North Korean Missile Lunch

Aaron Stein 0:01

Which is why I think we both advocate for somebody to go sit in the room and slide pancakes or pizza under the door.

Jeffrey Lewis 0:10

You are listening to the Arms Control Wonk podcast, the leading podcast on arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation. I'm Jeffrey Lewis, the founding publisher of the Arms Control Wonk blog and a scholar at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.

Aaron 0:28

And I'm Aaron Stein, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council's Rapid Career Center for the Middle East, talking to you today from a very, very, very snowy east coast of the United States.

Jeffrey 0:40

Are you on a ground floor or are you like down in your basement? I like to imagine you're in your Fuhrer bunker.

Aaron 0:46

My Fuhrer bunker is my spin studio. So no, I'm up at my kitchen, at my island, looking out the window, out to my driveway and across the street. And it's a winter wonderland here in March.

Jeffrey 0:57

Yeah, you know, it's frosty there, but things seem to be thawing on the Korean Peninsula. A group of South Koreans headed by the chief security, national security advisor to President Moon Jae-in went up and had a lunch with Kim Jong-un, his wife, his sister. And Kim Jong-un looked like he was having some real fun.

Aaron 1:23

Yeah, he was all smiles, partly. Seems to be enjoying his food. We actually wondered if he wasn't maybe a little bit drunk.

Jeffrey 1:32

Were there pictures of... Did you see the video? I haven't seen the video. No, no, no. Oh, the video is incredible. So he is laughing like... He's drunk on power or just straight up drunk. And when he walks the South Korean delegation to their cars to take off, he waves goodbye at them. Like, so he's like standing there waving.

I think his wife is next to him. Like, it's... I mean, obviously it was intended to convey conviviality and friendship and, you know, we'll talk about whether... There's anything behind all of that, but at just some level, it was... It was so, so over the top that it's hard not to watch that video and giggle. You know, it's like it's like the ending of a reality show, like an episode where they're like waving goodbye as their newfound friends go back to South Korea.

Aaron 2:34

So maybe like on a scale of like one glass with dinner towards Sandenberg exploding on television, maybe somewhere in the middle.

Jeffrey 2:44

I think if we were going to do this as a quiz, it would be, you know, how many glasses of soju did Kim Jong-un have? Is it A, 0, B, 1, C, 2, or D, more than 8?

Aaron 3:04

Which we call the full number.

Jeffrey 3:08

He looked pretty happy. And I'm studiously avoiding saying the South Korean National Security Advisor's name, Mr. Chung, because there's no way I can manage his given name. But Mr. Chung then gave a readout to reporters in South Korea where he then said that they had a deal. I thought we'd talk about that, because I'm not sure that they really do have a deal.

But also, I'm not going to be totally glum about this. I mean, there are a lot of people right now on Twitter and on TV who seem really dreary about the prospect that we're all going to get to live a little bit longer.

Aaron 3:51

Well, not if you drink as much as Kim Jong-un. But... I think we should go start down with the basics of the agreement and then we should go over what was in the readout. I think that's a good place to start.

Jeffrey 4:05

Right. Well, so and I think it's important to know, as far as I can tell, you know, the readout is the agreement or our knowledge of the agreement comes from the readout. So we don't we don't have anything other than what the South Koreans said. And that's a that's a problem, as we'll talk about. But the five points that are worth discussing are one, they establish or reestablish the hotline.

Two, they're going to have another inter-Korean summit. Three, Kim Jong-un agreed to the goal of denuclearization and said that it could be on the agenda for talks with the United States. Kim Jong-un also said that North Korea would refrain from provocations such as nuclear or missile tests while engaged in a dialogue with the United States. And Kim Jong-un said that North Korea would not use conventional or nuclear weapons against South Korea.

So... On the surface, all nice things to say. I mean, we can we can complain about sincerity and trust me, I'm going to complain about sincerity. But, you know, imagine if he said the opposite at lunch. I'm keeping the nuclear weapons. I'll test them what I feel like. And by the way, if it goes down, you're going to eat it.

