Tailkits and the Turks: US Nuclear Weapons in Turkey

Aaron Stein 0:01

You know, look, I don't think a country is going to create a little improvised nuclear weapons arsenal. Duh. You are listening to the Arms Control Wong podcast, a podcast about arms control, disarmament, nonproliferation. I am Aaron Stein, director of the Middle East program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and back in my office after a week of travel in Belgium.

Anne Pellegrino 0:28

And I'm Anne Pellegrino, a project manager and research associate at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies in overcast Monterey.

Jeffrey Lewis 0:35

And I'm Jeffrey Lewis, the founding publisher of the Arms Control Wonk blog and a professor at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey. But I am not in Monterey. I am in a car en route to San Francisco, but we had to have an emergency pod. Oh my gosh.

Aaron 0:52

Can you tell us where you are on the road?

Jeffrey 0:56

I am outside of Watsonville.

Aaron 0:59

Watsonville. And your GPS is going to ding in four miles and five miles after that, correct?

Jeffrey 1:07

2.7 miles.

Aaron 1:08

For listeners, if you hear dings, that means Jeffrey has to make a turn as he navigates his way to San Francisco.

Jeffrey 1:14

Among the indignities that we are suffering is my GPS, which I have muted, insists on dinging at every direction, currently coming up in 1.1 miles. And I have to have the temperature control off, which means it keeps getting a little steamy in here, like I'm in some kind of teenage make-out session. Jesus. Okay.

Other voice 1:38

Well, for listening.

Jeffrey 1:39

You never steam the windows up, Aaron, when you were a teenager?

Aaron 1:42

My mother listens to this podcast. Thank you very much. So that's not to be discussed.

Jeffrey 1:47

That's a hard no.

Anne 1:49

You can see my face right now. Maybe you can hear it in the tone of my voice.

Aaron 1:55

Oh, geez. Okay. Well, I think what got me on the phone en route to San Francisco from Monterey is a report today in the New York Times, which reported that I'm going to read the direct quote. Amidst turmoil with Turkey over events in Syria, over the weekend, State and Energy Department officials were quietly reviewing plans for evacuating roughly 50 tactical nuclear weapons that the United States had long stored under American control at Incirlik Air Base in Turkey, which is about 250 miles from the Syrian border, according to two American officials.

These weapons, one senior official said, were now essentially Erdogan's hostages. To fly them out of Incirlik would be to mark the de facto end of the Turkish-American alliance. To keep them there, though, is to perpetuate a nuclear vulnerability that should have been eliminated years ago. And the piece goes on to quote none other than the driving Jeffrey Lewis.

Do you want to tell the listeners what you tweeted and then was subsequently written in The New York Times?

Jeffrey 3:02

I believe I said that this has to be some kind of first in which a country where the United States stores nuclear weapons is firing artillery at U.S. forces.

Aaron 3:12

Yeah, and you tweeted that in response to the news over the weekend where Turkish artillery, according to the Washington Post, bracketed a small American special operations forces base in Syria as Turkey was invading and we were retreating. Yeah, it's well, I mean, as I always joke, these crises are good for my business but relatively bad for everything else. I don't want my business to be booming. No, it's pretty bad and it's pretty grim..

But I've done some digging on this, and I think it's worth unpacking a little bit because the New York Times, I think, sort of doesn't place the potential withdrawal of these within the broader context of why these things were being withdrawn in the first place.

Jeffrey 4:07

So what is or at least why officials are examining withdrawal?

Anne 4:12

Yeah, this has been but this has been a this has come up kind of in like a cyclical fashion every few years. And so this is not this isn't new. But what what's the underlying? Why does this keep popping up?

Aaron 4:26

I mean, I think as the U.S.-Turkish relationship continues to sink ever lower and lower, concerns about the security of the U.S. nuclear weapons at Incirlik Air Force Base grows and grows. But I think in this particular instance, these weapons were – As best as I can understand from interviews, need to be withdrawn for maintenance and probably replacement with all of these specific mods of the B61 are being upgraded or at least having Components change?

Jeffrey 5:01

Yeah, the B61, all of the different mods are being consolidated into a new single mod, the B61-12. So at some point, each of those weapons individually has to come home and then go back in its new modernized form.

