Over the past two years, we’ve had a project at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies to look at Iran’s space programs. For the past year or so, my partner-in-crime has been Jim Lamson.
Now Jim, and John Krzyzaniak from IISS, have written a very readable summary of Iran’s space efforts.
To Geostationary Orbit and Beyond?
Assessing Iran’s Space Launch Goals and Efforts
By Jim Lamson and John Krzyzaniak
Iranian president Ebrahim Raisi’s renewed emphasis on space is already beginning to bear fruit. Since the first meeting of the Supreme Space Council in more than 10 years last November, Iran has conducted three satellite launch attempts and revealed a new solid-fuel motor for space launch vehicles (SLVs). Many commentators see these activities purely through the lens of Iran’s ballistic missile development, but Iran has ambitious space launch goals that go far beyond developing rockets. A more comprehensive look at Iran’s space launch efforts and the challenges it will face in the years ahead gives a more nuanced picture of the military threats these activities may pose to the West in the future.
Iran’s Ambitious Space Launch Goals
What are Iran’s space launch goals? What is Iran trying to achieve with its space launches? First, both through its national space program and a parallel program of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Iran wants to launch satellites to various orbits and then operate them for both civilian and military purposes. Second, as a separate, lower-priority goal, Iran’s national space program also aims to launch an Iranian astronaut to orbit. Third, as highlighted by governments and analysts, Iran may intend to use technological advancements from its SLV development and launches—especially large solid rocket motors—to develop intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Achieving any and all of these goals will require Iran to conduct many space launches in the coming months and years.
Since its start in the 2000s, the national space program—run by the Iranian Space Agency (ISA)—has laid out ambitious space launch goals as a central element of Iran’s “space technology cycle” (charkheh-ye fanavari-e fazai)—which includes the development of satellites, SLVs, launch sites, and satellite ground stations. These goals include the development, launch, and use of increasingly capable remote sensing, communications, and navigation satellites for both civilian and military applications. This requires not only placing satellites in low earth orbit (LEO) but also launching satellites to 36,000 km geostationary orbit (GEO). Separate from its satellite efforts, the ISA also plans to conduct several launches in support of its “humans-to-space” (ensan be faza) effort to launch Iranian astronauts to orbit.
Reinvigorated by President Raisi in recent months, the national program’s current focus is to “stabilize” the launch and presence of satellites in LEO as soon as possible and to take steps to place a satellite in GEO by the Persian year 1404 (which ends in March 2026). According to Iranian space officials, the ISA plans to operate remote sensing satellites in LEO—for example, to monitor Iran’s natural resources, disasters, and pollution—navigation satellites in LEO, and communications satellites in GEO. Iranian space officials have stated that GEO is a “strategic” orbit and key to Iran’s success in the economic, military, and security fields. Separately, as part of its astronaut program, the ISA aims to launch an astronaut aboard an Iranian rocket into orbit by the Persian year 1410 (which ends in March 2032), for reasons such as joining the world’s space powers, creating national pride and showing Iran’s scientific and technological progress, studying human life in space, and achieving technologies for space exploration.
In parallel to the national program, for years the IRGC has implemented its own space efforts under a “super project” (abar-perozheh) with the goal of developing its own satellites, SLVs, ground stations, and a satellite control center. Like the national program, the IRGC has also highlighted its goals of placing satellites in both LEO and GEO orbits. In addition, analysts have highlighted concerns that the IRGC’s SLV efforts may also be intended to develop ICBMs.
In addition to civilian aims, both the national and IRGC space programs have acknowledged military goals for their space launch efforts. As part of the national program, Iran’s current and previous defense ministers have highlighted plans to use Iranian satellites for military reconnaissance, communications, and navigation as well as for tracking the positions of space systems. For its part, the IRGC has stated plans to use satellites for military reconnaissance, communications, and navigation.
These civilian and military goals appear to have taken on increased urgency due to Iran’s concerns over losing access to LEO due to overcrowding and to GEO by not acquiring orbital slots assigned by the International Telecommunications Union. Thus, the race is on for Iran to deliver satellites to LEO and GEO, not just to achieve its civilian and military goals but also to avoid the perceived closing window of orbital access.