That's not very nice.

Aaron 5:27

Right. So the gregarious behavior, the sort of swaying goodbye coupled with the five points here in this statement, this isn't a bad thing.

Jeffrey 5:41

Don't we all say things when we drink that we mean at the moment? I mean, you very sincerely mean them at the moment you are saying them.

Aaron 5:56

You're amplifying your own deep personal thoughts because your filters are a little down.

Jeffrey 6:00

Yeah. I mean, there are some things I want to talk about because I am not... I am... I am... I have low expectations, but... On the other hand, I mean, I'm serious when I say, like, don't act so glum that you get to live a little bit longer. Like, baby steps. You know, this is better than the alternative, so be happy about it.

Even if, at the same time, we don't go ahead and exaggerate, you know, what basically is one lovely lunch in Pyongyang.

Aaron 6:37

Yeah, and so, I mean, let's just dive into it. I mean, so, we've said the nice things about it. We've joked about Kim Jong-un maybe having a little too much of the Jesus juice. So, but let's try and be good.

Jeffrey 6:50

Isn't that what Michael Jackson called booze when he was trying to molest children? It could be. It could be. This is your scarred childhood?

Aaron 7:03

Yes. But so what do we see as the problems and potential issues with these five statements? Because certainly the hotline is not controversial, nor is the follow-up summit at the end of April. It's the other things that I think are where details will matter and more than just bullet points or read-out statements.

Jeffrey 7:26

Yeah, I mean, I think the first thing I'll say is that a hotline is good. You know, there's a hotline at Panmunjom. We've talked about how inadequate that device is. It seems from the readout that you're going to get something better. And so the ability of the two leaders to communicate is a good thing. But it brings me to my first observation, which is kind of a story.

Which is, you know, sometimes when you have only one side's version of events and that side is describing what the North Koreans said, you may not get things exactly right. And, you know, I always go back to the failed 2012 Leap Day deal. When the U.S. decided for reasons that are bad to instead of reaching an agreed statement with the North Koreans on the resumption of denuclearization talks, the United States agreed to do parallel unilateral statements with the North Koreans.

And so we had the U.S. version of what the North Koreans said, but then we also had the North Korean version of what the North Koreans said. And almost immediately reporters noticed that those two things were not the same. And when reporters asked State Department officials about it, the State Department officials acted like jackasses and really denied that there was any difference.

And pretty soon we found out that there were differences. And there was a big one, which I think Mark Fitzpatrick was the first person to notice, which is the American statement said that the North Koreans would not conduct tests of missiles, long range missiles of any kind. And the North Korean one just said long-range missiles. And they omitted the diplomatic language that referred specifically to space launches.

And, you know, Fitzpatrick pointed at it. And then, like, two days later, the North Koreans said, oh, by the way, we're doing a space launch. And then the U.S. collapsed the deal because, you know, we were accusing the North Koreans of perfidy. Although, to be completely fair, in their version of the parallel unilateral statement, it absolutely did provide for a space launch.

And so, you know, I think that's a case where there was some inattention to detail by U.S. diplomats. And we don't ever like to admit that we make mistakes. I mean, no human being likes to do it. But particularly in our partisan political environment, you know, diplomats have to pretend they're perfect when, in fact, they're human beings who aren't.

And so, you know, I'm sure Mr. Chung is a very competent and capable person, and I'm sure he had a note-taker there. But even if they just stuck to the water, you know, you can make mistakes. So it sounds like it's a new hotline. A bunch of this other stuff sounds good. I think the first caution is we don't actually know because we just have the South Korean version of what the North Koreans said.

And the South Koreans may have made it sound a little better either because they were having such a lovely time or because they have a political incentive to do so.

Aaron 10:41

Sure. And when I first saw it is you can... The goal of denuclearization that at least the South Koreans transmitted is clearly aspirational. And the way I interpreted it, because I am an American, was that it was a perfect way to almost gain the upper hand over the silent partner At the table, at least there in spirit, which is the US and this current political moment we're in where pressure seems to be the only tool that the administration is entertaining as a means to try and begin talks about this denuclearization concept and what denuclearization actually means.

