KCN-eh? November’s other North Korea Developments

Andrea Berger 0:17

At Monterey, and we're here recording our monthly North Korea news podcast together with two great guests this month. I'm joined by Cristina Varriale, who's a research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute here in London, and also by Hamish Macdonald, who's the chief operating officer of the Korea Risk Group, which produces NK News. Thanks, guys, for joining me.

Thanks for having us. Yeah, thanks. We've had a kind of quiet-ish month in terms of front page headlines related to North Korea, but still some pretty interesting stuff. And maybe we can start, Christina, I'll kind of direct this one your way, because one of the bigger developments that did happen in November on the North Korea front was the announcement that The meeting between Pompeo and his North Korean counterparts that was scheduled for early November got postponed.

And of course, we know that the US went out of its way to insist that this was something that was requested from the North Korean side, that it was purely because they weren't ready for the meeting and that there were logistical issues. But it occurred against a really interesting backdrop, which was sort of supposed demands for North Korea to make a declaration over its nuclear inventory, which is something that has been talked about a little bit in the press now with the press suggesting that the U.S. is not imposing that as a prerequisite for a Trump-Kim Jong-un summit to happen.

There was also North Korean threats to revive what is called the Byung-jin Line, which was one of Kim Jong-un's first big policies, really talking about the simultaneous development of nuclear weapons and the economy. And then we also had this lack of movement on the earlier supposed willingness of the North Koreans to let international inspectors into the Punggye-ri nuclear test site.

That was something the North Koreans had been talking about a little bit, but we really haven't seen movement on it. What do you make of all of this? Is this a slowdown in U.S.-North Korea diplomacy? And should we be concerned about that if it is?

Cristina Varriale 2:29

I think it absolutely is a slowdown, but I don't think we should be concerned. I think we're more likely to be going back to business as normal in terms of diplomacy with North Korea. The first six months of 2018 were an absolute whirlwind of summitry. We had, I think, two Kim-Moon summits. We had three Kim-Xi Jinping summits.

Obviously, we had the first Kim-Trump summit as well, all before the end of June. That's a lot of activity in the first six months of the year. And coupled with that, by those meetings, we also had North Korea's announcement of its no longer going to be testing nuclear, using its nuclear test site, the cessation of long-range missile tests, Trump's announcement of the suspension of the joint military exercises with South Korea.

So everything was packaged really tightly into six months. And what that meant was that all those shiny objects that were kind of pressuring the process fell away, which has now meant that North Korea has a little bit more space to drag its feet Lead the process how it wants it to be led, and just slow things right down.

Like I said, that pressure is no longer there for anything to happen quickly. And to balance that, there's still the ongoing process with the South Koreans. So that ongoing inter-Korean process allows North Korea to continue to say that it's engaging, say that it's being cooperative, and actually have the South Koreans back them on that. The South Koreans are Kind of selling the North Korean message for them.

And whilst that's going to be incredibly frustrating for the U.S., they're not necessarily helping themselves. The U.S. policy is still very much sanctions will come at the very end of denuclearization and we need to see a full commitment first. I do think that's changing. Like you said, we've seen hints of that changing with leaks, a declaration before a new Trump-Kim summit.

Is no longer going to necessarily be something that's required. And I do think there is a shift in the White House of an acknowledgement that a grand bargaining agreement isn't going to be the way forward in this process. I'm not quite sure yet they've figured out what their next steps are going to be. So in essence, actually, maybe North Korea is dragging their feet, is buying the US a little bit of time as well to figure out what it is they want to do next.

Andrea 4:50

How much do you think... North Korea, as you sort of described it, dragging its feet, which I agree with in some respects, is about creating pressure to move diplomacy up to an even higher level, namely to the level of Trump, where they probably feel like they can get A better deal out of that discussion than what's happening closer towards the Pompeo or even at working level, where they don't seem to be engaging really as actively.

Hamish, what are your thoughts on that? Is that sort of your view on what the North Korean playbook might look like? Or is this something else in the background?

