I’ve been asked to try to express the significance of the Sejil launch. At first, I was given a choice for what was the most significant aspect, from a technical point of view:
-The staging?
-The fact that it was a solid propellant missile?
-A reportedly new guidance system?
All of those are, of course, very important. But I wanted to give a slightly different twist to them. In my opinion, the two most important technical “advances” represented by the Sejil are not readily apparent on the launch pad. Or perhaps I should say they are hiding in plain sight:
1) The launch of Sejil confirms, if we needed confirmation, that Iran has two major missile development groups; one a liquid propellant group and this one, a major solid propellant developmental group. Certainly these efforts share many assets and resources but they also require their own specialties. Iran has had a very active solid propellant unguided rocket program (think the Zelzal family of rockets) but the Sejil represents their debut, if you will, on the strategic stage. It is impossible to overstate the importance of Iran having these two trained cadres of experts.
2) The Sejil also represents a major advance in indigenous production capability. The Safir, Iran’s most advanced liquid propellant rocket, is clearly dependent on imported Russian technology (the second stage clearly uses Russian engines and turbopumps). Its possible that the only imported components of the Sejil are the jet vanes, and even those might be indigenously produced.
I am not an expert in this area but was wondering if Iran can use the first stage of the Sejil missle as a booster rocket strapped to the Safir for higher lift capability (like the solid boosters on the Shuttle). Would that allow the lift of higher weight objects to orbit? What would be the major obstacles to overcome?
I don’t understand why it was necessary for you to see ANOTHER Sejil launch to conclude that Iran has a major R&D program on strategic solid fueled missiles. It was clear from the reports about the Ashura from 2006 and the Sejil launch of 2008.
I agree that the two main efforts of Iran in ballistic missile technology are liquid propulsion and solid propulsion;
However one can think about 4 efforts:
1. The Shahab missiles (various models)
2. The Ashura / Sejil
3. Space launch vehicles (Safir)
4. BM-25
We still have to wait for Iranian test of the BM 25 as a ballistic missile. It is clear that it was also used for technology transfer for the Safir.
Without gimballed nozzle and the strange exhaust pattern seconds before staging, it does not represent a major progress. Still few years away from making a militarily practical version.
Unless, if intelligence shows up confirming its alleged precision.
The BM-25 was only a bit of sensationalist German journalism; no proof has ever been offered of it being anything other. And the Safir seems to be the future direction of the shahab program, not a branch. For nuclear warhead delivery the Sejjil seems fairly accurate and will most likely take over the job of stone tosser in the IRI proto-strategic? or virtual-strategic? forces. The liquid program seems to be headed towards a purely spacelift capability.
Azr@el,
“The BM-25 was only a bit of sensationalist German journalism; no proof has ever been offered of it being anything other.”
Same claim could be used regarding Ashura missile, from the time intelligence sources talked about it until YOU saw pictures of the Sejil in 2008.
Just wait….and see.
BTW, if you look back to discussions here at ACW on Sejil and Safir, you will find very wrong estimates of highly reputable writers.
With respect, I believe your statement will belong to these “guestimates”.
You should have somebody translate the entire article below for you, line by line:
http://www.ayandenews.com/fa/pages/?cid=6320
Two things this technology will give Iran are the ability to make a mobile version of the missile far easier than a liquid-fueled one could be adapted, and also to silo emplace them far more easily than they could with the Safir.
Silo-emplaced Sejils could give Iran a quick retaliatory strike capability if it was attacked.
I’m increasingly of the view that the strange designation “BM-25” is simply a distortion of RSM-25.
Reasons to believe that the missile exists in North Korea were discussed here.
Ted Postol’s recent analysis of Iranian missiles shows how this technology appears to be integrated into the Safir launcher, as well as North Korea’s Unha-2 launcher.
Pedram –
Gimbaled nozzles are a useful performance enhancement, but only a small amount. They’re important for sub launched missiles (nozzle can be nearly the full launch tube diameter, no projecting support for vane mount/actuators). They’re useful for silo ICBMs – efficiency, and a little better clearance during climb out of the silo.