Jeffrey 11:35

Yeah, I mean, I want to talk both about pressure, but also about the way that the North Koreans phrased their commitment to denuclearization. A second story, though, that I want to tell, because I have my little list, which I think is the second caution before we talk about either of those things, is the North Koreans, sometimes when you agree to something with them, even if you do have an agreed statement, even if you do agree on the language, They have a very irritating quality of changing the meanings of things.

And my favorite example of this is, you know, we have this joint North-South declaration on denuclearization, which is a joint statement between the two countries in which both parties commit to not having nuclear weapons. The joint declaration also provides for neither party to build enrichment or reprocessing facilities. Almost immediately after signing that, South Korea realized that North Korea was building a giant reprocessing facility at Yongbyon.

Right. And asked the North Koreans about it. And to this day, that facility is called the Radiochemical Laboratory. Because the North Koreans are like, oh, that's not a reprocessing plant. That's a radiochemical laboratory.

Aaron 12:59

Let's not forget who we're dealing with here.

Jeffrey 13:01

You know, even if Kim Jong-un says, you know, I will destroy all my reprocessing plants, you know, you got to be like, and the radiochemical laboratories? Yes.

Aaron 13:11

Right.

Jeffrey 13:12

So, but we should talk about, so we should talk about those things. So we've got left on our list. We have to talk about the summit. We have to talk about the denuclearization. We have to talk about the promise not to do tests. And we have to talk about the promise not to nuke South Korea, which do you want to talk about first?

Aaron 13:31

I think it's because I brought it up. Let's talk about the denuclearization.

Jeffrey 13:34

So, the wording here, I think, is fairly important.

Aaron 13:41

Yeah, it's extremely important.

Jeffrey 13:42

Yeah, we have Chung's version of what Kim said. But, you know, it's... It's pretty general. You know, it was, it can be on the agenda. It was his, I can't remember if he said it was his father or his grandfather's dying wish. There are too many dead Kims now. I think he said it was his grandfather's dying wish.

But what he said was pretty general, you know, because it was couched in, and now, of course, I can't find the precise language, it was couched as North Korea would not need nuclear weapons if there were no threats to the country or to the leadership. Which, like... Okay? Right. Actually, true. Known to taxi drivers.

Aaron 14:49

That's right. It's Tom Friedman-esque in its analytical quality there.

Jeffrey 14:57

Yeah, and this maneuver actually was a favorite of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Cold War in the U.S. It's such a common thing to do that it has a name. It's called the Blue Sky Condition. Right. Which is, sure, we would be delighted to remove nuclear weapons from this particular country. As soon as the sky is blue, you know, there is not a cloud on the horizon, right?

Like once all security threats have been resolved, then of course we don't need the nuclear weapons, which is really the equivalent of like, sometimes you hear this in a modern sense. Like you will ask someone like, do you believe in nuclear disarmament? And they'll say, sure. And when we do that and you throw a party, I will come and I will bring my unicorn.

Aaron 15:43

Yeah.

Jeffrey 15:43

Yeah. Right.

Aaron 15:44

Like,

Jeffrey 15:46

I believe in denuclearization, but only once there are no threats. Like, then you don't actually believe in denuclearization, right? You believe that nuclear weapons are essential to dealing with a realistic depiction of the world. So I would not get too excited about that statement. No, no. I mean, nice that he said it's on the agenda. Like that gives us a little bit of face if we were to show up to talk.

So though I have the Trump talking points now that got emailed out this morning and we're not going to show up to the docs. But if we did, they at least wouldn't object to denuclearization being on the agenda, if only to tell us to go ourselves. Right.

Aaron 16:24

And I think we could talk about it. It would probably be wise to show up to these talks. I mean, I think so, personally.

Jeffrey 16:33

I think so, too, if only because of the other promise, which is no tests of missiles or nuclear weapons while in dialogue with the United States. Exactly. Which I'd like to get a freeze, but, you know, I think that works both ways. Explain. Because if we don't show up to talks, then the South Koreans have basically agreed to the North Korean framing.

