Quote of the week:
“Wake the damn Bambino. I’ll drill him in the ass.” — Attributed to Pedro Martinez, 2004, the year when the Red Sox broke the curse of not winning a World Series after trading Babe Ruth to the New York Yankees 86 years earlier.
Donald Trump announced at a campaign rally on Saturday that he will walk away from the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, a move that his National Security Adviser, John Bolton, has long endorsed. The reasons given for withdrawal are Russia’s deployment of a prohibited ground-based cruise missile and China’s stockpile of INF-range missiles.
There are effective treaty-compliant counters to the Russian violation by means of air-delivered and sea-based capabilities that the Pentagon is already pursuing. The White House could also leverage Vladimir Putin to return to treaty compliance by linking restraint on additional missile defense deployments in Europe to the removal of Russia’s noncompliant missiles. But neither Trump nor Bolton has demonstrated a fondness for diplomacy or an interest in reaffirming the INF Treaty. This move isn’t about linkage; it’s about freedom of U.S. action and a deep, abiding distrust of treaties. Trump’s withdrawal from the INF Treaty fits into an “America First” strategy that undermines diplomatic ties. That’s the take away by U.S. friends and allies — along with a foreboding sense of an intensified nuclear competition.
Highlighting the China angle for exiting the INF Treaty is new. Previously, Moscow complained more about this than Washington and Asian countries haven’t been overly alarmed about China’s nuclear-tipped missiles. Instead, they appear far more concerned about China’s growing conventional seapower and its investment strategies that are hard to turn down, but that offer too little in return for massive debt.
As in Europe, the Trump administration will have a hard time finding states in Asia willing to deploy U.S. nuclear-tipped missiles. Thirty-five years ago, the United Kingdom, West Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and Belgium agreed to deploy 572 nuclear-armed U.S. “Euro-missiles.” None of them appear willing to accept them now.
Nor is there likely to be enthusiasm among Washington’s friends or allies in Asia about hosting nuclear-armed, land-based missiles. Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Vietnam all seem unlikely to host these missiles. That would leave Guam, 4,000 kilometers from Beijing and 3,000 kilometers from Shanghai — hardly a decisive strategic counter, or a better one than sea-based options. The only argument for basing in Guam is that nuclear-tipped missiles can reach targets in China much faster than the aircraft based there — but not as fast as sea-based options.
The Asian country that has the most reason to be concerned by Chinese INF-range missiles is India. Indian strategic analysts have taken note of these missiles that are mostly deployed on the Tibetan Plateau — an all-azimuth basing location. New Delhi has responded in deliberate fashion with the 4,000 kilometer Agni IV and the 8,000 km Agni V missile. There’s no clamor within India for Washington to trash the INF Treaty, nor any inclination to rely on American INF-range missiles based in Asia. New Delhi believes deeply in its strategic autonomy; it’s not going to contract out deterrence to Washington. Nor are friends and allies that do rely on extended U.S. deterrence, whether in Europe or Asia, calling for the demise of the INF Treaty. They understand that nuclear dangers will grow in its absence and without an effective replacement.
Walking away from treaties has adverse diplomatic and strategic consequences. When the George W. Bush administration announced its withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2001, the Kremlin responded by withdrawing from the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and its prohibition on land-based missiles carrying multiple warheads. The Kremlin is now moving forward with deployments of new “heavy” land-based missiles capable of carrying ten or more warheads. Their purpose is to defeat U.S. missile defenses. Likewise, the demise of the INF Treaty would only reinforce the nuclear competition now underway.
The missing piece here is diplomacy. Shoring up nuclear deterrence is about clarifying threats. Diplomacy is about reassurance and reducing nuclear dangers. “Strengthening” deterrence without reassurance results in increased nuclear dangers. It also highlights the importance of congressional debates over the Trump administration’s defense budget allocations.
In coming debates over steel vs. silicon — choices between familiar, costly instruments of warfare we can see vs. techniques that are invisible to the naked eye — Capitol Hill appears hopelessly behind the curve. Yes, there is greater recognition of the threat of cyber warfare in all military domains, but meaningful, significant budgetary allocation shifts from steel to silicone are hamstrung by dearly held commitments that the naked eye and congressional constituencies can appreciate. Of these, the most expensive, most disastrous if employed, and the least likely means of waging warfare are with weapon systems dedicated to nuclear exchanges. Bad budgetary choices on can easily be accentuated by the decision of the Trump administration to walk away from the INF Treaty.
Note to readers: A version of this essay appeared in Defense News on October 21st.