Vanes also tend to be vulnerable to failure (erosion in the exhaust gas stream, cracking and breaking off in extremis). Steerable nozzles less so.
But expendable missiles or launchers using thrust vanes are common and the technology works just fine.
There’s a common bigotry “Oh, they’re not using the best western technology for their vehicle”. Our vehicles are often overengineered by even our own standards. Much more primitive vehicles are prevalent in very successful space and missile programs elsewhere. And they work just fine. Margins and simple engineering are often a good thing.
I believe the whole DPRK in possession of the SS-N-6 aka the RSM-25 aka the SERB issue was sufficiently debunked here: http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1500/nork-irbm-musudan-1
Further, with all due respect to Mr. Postel, why would the IRI use open cycle Nodong engines if they have access to Isayev closed cycle OKB 4D10’s. It’s a 23 ton-f UDMH/fuming NTO engine that can throw a nuclear payload 2,500 km using a rocket massing only 14tons. Why would the Iranians, if they had access to such a weapon, go thru the process of incremental Nodong development. Why for that matter would the DPRK?
I think it’s great some journalist pulled a name out of the sky, BM-25, which is the name of a soviet MRLS system, to sell a few more papers. I even think it’s kewl to after the fact try to claim that the BM-25 is the R-27, a completely new association. But after this all said and done we must put it to one side and return to tangible facts; The IRI doesn’t have the space shuttle nor the SS-N-6, the DPRK neither has the SS-N-6 nor the Energiya SLV. From all accounts what North Korea is chasing is a 4 cluster of Nodongs and the Iranians are most likely going after a single nodong 3 stage stack with 2 SRBs.
Another possible explanation for the “BM-25”-designator could perhaps be a misunderstood (by the press) reference to the UNSCOM-mission 81 with the alternate identification “BM-25” (for Ballistic Missile inspection mission nr. 25); There was a pre-1991 iraqi paper-project on a two-staged liquid-fueled missile with a diameter of 1.25m in both stages (i think this project was never worked out in full detail, e.g. it’s unclear which type of engines it would have used), somewhat similar to the Safir IRILV.
(And before anybody starts pointing out that the Iraqis and the Iranians never ever would have worked together: I’m fully aware of this fact and i also don’t think this is/was the case. But the Iraqis worked together with the North Koreans before 1991, and they in turn worked together with the Iranians from 1998 on, so this could possibly be some sort of “recycling of ideas” by the involved north korean/russian? “rocket scientists”…the same maybe also applies to the Paektusan-1/Taep’odong-1, which could partially overlap with the iraqi “Al-Tammuz”-project.)
Does anybody (of course, preferably one of the involved former UNSCOM-inspectors) have further information on this issue?
Azr@el:
AGAIN you ignore the fact that the Isayev 4D10 consists of two distinct components:
– The fixed closed-cycle main chamber (with ~19t sea-level-thrust);
– The gimballed two-chamber open-cycle vernier-engine (with ~3t sea-level-thrust);
The latter is definitely the Safir-upper-stage-engine (albeit somewhat modified -> nozzle-extensions)!
I must add that i do partially agree with you: i also don’t think the DPRK has access to the closed-cycle main-chamber (which is without doubt more difficult and complex to produce than the open-cycle vernier-engine). Thus, i also don’t think the DPRK has full access to a R-27/SS-N-6/Serb, so i’m somewhat sceptical of Mr. Postol’s Eunha-reconstruction (BTW, there are some technical mistakes in his otherwise quite interesting and well-investigated paper; e.g. he ignores the common-bulkhead in the Scud-C, Ghadr-1 and Safir IRILV-first-stage, and it doesn’t bother him that his propellant tanks occasionally overlap with the guidance section of the mentioned missiles – also, the Ghadr-1 seems to have R-12/SS-4/Sandal-style inverted tanks with an additional bulkhead in the oxidiser tank for center-of gravity-reasons).
But i must also add that from photo-measurements i get a diameter of the Eunha-second-stage of ~1.5m, too (which would be a distinct characteristic of the R-27/SS-N-6/Serb).