Which is that they're allowed to test nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles as long as the U.S. refuses to engage in talks.

Aaron 17:11

This is what I was alluding to earlier. I mean, it's a very carefully worded statement. It's actually quite clever in that it reverses a lot of the pressure that the U.S. is trying to put on, and it drives schisms. And so you worry about this decoupling thing that we've talked about on previous podcasts about this.

Jeffrey 17:27

Well, this is the other story I wanted to tell. These are like annals of bad Obama-era diplomacy. Do you remember the zombie fuel swap with Iran?

Aaron 17:36

I'm a Turkey expert. I am intimately familiar and have heard many Turks yelling about that. So yeah, let's tell the listeners.

Jeffrey 17:44

I've heard many a Brazilian yelling about it. For listeners in... 2010, the Obama administration had a great idea. You can't see me making very sarcastic air quotes. They wanted to get the Turks and the Brazilians to agree to a new round of sanctions on the Iranians, because I guess at the time they were both rotated onto the Security Council?

Yeah, they were both non-permanent members. And so they had this, the Obama people had this brilliant, flippant idea where they would encourage the Brazilians and the Turks to go get an agreement from the Iranians, basically to swap some enriched uranium in exchange for completed fuel assemblies for the Tehran research reactor. It was kind of a small confidence-building measure.

Aaron 18:31

Right, and it was modeled on a U.S. effort that had failed previously.

Jeffrey 18:36

Right, and really the idea here was the U.S. effort hadn't really gone anywhere, and they're going to object to me saying this, and there's going to be howls of protest, but whatever. They, I believe, figured that because we had tried and it hadn't worked, we would let the Brazilians and the Turks try and it wouldn't work. And when it didn't work, they would see that the Iranians are obstreperous and unreasonable and they would support a new round of sanctions.

The problem is the Iranians agreed.

Aaron 19:09

Yeah, you know, and that should be, is that the terms of the deal were altered to such a state that it was favorable to Iran at that point and not to the initial intent of the deal. But the Turks and the Brazilians didn't care.

Jeffrey 19:21

Well, I don't know if it's that they didn't care. I mean, they were getting, you know, what I think was happening is Washington was giving them the green light because Washington thought that the Iranians would never agree. And Washington didn't want to complicate their pretty narrative that... It was all the Iranians' fault. So Washington, I think, failed to warn the Brazilians and the Turks that the agreement was getting worse the longer it took to reach it because they didn't want to be seen as at all responsible for its collapse.

They wanted the blame entirely to fall on the Iranians. But yeah, the Iranians waited long enough until it was a pretty good deal for them, and they were like, okay, we'll do it. And then we had to say, no, no, no, we don't agree. Right. Which then sucked all the wind out of the sails of that sanctions effort for, you know, a non-trivial period of time.

Aaron 20:11

Right. I mean, to be clear, they were non... I mean, they didn't have veto power, and so it ultimately didn't stop the sanctions, but... I can tell you that the fallout between the U.S. and Turkey and NATO ally now seems pretty laughable compared to all the shit that's going on in bilateral relations. It wasn't a happy time.

Jeffrey 20:29

Yeah, and the Brazilians were pissed too. And I think that what's likely to happen now... Is that the South Koreans have accepted the North Korean frame, which is when the U.S. shows up to talks, then we'll take a break from all the testing and we won't engage in any provocations during the talks. Asterisk, he didn't say long-range missiles of any kind, so you might still get a space launch.

But I don't think the U.S. is going to show up to talks. You know, I got the Trump talking points this morning and it's still the same. Which is North Korea must take concrete steps toward denuclearization before we're willing to talk to them. And so what will happen is, you know, they're going to do another missile test and Nikki Haley is going to be like, you know, I think she'll show up and ask for sanctions and they will have pulled off the trick of making the North Koreans the sympathetic party.