Major Lines of Effort
Two entities already have a visible presence in developing the rockets to help Iran establish a fixed presence in LEO. The first is the Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO), under the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics. The Aerospace Industries Organization and its sub-entities produced the Safir, which first put a satellite into LEO in 2009 but as of 2020 was officially retired. It also produces the Simorgh and Zoljanah. Both are, in theory, capable of putting payloads of a few hundred kilograms into 500 kilometer orbit, but neither has ever successfully done so.
Next in the AIO’s launch vehicle development pipeline is the Sarir, which will reportedly be based on the Simorgh and use the same cluster of four Shahab-3 engines for its first stage, but it will have a new, larger upper stage. Following that will be the Soroush-1, capable of carrying somewhere between 8 and 12 metric tons to LEO and so classified as a medium-lift launch vehicle. According to various press reports Soroush will be four meters in diameter and have four auxiliary boosters attached to the main stage. The Soroush-2 will be even larger than its predecessor and reportedly will use a new first-stage engine called Bahman, which will burn cryogenic propellants, and a second-stage engine that will also use cryogenic propellants. Soroush-2 will potentially be able to carry a payload of 15 tons to LEO.
The second major player working to secure Iran’s presence in LEO is the Space Command of the IRGC Aerospace Force, through its management of one or more IRGC research centers, based on a project that was initially called Ghaem. The IRGC produces the Qased SLV, which recently placed its second satellite, Noor-2, in orbit. The Qased relies on a converted liquid-propellant Ghadr missile for its first stage, topped by two solid-fuel upper stages. But, despite this configuration, the IRGC has long been interested in developing all-solid-propellant SLVs. Ali Jafarabadi, the space commander of the IRGC Aerospace Force, stated in 2020 that the IRGC planned to develop the Qased-2, a three-stage SLV that would use a solid rocket motor in its first stage, be lighter than the Qased-1, and would carry heavier payloads to higher altitudes, and the recent unveiling of the Raafe motor indicates substantial progress toward that goal.
While these two entities – one under the Ministry of Defense and the other under the IRGC – were long thought to be working in parallel, if not outright competition with one another, to develop SLVs, recent developments indicate a trend toward increasing cooperation and integration. For starters, the IRGC Aerospace Force commander Amir Ali Hajizadeh was present at the November meeting of the Supreme Space Council, an unexpected turn since the IRGC space program sits outside this administrative structure. Additionally, in February Iranian Space Agency chief Hassan Salarieh stated in an interview that over the coming year a pair of his organization’s Nahid satellites would be launched by both “Zoljanah and Ghaem”rockets. Just a few days later, the space commander of the IRGC Aerospace Force Ali Jafarabadi said the IRGC was part of the national space program, spoke explicitly about IRGC–AIO cooperation in space launches, and stated that in the near future the IRGC would deliver upper-stage rocket motors to the AIO. This followed comments in 2020 in which he said the IRGC had offered to launch ISA satellites as well. This increasing cooperation and integration is worth watching, as it augurs a more streamlined, unified effort.
Beyond these two, there are new entrants on the horizon. For example, in February Iran’s Regular Air Force—parallel to the IRGC’s Aerospace Force—signed a memorandum of understanding to collaborate on space projects with the civilian Iranian Space Research Center (ISRC). One goal of this collaboration is to develop an air-launched SLV to carry small payloads into LEO, modelled after Northrop Grumman’s Pegasus project. Experts from the Regular Air Force’s Shahid Sattari University have studied a conceptual design for an air-launched SLV, similar to the Pegasus, to launch small cube satellites to LEO.
Private companies also have outsized aspirations in this area. Manouchehr Manteghi, a long-time aerospace official who is now secretary of the space technology development headquarters under the vice president for science and technology, recently spoke about the growing role for private companies in Iran’s space efforts and predicted that “in 3 to 4 years we will have a private sector launcher.” One company aspiring to work on launch vehicles in Iran is Ati Aerospace Group (Grouh-e Havafaza-ye Ati), whose website advertises services such as developing and building small-lift launchers using liquid, solid, or hybrid propulsion.
