenal of DFs? They’d have to just to keep up with the testing pace suggested on DT.
— Robot Economist · Jan 18, 10:42 PM ·
Here’s a rather relevant paragraph from James Oberg’s article at MSNBC:
In 1985, the U.S. Air Force fired a kinetic kill vehicle against a retired military satellite called Solwind. The satellite disintegrated into a swarm of fragments, almost 300 of which were big enough to be tracked by ground radars. The last of them took 15 years to re-enter the atmosphere and burn up.
— CCTang · Jan 19, 12:19 AM ·
So, the Chinese moved the satelite in order to better line it up with the launch site, and MSNBC’s space analyst said:
“In fact, the reason the U.S. Air Force chose the air-launched anti-satellite system is that it does not have to have its target line up with a ground-based missile pad. Naturally, a real target in the real world would never make such a helpful maneuver.”
So, if this ground based test excluded the factor that had made ground based ASATs impracical, in what sense is this a strategically significant breakthrough? I understand that it indicates a very high level of Chinese technical capacity, but the basic rules of the game with regards to ground-launched ASATs (they don’t work because of allignment issues) seems to be still in place, to me. Again, that’s not to say that this is an insignificant event, but rather that its a novel event in the history of Chinese military capabilities but not in the history of ASATs. Can someone explain to me if I’m wrong about this?
— Max Postman · Jan 19, 03:55 AM ·
Hi –
One of the considerations that the Chinese may be using is simply to deny the use of the high ground to the US. The Chinese military, as we know, is far behind the US in using satellite-based information systems, while the US is increasingly dependent on them.
If you can degrade the US systems by creating large amounts of debris which either forces manouevering the assets out of danger paths (using up manouevering reserves) or slowly degrades these assets over time due to microimpacts to the point of uselessness, rather than attacking US assets directly, the Chinese may be trying to level the playing field in advance of doing something (gee, what might that be?) that the US would oppose.
Sounds almost exactly like the kind of thing that the Chinese military loves to do (small incremental instigations, each not actionable, but adding up to something that is actionable: where do you respond???).
Not good, not good at all. This looks more and more like a return to cold-war behavior.
— John F. Opie · Jan 19, 05:01 AM ·
Could the Chinese pursuing an ASAT method the United States abandoned because it creates too much debris and is more “dangerous” be an example of the United States imposing military constraints on itself that other countries will not abide by?
— Mike · Jan 19, 10:44 AM ·
There’s a good article on limitations an possible countermeasures here:
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/16694039/
This test adds some context to the reports of Chinese laser illuminating US satellites over the past couple of years. Widely reported as laser weapons, I think it’s at least as likely they’re part of a tracking system. As the article above indicates, precise orbit calculations are probably required for a ground-based intercept KE ASAT.
It would also be interesting to know if the ASAT used a unitary kill vehicle or possibly a pellet-based one. Perhaps one of the experts here could determine if it’s possible to tell based on the debris pattern. Obviously, a unitary kill vehicle would indicate the Chinese have developed a very precise terminal tracking system.
— Andy · Jan 19, 10:45 AM ·
Can we regard this program as the acquisition of a bargaining chip for a space arms control treaty (see under PAROS)?
China would like to see the U.S. restrict its missile defenses, since they tend to counteract the Chinese deterrent, under worst-case (Chinese) assumptions. The U.S. would like the Chinese to restrict their newly demonstrated anti-space capabilities.
Setting aside the Bush Administration’s ideological predisposition against treaties, isn’t there room for a deal here? Maybe negotiated by the next Administration?
— SQ · Jan 19, 11:14 AM ·
“but the basic rules of the game with regards to ground-launched ASATs (they don’t work because of allignment issues) seems to be still in place, to me.”
Your assumption is incorrect—it is not that ground-based systems “don’t work.” They work. It is that they are less ideal than air-launched systems in some cases.
Air-launched ASATs also have drawbacks too, such as limitations on the size of the rocket that can be carried by the aircraft.
It is worth noting that after the United States abandoned the F-15 ASAT, it began development of a ground-launched ASAT.