Anne 5:19

So they're supposed to be coming out anyways.

Jeffrey 5:23

But not all at once.

Aaron 5:25

The idea is that The ones that are in Turkey will be, I mean, people will object to the word upgraded, but I'm just going to use it. Upgraded, the explosive package will more or less stay the same, but it's going to get a guided tail kit. So it's essentially going to make smart what had been a dumb bomb.

Would you say that's a good way to summarize it, Jeffrey?

Jeffrey 5:46

I mean, it's going to be smarter.

Aaron 5:48

Smarter.

Jeffrey 5:51

I don't know that we should call a bomb dumb. I mean... I don't, I don't need a B61 being angry with me. Yeah, yeah, I mean, okay, it's to make it give them a little bit more I can't pronounce that word, precision guidance. I mean, but that's a lovely video of the B61 Mod 12 doing B61 Mod 12 things that we can put in the show notes and maybe, maybe talk about on Slack. Yeah, that's a good way to put it..

Aaron 6:17

But I think within the context of these things, of these negotiations to pull them out for upgrades and then put them back in, Turkey is the host nation and wanted some upgrades to the language on liability in the case of an accident, which isn't beyond the realm of crazy. It's sort of bureaucratic sideshow to what is already going on with what you were talking about, Anne.

The collapse in the relationship, but just general questions about the safety of these weapons.

Jeffrey 6:48

So, Aaron, if I understand what you're saying, it's that there's been an ongoing conversation about the status of those weapons and the bureaucratic arrangements that allow the status of those weapons, in part because there is going to naturally be a process of removing and returning them. Yes. And the scoop in the New York Times is one, the weapons are still there.

Yes. And two, they're considering as they remove them, not sending them back.

Aaron 7:17

That's certainly the subtext I was getting is the second part is like certainly is that they're still there. Absolutely. And that once they all come out or it's more or less if this thing continues to crater, should we even send them back? Is it wise to send them back?

Anne 7:33

No. No. No. Spoiler alert.

Aaron 7:36

No. Well, you know, so we've all, I mean, go ahead, Jeffrey. I mean, you've sort of been very vocal about this because you have this really unique way of talking about it in that people always bring up the permissive action links as the deterrent. Make sure you make your turn, Jeffrey.

Jeffrey 7:53

Getting on to 101 toward Hollister, baby.

Aaron 7:57

I know that turn.

Jeffrey 7:58

Going to drive by my peeps in Gilroy. Much love to the garlic.

Aaron 8:02

And yeah, but so you have written sort of about the permissive action link and what they're actually designed to do and what your, like, I guess, worst case scenario for these weapons in Turkey, why they may not be adequate for safety.

Jeffrey 8:19

Yeah. Yeah, so I think there is a little bit of a misunderstanding about the safety and security of U.S. nuclear weapons. So all, not all, many, most, probably now most, I'm not sure, but most types of nuclear weapons are fitted with, actually all weapons are fitted with coded control devices, devices in which you have to put in a code in order to be able to use them.

The B61 is one of a set of devices that have something called permissive action links, which again require a code to be entered in order to arm the weapon. The thing about permissive action links, and there was a huge debate about this in the 90s, and if you read the kind of descriptions of them really, really carefully, they are designed to delay Someone who has access to the weapon from being able to arm it.

They aren't impregnable. And there was a big debate in the 90s about how long it would take, say a terrorist group, if they got a weapon, like how much time would you have before they could work around them? And they definitely don't have self-destruct mechanisms with maybe one exception. There's been a whole discussion about putting those kinds of mechanisms in, but that's been like a perspective discussion.

There is a command disable option as I understand it, but to a first approximation, like if Turkey seized those weapons, While they would need codes to be able to use them, those codes would not last forever, right? That if they really wanted to, they could reverse engineer those things. So like permissive action links are good and they provide a lot of security and a sense of safety in the event that, you know, a weapon is lost.

They probably shouldn't use safety in that way, but like they are not, not, not designed to work forever. And they're definitely not designed to deal with a nasty host nation that seizes them.

Aaron 10:23

This has come up within the context of the coup attempt in July 2016 and now with being fired upon. And so, Jeffrey, you've always been concerned about like – I mean sort of wary of like the coup type scenario where a hostile government takes over and that you have these things there that are not impregnable.

