The DPRK has issued its own “nuclear posture review” — actually a “memorandum” titled something like “The Korean Peninsula and the Nuclear Issue” (English | Korean).
The Korean version is substantially longer and more detailed. It needs a decent translation, including the title.
I can’t decide whether I am pleasantly surprised or sort of disappointed, but the DPRK nuclear memo lacks much of the bluster that typically livens up any effort at reading North Korean propaganda. Indeed, the declaratory language is pretty modest stuff:
The mission of the nuclear armed forces of the DPRK is to deter and repulse aggression and attack on the country and the nation till the nuclear weapons are eliminated from the peninsula and the rest of the world. The DPRK has invariably maintained the policy not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states or threaten them with nukes as long as they do not join nuclear weapons states in invading or attacking it.
Interestingly, the DPRK seems to have modeled US declaratory policy more than, say, Chinese.
Yes, the DPRK and US Negative Security Assurance language are similar minus the NPT bit of course.
China, on the other hand, is very sensible in having a no first use policy.
It is interesting to see that, indeed, DPRK possesses some deterrent value even in its crap 4 kT nukes, with no real delivery system for them yet. This attests to the argument of minimum deterrence.
Could we all go to crap 5kT nukes, now that the Cold War is over?
This is a change.
Even recent remarks didn’t hint at this new twist.
It’s hard to see this as anything but a tit-for-tat reply to the NPR. But one wonders what unfolded between the relatively sedate initial response and this week’s new policy statement.
Entirely apart from the merits of the outcome, North Korean policy reviews are evidently more streamlined than our own.
FSB, hold your breath for the forthcoming Iranian NSA.
Something like: “By the grace of God, we would never use our modest nuclear weapons capability, that would be un-Islamic and contrary to the teachings of the Imam”.
Of course, there will be interpretative statements (related with the velayat-e faqih in lieu of the right self-defense).
And you will also have caveats (in case of aggression by the “world of arrogance” and zionist-colonialists, etc. in lieu of the BW marker).
But what do I know, the Islamic Republic has never attacked anyone (and China is a peace-loving country).
What will happen if every country has some 4kT nukes, deliverable or not? Is there any study on that scenario? We apparently need it, because more countries will have these weapons.
By the way, DPRK will never have a NFU; its nukes are not for retaliation as they cannot survive a first strike. Their deterrence is only credible when a first strike is very unlikely. The more unlikely, the more credible the Dear Leader’s nuclear deterrence.
Anyone who declares No First Use must be sure that either they will not be striked or their retaliations are effective.
I wish people would stop degrading NK for their “4 kt” weapon.
A functional 4 kt weapon is either one functional D-T gas boost or a half kilo more of Plutonium (or less) away from a 10+ kt nuke.
And 4 kt is enough to act as a primary for a low yield secondary, particularly a medium enriched uranium fission secondary rather than a high-compression-required fusion secondary.
Is there actually any proof for the new “dogma” of NK being unable to deliver nukes with a missile? After all they had almost twenty years of time to work on this issue, and probably got the CHIC-4 design plans from Pakistan.
I suspect that what a functional 4 kt weapon is “missing”, is not half a gram of D-T or half a kilogram of plutonium, but half a ton of high explosive and tampers. In other words, a classic entry-level weapon akin to the US Mark 5/7/12, shoehorned into a Nodong-style RV and thus forced to accept a somewhat lower compression (and so yield).
Meaning, I also am skeptical that NK is unable to deliver its nukes. That’s not so much dogma as just wishful thinking, but dubious either way. One needs to consider at least the strong possibility that the DPRK can put four kilotons of instant sunshine inside a missile, today.
And four kilotons over downtown Tokyo, Seoul, or San Francisco would kill on the order of fifty thousand people. A prospect which I should think is at least minimally deterring.
Shaeen,
indeed, the Islamic Republic has never attacked anyone. China is at least as “peace-loving” as the NATO countries, although their human rights record is marred in distinctly different ways from that of big Western powers.
