The Stimson Center will release an edited volume in September comparing and contrasting deterrence against nuclear and space warfare. Here’s a preview.
Nuclear deterrence and space deterrence have common elements as well as distinct differences. No difference is more striking than the visibility of deterrence capabilities in one domain and its lack of visibility in the other.
The advent of nuclear weapons was advertised with spectacular effect. The mushroom cloud instantly became the symbol of the “atomic age.” Ever since, nuclear deterrence was widely presumed to be strengthened by visible displays. Tests of warhead designs came with exclamation points when carried out in the atmosphere, and continued to leave a distinct impression once driven underground. Missile flight tests repeatedly affirmed vigilance and readiness. Some states still parade nuclear-capable missiles on national holidays.
In contrast, capabilities to harm space assets have been tested only occasionally in dramatic ways and have mostly been pursued quietly or by indirect methods. Consequently, space warfare capabilities rarely make headlines, unlike actions signaling nuclear deterrence, which are the subject of intense public and media attention.
While nuclear deterrence rests on deployed or readily deployed capabilities, the weaponization of space – defined here as the placement of dedicated war-fighting capabilities in this domain – has yet to occur. The nuclear superpowers deployed nuclear weapon delivery vehicles carrying thousands of warheads, many ready for launch on short notice. In stark contrast, US and Soviet military capabilities specifically designed to harm satellites were rarely deployed, had limited operational utility, and were subsequently mothballed. Anti-satellite tests during the Cold War were surprisingly rare phenomena.
There were, to be sure, years of heightened military friction and competition is space, especially in the 1970s, prompted by Soviet ASAT tests, and in the 1980s, after President Ronald Reagan announced his Strategic Defense Initiative. These brief periods of intensified competition did not result in arms races in space and ended with whimpers, not bangs. Both superpowers were extremely careful not to cross each other’s red lines in space, no less than on the ground and at sea. Just as Washington and Moscow learned not to play with fire in particularly sensitive zones after the Berlin and Cuban missile crises, so, too, they reached tacit and diplomatic agreements not to create havoc with satellites.
Why was demonstrable deterrence deemed to be crucial for nuclear capabilities, while inferential deterrence sufficed for space? One reason was that missile systems designed for one domain could be adapted for use in the other. Over time, reassurance found a place alongside deterrence to keep the Cold War from becoming hot. The nuclear superpowers figured out how to cooperate as well as compete in both domains.
The United States and China now find themselves in an intensified competition over the military use of space, punctuated by tests explicitly demonstrating ASAT capabilities during the George W. Bush administration. Will this competition continue unabated, or will the Cold War track record of surprising restraint and inferential deterrence be extended?
Success in the past was based on a mutual recognition that attacks on satellites invited uncontrolled escalation and horrific consequences. Inferential deterrence was also reinforced by language protective of satellites embedded in diplomatic accords. Military planning and doctrine will continue to be offensively-minded: that’s what major powers do. Will cooler heads continue to prevail between Washington and Beijing, as they did between Washington and Moscow?
The linkages between nuclear capabilities and space assets haven’t ended with the Cold War. Can a formula for success built around inferential deterrence and reassurance, which has belied worst-case projections, be replicated?