Jeffrey 10:45

Yeah, I got to bleed off some steam here, Aaron.

Other voice 10:50

Oh my gosh.

Anne 10:53

Oh my gosh. This is too much for a Monday morning, man.

Jeffrey 10:58

This is a lot. I am partly worried about the wrong person getting his or her hands on a weapon. But I am more worried about the general damage that would be done to US, maybe credibility is not the right word, but just the ability of the United States to operate around the world, I think would be substantially constrained if people thought that we were in the habit of losing things like nuclear weapons.

I think it'd make it much harder to sustain NATO's nuclear mission. And I think it would cause a ton of foreign policy problems.

Anne 11:42

Yeah, I think you're spot on about that. I mean, I hadn't really thought about that aspect before, but this certainly would have ripple effects kind of everywhere. And that credibility just goes like into the toilet. And then you just like, you know, you just like shove it in there, flush it down.

Jeffrey 12:01

Well, think about the people trying to put conventionally armed intermediate range missiles in countries in Asia. Right. And they keep saying like, oh, yeah, we'll be able to talk the Japanese into it. Right. Yeah, well, you know, good luck if the Turks end up in possession of a bunch of nuclear weapons, right? They don't have to use them for that to be a really difficult foreign policy scenario in like a whole bunch of areas.

Aaron 12:31

So I have a slightly different take on this. Now that I don't disagree with anything you said, but I find the weapons in Turkey destabilizing for different reasons. It's because of the way that they are slated for use, in that the Turks don't have dual-capable aircraft stationed alongside them any longer. In fact, most reports say they decertified their pilots so that Turkey doesn't have a physical nuclear role within the alliance.

Or if they do have one, it's at very, very, very low levels of readiness. I mean, the American level of readiness to use these things are low, too. But imagine in a crisis where... We get to the point where we're even thinking about using these nuclear weapons and we have to fly in an American squadron to carry them.

I mean, Jeffrey, I think you're on your way to Planet Labs. I've learned from Anne. Think about how fast the world would know if a squadron of F-15 showed up in Turkey and what that would signal to, say, Russia in the event of a conflict. And so they're destabilizing in a different way, in addition to the security concerns you already have.

So If the Turks don't even want to use them, I always wonder what it is that we're keeping them for in the first place.

Jeffrey 13:43

Oh, it's a glorified storage depot. I mean, as you say, the Turks don't have any aircraft that are certified to deliver them. The U.S. doesn't permanently base such aircraft there. It really is just for storage. And, you know, there are other places in Europe, particularly in Germany and Italy – sorry, I have to stay on the route – particularly Germany and Italy that – Do have the space to accommodate those weapons.

It's just that we judge that it is politically too hard to put U.S. weapons in those countries, which then kind of raises this big question about, like, why are we doing this at all, right? Allegedly, these weapons are there to reassure our allies, but they are... They're really reassuring Turkey, right? I mean, the problems in the Turkish relationship are so much bigger than that.

Anne 14:34

So earlier, Aaron, before we were talking, before we were recording, you said something that the Turks have always wanted to renegotiate the basing arrangement. That's been in the back of my head. Can we talk about that?

Aaron 14:51

Well, they wanted to renegotiate, as best as I understand, is the liability clause within the arrangement in case there's an accident with this weapon. I mean, my guess is that, like, who would pay, right? Yeah. There was an accident or, you know, who was on the hook. But, you know, they have maintained, it has been Turkish policy, is that while they decertified their aircraft, it's the F-16s, Sometime in the mid-1990s.

We don't know exactly the year. They wouldn't be the one to call for these weapons removal from Europe. That would have to come as part of a broader arrangement within NATO itself. And that's more or less how Turkey thinks about it. And you can see why that would be a policy that comes up in the 1990s when there's, as Jeffrey was saying, the concern was one of these things would get out into the wild and a terrorist would use it rather than nuclear war.

Right. I mean we have kind of a similar case study in – like Jeffrey, I don't know if – like we don't quite know all the details but maybe you know more than I do about like the US removal of US tactical nuclear weapons from Greece. I believe it was in 2001, whether or not there's applicable lessons here.

