Admiral Mike Mullen, the outgoing Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, spoke plainly about Pakistan’s military and intelligence services during his last appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee on September 22nd. Here is what he said:
The fact remains that the Quetta Shura and the Haqqani Network operate from Pakistan with impunity. Extremist organizations serving as proxies of the government of Pakistan are attacking Afghan troops and civilians as well as U.S. soldiers. For example, we believe the Haqqani Network—which has long enjoyed the support and protection of the Pakistani government and is, in many ways, a strategic arm of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Agency—is responsible for the September 13th attacks against the U.S. Embassy in Kabul. There is ample evidence confirming that the Haqqanis were behind the June 28th attack against the Inter-Continental Hotel in Kabul and the September 10th truck bomb attack that killed five Afghans and injured another 96 individuals, 77 of whom were U.S. soldiers. History teaches us that it is difficult to defeat an insurgency when fighters enjoy a sanctuary outside national boundaries, and we are seeing this again today. The Quetta Shura and the Haqqani Network are hampering efforts to improve security in Afghanistan, spoiling possibilities for broader reconciliation, and frustrating U.S.-Pakistan relations. The actions by the Pakistani government to support them—actively and passively—represent a growing problem that is undermining U.S. interests and may violate international norms, potentially warranting sanction. In supporting these groups, the government of Pakistan, particularly the Pakistani Army, continues to jeopardize Pakistan’s opportunity to be a respected and prosperous nation with genuine regional and international influence.
When Mullen, the foremost U.S. defender of trying to maintain sound working ties with Pakistan’s military, pretty much throws in the towel, the downward trend in bilateral relations is likely to accelerate. By publicly confirming and not qualifying reality, Mullen has changed the rules of the game, while laying the predicate for actions that will further inflame anti-U.S. sentiment within Pakistan by embarrassing Pakistan’s military hierarchy. The prosecution of the U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan will then become much harder, and whatever residual support Pakistan provides to the United States on other issues will be placed at risk.
Both countries are well past the stage of doing favors for each other; cooperation is limited to common interests. After 9/11, the Bush administration issued an ultimatum for Pakistan’s military establishment to cut ties with the Taliban and help the United States crush al-Qaeda. General Pervez Musharraf did so in qualified ways. Pakistan’s military was paid for its support and its self-interested sacrifices, but each party became disillusioned with this compact. Rawalpindi’s contributions in the “war on terror” remain highly selective, and the benefits provided by Washington have come with insults to Pakistani sovereignty and contention over the Taliban’s role in Afghanistan’s future. Disputes now loom larger than common interests.
In 2009, there was talk of moving beyond this transactional relationship with the passage of the Kerry-Lugar-Berman legislation, but these hopes have been unfulfilled. Not much aid has made it through the pipeline because of bureaucratic obstacles and concerns over corruption and the misdirection of U.S. financial assistance. Differences in U.S. and Pakistani policies have also grown as Washington’s relations with New Delhi have improved. Only Pakistan opposes the start of negotiations to end the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. Rawalpindi has also pursued policies toward Afghanistan and India that have increased its international isolation. The Obama administration has apparently concluded that its has not been able to influence Rawalpindi’s unfortunate choices.
As usual, Ayaz Amir hit the nail on the head in his September 23rd column in The News:
When the Americans leave, the mental decision to leave having already been taken, Afghanistan will erupt once more into civil war. This is the writing on the wall, the message emblazoned across the skies. All the more reason for Pakistan’s strategic geniuses to avoid the temptation, irresistible as it may be, to take sides in that civil war. Who comes out on top, the Taliban or warriors from Mars, should be none of our business.
The theory of strategic assets for the future thus becomes irrelevant. We paid a heavy penalty for this theory in the past. We can’t be repeating the same mistakes. Our old assets were the likes of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. What good did they do us? Our new assets, even though our denials are vociferous, are the likes of Sirajuddin Haqqani and his so-called network. What are we expecting of them? That they will deliver Afghanistan to the ISI’s safekeeping? Is this grand strategy or the repetition of grand folly?
Alas, the repetition of grand folly in this part of the world is a hard habit to break. Rawalpindi’s share of costly misjudgments exceeds those of Washington and New Delhi. The growth of its nuclear arsenal is accompanied by disinterest in improving ties with India, a prerequisite if Pakistan is to become a normal nation. Rawalpindi’s Afghan policy repeats mistakes of the 1990s, perhaps based on the assumption that the Pentagon and the U.S. intelligence community will continue to prevent another divorce – but both of these stores are now under new management. Alternatively, the boldness of recent strikes in Afghanistan by Rawalpindi’s partners may reflect the calculation that the relationship with Washington has been broken beyond repair, and besides, most U.S. forces will be leaving the region. For whatever reason, Pakistan’s security establishment is acting in a way that suggests that its influence within Afghanistan matters more than its relations with the United States.
Admiral Mullen advised his listeners on Capitol Hill not to disengage from Pakistan, but rather to “reframe” the relationship to buttress civil authority and to expect far less from military leaders. This was the sentiment behind Kerry-Lugar-Berman – one well worth pursuing, but which has not yet had much success. Pakistan’s military leaders will not cede or share authority over national security easily, especially with respect to Afghanistan, India and nuclear weapons.
Unless Rawalpindi changes course, Pakistan may find itself reframed from a major non-NATO ally to a state sponsor of terrorism. Then the architects of policies that have diminished Pakistan’s security and international standing will again blame the United States for exiting the relationship after misusing it.