Podcast: The INF and the Dismemberment of Ukraine

Aaron Stein 0:02

Hello and welcome to the Arms Control Wonk podcast. My name is Aaron Stein. I am a PhD candidate at King's College, an associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute in London, and a sometimes contributor to the Arms Control Wonk website.

Jeffrey Lewis 0:18

And I'm Jeffrey Lewis. I'm the founding publisher of armscontrolwonk.com. And my day job is the director of the East Asia Non-Proliferation Program at the Monterey Institute of International Studies.

Aaron 0:33

So today we're going to start with a question. And it's sort of a counterintuitive question. Now that Vladimir Putin has seized Crimea and appears to be in the process of dismembering Ukraine,

Jeffrey 0:47

Are alleged INF Treaty violations something that people should even be paying attention to? Does it really matter anymore? Yeah, and I think that's exactly the the the question to start with, because it it does seem like these are minor technical issues, but on the other hand, I think we're we're we're headed for a pretty rough time, and and suddenly Cold War questions like strategic stability and arms control are going to be relevant again.

And we're spending a lot of time now on European security, and it raises a lot of the same questions that led to the negotiation of the INF Treaty in the mid-1980s.

Aaron 1:31

Since the conclusion of the treaty, there's been constant talk about, at least on the U.S. side and on the Russian side, about violations. And the two issues that come up the most are with the missile, the RS-26, and this cruise missile that's been reported about, but not too much information has been released about it. So I think much of it's still – so the two issues obviously get confused a lot because of both the cruise missile aspect and the ballistic missile aspect and how those two systems work differently.

Jeffrey 2:07

Right. I think the way that I keep it straight is if you look at the angry letters that House Republicans sent to the president, they refer to a circumvention and a violation. And so I think of the two things, one as the circumvention and the other as the violation or alleged violation. And so the The circumvention is this new ICBM called the Roubaix, the RS-26, which I think is a two-stage version of one of their big ICBMs, the SS-27.

And it's a circumvention because of how they've tested it. We talk about that. And the violation is a cruise missile, which I think is intended to be deployed on the Iskander short-range missile system.

Aaron 3:05

Right. I mean... The RS-26 flight testing to ranges less than 5,500 kilometers, I think they flight tested it to something like 2,000 kilometers, if I'm remembering the range correctly, would suggest that it wasn't a violation of the treaty per se, but rather... Flight testing a missile to perform a mission which is against the spirit of the INF Treaty.

I mean, would you say that that's a correct interpretation?

Jeffrey 3:33

Yeah, I think that's right. Hence the phrase circumvention. You know, they've successfully tested the missile three times. The first time they tested it and it went over 5,500 kilometers. So officially it counts as an ICBM and it gets counted under the new START Treaty. But then what they did was the next two tests were over a much shorter range, about 2,000 kilometers, with a new combat payload, which was apparently more warheads.

And so it's a circumvention in the sense that with one test to the range of an ICBM, it counts as an ICBM, even if in real life with its real warheads, it won't travel nearly as far. And this actually—this was a problem with the INF Treaty in the 1980s. So the missile that we were worried about was something called the SS-20, and it was basically the first two stages of a larger ICBM, which was a three-stage missile.

So they just took off the top stage, put three warheads on it, and called it— An intermediate-range nuclear force because they didn't want it to count under the arms control treaties of the time, which only covered ICBMs. And so when we signed the INF Treaty, we were super worried that they would do this, that they would take an existing three-stage missile and just take off the top stage.

And the Russians have been really careful about talking about what the RS-26 is, but they've said it was built on the basis of something called the SS-27, which is a three-stage ICBM. And so my suspicion is, just like the SS-20, they've taken off the top stage, they're packing on a bunch of warheads, and even if it's officially a circumvention because of the way they've tested it, it's basically an analog for the missile that started all of the problems in the 1980s.

Aaron 5:35

I think this actually gets back to the issue of Ukraine and what's going on now. The missile, even though it's classified as an ICBM, the way in which they tested it, as I said earlier, would suggest that it has an intermediate role. But is it even useful in a Ukraine-type conflict? I mean, what I'm saying is that now with NATO having extended its borders so much since the end of the Cold War...

