This post is from May 2009. Facts and links may have changed since. See more from that month

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North Korea and Game Theory

I had an op ed on Sunday in the Washington Times about what to do about North Korea:

Although deeply injurious to U.S. interests, nothing that Kim Jong-il has done is irrational, crazy or, that old orientalist favorite, inscrutable. The North Koreans have repeatedly stated that they would abandon their nuclear weapons for a normal relationship with the United States. In pursuit of this goal, North Korea seems to be following the simplest — and most effective — strategy from game theory: tit for tat.

[snip]

As a strategy, however, tit for tat is not perfect. “The trouble with tit for tat,” as [Political Scientist Robert] Axelrod wrote, “is that once a feud gets started, it can continue indefinitely. … The injuries can echo back and forth until the original violation is lost in the distant past.”

[snip]

The solution in this case is neither to continue the escalation — that’s how we got the North Korean nuclear test in October 2006 — nor to ignore the provocation.

Rather, the solution is to develop a policy that, in effect, returns only a fraction of a tit for a tat. This means provocations are punished, but the “echo” of retaliation is dampened.

There is a companion piece by Heritage’s Bruce Klingner who, as you might imagine, prefers a rather larger TAT than I do.

Jeffrey Lewis

Writing on ACW 2004–2026

Dr. Jeffrey Lewis is the founding publisher of Arms Control Wonk.com. He is the Director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey. His also a non-resident affiliate at Stanford's Center for Security and International Cooperation and a Contributing Editor to Survival.

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