IAEA inspectors are back in Iran.
A lot has happened since my last update (Olli, Ali, Oxen-Free: IAEA-Iran Action Plan). Making sense of the press reports is tough, though, without some context.
Here is what I can piece together on the who, what, why, when and how of IAEA visits to Iran..
- After IAEA DDG Olli Heinonen and an IAEA delegation visited Tehran for meetings with Javad Vai’idi on 12 July, the two teams had a second meeting in Vienna on 24 July. A third meeting is now scheduled for 20 August in Tehran to discuss further details of the “Action Plan.”
- At the July 24 Heinonen-Vai’idi meeting, Iran agreed to let the inspectors visit the heavy water reactor under construction near Arak. A three person IAEA inspection team was already due in Iran on July 26 to conduct routine inspections of Isfahan and Natanz. That team spent about five hours at Arak reactor on 30 July. They were schedule to remain in Iran until the end of the week.
- On August 6, an IAEA team will visit Tehran to discuss appropriate monitoring arrangements for Natanz. Let’s hope that the IAEA can get the remote monitoring arrangements that David Albright from ISIS and Andreas Persbo from VERTIC have been publicly advocating.
For background, I would suggest Reuters’ Frederick Dahl, as well as stories in IRNA, Mehr, and Fars. I will post the full text in the comments section.
IRNA Story
Mehr Story
Fars Story
Incidentally, speaking of the Arak reactor, what do you think of Iran’s offer to forego plutonium reprocesing?
Javad Zarif wrote about this:
Since August 2004, Iran has made eight far-reaching proposals. What’s more, Iran throughout this period adopted extensive and costly confidence- building measures, including a voluntary suspension of its rightful enrichment activities for two years, to ensure the success of negotiations.
Over the course of negotiations, Iran volunteered to do the following within a balanced package:
Present the new atomic agency protocol on intrusive inspections to the Parliament for ratification, and to continue to put it in place pending ratification;
Permit the continuous on-site presence of IAEA inspectors at conversion and enrichment facilities;
Introduce legislation to permanently ban the development, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons;
Cooperate on export controls to prevent unauthorized access to nuclear material;
Refrain from reprocessing or producing plutonium;
Limit the enrichment of nuclear materials so that they are suitable for energy production but not for weaponry;
Immediately convert all enriched uranium to fuel rods, thereby precluding the possibility of further enrichment;
Limit the enrichment program to meet the contingency fuel requirements of Iran’s power reactors and future light-water reactors;
Begin putting in place the least contentious aspects of the enrichment program, like research and development, in order to assure the world of our intentions;
Accept foreign partners, both public and private, in our uranium enrichment program.
Iran has recently suggested the establishment of regional consortiums on fuel-cycle development that would be jointly owned and operated by countries possessing the technology and placed under atomic agency safeguards.
FROM:We in Iran don’t need this quarrel Javad Zarif The New York TimesTHURSDAY, APRIL 6, 2006 http://www.iht.com/bin/print_ipub.php?file=/articles/2006/04/05/opinion/edzarif.php