Hamish Macdonald 5:34

Yeah, I certainly think the North Koreans would rather hold out to, you know, have Trump meet with Kim again. You just look at the results of the Singapore summit, the vagueness of the declaration there. What North Korea got out of it. They only really had to say, despite Pompeo's insistence that, you know, fully verified denuclearization was agreed to by Chairman Kim, as we've heard so often.

Basically, all they agreed to do was work toward denuclearization of the Korea Peninsula. So things have stalled significantly since then. And I do believe that Kim Jong-un and the North Koreans certainly want to be sitting across from Trump again. To maybe get more concessions than they would if they're negotiating with Pompeo or Stephen Biegun and things of that nature.

So I certainly think that's a consideration, especially as the end of the year comes up.

Andrea 6:24

Yeah, I was at, I mentioned this as well in a conversation I was having with someone the other day, that I was at an event with a senior US official who was really clear and Straightforward in reminding the audience that the U.S. hasn't really had negotiations with North Korea yet. We talk about whether or not the pace of negotiations is slowing down or not, but it really hasn't actually been a negotiation yet.

It's been a set of discussions on sort of continuing diplomacy, but not really taken the form yet of an actual conversation over what to give up in exchange for what else.

Cristina 7:02

I think also it's just part of the nature of how the process was initiated this year. We started at the very top level with summits and have worked almost backwards to the working level rather than starting with the working level and reaching up to that ultimate presidential level summit. So that's kind of set the tone for what the North Koreans are going to be expecting.

And after Singapore and Trump's tweet of, well, the North Korea threat's over now, where's the incentive to continue to deal with people at the lower level? When they can offer very, very little in terms of substantive changes to their nuclear program, and have the President of the United States declare that the threat they pose to the US is over.

Andrea 7:44

Not only that, to give part of the press conference in almost verbatim terms from KCNA, right? We were sitting there listening to the Singapore summit. And he's talking about how military exercises are threatening to North Korea. And it was like hearing a North Korean press release just coming out of the mouth of the U.S. president.

Hamish 8:01

He called them war games, which is their words.

Andrea 8:05

Indeed. So I completely agree with you. And this is the risk, actually, of going to a second Trump-Kim summit is if you get something and if the North Koreans have their view that, This level of diplomacy is the one that best serves them validated, then the working level is potentially going to become increasingly untenable. So I agree with you completely that there's a challenge here in terms of incentivizing North Korea to You know, try to deal with one person above others in the US system.

Hamish 8:41

Absolutely. I totally agree with that as well. And one thing that's interesting from the North Korean perspective is that, you know, with these agreements, the devil is in the details. And the North Koreans are essentially detailed devils themselves, right? So this vagueness really plays into their hands quite nicely.

Andrea 9:00

Christina, another development on the high level diplomacy front and indeed with a military component, but focused on the US and South Korea has been actually some of this, you know, we just mentioned joint military exercises. That's been a talking point this month as well. Mattis announced this month that the US and South Korea are going to be going forward with the Foal Eagle joint military exercises in the spring, which are your field training exercise where you've got in the past, you've had bombers flying and amphibious beach landings and that sort of thing.

Though they did note that those are going to take place at a level that is sensitive to the state of the diplomatic discussion. They didn't say anything about the corresponding Command post exercise, Key Resolve, which occurs as well around the same time. But I'm not sure how significant that is. Did the announcement that Full Eagle is going to happen surprise you?

Cristina 10:01

It did. Although I want to add an air of caution to that because I think matters this year has not been that well connected to especially the White House thinking and the broader US administration's thinking on how to approach North Korea. He was very insistent in the first part of the year that the exercises were not up for negotiation, they wouldn't be suspended.

And to some extent that is down to the personality of the president possibly being detached from the broader administration rather than Mattis being detached. But he was very wrong there. He's also reiterated a number of times himself and through various DOD statements That it was only Ultra Freedom Guardian that was going to be suspended. It didn't apply to any others.

And then the Air Exercise Vigilant Ace was suspended. So at the moment, I'm being cautious as to whether or not the very brief comment Mattis made at the end of a press conference should be taken as the truth or whether or not it's something he's pushing for and whether or not that's going to get through. That said, if they do go ahead, I would be incredibly surprised.