What purpose does this missile serve moving forward in the future and are there other systems that perhaps aren't as sexy or that aren't getting as much attention because they aren't part of this inf circumvention debate that could play a role moving forward in both arms control and perhaps perceptions and signaling with nuclear weapons that are already in europe u.s forward deployed nuclear weapons as well as russian tactical nuclear weapons and nuclear forces that are obviously deployed on their own territory

Jeffrey 6:30

Yeah, so the way I think about the problem is that, you know, in the 1980s, what we were worried about was the Soviets had missiles that could sit in the Soviet Union and target Western Europe. And so if they were to use those against, say, Paris or London... The U.S. would have to decide whether it wanted to directly attack the Soviet Union.

And so there was, I think, a fear among European states that if the Soviets were striking European targets from the Soviet Union but not attacking the U.S. homeland, that we wouldn't be willing to come to their defense. It was a decoupling argument.

Aaron 7:10

And this is a little bit different because, as you know, NATO has now moved so much closer

Jeffrey 7:17

To to Russia and and the Russians don't have any allies right there is no Warsaw Pact anymore so all of their forces start in Russia to begin with but what I worry about with a missile like this is that previously The Russians, unless they were going to use an ICBM, really would have had trouble holding at risk Western European capitals.

And so I think for the states that are close to Russia, like Poland or the Baltics or even Turkey, I think there was a sense that the... Willingness of NATO to come to their aid might be reduced if the Russians can sit back and then hold all of NATO at risk. So it does strike me that it raises some interesting questions about the credibility of our guarantees.

To the Baltics and Poland, particularly if they think that maybe suddenly the Belgians or the Dutch or even the Germans will get a little bit wobbly if the Russians have these kinds of forces.

Aaron 8:41

I would take it even a step further. I think we've seen as the debate about what to do about Russia, how are we, the West, going to respond to the annexation of Crimea and now the dismembering of the Ukrainian state, you've seen waffling amongst the European Union, of which many double as NATO members. So if you're in the Baltic states, I think the credibility of the alliance to do something militarily Now has eroded.

And I think it puts more pressure on the United States to fill that vacuum. And are we prepared to do that? I mean, is the Obama administration taking steps to reassure both the Baltic NATO states? And to what extent are the Europeans playing a part, if any, in that? I mean, how does that play moving forward?

Jeffrey 9:31

Yeah, I think that's exactly right. I mean, that is the context that causes me the most concern, which is we do have this real challenge of convincing the Poles and the Balts that the Germans and the French and the Dutch and the Belgians will be there for them. And I think we're struggling at the moment to make that case.

And the sudden deployment of forces that might... Might discourage Western European capitals from making good on their obligations is probably only going to make people in Warsaw a lot more nervous.

Aaron 10:14

An issue that I see coming and that I haven't seen tied to this debate is that the current weapons that are stored in Europe are undergoing this major life extension program. We can talk about how mismanaged that is in a different podcast, but There's a real threat that some of the, one of the five, who currently host nuclear weapons and the dual-capable aircraft, I'm thinking about Germany, may not have the aircraft used, needed to deliver them, the F-35, after 2022-ish.

So if the Russians can split NATO on this issue of Crimea and something as simple as sanctions, I mean, how will the Baltics read perhaps German unwillingness, I would say, to purchase the F-35 or for the United States to make the B61-12 carryable by the Eurofighter? You know what I'm saying? Like, how does this play out in the long-term future?

I mean, a lot of people are saying NATO is back. They have a new reason for being. I see a lot of problems moving forward, particularly with the empowered Russians.

Jeffrey 11:27

Right, so this is the classic NATO problem that led to INF. So as soon as the Russians started deploying the... The first thing the Germans said is, we want American intermediate-range nuclear forces deployed as a response. And so then as soon as we said, OK, the Germans said, whoa, wait, wait, well, we don't want to be the only country to take them, and there are political sensitivities, and, you know, there'll be riots.

And so suddenly, after having insisted that we take those steps... You know, the Germans went really wobbly. And so NATO ended up with this dual track decision where there was a plan to put in new intermediate range nuclear forces. But then also there was an arms control track, which I think originally was supposed to be the spoonful of sugar.

That helped European populations accept new nuclear weapons. And I think you see exactly the same thing now, which is the B61-12 life extension is horrifically expensive and kind of a mess. The Air Force, the United States Air Force, has no interest in making the F-35 nuclear capable. You know, we just saw the former chief of staff of the Air Force float a trial balloon about taking that money and putting it into a bomber instead.

European countries won't pay for the appropriate amount of security at the bases. And so we do have this interesting challenge, which is the Russians are building these forces to— But it would seem to me if we try to make the symmetric response of either increasing the role of those nuclear weapons or trying to put in replacements, we're actually likely to make...