Of course, a presence in LEO requires more than just launchers – it takes satellites too. The Iranian Space Agency has the responsibility for operating Iran’s civilian satellites, and contracts with its affiliated ISRC, the Defense Ministry’s Iran Electronics Industries (IEI), and several universities to develop them. For example, Malek-Ashtar University of Technology designed and built the Rasad, launched in 2011, and Sharif University of Technology designed and built the Doosti, unsuccessfully launched in 2019. The ISRC, IEI, and Iran’s universities are developing several families of remote sensing and communications satellites for future launches to LEO and eventually GEO. This includes the Payam and Pars families of remote sensing satellites with planned resolutions of about one meter. Additionally, the growing trend of private sector involvement in space also extends to satellites. During celebrations of Iran’s national space program in February 2022, Manteghi unveiled a satellite called Kowsar that was produced by a consortium of eight knowledge enterprises and private companies. According to Manteghi, Kowsar is set to be launched in less than a year.
On the military side, the IRGC operates the Noor-1 and Noor-2 satellites, though it is not entirely clear who designed and built these. One possibility is that the IRGC has its own in-house satellite development capability, but another possibility is that the IRGC contracted with one or more of the entities that develops satellites for the ISA.
The lines of effort to reach GEO are similar to those for LEO, albeit in earlier stages. The AIO’s Soroush series of SLVs will be the main workhorse for the task, although the Sarir may also have a role as a test platform for placing payloads into parking orbit and then transferring them to geosynchronous orbits. The Soroush-1 will be too large for the facilities at Semnan as they are currently configured, however, and thus the plan is to launch it from a new, yet-to-be-built launch center in Chabahar. Chabahar will offer multiple advantages over Semnan, including closer proximity to the equator and an ability to launch more toward the east, both of which will reduce the amount of energy required to reach GEO, and its proximity to the Indian Ocean provides safer launch corridors than Semnan.
The IRGCis also interested in reaching GEO, but how this effort will proceed is not entirely clear. In an interview following the successful launch of the Qased in March 2022, Ali Jafarabadi, space commander of the IRGC Aerospace Force, said, “The space program for the whole country — of which we are a part — is to establish a fixed presence in LEO … and then to reach 36,000 km orbit.” It is possible the IRGC role will be limited to producing rocket motor stages to deliver to the AIO, but more likely the IRGC will produce one or more follow-on systems to the Qased family that are capable placing satellites in GEO themselves.
The humans-to-space effort is at an even more nascent stage. The Science Ministry’s Aerospace Research Institute (ARI) is leading the effort to produce the capsule for crewed spaceflight and using launchers developed by the AIO. Between 2006 and 2013 the Iranian Space Agency launched several Kavoshgar rockets—including with a monkey and other live animals—into sub-orbital space as initial steps toward developing crewed space capsules. The project has made little to no headway since then, however, due to a lack of funding during the Rouhani years. Iran has developed prototype space capsules to carry astronauts and has stated plans for incremental steps, including the suborbital launch of a space capsule, launches of animals to orbit and astronauts to sub-orbit, leading to the launch of an astronaut to orbit by 2032. For launch, the Soroush-1 would likely be the first SLV capable of lifting the 2-ton-plus crewed capsule into orbit.
Obstacles Ahead
Iran faces significant programmatic and technical challenges to successfully implement these efforts and achieve its space goals. First, Iran must successfully develop—and prepare for the launch queue—multiple families of increasingly capable remote sensing, communications, and navigation satellites for launch to LEO or GEO. Second, in support of its GEO goals, Iran must develop a family of orbital transfer systems that will propel its satellites from LEO parking orbits to successively higher orbits, eventually reaching GEO. Third, both the national and IRGC programs need to develop their families of increasingly capable SLVs, a challenge both in terms of overall SLV design as well as developing and integrating complex new technologies such as large liquid rocket engines and solid rocket motors. Plus, the AIO needs to fix apparent technical problems with the Simorgh SLV that have prevented its successful delivery of any satellites to orbit. Fourth, for the astronaut effort, Iran needs to develop the space capsules and launchers necessary to safely launch and return astronauts to earth. Fifth, to support future launches of both satellites and astronauts—especially those relying on the Soroush SLVs—Iran needs to construct and put into operation the large new space launch facility in Chabahar. Finally, Iran needs to integrate multiple elements above in the form of successful space launches. The risks are high—delays, disruptions, or failures in any of these elements will hinder the entire effort.