Aaron 21:23

I think that's exactly right. And so when I saw the initial five readout points, I was like, oh, that's real clever. Real, real clever because these guys won't be dexterous enough to bend and try and take yes for an answer and then try and flip that leverage backwards.

Jeffrey 21:38

Right. I think the smarter thing to do would have been to say, look, we have all these concrete proposals, but or all these concrete steps that we require. But, you know, in light of the opportunity, we're prepared to make a short term exception and at least sit down and see how it goes. Because honestly, like. Stopping the North Koreans from conducting tests of their ICBM and stopping them from conducting further development tests of their solid-fueled missile program.

Like, I'm already wasting a shit ton of money paying Rex Tillerson to do Jack Taco. Like... Like, I don't, like, I don't care. Like, we're lighting that money on fire anyway. Like, if we just want to lock him in a little room with some North Korean, and the LSE talks are ongoing, you can't test anything. Like, that's a win-win.

Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah. You know what we can do? We can feed them pizza for dinner and pancakes for breakfast because that way we can slide them under the door. We don't even have to unlock it.

Aaron 22:50

Yeah, no, I'm totally with you on this. You know, I am a big believer in bureaucratic working groups that have sort of nebulous end states where you can talk for a very long time. If during that interim talk things you don't like just get frozen. So this seems like an opportunity to have talks, maybe a little soju, you know, hanging out, getting to know one another, trying to get your hands on one of the Kim pins, and drag this thing out because you want to freeze.

Oh, my God.

Jeffrey 23:21

Can I have your pin? I've never thought to do that to a North Korean. I should bring some kind of pin with me, and I should suggest if I, you know, the next time I'm in close proximity with North Korean that we swap pins.

Aaron 23:33

Yeah, yeah, yeah. I think that's a goal of many North Korea watchers, including me, who's not really a North Korea watcher, but when I see the pins, I instantly want it. But I'm always too afraid to ask. But anyways, we're digressing.

Jeffrey 23:46

Well, I want to talk about pressure, too. Yeah, let's talk about it. Because I have a... So the question is, why did the North Koreans do this? And it goes back to my criticism of the Leap Day deal. Where I think the reason we screwed up in 2012 is we had the North Koreans all wrong. We thought that they wanted food aid.

And, you know, we told our big, powerful American story where the weak little North Koreans were cracking under our pressure and they desperately needed, you know, boxes of plumpy nut. And, like, that's why they agreed to this deal. And that's the story we like to tell because in this story we are powerful and righteous. But actually... I think the reason we screwed up is because that's not what the North Koreans wanted all along.

What they wanted was the space launch. They wanted to be able to do the space launch for the centenary of Kim Il-sung's birthday. And they were looking at bringing the pressure down across the board so that they could do this one thing. And my strong suspicion is that what the North Koreans want to do is they want to finish the testing cycle for the Hwasong-15.

And they want to bring the pressure down so that they can complete this really unusual event, which is... You know, entering into a mutual deterrence relationship with the United States, which really only two countries have ever done, right? The Soviets did it and we really didn't like it. And then the Chinese kind of did it, but they did it like in the 70s, really slowly at a time when relations between the US and China were getting much, much, much better.

So, you know, this is like the first North Korea is the first small vulnerable country to manage this transition. And I think they are interested in reducing the level of pressure. And I know that some people will say, oh, well, that means we shouldn't talk to them. But like, this is the story I want to tell from the Chinese, which is when the Chinese went through the nuclear part of their transition.

They felt an enormous amount of international pressure about atmospheric testing. Like a ton of pressure. They got, you know, just crapped all over. Crapped upon all over? I don't know what the right phrase is. But like when Zhou Enlai went to Africa, he got a real hard time about it. And it was such a pain for the Chinese.

Like there was a ton of pressure on them. But it wasn't enough pressure to get them to not build nuclear weapons. It was just pressure that made them engage diplomatically to try to minimize the pain that they felt while they pursued this other thing that they were going to do no matter what. So that's why actually the Chinese did airdropped nuclear tests, by and large, is they wanted to reduce the amount of fallout.