— Dwayne Day · Jan 19, 11:53 AM ·
Also, with regard to ground-based systems, the PRC one is currently guessed to be based on a mobile MRBM (DF-21a, maybe). And China has good east-west communications, which is the relevant direction when you’re trying to get close to the ground track of a target satellite. Not as fast or flexible as an air-launched system, but better than having to wait for the ground track to come to you, taking a crossing shot, or flying a dog-leg ascent trajectory.
— Allen Thomson · Jan 19, 01:02 PM ·
Allen,
If the weapon utilizes a mobile MRBM, that would certainly increase the system’s utility, but I wonder if any related sensors required for targeting or guidance are also mobile – or at least could they be made mobile? If so, then threat this system poses in any future conflict is significantly enhanced since it wouldn’t be tied to fixed installations which are easily destroyed.
— Andy · Jan 19, 02:11 PM ·
> If the weapon utilizes a mobile MRBM, that would certainly increase the system’s utility, but I wonder if any related sensors required for targeting or guidance are also mobile – or at least could they be made mobile?
The details depend on how the system (as a whole) actually works, but in general the sensors need for LEO satellites are pretty modest and could be made mobile if needed.
I’ll note that the whole subject of PRC space surveillance/ tracking capability is remarkably murky, even for fixed sensors.
— Allen Thomson · Jan 19, 02:35 PM ·
I don’t think the fact that the Chinese were developing space weapons while pushing for PAROS in the Conference on Disarmament is indicative of bad faith. Stopping the development of such weapons would certainly have been a very substantial gesture of good faith, but the bottom line is that arms control treaties exist (among other reasons) to allow countries to refrain from developing certain capabilities without suffering a comparative strategic disadvantage in the zero-sum game of global security. Its unfair to expect a country advocating a global arms control measure to unilaterally assume the treaty before advocating its enaction, ESPECIALLY in a situation like PAROS where the US has made it crystal clear that this administration will not even be allowing negotiations on the issue in the Conference on Disarmament.
— Max Postman · Jan 19, 04:06 PM ·
“ts unfair to expect a country advocating a global arms control measure to unilaterally assume the treaty before advocating its enaction, ESPECIALLY in a situation like PAROS where the US has made it crystal clear that this administration will not even be allowing negotiations on the issue in the Conference on Disarmament.”
While the first part of that statement is true, the problem is that there is a massive gulf between advocating a treaty and then making an unannounced and provocative test that would clearly be banned by it. It essentially renders the entire political position moot. Blows it out of the sky, so to speak.
If a country is seriously interested in such a treaty, then one would expect that prior to any test they would increase their rhetoric, and then announce a change in their position. Then test.
The sudden unannounced test makes the treaty position appear to be essentially a ruse, not genuine.
Your assumption that this is all in response to the United States seems to be part of a pattern I am seeing in the comments here of blaming the United States for the actions of a sovereign nation that it has very little ability to influence. Why make the United States out as the bad guys in this situation? The United States didn’t test an ASAT weapon here, and did not create a debris field.
— Dwayne Day · Jan 19, 09:30 PM ·
Think all orbital objects below 850 km are now technically at risk over an extended timeframe from the fixed base. Add mobile launchers, then most below 850 km are operationally at risk. Add future chinese Navy subs with modified SLBMs, then all assets below 850 km are probably operationally at risk from safe and distant launch points. Add in breakdowns in export controls and weapon proliferation. Add a Chinese KE warhead to an Iranian Shahab-4 or just sell them a Chinese sub properly equipped (the Iranians don’t seem to care about space to any reasonable degree) and the gloves come off for the US and Israel. The Chinese don’t want to directly lock horns with the US. It’s all about giving the US pause in the Pacific and on the East Asian continent to buy strategic time to become more powerful and influential internationally. To really cause trouble and strategic imbalance at our worst possible time, they’d probably be helping another nation (e.g.-Iran) who couldn’t care less about a realm that is utterly precious to the US, to employ such technology and level or tilt uphill the playing field for US expeditionary warfare.
— SD · Jan 19, 09:40 PM ·