I suppose the DPRK probably has access to at least several components of the R-27-program, but not the complete missile (tank structures are comparably simple to produce, but engines, especially closed-cycle-ones, and guidance systems are anything but…).
Azr@el:
Why would anyone rely on Nodong technology if they had something so much better? An excellent, excellent question. One could speculate about the answers. Bureaucratic politics always offers a wealth of explanations for suboptimal decision-making. There may also be some limits on the ability of both the IRI and DPRK to manufacture or acquire certain components. But the short answer is, I don’t know.
I can say with much greater conviction that neither the previous discussion at the Nelson Report or here at ACW constitutes a debunking of the Musudan. As someone who has long shared the prevailing skepticism — just ask Daniel Sneider what a pain I’ve been in the past — I’ve got to say that the story looks more credible all the time.
(But that photo at the bar is pretty remarkable, isn’t it?)
Jochen:
When exactly did the Iraqis and the North Koreans work together, pre-1991? This seems highly speculative, even fanciful. It seems rather unlikely that the sources who fed the story to Bild would have made this connection.
But this is not my forte by a long shot. Maybe Forden has better answers to both of these questions.
Using the SS-N-6 engine would mean the Iranians would have a launch mass of around 18 tons, instead of 26 tons. The larger first stage of the Shahab-3-derived launcher would more than make up for the lower specific impulse.
Josh:
1.) Of course, this is only speculation (since nobody seems to be willing to admit such a link – the UNMOVIC always used the unspecific term “foreign country”…).
2.) There was definitely an iraqi-northkorean/russian cooperation between 1998 and 2002 (i could add dozens of citations from the ISG final report). Why shouldn’t they have cooperated already earlier (perhaps also by means of an intermediary/mediator like e.g. Syria)?
3.) Have you ever considered that one of the mysterious not-named “foreign countries” mentioned in the UNMOVIC Compendium as the source of the iraqi 1.25m-missile parts (e.g. for the Al-Abid second stage, the Al-Kharief or the S-13 -> see UNMOVIC Compendium p.434ff) and the “30t-engine” might be the DPRK (may i remind you, the DPRK apparently had its first, unsuccessful Nodong-testshot in May 1990 – and that would fit quite nicely into the timeframe of the iraqi S-13-Project, which “by coincidence” also shared a rather similar performance envelope…)?
4.) Where did the DPRK get the money from to “develop” the Nodong-A in the years 1988-1990 (again, this is exactly the timeframe of the mentioned iraqi 1.25m-projects)?
Jochen,
I think you are off-track if you are trying to imply North Korea assisted Iraq in any of its missile development programs prior to 1999. After all, the ISG report explicitly says those procurement activities began in 1999. (See p. 119 of the Regime Finance and Procurement chapter.)
Geoff:
So you, too, assume that the oil-rich Iraqis and the not-so-food-rich North-Koreans started toying around with 1.25m-diametered storable-propellant-missiles with 30t-engines at the same time by mere coincidence? (Yes, i know what the ISG report says, but the era before 1991 is not examined in great detail there anyway, most likely because of lack of information…and the mentioned “beginning” of procurement activities might perhaps as well refer to a recommencement of earlier, abandoned activities, as far as i see;)
Of course, another possible candidate for such a hypothetical “idea-transfer” from the iraqi Al-Kharief to the iranian Safir IRILV (please mark that i don’t say that both systems are identical; i interpret the Al-Kharief to be only some sort of inspiration for the Safir) might be Russia (or rather russian scientists/engineers). They demonstrably helped the Iraqis pre-1991, and with considerable certaincy also helped the North Koreans and the Iranians with their missile programs…
BTW, Geoff: the UNMOVIC Compendium mentions S-13/Al-Kharief/Al-Abid-related procurement efforts by pre-1991 Iraq in at least two different countries – one would be the USSR/Russia; What exactly would be the other one?
I’d have another question (i haven’t yet found something definitive on this one, but this could be vital in shedding light on the whole issue): Where did the Iraqis get the ten sets of 1.25m-Z-rings for the Al-Abid-second-stage from (see UNMOVIC Compendium p.443)?
I know of nothing in the CAFCD (or FFCD or any internal UN report for that matter) that contradicts the most simple interpretation of the ISG statement.