And they worked really hard to try to move testing underground, but they found that technically too difficult and couldn't do that to the 80s. And I would suggest that the reason they have a no first use policy and a whole bunch of historical arms control proposals is it was all about the diplomatic effort to reduce the international pressure on them that arose from their need to conduct atmospheric tests.

I think the North Koreans are in exactly the same spot, which is they want to finish testing the Hwasong-15. I hope they don't feel the need to do an atmospheric test for the warhead. And their goal is to reduce pressure. I don't think it works the other way, though. I don't think we have enough pressure that they will not do that.

They're going to do that one way or the other. They're just trying to temporize to make that as minimally painful on them as possible. So we should try to get something... Out of it from them because I think they're going to do it either way.

Aaron 27:25

Right. And so with this analytical framing, the policy option is simple. It's to try and prevent them from finishing this cycle, which is why I think we both advocate for somebody to go sit in the room and slide pancakes or pizza under the door. Oh, it can be both.

Jeffrey 27:45

It can be pancakes in the morning and pizza at night.

Aaron 27:47

Yeah, or both at once. Why not? Culinary delights from the United States. Pancakes and pizza. But yeah, I mean, this becomes a way to try and take away what they want, whereas if you don't show up, You don't take away anything, right?

Jeffrey 28:16

Yeah, I mean, I think we're at the point where they're going to do this whether we like it or not. If we show up at talks, it'll delay them because it's going to raise the price for them of testing. And so they'll probably slow down a little bit. And what we can use that pressure for... I think, is not to get things on the denuclearization side, which I just don't think is going to happen, but it's to try to get other stuff.

You know, like, whatever. We can say that missile tests are a provocation. And I think it's not nice when they fire things over Japan. But, like, I really want them to, like, not, you know, shell South Korean islands, not to put landmines in the DMZ. You know, like, there's a lot of other bad stuff they can do that aren't missile tests.

Missile tests actually are the least bad thing that they are capable of doing. I'd like them to not rub VX in people's faces in airports. That seems to be a trend that they've started. Yeah, I know! Catching on! Yeah. So, you know, like, I think they're, one way or the other, the North Koreans, oh, I can actually preview this.

The North Koreans are totally going to finish their ICBM. Do you know the best way that we could tell?

Aaron 29:42

Well, explain. This is lovely. I'm sure you have some sort of OSINT wizendry that you and your team have been working on.

Jeffrey 29:47

Yes, we do. This is Schmerler as geolocation Jesus. Right.

Aaron 29:52

Not to be confused with Jesus Jews.

Jeffrey 29:54

Yeah, so Schmerler and I picked out a launch site for the... The Hwasong-15. And it was one of a couple of candidates. We had one we liked the best. But there was always this other candidate that we thought, like, we can't really exclude it. And so we were always, like, we never ended up publishing because we were, like, also looking at this other site.

And then we started to notice things happening at the second launch site, which we've now been convinced is the main one. They've built a giant memorial there to the Hwasong-15 test, and Schmerler's going to publish the satellite photographs.

Aaron 30:32

Ooh, when's that going to come out?

Jeffrey 30:36

Probably in the next day or so. I just have to give it a once-over, take a look. We've got a few technical problems getting the gallery to work. But yeah, Schmerler, not only did he find the launch site of the Hwasong-15 test, but we have watched them clear that space and put up a memorial. I've never seen a memorial to a missile test.

And, okay, it's small, and, like, yeah, okay, building a memorial doesn't mean that, you know, like, that you might not make a trade, but it kind of does. Like, you know, it's a sign of, like, what a big deal is, and my guess is that means that Kim Jong-un will be making a repeat visit at some point to that location.

So, you know, like... This is a big deal for them. No country that's built an ICBM capable of delivering a nuclear weapon has given one up.

Aaron 31:29

They're going to finish this.

Jeffrey 31:31

I just think that they're trying to reduce the overall level of pressure on them and danger as they do it. And, you know, like, I mean, it sounds weird because you kind of want to be like, well, we don't want them to finish, and so we should up the pressure. But actually, like, no, they're going to do this one way or the other.