Mostly because I don't understand why the South Koreans would agree to that. It would be completely contrary to what they've been pushing for. It's not something that is going to be in spirit. I think I probably sound like a North Korean propaganda statement here now, but it's not going to be in spirit with the diplomatic efforts that are happening.

I'm not sure the South Korean administration would want to risk their engagement with North Korea. If they do go ahead, though, in 2019, there are multiple options for reducing the scale and scope of the exercises. And as you alluded to, that could be anything from reducing the amount of strategic assets the US sends and the bomber runs, holding back from having troops storm the beaches, which actually didn't take place in 2018.

But I actually think that was because of a weather front that moved in rather than efforts to descale the exercises. There is also the option to take the exercises off Peninsula. I'm not entirely sure that at this stage, if the decision is taken now, there's enough time to plan for that to happen. And it would also create a quite big vulnerability gap on the Peninsula if a significant portion of Assets are taken away to exercise elsewhere.

I'm just not convinced there's enough time to make that happen for the spring of 2019.

Andrea 12:42

It's interesting. So the point you make actually about Mattis is a really interesting one. And I think you're right. Especially given what we were just talking about, that there's potentially going to be a Trump-Kim summit In between now and when Full Eagle happens, you can't rule out the possibility that given the seeming ad lib that happened by Trump in the Singapore summit about military exercises, that this happens again at Trump Kim version two, and you get some change to whatever the plan is that the military establishments are working on for that exercise that occurs at the political level.

You know, I think that's right. That can't be ruled out. So even if what he's speaking about now is a reflection of the current state of planning, that may not be the current state of planning, you know, come Trump-Kim summit number two.

Cristina 13:38

But

Andrea 13:39

I also wonder if some of it might have been to float to see what the reaction was like at this stage. And I need you to help jog my memory here because I can't remember when announcements are usually made about the occurrence of Foal Eagle and Key Resolve. And I feel like it's normally in the early part of a new year.

So you would normally get that in January or February rather than before Christmas. Is that right?

Cristina 14:09

From memory, and I would have to confirm this, but from memory, I think it would be after Christmas. The planning usually takes around six months. But whether or not that announcement comes at the beginning of planning, I would need to double check.

Andrea 14:25

Yeah. Whether or not that was intended, it has been interesting to see what reactions have occurred or not. We were both scrambling to see whether or not the North Koreans had reacted to that, given that they'd been reacting... Quite ferociously to really small scale exercises, exchanges that were taking place between Marines, I think it was, in October to November.

And so if they've been reacting badly to those, I was sort of expecting to see quite a fuss kick up over Mattis's comments on this one. Hamish, I haven't seen anything happen yet. You monitor this more closely than I do. Have they said anything about it?

Hamish 15:10

I haven't seen anything too expansive. They've concentrated more recently on the human rights issue. Issue that's been brought up. They put out a big statement on that and then they also reacted quite negatively to the big furor around the CSIS New York Times Sanger report about the missile bases. So that took them a week and a half to respond to by the way, week and a half, two weeks.

So they're taking their time building things. So something could be on the horizon. But yeah, as yet there hasn't been any kind of Massive reaction that you would expect from KCNA. But you're right, they did react quite negatively to other small-scale exercises. I believe it was the KME exercises as well. So if that's an indicator, then something big may be coming.

Andrea 15:55

Yeah, we've seen a lot of change in the language in North Korean media over the past month, month and a half or so. That's revived some of the enemy hostile language in terms of describing South Korea and the US and the human rights resolution in the UN has been one of the things that have kicked that up.

But going back to the point about for legal, if If Foal Eagle were to occur in the springtime, Christina, what would you think that means for the freeze for freeze arrangement that's kind of taking place without anyone talking about it as such?

Cristina 16:34

So I think firstly, it would depend on what those exercises look like. So although official sources deny they were altered in 2018, if you look at them closely enough, they absolutely were. Max Thunder was separated from Foal Eagle as a way to make Foal Eagle look smaller. Although it did happen later as a separate exercise, it was kind of portrayed as an effort to reduce in order to support diplomatic initiatives.