The alliance, you know, go through this prolonged period that's like the 1980s that will actually exacerbate the differences and probably only further convince the Poles and the Baltics that Western Europe really isn't going to be there for them. So I, you know, I think it's. Those INF forces that the Russians are fooling around with, even if they aren't of tremendous military importance, do make this a huge political problem for NATO.

As somebody who likes NATO, that upsets me. As somebody who's interested in public policy, it's a really interesting problem.

Aaron 14:11

You're already seeing the calls to return to phase four, the phase-adaptive approach, if I remember correctly, deploying missile interceptors, recommitting to the plan to deploy missile interceptors in Poland as a way to blunt this threat. I think if you see the INF circumventions become a bigger deal, I mean, outside of our Milwaukee community and perhaps outside of the Republicans who make a big deal about it, Would that not double down on the argument that, yes, we need to return to the original intent of missile defense, which is to defend against Russian missiles?

And two, have we thought enough about this? How is Moscow going to view that outside of the normal talks about whether they affect strategic stability? But rather, how would Moscow view these as a threat, perhaps even as a first-strike weapon against command-and-control sites or Kremlin?

Jeffrey 15:09

Yeah, you know, one of the things I find fascinating is that NATO has been surprisingly reluctant to put forces in former Warsaw Pact states. And so the Russians screamed, for example, about when the U.S. was doing theater missile defense exercises in Poland. But the Poles were equally upset because if you look at the big high-resolution pictures – They didn't actually train with the actual missile defense interceptors.

And so the canisters all had empty stenciled on them. So, you know, at first the polls were like, hey, could we actually get some canisters that didn't say empty? Because it was really tremendously, they thought, embarrassing. And so I do think that... If as relations get worse and NATO collectively looks for ways to show that it's committed to the defense of its allies closest to Russia, a lot of those self-imposed restrictions are going to come off.

And then the flip side of that, which we talked about a little bit before, is this concern that the Russians have always expressed that You know, they look at missile defense interceptors in Poland and they don't see missile defense interceptors. They see INF Treaty circumventions. And it's impossible to convince them that those are going to be secretly armed with nuclear warheads and used to decapitate the Russian leadership, just like a Pershing 2 would have under the INF in the 1980s.

Aaron 16:58

Yeah, I mean, one thing, I lived in Turkey, for the listeners who don't know, for three and a half years. And the first time and only time I've been to Moscow, I flew through Ankara. And one thing I was struck by is that when you look out the window, you're over Crimea from Ankara in about 45 minutes.

It seems like it's on the other side of the world, but it's not. It's actually very close, just across the Black Sea, obviously. But I think one thing we need to reconcile is how quick these missile flight times will be. And Is the alliance prepared to at least try and do something about that? Maybe through deterrence with making the the weapons in Europe more usable? And is that even a smart idea? And how would Moscow perceive any move on the NATO front to strengthen and show more resolve to defend the Baltics, perhaps by Deploying more aircraft at air bases.

And how is Moscow viewing those moves? I mean, what we're seeing today. I mean, an F-16 can carry both a nuclear weapon or not. And how would Moscow know the difference moving forward?

Jeffrey 18:10

Well, the thing I find most interesting about that is the Russians often have this charming level of paranoia. And so there's a huge discussion about taking... Dual capable aircraft and forward deploying them in Poland and the Baltics in order to show the support of Western Europe for the allies closest to Russia. But The people who propose that idea say, well, the best part about this is we would be taking these aircraft that have nuclear weapons assigned to them and they would be leaving the nuclear weapons behind and going forward to do this conventional mission.

And it would show that we don't rely on nuclear weapons. But just knowing Russians, you know, I suspect they will immediately conclude that the nuclear weapons must have been secretly forward deployed along with the aircraft, because that's just the kind of thing that you hear when you talk to Russians who get worked up about security issues. And so there's all of this opportunity for miscommunication, misinterpretation in these areas that we just really, I don't think, have thought about in 25 years, and now it's made A hundred times worse because Moscow is so close to the edge of NATO.

And the Russian response is to rely on missiles in Kaliningrad, which is sort of in the middle now of NATO. So with such little warning and so little flight times and, you know, a good bit of Russian paranoia, it would seem to me things could go really, really wrong.

