The thirtieth anniversary of President Ronald Reagan’s surprise roll-out of the Strategic Defense Initiative has been duly noted within narrow circles. The section of my shoe box files devoted to SDI is thick and inviting. The 4 X 6 card at the front end is a note to self: “The national security of the United States is far too important to rest on the strength of rhetorical questions.” The rhetorical question that launched SDI was a beaut: “Wouldn’t it be better to save lives than to avenge them?” Never underestimate the power of this device to frame a political issue advantageously.
A great deal of money, angst, and upset followed. This debate had its surreal moments, and yet SDI prompted pragmatic, exceptional results – not in space, but at the negotiating table. Here’s a small sampler from my file cards:
“We won’t put this weapon – or this system in place, this defensive system, until we do away with our nuclear missiles, our offensive missiles. But we will make it available to other countries, including the Soviet Union, to do the same thing.” — From the text of President Reagan’s interview with Soviet journalists, Washington Post, November 5, 1985.
“I think this could be the greatest inducement to arms reduction. It’s the only weapons system that’s ever been invented for which there has never been a defensive weapon created.” – Reagan’s interview on election night with Lou Cannon, Washington Post, November 7, 1984.
“Applications of current technology offer no real promise of being able to defend the United States against massive nuclear attack in this century.” – Report of the President’s Commission on Strategic Forces (Scowcroft Commission), April 1983.
“I say this with confidence, since it is irresponsible to bluff in such matters. There will be a reply to SDI. An asymmetrical reply, but there will be a reply. And we shall not sacrifice much at that.” — Mikhail Gorbachev, after the Reykjavik summit, October 14, 1986.
“The end is unattainable, the means hare-brained, and the cost staggering.” – McGeorge Bundy, George Kennan, Robert McNamara and Gerard Smith, borrowing from Arthur Vandenberg, in “The President’s Choice: Star Wars or Arms Control?” Foreign Affairs, Winter 1984-5.
“The Star Wars proposal was, however, another of those uncalculated ventures in personal diplomacy. Without any preparation, indeed without any realization, it attacked the prior foundation of the basic arms relationship. Our allies suddenly learned that deterrence, on which security had rested, was to be replaced. Britain and France learned that their independent nuclear forces, into which they had poured a considerable portion of the national treasure, were to be rendered obsolete. We were all to learn rather suddenly that deterrence was ‘immoral’ and flawed.’ Such phrases seemed to have been borrowed from the Catholic bishops. While there may be considerable satisfaction in dishing the left by stealing its clothes, it hardly seems necessary to undermine the foundation on which Western security must rest for the foreseeable future.” – James Schlesinger, “The Eagle and the Bear,” Foreign Affairs, Summer 1985.
Ronald Reagan’s rhetorical question kick-started a careening roller coaster ride that ended safely. The impulse provided by SDI helped produce historic arms reduction treaties with Moscow, but only after missile defenses were effectively grounded by political, technical and cost constraints. As long as technology continues to disappoint, missile defenses will remain a costly insurance policy against rudimentary threats, as well as a device for alliance management and reassurance.