It depends if we're talking about just rerunning Foley at the same size as 2018 was. And if we are, I think that is not going to go down very well at all because the freeze of that level of exercise has set the baseline for engagement this year and I think that's almost been accepted as Well, if we are going to engage, this is the status quo context we're engaging in.

Andrea 17:28

So maybe we need to quickly remind our audience what the freeze for freeze arrangement actually is. Can you give us a little capsule sort of explanation of what that concept was, who originally came up with it, and what's happening now in relation to that idea?

Cristina 17:44

So the freeze for freeze agreement or arrangement was initially proposed by China A couple of years ago, it's something they've been pushing. And then it was formulated into a joint statement with Russia, I think in July 2017, Beijing and Moscow put out a joint statement suggesting that in order to initiate diplomatic engagement, North Korea on the one hand should stop missile testing and nuclear testing.

And on the other hand, the US and South Korea should suspend their joint military exercises. And actually, if I recall correctly, I think that proposal did only reference the large scale South Korean-US joint ministry exercises, which I thought was quite interesting. I don't think it's coincidental that in the three times that Kim met Xi Jinping this year, he then started to initiate some of these steps.

I think that's obviously correlation doesn't always equal causation, but I think in this time, it definitely has a good relationship there. But I think Kim's gone a little bit further. He's not just stopped the nuclear testing and the missile testing. He's decided to also blow up the tunnels of the test site, which I think is maybe something Beijing pushed him to do to really demonstrate commitment, or maybe it's something he chose to do to add a little bit of showmanship to the whole process.

But I think that's definitely set the status quo for engagement. If Foley goes ahead in 2018, would it damage that? I think it definitely has the potential to, but I think it would really highlight one of the, for me, one of the major weaknesses in the process that's kicked off this year in that I don't think it would damage too much the South Korean, I don't think it would damage too much the South Korean, North Korean track.

That in turn would actually damage the US-South Korean relationship. And I think that's, Quite a big risk, actually, that if the inter-Korean track continues and the US-North Korea track collapses, where are we left then, especially in terms of relations between the US and South Korea?

Andrea 19:54

Yeah, it would be interesting to see whether the North Koreans feel that they have to unfreeze something on their side in reaction to those big military exercises, which are traditionally the ones that they protest against most.

Cristina 20:10

But just on that note, I think one of the reasons we're in the position of being able to have engagement with North Korea is because of the successful long-range missile tests they were able to conduct last year. I think it opens the question to the level of confidence they have in those capabilities. Would they risk going back to that level of testing straight away and potentially weaken the position they're in right now if those long-range tests hadn't been successful last year?

Would Kim have been as willing to come to the table and engage? And if he did choose to reinitiate long-range missile tests and they fail, what does that mean? So I wouldn't suggest that that would be the go-to response for North Korea in this circumstance. It would go back to the testing levels of 2017.

Andrea 20:59

Also, if North Korea might want to do Something not totally dissimilar to Iran in the face of U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, which is keep the good guy ground, or at least some sort of pattern of action that allows them to purport they're the ones who are behaving in the face of reckless and hostile U.S. action, right?

So I could see continued restraint, even in the event that full legal goes forward. Hamish, let's talk a little bit about some of what's been happening on the inter-Korean front, moving away from the US-North Korea dialogue. So South Korea finally got the green light to go ahead with its planned rail survey in North Korea. That was part of its package of measures that was agreed to at the September Pyongyang summit between Moon Jae-in and Kim Jong-un.

And I think actually today is when they're starting that rail survey, is that right?

Hamish 22:02

Yeah, so they kicked off today. It's an 18-day survey. 18 days will be spent in North Korea, sorry, but 16 of those days will be conducting the survey up the western and eastern corridors of the peninsula.

Andrea 22:19

And this was controversial because it... Even just the survey, not actually the rail project itself, were they to move forward with that. Even that survey involves moving sanctioned commodities into North Korea in the form of certain equipment, et cetera. And so Seoul had to seek a sanctions exemption from the UN in order to go forward with that.

And it got that exemption a few weeks ago and then basically plowed straight ahead to make sure that it was able to get this survey done by the end of the year. What did we learn from the process that South Korea had to go through in order to secure the exemption? And here I'm thinking about sort of the background discussion with the US, the way they communicated that this activity had been signed off internationally, etc.