Aaron 19:58

Yeah, I mean, the scenario I talked about over on my own blog, Turkey Won't, was the Turkish decision in the mid-1990s to decertify their dual-capable aircraft and to actually have nuclear weapons at Incirlik Air Force Base, but not to have the dual-capable aircraft needed to deliver them actually deployed on base. In a crisis, or in a very slow-moving crisis, and I would actually call Ukraine slow-moving.

I mean, the dismembering of the country is taking place over a month now, and it's matching up pretty closely with what we know about the expected time in which these weapons in Europe could actually be used. I don't think they'll actually ever be used, but in the event of a slow-moving crisis in a NATO country, like Poland or one of the other Baltics, Actions NATO takes to reassure and perhaps signal that it's willing to escalate to the nuclear threshold, simply to reassure the Baltic allies who are more favorable to nuclear weapons than the Western European allies, trigger a response on the escalatory ladder on the Russian side that we aren't planning for, or we aren't even thinking about.

So the option will be to reassure the Baltics, Moscow interprets it in a different way, and all of a sudden we have a crisis Weapons that are never intended to be used at all.

Jeffrey 21:22

Yeah, it's one of the reasons I'm not crazy about conversations about signaling, right? Because signaling assumes that you have a vocabulary that both sides understand and both sides agree on. And what's so interesting to me about this crisis is, you know, the Russian propaganda about Ukraine is just ridiculous. And yet there seems to be some evidence that That Putin believes some portion of it, right?

There was a report that Merkel had found Putin in a phone call detached from reality. And I think George Bush made a comment about this a little bit when he was talking about how Putin seemed to always see relations with the Was trying to disabuse him of that notion. And so if you start from the premise that Putin has a particular worldview that interprets Western actions in a sort of conspiratorial or dark light, It helps both explain the enthusiasm for circumventing the INF Treaty, but then raises all of these questions about whether they would interpret signals correctly.

One of my favorite examples of this, which has nothing to do with Putin, but is just too good not to share, is to read Saddam Hussein's Discussions with his advisors about the United States and nuclear weapons and American motives is to be treated to an exercise in insanity, and and it's clear that he was misinterpreting all kinds of signals because he was just coming at it from this totally crazy place. Yeah, no, as somebody who lived in the Middle East for three and a half years, or

Aaron 23:24

The level of conspiracy theory that goes around amongst people who should not believe in those types of conspiracy theories is stunning and slightly frightening, especially when thinking about nuclear weapons issues. But I think it speaks to a larger point, is are we back in a type of Cold War enmity where we have to start thinking about this?

And where is this going? I think it's the million-dollar question that nobody has any idea of, maybe not even Putin himself.

Jeffrey 23:53

Yeah, I mean, my suspicion is it's pretty bad. I wrote a column for Foreign Policy a couple of months ago as the Russians were shutting down the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. And, you know, at the time, I was making the point that... That program was premised on the idea that we had a cooperative relationship and that we were working together.

And my sense was that the Russians had moved to a different spot, that the Russians saw it as spying and that they were going to modernize their forces and that they saw their relationship with the West as being essentially... And it just seems to me that that process has mirrored the dismantlement of democratic institutions in Russia. And so the more that Putin has...

Marginalized any opposition voices, and begun to rely on the most regressive of elements in society for his support, I think the more threatened he is going to feel by his neighbors and the worse he is going to act. And so... The more frightened of him they're going to be, and so the more threatened he is going to feel.

And it just seems to me that it's this really ugly, vicious cycle that we are, I fear, stuck in as long as Vladimir Putin is drawing breath.

Aaron 25:38

Yeah, I just don't see a way out. Even if he wanted to de-escalate, I don't think he wants to do that at all. There is no pathway for him to do it. And there's only a pathway for escalation or maintenance of the status quo, and both either lock in the tensions we have now or make them worse.

And I think the argument of NATO expansion I think adds a layer of complexity to this that was not present up until 1991. The proximity of the two sides is very close. And I think it adds a whole other layer that makes the relationship even more complicated.

Jeffrey 26:21

Well, this is a pretty depressing first podcast.

Aaron 26:23

Yeah, I know. Well, we survived the first Cold War. I'm assuming we could do so again, even if it's not quite as bad. But perhaps we should leave it there and pick up on a different topic next week.

Jeffrey 26:38

Yeah. Hey, it was great talking to you, Aaron.

Aaron 26:40

Great talking to you, and have a good day.

Jeffrey 26:41

Okay, bye.