The NDU study by experts attested that its ambitions are for deterrence. (The US has attacked two of its neighbors, and Israel, the regional superpower, has attacked Lebanon, Syria and Gaza so deterrence is indeed desirable for them).
A major reason that Iran will not do a first-strike on Israel — besides the minor point that it would guarantee their own annihilation — is that there is in intrinsic deterrent there.
There are really two stable points: zero nuclear weapons states in the middle east, or several.
Hyping the Iran threat is really quite silly. especially considering our DNI says — as of 2010 Feb — that Iran does not have a weapons development program.
Although North Korea’s desire to be formally recognized as a nuclear weapon state are nothing new, yesterday’s document expresses these desires in a new context. The document suggests that North Korea’s external relations department have been keeping a close eye on the recent flurry of non-proliferation activity and news. Consequently it seems that North Korea has concluded that jumping on the non-proliferation bandwagon is now the best way for it to assert its nuclear weapon status.
First – in the context of the recent Nuclear Security Summit, the Foreign Ministry’s call to ‘join the international efforts [on] nuclear non-proliferation and on nuclear material security’ can be read as an attempt to inject some credibility into the concept of North Korea as a responsible nuclear steward. A country that should be regarded on an equal footing with others in the nuclear ‘club’, that could presumably even contribute expertise to the next Nuclear Security Summit, to be held in 2012 in South Korea.
Next, it seems the mostly positive international reaction to the U.S Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) has motivated North Korea to attempt to win similar praise. Thus the articulation of the ‘mission of the nuclear armed forces of the DPRK’, which describes Pyongyang’s arsenal largely in defensive terms, appears to be an overt attempt to emulate Washington’s mainly defensive posture. By going down this path, North Korea may be hoping to win some hearts and minds and be seen in a similarly responsible and non-aggressive light – characteristics it realizes are required in order to get the recognition it so desires. Note: It’s worth pointing out that Pyongyang didn’t catch up to Washington in one respect: It’s posture statement includes its own version of the so-called “Warsaw Pact” clause, which the U.S. NPR just ditched.
Finally, North Korea’s PR people seem to have also picked up on the momentum surrounding the forthcoming NPT Review Conference as a way of aligning their nuclear status with that of the five recognized nuclear states. Indeed, part of the Memorandum is strongly reminiscent of the language and obligations found in Article VI of the NPT. Compare:
From North Korea’s posture memo: ‘[North Korea will] neither participate in [a] nuclear arms race nor produce more than it feels necessary… [And will] join the international nuclear disarmament efforts’
To:
And from Article VI of the NPT: ‘[Parties will pursue] effective measures relating to [the] cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.’
This similar choice of language attempts to paint North Korea as an advocate for disarmament and as a responsible nuclear steward – again, no matter how incredible that might sound to some.
In short, it appears the objective of this Memorandum is to present North Korea’s nuclear weapon status to the rest of the world as an irrefutable and justifiable fact, using the language and rationales traditionally used by the other nuclear weapon states (apart from Israel). Just like them, North Korea is now saying that it will keep nuclear weapons until ‘they are eliminated from the peninsula and the rest of the world’. You could say imitation is the best form of flattery.
(This is an excerpt from a blog I did on NOH in case you are wondering!)
“ …North Korea’s nuclear weapon status to the rest of the world as an irrefutable and justifiable fact…”
Appears to be a fact given the Norks attacked & sunk a SK military ship killing 46 sailors and SK has not responded militarily.
“Appears to be a fact given the Norks attacked & sunk a SK military ship killing 46 sailors and SK has not responded militarily.”
What can South Korea do though? Go and launch a reprisal attack on the North? It would change nothing and actually just feed the regime with more excuses for the poor conditions there.
Its not in South Korea’s interest to prove that the DPRK was involved in this, it will put Lee Myung Bak in a tricky position.