Jeffrey 16:08

Yeah, we don't know very much. I mean, actually, the best account we have is this guy who was running for some, you know, he was, like, running for dog catcher in, like, I think Omaha. I mean, not really dog catcher, right? Some menial public office. Gave different accounts of his involvement. And each time he left out sensitive details.

Like in one case, he left out that it was in Greece. In the other case, he left out that it involved nuclear weapons. But he told the story enough times that when you put it together, you had kind of a basic account. And his version, which again, because we've never got, you know, there's this neither confirm nor deny policy.

We don't really have an official version. But his version is that there were real reliability concerns, particularly involving the commander of the base. That led to just a broader sense that the Greek government wasn't taking care of these weapons safely. Or wasn't providing the general environment in which the U.S. could take care of the weapons safely.

Anne 17:16

What does that mean?

Jeffrey 17:18

General environment of like... Well, so this is me being weird. I... There are narrow security problems like in Greece, the commander was a drunk in Belgium. They failed to hire a dog catcher, which is how the activists actually got inside one of them. But, you know, you can fix individual security problems. What I think happened in Greece and what I think should happen in Turkey and frankly, I think it probably should happen in Belgium, too.

Is that the U.S. looked at the security problems and concluded that this wasn't like an isolated incident, but rather a persistent problem that was likely to recur. And that's what I think about the Belgian case. You could always hire a dog master, but the fact that they were unwilling to do it bothered me more than the actual lack of a dog master.

Aaron 18:15

You're talking to us because we know the story. Tell the listeners the story about why a dog master and hippies matter for Belgium.

Jeffrey 18:22

Oh, okay. So about a decade ago, there was a group that got into a Belgian air base where there are U.S. nuclear weapons stations, Flying Brogal. And they got in through the fence, and they went out to the runway, and they were going to lay down on the runway to keep planes from taking off. But there was no security.

No one arrested them. So they kind of got bored of pretending to be dead on the runway. And so they started wandering around and they got into a they found a fence open and they found the hardened protective shelters where aircraft are based.

Aaron 18:59

Yeah.

Jeffrey 19:00

And, you know, in basically in the floor, there are vaults where U.S. nuclear weapons are stored. And they walked around and they put some stickers on the on the on the shelters and still nobody came and arrested them. And so then they kind of like. Are like, how do we get arrested, right? You know, it's like the old saying, you can't get arrested in this town. So, so they, they walked out into the central area and finally a Belgian security guard like rolls up and he's, he's got a gun but it doesn't have a clip in it. So he is unharmed confronting like, you know, some reasonable number of protesters. I can't remember, four or five.

Aaron 19:39

Some of which are geriatric.

Jeffrey 19:42

No, they were pretty young. That was at Y-12. Oh, okay.

Aaron 19:49

Sorry. I'm screwing up my own break-ins.

Jeffrey 19:53

It's okay. There are so many security breaches at U.S. nuclear facilities, it is very hard to keep them all straight.

Anne 20:00

I'm surprised that Armando Iannucci has not made a film about About one of these incidents.

Jeffrey 20:09

Yeah. So the guy, so finally they're, you know, like, they're sent off. The Belgian authorities, by the way, had helpfully pointed out that the nuclear weapons were stored on the other side of the base because they had wanted to reassure people. And so then the protesters went into the part where the weapons really were stored. And some idiot had left one of the doors to the shelter open.

So they got inside the shelter and they took a picture of the control panel for the, well, they took a picture of the whole shelter and inside you could see the control panel for the WS3 vault where a nuclear weapon or two actually is probably stored.

Aaron 20:52

And the dog.

Jeffrey 20:53

And so then the question is like, how the does that happen? And one of the things, because one thing is they're supposed to be dogs at the base, like guard dogs, who, you know, bark and, like, eat you. And the dogs were all in their kennels because Klein Brobel had failed to hire a dog master.

Anne 21:15

Oh, my gosh. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. This is the story.

Jeffrey 21:18

Well, then that raises the question, right? Like, well, so... Is this about not having a dog master? Or, in fact, is this about just not giving a s*** about security?

Anne 21:31

Oh, I think it's not giving a s***.

Jeffrey 21:33

That's exactly right, right? Because they don't hire a dog master, they don't keep the gates closed, the guard doesn't have a gun, the guard looks, like, totally shocked. Hang on, gotta bleed off some steam. Oh my god.