Hamish 23:09

Yeah. So, I mean, initially what they wanted to do was, like you said, plow forward with the project and plow forward with inter-Korean engagement while the U.S. engaged North Korea. And they moved too quickly for the U.S. liking, you know, while Pompeo... Reiterates that South Korea and the US are in lockstep with each other. You didn't have to scratch very far below the surface to see that that wasn't the case.

If you just look at Moon's visit to Europe, he was actively lobbying against the US position. He wanted sanctions rollback, sanctions relief in order to advance things. And they wanted to do that on the rail front specifically. So the process that they went through was negotiations with the US. I think key for that was the formation of the working group that allows them to coordinate better.

And to go back to Pompeo comments again, he said on November 20, which was the day that the working group kicked off, He said that the U.S. had made it very clear to the South Koreans that they view denuclearization and inter-Korean detente as approaching in a parallel track. They're in tandem with each other and one can't outstretch or outpace the other, right?

Andrea 24:24

Yeah, I think the phrase was inter-Korean rapprochement cannot proceed ahead of denuclearization or something along those lines. Yeah, exactly.

Hamish 24:33

So... The working group serves as a mechanism to be able to allow for the two countries to better coordinate on that front. I think it's a necessary working group. And for the South Koreans, it's already produced the initial exemption, which, like you said, involves some goods that pertain to machinery and railway tracks and things like that, that Need to be exempted in the future as well, but also oil and fuel, which is currently under UN Security Council caps and measures also.

So, for instance, the six to seven cars that the South Koreans are sending north, one of them is a 55,000-litre oil tanker. So... Storming that into the DPRK without an exemption would have kicked up a bit of a storm. So the working group and that process was entirely necessary. The South Koreans have been able to take a positive step forward that they wanted in engaging with North Korea.

So that seems to be the new consensus behind the scenes, that there will be a better coordination, South Koreans have to slow down a bit, and then they can get at least some of the exemptions that they need to push things forward.

Andrea 25:46

And we've seen that today as well. Just today, there was some headlines about how South Korea secured an exemption for moving commodities into North Korea related to the connection of a military hotline. So copper and fiber optic cabling and that sort of thing. And that's been put out into the media. So it's well known that South Korea has a...

You know, go forward stamp on its activity.

Hamish 26:09

And the South Koreans, with their public language, they're keen to do two things primarily. Firstly, that they're keen to show that they're making progress, that they're getting exemptions. And then secondly, they're also messaging towards the U.S. that they're being extremely careful about the sanctions involved now. So, for instance, today there was a comment from Eugene Lee, who is the deputy spokesperson for the South Korean Ministry of Unification, Lee was talking about the fuel that's going north, and he said the following quote, which is, we are carrying some in reserve, of course, but we plan to bring back all of it if there is any left.

Andrea 26:46

Just in case you were wondering.

Hamish 26:47

Just in case you were wondering, we're not going to let a drop stay in North Korea if there's some left. So yeah, they are very keen to promote the fact that progress is being made, but they're also very keen to let the US know that they're being precise and careful about what they're doing in the framework of the existing sanctions.

Andrea 27:05

How important is the rail project to inter-Korean rapprochement and the broader effort that Moon is undertaking here? Is the rail survey really just a tiny piece or does it actually have a much bigger value than people might naturally assume on the basis of what on paper is just checking up to see what can be done on inter-Korean rail links?

Hamish 27:29

I think it's a bit of both, actually. It's minor in terms of the scope and scale of what Moon wants to achieve with North Korea, but it is in itself a significant project. So they're looking at 400 kilometres of rail on the west coast, about 800 kilometres of rail on the east coast. They're checking to see the viability of the railway, the damage that has been done over the years, and the modernisation and connection project that...

Is the next step for both Koreas is really significant, both in the cost and the time that the Koreas are going to spend on it. What's also significant is that it links up China and Russia to South Korea, ostensibly. The Chinese have already come out in favor of it, as they do with most engagement projects, and they've linked it as well linguistically to the Belt and Road Initiative.

It's got regional significance as well, which is an important point to make.

