Yesterday, we had a pretty full room and Voice of America’s Persian TV service to hear Gary Samore talk about “Countering a Nuclear-Armed Iran”. The audio for the event is online.
Gary was pretty pessimistic about the current course of negotiations. He made a pretty strong case for suspension as the basis of negotiations, although I am prepared to be extremely flexible on what it means for Iran to “suspend” its activities.
More Technical Details on Iran’s Program
Gary’s old shop, the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, has released a Strategic Comment which details the technical status of Iran’s enrichment programs.
The author, who I understand is Mark Fitzpatrick, makes two claims that deepen our understanding of Iran’s technical problems:
1 The issue of impurities in Iran’s domestically produced hex will only damage the centrifuges over several years of operation, posing less problems for enriching uranium for a bomb program than for fuel.
The domestic UF6 is contaminated to some extent with other heavy metals present in the uranium ore but, according to officials who have seen the sampling data, this does not present a problem for the time being. The contamination, which is not as significant as had been reported earlier, will degrade centrifuge operations over time, reducing their lifespan to a third of the normal ten years. However, if commercial production is not Iran’s intention, this would not matter.
2 Iran may solved some manufacturing bottlenecks through the importation of maraging steel and ring magnets:
Western intelligence agencies had earlier assessed that limitations in some key raw materials and the difficulty of producing certain sophisticated components presented bottlenecks in Iran’s centrifuge programme. Iran may not be able to produce the maraging steel necessary for producing certain centrifuge parts. IAEA officials now believe, however, that Iran has managed to import enough maraging steel (including from the UK in the 1990s) for its centrifuge purposes. Similarly, although Iran may not be able to produce its own ring magnets, it was able to import a sizeable quantity through an Asian intermediary before export controls were tightened. Whether Iran can also produce the delicate bottom bearings on which centrifuges spin is also unknown.
One sentence that I believe will cause the author some trouble is the claim that “would not be surprising to learn that Iran has a pilot P-2 plant.” I wouldn’t be surprised if Iran conducted P-2 research at an undeclared facility, but I would be surprised if it was on a scale similar to the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz, which holds up to 1,000 centrifuges.
Anyway, the whole item, entitled Nuclear Iran — How Close Is It?, is worth a read, even if it is a bit depressing on the subject of how much progress Iran has made.