The only question is, do they do it in a context that's, like, dangerous where we run the risk of stumbling into war? Or... Do we get ahead of the game and start focusing on stability? And, like, nobody wants to do that, but that's the lesson of the nuclear age. Nuclear weapons force you to collaborate with your enemies because you share an interest in survival.

Aaron 32:12

That's why nuclear weapons are bad. Right, that's why nuclear weapons are bad. And ultimately, I think, wraps us up nicely, which gets us to sort of the meat of their own statements about the value to nuclear weapons as translated by the South Koreans.

Jeffrey 32:26

Yeah. And so, you know, I think that we're kind of in a nice spot where we can probably delay some of the stuff right now if we were to show up to talks, because also they're not going to want to mess up the inter-Korean summit that they're going to do. And that'll probably take us through late April in a relatively calm and relaxed manner.

By the way, fun fact, you know who was in charge of the committee organizing the inter-Korean summit? That president? No. Did in, I guess it was 2007, 2007, no, Moon Jn Moon was his chief cabinet secretary but he also served as the I think it's like the chairperson of the inter-Korean summit, but so the reason that this matters, right, is that.

Historically speaking there's been a little bit of there's been a little bit of money that changes hands there's a little grace yeah you know and it was rumored to be well not rumored there was an investigation in South Korea at the 2000 summit I think it was like 500 million dollars The 2007 summit doesn't seem to be as much, but there was, like, a lot of, like, gift-giving, and I'm guessing there's some overpayment and other techniques by which money changes hands.

So, I don't, again, like, I don't mind bribing people to behave well, like... That's way cheaper than all the alternatives. But there will be people in South Korea who don't want this summit. And my guess is I would brace myself for leaks indicating that money had changed hands. And whether those leaks will be true or not, they certainly seem to have been true in the past.

Aaron 34:37

Yeah. I mean, so I guess the takeaway is that we're going to see a lot more about this coming up before the inter-summit. And then probably the most predictable actor in this will be the Trump administration because they seem to be stuck on talking points and not willing to budge on that.

Jeffrey 34:56

We're just going to see a lot of Mike Pence's resolve face. Hopefully there'll be another sporting event at which he can throw a temper tantrum, which is the arena in which he seems to really, really exceed. Maybe they can get him to go to the NBA finals and, I don't know. Do a walkout. Poop on a Kim Jong-un doll or something.

I don't know. His resolve face looks like constipation. I guess that's unkind. I mean, I just look at Mike Pence and like some people see the steely resolve of a tough man. And I just see a guy who needs some mucilix and maybe some medication to like ease things out.

Aaron 35:37

Is this where I should talk about the Slack channel? Because Scott's having some technical difficulties and his microphone isn't working.

Jeffrey 35:43

Yeah, Aaron, why don't you tell me about the Slack channel? I've been totally negligent on the Slack channel because my life at the moment is flipping insane in the membrane.

Aaron 35:53

Well, if you'd like to know more about Mucilix constipation and Jeffrey's travels throughout Germany, which links all this together, we have a long dialogue about this and other technical issues.

Jeffrey 36:03

Yeah, I was not constipated in Germany, that's for sure.

Aaron 36:07

About this and other arms control and nonproliferation. If you want to join in the conversation, of which Jeffrey should get more involved in, you can head on over to our Slack channel, which is... To our Patreon page, excuse me, which is... Hold on. Which is patreon.com slash ACW podcast for $5 a month. You can get access to our Slack.

And if you're a student, that drops down to $3 a month. And you can come join the conversation and talk about all this fun stuff.

Jeffrey 36:38

Yeah, and I think we are moving forward on our first interesting satellite project.

Aaron 36:45

Yeah, I mean, we have been talking about this for a while, but it's definitely coming.

Jeffrey 36:50

Yeah. No, no, it is. I've got a good one. I just need to organize my life and present it.

Aaron 36:55

Well, Aaron, thank you for joining me. Always a pleasure.

Jeffrey 37:00

And thank you for listening.