Andrea 28:29

One of the things I think has been really interesting in the South Korean messaging about this is that they've been saying that while the rail survey is going forward, the actual Construction of or work on any rail links will not proceed unless there's progress on denuclearization. So again, they're feeding back into that kind of US policy discussion on this.

Hamish 28:51

Absolutely. And it's worth noting as well that Mark Knapper, the acting assistant secretary of state, came out yesterday, I believe, or maybe it was Wednesday, and said the exact same thing. No appetite within the international community to allow the concrete sanctions exemptions and the broad sanctions exemptions necessary for the next step with the modernization and the construction unless there are concrete steps on denuclearization so the u.s messaging has been very clear on that as well they want to make it clear that this isn't a slippery slope exemption that this will lead necessarily to other broader exemptions unless north korea takes those steps to denuclearize and

Andrea 29:34

Christina, I don't know what you think about this idea generally, but I'd be really interested in your thoughts. It strikes me that the type of surveying activity that's being done here is actually quite a good idea from a strategic perspective, because what you're doing is, one, you're showing North Korea in concrete terms that there's a willingness to go further if this process can continue.

And by progress, I mean on denuclearization as well. And it presents, actually the survey gives you a very concrete map of what North Korea could have if this process is successful and makes further strides. So it strikes me that surveying activity is actually quite a clever thing to be doing, precisely because it shows North Korea what it could have.

Cristina 30:21

Definitely, I completely agree with that. And it also, I think, creates a model of engagement in other areas. And you mentioned denuclearization. Could some kind of inter-career and working group surveying different aspects of North Korea in different ways create a model that can be taken to the nuclear programme as well that's just kind of a spitball idea but whether or not establishing those processes establishing those connections essentially it's a bit of a trust and confidence building measure demonstrating how the two careers can work together in different areas before eventually applying that to the nuclear programme I don't know what that would look like and how the US would feel about just a purely inter-Korean process on the nuclear front.

But if it's going to get something tangibly changed with North Korea's nuclear program, maybe it's worth exploring.

Andrea 31:13

I think the thing that this does set up is, so if we're sending the message to North Korea that we'll do the rail survey, but you won't actually get the rail project until there's concrete movement on denuclearization, whatever that step on denuclearization is, Is in the first instance, so let's say it's dismantling the Yongbyon reactor or something, the sanctions relief, or at least Anna Voelker, Large scale exemption that would have to currently other end would have to be sufficient to facilitate.

Anna Voelker, The movement forward on the survey activity. Anna Voelker, And that's a challenge because actually you could envision from a sanctions perspective that are massive rail based infrastructure upgrade. Is going to require several different sanctions to be changed and the corresponding action from North Korea would have to be significant enough to warrant that. So it's a bit of a sticky kind of next step if you look at it that way.

But, you know, one I think can be worked through.

Cristina 32:19

It is, but I also think it's worth noting that the US need, in my opinion, need to see examples of how denuclearization and engagement with North Korea can progress Without a grand bargain agreement. And by taking this step-by-step, small exemption for small step on the nuclear programme approach, maybe that's why we're breaking the self-perpetuating US policy line of no sanctions relief until full denuclearisation.

Andrea 32:47

And I think there would be so many officials within the US outside of it in Europe as well, who would be on board with the idea of a phased approach, both to denuclearization and to sanctions relief. There are very few people I speak with who think that the all or nothing approach that at least some in the US community are taking is a sensible and realistic one.

And most seem to believe that That all or nothing approach, as we were talking about earlier, is really one that's going to get you nothing. So, yeah, it is a challenge, but interesting kind of movements here to watch in the next few months with relation to what the follow up is to the rail based surveys that are happening.

Speaking of infrastructure, Hamish, you've been paying some pretty close attention to Chinese infrastructure developments that are happening along the North Korea-China border. Tell us what you're seeing.

Hamish 33:48

Yeah, so I've been trawling the North Korea-China border a little bit lately using a fantastic tool called Planet Labs.

Andrea 33:58

A little bit, by the way, is a gross understatement.