The goal to place a satellite in GEO by March 2026 illustrates the steep programmatic and technical challenges Iran faces in achieving its ambitious space goals. According to Iranian officials, Iran’s progression for placing a satellite in GEO will include several complicated steps—what officials have called a “complicated path” (masir-e pichideh). This path includes conducting at least four launches, using different SLVs, to deliver satellites to LEO parking orbits, where orbital transfer systems will then propel them to successively higher orbits, and eventually to GEO. Any delays or failures in the elements of satellites, orbital transfer systems, SLV development, or launches will severely disrupt and delay, if not bring to a halt, the race to GEO. And Iran aims to do all of this in four years.
Outlook and Implications
What should analysts and policymakers expect in the months and years ahead? First, they should expect a higher pace and number of launches intended to make progress against Iran’s LEO, GEO, and astronaut goals—perhaps higher than in the past. These will include LEO launches of the multiple satellites currently stuck in Iran’s launch queue, LEO launches of several new remote sensing satellites in development, launches of communications satellites as steps to reach GEO, sub-orbital test launches of new Iranian SLVs, and launches as steps to carry an Iranian astronaut to orbit. More launches may increase concerns about the dual-use nature of Iran’s rocket and satellite technologies. However, there’s also the possibility that Western officials will eventually become desensitized to these launches, just as they have become numbed to North Korean missile tests, leading to less vociferous international outcry and a tacit, albeit unwilling, acceptance of Iran’s space program.
In terms of ballistic missiles, while a liquid-fueled system like the Simorgh would make a terrible missile, Iran’s solid-fuel SLVs have more carry-over potential. Plus, Iranian officials and media have exacerbated worries by emphasizing the ability for certain systems to be towed and launched from various locations using mobile erector launchers.
There are other military concerns beyond the rocket booster technologies, though the risks for now are low First, as part of its humans-to-space effort Iran will likely want to continue recovering space-launched payloads. If so, the knowledge and experience it gains from a space capsule program would be beneficial for the development of ballistic missile re-entry vehicle technologies. However, it would likely not be decisive, as designing a re-entry vehicle for a long-range ballistic missile would not be a major challenge for Iran in any event.
Second, if Iran’s Regular Air Force successfully develops an air-launched SLV, this could potentially be repurposed as an air-launched ballistic missile. Iran has shown little to no capability or intent in producing an air-launched ballistic missile, however. Plus, it’s worth noting that Iran’s missile force largely owes its existence to its under-equipped air force, and Iran’s ground-launched missiles will likely remain a much greater concern than future air-launched capabilities.
Third, Iran may seek to develop direct ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, either launched from the ground or air. Here again, however, the risk is very low, at least in the near and medium terms. First, there is no evidence Iran is interested in developing these weapons. Second, the technical challenges for Iran to develop a viable ASAT capability are steep, including not just the rocket booster and kill vehicle but also the significant obstacle of precisely tracking and targeting satellites in orbit.
Finally, Iran will almost certainly proceed in the deployment of increasingly effective remote sensing satellites that it could use for reconnaissance and targeting. Although here Iran has demonstrated intent—both in official statements and with its launch of the two Noor military satellites—its capabilities are lacking. In addition to its efforts to develop increasingly capable remote sensing satellites—including the Payam and Pars families with planned resolutions of about one meter—Iran is exploring non-indigenous short cuts in this regard. The Washington Post reported in 2021 that Russia was preparing to supply Iran with a Kanopus-V satellite with a 1.2-meter resolution camera “within months,” although Russia has apparently still not yet launched the satellite. If and when it is deployed, it will advance Iran’s reconnaissance capabilities substantially.
This broad look at Iran’s space launch goals and efforts reveals a mixed picture. On the one hand, there are more potential areas of military concern than previous analyses have recognized. On the other hand, virtually all of the risks are low in the near and mid-term—lower, anyway, than the risks posed by Iran’s more advanced and very well-publicized missile program. While Iran has pulled off some important surprises and advances in its space launch efforts in recent years, its ambitions are lofty, and the challenges ahead are steep. Observers should avoid over-hyping these activities and attempt to distinguish between those that pose a viable military threat and those that do not.