Before 1981, Iran and South Korea were close trading partners and North Korea and Iraq were on very friendly terms. After the war began these relationships flipped. The South Koreans began supplying weapons to Iraq and IRI and the DPRK got into bed with each other and seem to be there still. The only missile exchanges between the DPRK and Iraq seem to have been scams; the DPRK would insist on payment up front and then make excuses for non-delivery, i.e. sanctions and what not. Syrian-Iraqi relations post Iran-Iraq war were never close and in fact the Syrians joined George the First crusade to topple the “evil” Baathist and potentionally replace them with the good Baathist. Iran’s relations with South Korea did eventually normalize into a trade relation without a military component.
With this in mind it would seem that any IRI-DPRK-Iraqi tech sharing is as speculative as George the Second’s declared “Axis of Evil” alliance composed of said same nations. As far as the 1.25m diameter of the conceptual Al-Sheeref wouldn’t the easiest route be Pakistan.
And, on another note, isn’t it far more likely to assume that the Safir upper stage is powered by a single turbine Dual volga engine tweaked to run on more energetic fuel then to assume that it’s running on the 4D10’s vernier thrusters? Can the 4D10 vernier thruster even operate independently of main closed chamber turbine?
Azr@el:
1.) Of course the ZhRD 4D10 (the vernier-engine part) can operate independently from the main-chamber – it has it’s own turbopump! (How else could the one be open-cycle while the other is closed-cycle?)
Look here (this is a museum exhibit of a ZhRD 4D10 turbopump):
http://www.novosti-kosmonavtiki.ru/content/photogallery/gallery_031/pages/IMG_2673.html
2.) Now let’s take a closer look at the Volkhov/Volga-engine S2.720: That one is fixed, not gimballed; There is one (open-cycle-type) turbopump per thrust chamber; and it uses the propellant combination AK-20K(IRFNA)/TG-02(Tonka).
3.)The Safir upper-stage engine uses two gimballed thrust chambers (which are somewhat smaller than the Volchov\Volga-engine-chambers without the nozzle extensions – try some photo-measurements on the 2008-footage) which are fed by a common open-cycle turbopump. Judging from the tank-volume-ratio (while keeping in mind that the turbopump is obviously immersed in the lower tank and the common-bulkhead-design), a NTO/UDMH-combination is likely.
Please consider: What would be easier to implement for the Iranians: adapting the Serb-vernier-engine or redesigning the Volga/Volkhov-engine for different propellants and gimballing while designing a completely new common turbopump (especially without any experience on that sector – turbopumps can be quite complicated beasts)?
BTW, if there really was a pre-91 collaboration between Iraq and North Korea (i consider this an interesting hypothesis worth to discuss, nothing more and nothing less – and i’m not convinced that the CAFCD was anywhere near complete), then you’re probably right: the Iraqis obviuosly never got what they were paying for…
Oh, and you mentioned another interesting candidate for a possible intermediary between Iraq and North Korea: Pakistan (also not known for their overabundant wealth; despite this, they have a quite extensive nuclear and missile program; but they obviously only got their Nodong from 1998 on…).
If Iran advanced enough for indigenously designing 2 stage 2000km solid fuel missile, how many years (theoretically) Iran need for designing 3 stage 12.000km solid fuel ICBM? 5-6 years? What problems it have to solve for designing larger diameter rocket motor? Can Iran use several Sejjil’s first stages as initial boosters to increase Sejjils’s range?
Why Iran should waste money, time and nerves during all that decades, modifying dead end path (Nodong/Scud engine with its inefficient propellant)? For having prestige launching small satellite into LEO with only two stages but not three? It’s thousand times cheaper and easier to launch Omid into space using 3 stage Taepodong 1. Iranians officially declared they will have human launches in 2018. It’s impossible if they have no something better than modified Scud. Anyway, future launches of heavier satellites will show what Iranians have….
To Teto:
I guess the main problem might be metal-cutting equipment for larger diameter missile body(Unless they already have it). Anyway, at the rate they are going, Iran will make solid fuel ICBM capable of reaching US till ~2015.