Hamish 34:01

Yeah, yeah. A fair few hours looking at maps. When I close my eyes, I can still see the North Korean layout. But yeah, I spotted a few infrastructure developments and I concentrated on about seven of those developments, which all lie, interestingly, in Jilin province. So the other province is Liaoning that has locations like Dandong and Dalian and These pre-existing North Korea-China trading hubs.

What's interesting is Jilin is pushing forward with these infrastructure developments. And these range from maintenance of existing sites that lie at key crossings along the border, that lie in the immediate proximity of customs offices. So they're obviously linked to trade. And it's maintenance like road paving, leveling of earth, things like that. And then at the advanced level, at the other end of the scale, some of the construction that has come along is wholly new and very significant.

So what I'm seeing is a lot of that has developed since the beginning of this year, so a lot of infrastructure developments in 2018. But at some of the pre-existing sites, there has also been a relatively consistent pace of developments in 2017. Now, the 2018 construction is very interesting because it obviously shows that China wants to push ahead with, despite no sanctions exemptions yet, despite no real progress on denuclearization, they want to push ahead with upgrading the facilities that wouldn't necessarily have to be there to facilitate increased trade with North Korea.

But in 2017, the fact that they were progressing at a similar pace with some of those projects indicates a remarkable patience with the North Korean government. It's indicative of China's consistency with their foreign policy and their consistency with their stance with regard to North Korea. So comparing the two was also quite an interesting thing to do.

Andrea 36:09

Yeah, I found some of the spots you were looking at to be particularly interesting. And one that my colleagues at CNS and I keep a lot of watch on is the crossing at Musan and Nanping. So for listeners, there's a North Korean iron ore mine basically right on the border with China. And Anna Voelker, Musa and the mine itself is on the North Korean side, but the rail head that exports that iron ore into China is on the Chinese side at nanping.

Anna Voelker, As a bridge that goes across and the last shipment I think we actually saw so you can watch, for example in 2017 you can watch the pile up of iron ore on the rail head. As it gets exported into China. And I think September 2017 was the last one of those I saw. But now, as you noted in your article, there are a whole bunch of constructions on the neighboring processing facility for that iron ore.

So they've built like six massive buildings, covered shelters directly next to the rail head. And that rail crossing is really only used for exporting North Korean iron ore. So it suggests that At minimum, they're feeling at some point in the future, they're going to be able to make use of those buildings again.

Hamish 37:30

Yeah, exactly. I mean, you've got the larger compound to the north, which there have been some rather significant developments as well. But like you said, just south of the rail yard, which is purely for the processing of that transport of that iron ore, there are a lot of developments and the sort of warehouse shaped hollow buildings that they are constructing Could be used, obviously, they're located in the iron ore sorting yard, could be used to obscure the fact that iron ore is there.

Andrea 38:01

The fact that sneaky researchers are sitting on their laptops in London and watching them do it.

Hamish 38:06

They're trawling the border for hours so they can't see. You know, the Chinese would say, you know, it's to protect the iron ore from weather damage, etc., But, you know, given what we've seen... What iron ore, China? Yeah, eventually, when the sanctions are dropped. Yeah, but that is a very interesting spot where some of the more significant developments are happening.

There's also another one near the North Korean town of Chunggang. I've written that down so they don't Mispronounce it, Chunggang and Linjiang, where there is a little border crossing and a little customs office. But if you go a few kilometers south, there are about 10 to 12 new, incredibly large buildings. And it's inconclusive at the moment, but it looks like North Korea and China are building a new crossing there as well.

And that links up very nicely with Linjiang where North Korea traders have operated. And in fact, OFAC has actually sanctioned a couple of individuals that were acting on behalf of an already designated company making illicit transactions. So a few interesting bits and bobs along the border.

Andrea 39:12

What else did we miss out in terms of interesting stories from November? Is there anything else that we wanted to flag? I'm going to put the puppies. Christina, tell us about the puppies. They're going to go on the show notes. There's going to be a giant photo of the puppies on the show notes.

Cristina 39:29

Awesome. Sometimes you just need a lovely good news story and fluffy puppies is always a winner. It's almost like Kim Jong-un might have thought of that.

Hamish 39:40

Well, the dog that was given to Moon Jae-in would have had to have been pregnant at the time.