Other voice 21:44

This is gonna go down as an all-timer. And this is...

Anne 21:48

I can't see. I don't want to die. Why does it really make that much noise if you put on the climate control, man? I mean, you told me it did.

Jeffrey 21:58

Now I got the climate control on. Let's see how it goes.

Other voice 22:00

We can't hear. Oh, no. It sounds like a wind tunnel. It sounds worse.

Jeffrey 22:07

Scott can edit out the steam bleeds. I think he's got to keep them in now.

Other voice 22:15

I actually want him to keep them in.

Jeffrey 22:18

Anyway, the point is when you design a security system It doesn't matter how well designed it is if the people running it don't follow the rules.

Other voice 22:34

Right.

Jeffrey 22:35

Right? So, like, should there have been an unlocked gate? No. Should there have been an unlocked shelter? No. So, like, was the security as designed adequate? Probably. But, like, no matter what you do, no matter how much money you put into it, if the people responsible for guarding the weapons don't give a fuck, then you're wasting all of that money.

And so that kind of naturally leads to this sort of general question of, like, how much warning of lack of security do you need before you decide something is unsafe?

Aaron 23:10

Which takes us back to the Greece question that I led with. And frankly, as it links to the Turks, you know, the base where refuelers took off from in July 2016 to refuel rogue F-16s was the, you know, Angelic Air Force Base is a Turkish Air Force base, but it's split between the two sides. One side's the Turkish side, one side's the American side.

Took off from the Turkish side of the base. You know, and so you had elements of the coupists Were enmeshed, let's say, in the U.S. Air Base where the D-61s are deployed. They're deployed and stored and they're stored exactly the same way they are in Belgium in hardened aircraft shelters.

Jeffrey 23:57

Oh, well, wait. There is an important difference now because Interlec, Aviano, and... Oh, Jesus, what's the base in Germany? Because they're partly U.S. air bases, some of them got a security upgrade that Belgium doesn't have. In fairness, they did do a big security upgrade at Interlec, but, you know, I still want them to take them out.

Aaron 24:28

Right. I mean, so... I mean, I guess the way we wrap up this conversation is I guess we already know everybody's thoughts. I mean, should these things stay out? And if they do stay out, does it really matter?

Jeffrey 24:43

No! Does it matter? We have much... This to me is like a crazy thing. Like, the fact that this argument, that these nuclear weapons provide some tangible reassurance, is just the most absurdly stupid f***ing argument I have ever heard. And it is like such a testament to the power of... Of like received wisdom because, you know, like why is the U.S.-Turkish relationship falling apart?

Like it doesn't have anything to do with nuclear weapons, right? Whether you put them there or take them home, You know, there are these huge structural factors that are driving this. And so, like, if we didn't have nuclear weapons at Incirlik, no one in their right mind would say, you know how we could arrest this decline of relations?

We could put 50 nuclear weapons in Turkey. People would look at you like you are the dumbest person on Earth. But if you make that argument in reverse, you are like, you know, suddenly you're Greg f***ing Weaver. Yeah.

Other voice 25:56

Anne, your thoughts before we mercifully close this for the listeners' ears?

Anne 26:00

I mean, just no and no. No and no.

Aaron 26:06

You know, it's, you know, I study Turkey for a living. We really have to start contemplating. It's like a friend of mine, Francis Brown, says, you know, the boys, the men song, it's the end of the road. The unthinkable we now need to start thinking about is what does a future where the US and Turkey aren't actually allies look like?

What does this mean for NATO? And then these relics. The US has had nuclear weapons in Turkey since 1959. These things that we have deployed there in various forms, the latest of which is the B61. What is their physical value? They don't have value. If the Turks assigned value to them, they wouldn't have skimped on certifying their dual-capable aircraft.

It's a variation of the dogmaster argument. If they were so important to Turkey, they would continue to ascribe military value to them, but they do not through action. And we don't need to know the secrets to know that, because we can see the other end of that. It's the same way Jeffrey thinks about this. If Turkey thought nuclear weapons were so important, they would make sure that they had the ability to carry and drop nuclear weapons.

