Looks like Valentine’s Day came early this winter for Kim Jong Un. The North Koreans are significantly expanding the February 11 Plant (Feb 11) outside of Hamhung. We think we have identified a new missile assembly building under construction, an effort to increase the throughput of the plant.
This post is elaborating on a piece we collaborated on with Reuters published late last month.
Feb 11, which is subordinate to the Rakwon Machine Complex, has been visited a number of times by members of the Kim family. Kim Jong Il visited it in 2011 shortly before his death, and Kim Jong Un has visited it at least five times, in 2013, 2015, 2016, 2022, and 2023. This construction is the latest in a string of updates and improvements to the site which have been underway since 2020 and reflects the plant’s role as a location for component production for and final assembly of the Hwasong-11 series of ballistic missiles. The North Koreans have exported the Hwasong-11A to Russia where it has been employed in the Russian invasion of Ukraine (The U.S. intelligence community designation for the Hwasong-11A is the KN-23). Our team believes the construction has been driven by the desire to expand production of the Hwasong-11 series of ballistic missiles to supply both the Korean People’s Army missile units and the Russians.
Major Site Expansion
The first major expansion of the plant started in mid-2020, when the North Koreans began constructing a new, large building (Building B) in the center of the complex (39.920212°, 127.657091°). Building B was completed in 2021 and had a unique roof with three different colors of roof tiles (red, green, and blue, all three of the colors produced at the Onchon Tile Factory). However, it was reroofed in 2023, when the North Koreans replaced the discordant green and blue tiles with all red ones.
Another building (Building A) also got a new roof in 2023, just barely to the north of the large new building (39.921628°, 127.656521°).
Shortly after the renovations to those buildings were completed, Kim Jong Un visited the plant as part of his tour of defense industrial sites in August 2023 (“Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Inspects Major Munitions Factories,” Korean Central News Agency, August 14, 2023. Also on this tour Kim visited the Tonghungsan Machine Plant, the Sinhung Armored Vehicle Plant, and a factory near Sinhung involved in the production of Armored Personnel Carriers).
While at Feb 11, Kim walked through buildings which appeared to house final assembly lines for Hwasong-11 missiles, which my former colleague Decker Eveleth (His Magnificent Duckness, El Duckerino) geolocated to buildings “A” and “B.” The North Koreans were attaching tail kits, nozzles, cable raceways, and nosecones to the solid propellant boosters in those buildings.
On the same visit, Kim viewed one of the underground facilities at the plant. He was photographed walking through a tunnel producing missile components such as fins and possible jet vane actuators. He also visited a tunnel where a large flow forming machine was producing metal casings for solid propellant rocket motors.
The entrances to that underground facility were upgraded in 2022. The North Koreans built large earthen berms around the entrances. A near-infrared satellite photo from our friends at Planet Labs shows vegetation growing on top of the berms, confirming they aren’t construction covers or some other temporary structure, but are indeed earthworks. It is unclear whether the berms are to protect the entrances from attack, or to prevent an accident either above or below ground impacting the rest of the facility.
Since Kim’s visit in 2023, there have been some other changes to the plant.
Rail Transfer Point Changes
The most significant expansions to the plant in recent months have been centered around the rail transfer point. This looked to have also been a site for coal transshipment. Recent construction has moved the loading point much further back to make room for a new building. The layout of this building appears to match that of Building A. Satellite imagery shows it has the same width as the original assembly building. It also has a similar internal configuration to the original assembly building. We can see from satellite imagery that there are two lines for production separated by a set of internal supports down the long axis of the building. Partway down the long axis, the line of supports is interrupted, and there is a connecting space between the two lines. This is very similar to the internal structure we see of Building A when Kim walks through it during his August 2023 visit. The cross support beams are missing from the internal connection area.
A similar layout implies similar function, but this could also be a new storage building. However, our team assess it to be more likely that the North Koreans are trying to increase the throughput of the plant by increasing the space they have for assembly and by bringing in more workers.
Site Support Expansion
In addition to major construction within the factory itself, we see additional changes to support facilities. One is the construction of what looks to be a new set of apartment buildings southwest of the entrance to the plant. Demolition began over the summer as older houses were cleared and foundations laid. These are clearly larger buildings which will house more workers than the existing housing near the plant. This construction may be to help with the throughput increases at the factory. If the North Koreans are interested in scaling up how many missiles they can produce, the plant will need more workers, and therefore more housing, to staff the new assembly lines.
New housing has also been used as a reward for workers in the defense industry in North Korea. Many of the premier defense industrial plants in the DPRK have gotten nice, new apartments in the past decade or so, including Kangdong, the January 18 plant, and Tonghungsan, to name a few. This type of incentive for defense industrial workers has been one of Kim Jong Un’s signature policies as he tries to reward and encourage those making the hardware he sees as crucial to his defense policies.
Additional Recent Construction
One of the more puzzling changes to the site has been new construction in a valley jutting out of the south end of the plant. The large industrial buildings at the mouth of the valley had previously been identified as a sheet metal processing workshop. Further up the side valley to the south is a building with a tower. A very large retaining wall and foundation have been laid out next to the original building. Two cisterns have been constructed as well. It is unclear what the original building was, and whether this new building will complement or change the function of that original building. However, it does look to be related to the operation of the plant in some way.
One building in the north-east of the facility was torn down and rebuilt (39.927022°, 127.663840°). The old building used to be bermed but the new one is not. The lack of berm for the rebuilt building may be because it is isolated from the rest of the facility, and protective earthworks aren’t necessary, or because the function of the building has changed.
Another change has been a new building in the center of the plant (39.920376°, 127.653016°). A residence with a garden was cleared and a new, multi-story building erected in its place. The building’s purpose is unclear. It likely serves an office support function or could be a new e-library or tech center.
One other notable change, is the roof on Building B has experienced significant erosion. The most faded tiles are those added when the building was originally completed in 2021, while the tiles added later in 2023 are in much better shape. Something inside that building is generating a lot of problems with the roof tiles. Exactly what that is, however, is unclear.
Final, minor change, a bridge crane which sat in front of one of the entrances to the secondary UGF complex at the site was removed sometime between June and October 2023. The bridge crane was clearly disused. Its removal may indicate this entrance is going to be seeing more activity or will be handling larger objects impeded by the disused crane.
Conclusion
There is a lot of demand for the Hwasong-11 class of ballistic missiles assembled at the February 11 plant. The North Korean defense industry recently transferred 250 Hwasong-11D TELs to “front line units.” Each of those TELs can carry 4 Hwasong-11Ds, so there is outstanding demand in the DPRK armed forces for at least 1000 of those missiles. Moreover, it seems like transfers of KN-23/Hwasong-11A missiles to Russia will continue as Russia has used about 60 of those missiles in Ukraine so far this year.
All of this indicates the Hwasong-11 is a very in-demand system for the North Koreans, and they have incentives to expand their ability to produce them to meet that demand. Another element worth considering, the North Koreans many now have the resources, either technical or financial, from their relationship with Russia to engage in this type of throughput expansion.
Nevertheless, it is worth keeping an eye on this facility as the new construction nears completion and paying attention for similar throughput expansions at other North Korean defense industrial plants.