Andrea 39:46

Christina, tell us about what on earth we're referring to for those who don't follow the puppy exchanges between the Koreas.

Cristina 39:54

I mean, for me, it's a great way to do diplomacy. So Kim gifted two quite rare, I think, North Korean dogs to Moon. And they've ended up in a lovely, what looks like a lovely wooden kennel in the Blue House. And the female dog gave birth to puppies, I think, about a month ago now. And this week, the Blue House decided to release the first images of the six beautifully fluffy, lovely little puppies.

White little puppies. Yes, they're gorgeous. Hashtag symbolism, right?

Andrea 40:25

It is not a coincidence that the dog that is the symbol of inter-Korean rapprochement gave birth. So yes, good. That's good news story. Less good news story, employee at the French Senate getting tried for treason for giving French state secrets out to North Korea. Hamish, tell us about it.

Hamish 40:50

Yeah, so I'm going to try to pronounce his name again, but it's Quennedy or Kennedy. Apologies to every French person that listens to this and my horrible Australian accent. But yeah, this individual was detained this week and it appears that he's been charged with treason, essentially. He's an interesting character that fits the mold of a lot of other kind of North Korea sympathizers that we see.

A member of an organization that's essentially like the KFA, Korean Friendship Association, where they promote North Korean ideology. He's been quoted as saying things like, you know, Pyongyang's a wonderful place, North Korea's a wonderful place, there's no litter anywhere, so therefore, you know, They're not as bad as we think, you know, stuff like that. And I was looking for YouTube clips of him to see what other statements he made, thinking they were maybe on his own blog.

But it appears that he's a frequent contributor to Russia Today. So there are some interesting links to this fellow, but he seems to be in quite a bit of hot water at the moment.

Andrea 41:56

Speaking of Russia, can we talk about what hasn't happened yet? Noting that we've got only a few weeks on the clock until Christmas. There were a few high-level meetings that were, we thought, probably going to take place before the end of the year that look now that they may not. And namely, we were talking about a Kim Jong-un visit to Seoul, a Kim-Putin meeting at some stage.

And And I don't know where those are at. If you guys have any insights on where we are, Seoul and the Blue House seem to be keeping open the possibility that Kim Jong-un is still going to make it over yet. I feel like that's, you know, that sun is setting on the year, so they better move quickly if it's going to happen.

But I don't know. Hamish, what are your thoughts on this?

Hamish 42:45

Well, if you look at North Korean actions in the past, whether they be engagement or whether they be more provocative, they kind of end at November. You know, it kind of winds down a little bit at the end of November. Things reset in the new year.

Andrea 43:01

You joke, but we've had so many Christmases destroyed by North Korean activity. Rocket launches and Jansung Tech and all of that.

Hamish 43:12

Yeah, I mean... In terms of the diplomacy that was launched this year, it was very much in January. It was a new leaf, a new page after the last November launch. And so maybe they're looking for a bit of time to pause and then reset the diplomacy. There's the three main ones, Kim Trump, Kim Moon, Insol and Kim Putin.

And I wonder if Putin is keen to wait a little bit until next year to act as a bit of a spoiler as well for the Kim Trump. That would be very much in the Putin playbook.

Andrea 43:50

I still don't understand what is driving the pace and the nature of that high-level Russia-North Korea interaction. That one... Full transparency still completely misdivised me. So maybe we need to get a Russian guest on to tell us what's happening.

Cristina 44:08

I did wonder as well whether it's to some extent the joint proposal on the freeze-freeze agreement, whether it's just Russia trying to keep their toe in the game a little bit as well. If North Korea's actions were a result of his meetings in China this year, was Putin being put a little bit aside considering it was a joint proposal and actually...

The engagement with bilateral, not trilateral.

Hamish 44:30

In terms of keeping their toe in it a bit as well, they did the trilateral joint communique regarding sanctions rollbacks as well. So North Korea, China and Russia released that statement basically saying we should reward North Korea for the diplomacy by reviewing multilateral measures. So they're keeping in the game. They're there.

Andrea 44:52

Great. Well, I think we'll wrap up there. Thank you guys so much for joining me. It's been really fun to have you both on the podcast. And thanks for listening.