Through action, Turkey has made the decision not to be able to carry and drop nuclear weapons. So therefore, they don't think that these nuclear weapons are critical for them. And I think that's how we should think about it.

Jeffrey 27:36

Revealed preference.

Aaron 27:39

Yeah. That's a good way to put it. Do we have anything else to add? Just bring them home. We can bring them home for maintenance and maintenance can be extended out for a very long time. B61-12 program is already run relatively behind schedule.

Jeffrey 27:57

Actually, you know what? Despite the animated nature of my earlier comments, if we were to return to our effort to Placate those people who have put us in this position by refusing to bring these weapons home. We could say that we could remove them on the ground, they are being replaced with B61 12s and then just simply indefinitely delay that decision. I think that's a good way to do it. Bureaucracy at work. Yep, make it work for you.

Aaron 28:33

And if the Turks really do want to renegotiate liability, you know, like, don't call me, I'll call you.

Jeffrey 28:38

Well, I don't know. The liability isn't just involving the nuclear weapons, right? Is it involving all activities at the base?

Aaron 28:48

I don't have that much detail, but I would assume it's relative. I assume it's probably all of the above, but I don't know.

Jeffrey 28:56

Because just as you say, I think this relationship is running its course, and so… That those, you know, it's not clear to me how long the United States is going to be operating out of that airbase.

Aaron 29:07

I think that's I think that I think that's a very wise thing. And some of these things that the president has been talking about, you know, like, I guess President Trump is very difficult to understand even on his best of days. And he hasn't been having the best of days in a long time. There does seem to be some sort of sanctions action coming.

We're recording this on Monday, Columbus Day. So maybe by the time it's out, the sanctions will have happened. Maybe not. Who knows?

Jeffrey 29:31

Is this what we're going to destroy the Turkish economy? I've done it before.

Aaron 29:36

I've done it before. I can do it again. But Erdogan's coming to the US on November 13th, which will be a terrible day for a number of reasons. I'm calling in sick. It's just really hard to tell. And so – This may be a very good time to do maintenance to do all of the above replacement to the tail kit on the b61s in turkey and let that one what you got there is the busted tail kit i have to fix that don't know it's the holiday weekend here in the u.s we got a lot of holidays coming up there's jewish holidays last week we have a product recall we've decided the tail kits are

Jeffrey 30:16

It's like those airbags that were decapitating people.

Aaron 30:19

Oh, my gosh. Yeah. Okay. I think we've effectively gone off the rails now.

Anne 30:24

But, like, I think – We were never on the rails for this podcast, let's be clear.

Jeffrey 30:29

I've been on the road the whole time. Well, long-time listeners – Double nickels on a dime.

Aaron 30:35

Long-time listeners will know that we have a tradition of emergency podcasts. It's usually Jeffrey in his car. This time the car is moving.

Jeffrey 30:44

I have to go to Planet. I'm on their customer advisory board. So I have to look very serious, say very serious things, and then be fed a really sumptuous dinner. This is my charge today.

Aaron 31:03

Do you get to spend the night in San Francisco?

Jeffrey 31:06

I get to spend two nights in San Francisco.

Aaron 31:10

Where in the city? Can you let the listeners in?

Jeffrey 31:16

It's near Planet's headquarters, which is south of Market, which I know is like an allegedly hip neighborhood, but I prefer the dirtier, rowdier parts of San Francisco to the yuppies.

Other voice 31:36

But maybe I just don't know the good spots.

Jeffrey 31:38

Listeners can maybe tweet at me or something.

Aaron 31:42

Well, this has been a dirty and rowdy podcast. Anne, any last words?

Anne 31:50

It's already been a long morning, so thanks for letting me pop in and say a few things.

Aaron 31:59

I mean, are you sure? I don't know what else to say about it.

Anne 32:03

I don't know.

Aaron 32:04

So for that, thanks, everybody, for listening. Jeffrey, thanks for calling in while driving. Listeners, thanks for putting up with the sound. And if you enjoy the show, head to patreon.com slash ACW podcast. We're $3 a month. If you're a student, you can join our Slack channel and get access to a second mini podcast called Brilliant Pebble. And the same benefits if you're a normal person at $5 a month.

With that, thanks everybody for listening and thanks everybody for calling in.