Kim Jong Un’s 2019 New Year’s Day Speech

Jeffrey Lewis 0:05

You are listening to the Arms Control Wonk podcast, the leading podcast on arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament. I'm Jeffrey Lewis. I'm the founding publisher of the Arms Control Wonk blog and a scholar at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.

Aaron Stein 0:21

And I am Aaron Stein, director of... The Middle East program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. New title for a new year.

Jeffrey 0:28

Yes, this is a year of many changes. You have a new job. That's right. My view outside my office is totally different. I saw Corey Shockey was congratulating you, but crying as they lost out. You've got a new employer.

Aaron 0:48

I do, I do, and Corey is a very, very nice person and didn't actually have to tweet that, but I thank her anyways. I do. We all love Corey. It's a little closer to home and just a little broader portfolio. Now I have to do all the Middle East, not just focusing on Turkey with some podcasting and nukes.

So I have to do all of the Middle East in podcasting and nukes.

Jeffrey 1:07

Yeah, this is going to be... I think this podcast, we're going to talk about North Korea. It's the New Year's Day speech. It's the thing we're all supposed to discuss. But there's also some housekeeping to talk about. So you've got a new job. I am going to spend the entirety of January in Middlebury, Vermont, teaching a class.

Aaron 1:30

That is a... My wife went to school there. That's going to be an interesting experience, I think, for you and the family.

Jeffrey 1:37

Well, so we're still deciding whether to bring the family. I've got the house rented, but I don't know if we want to take the kids out of school. We really need to make a decision because I'm getting on a plane Saturday, and the question is, do we bring them for part of it? Skiing is apparently good. It's very cold.

Aaron 1:55

Very cold and not a lot to do.

Jeffrey 1:57

Well, that just means I'll have more time for podcasts.

Aaron 2:01

Well, there you go. I think it's been a while, you know, because for listeners, I go to Turkey for... The holidays basically every year and I don't take my computer for a number of reasons. And so there is no podcasting in Turkey. So we've sort of been off for a while.

Jeffrey 2:19

We have, we're going to make it up. We're going to have podcasts. We've got a ton of stuff to do in the future. We've got to do Russia's avant-garde launch. I was so pleased that we geolocated the silo and got that beautiful planet image of the tracks and the snow.

Aaron 2:34

Yeah, yeah, yeah, that's on Twitter. I think we're going to bring on a friend of the pod, James Atkins.

Jeffrey 2:38

Yeah, we've got to work out his schedule. We want to do that. We're eventually going, you know, as I think everybody can see the day that we're recording this, Mike Pompeo has started talking about the coming Iranian space launch, which is a thing that Fabian Hinz, friend of the pod, but he noticed a couple of weeks ago that the Iranians look like they're probably going to do a space launch maybe in early February.

And we're just waiting for a nice clear picture. Unfortunately, it's been cloudy.

Aaron 3:09

As somebody who just returned from the Middle East, it was a little rough weather over there.

Jeffrey 3:15

We also, by the way, we have some cool North Korea geolocation stuff. Even more nerdy than normal. Yeah, this is exceptionally nerdy. I don't think anyone else will care, but it was like a two-year passion project for Dave Schmerler and I, and we finally finished it before he got on the plane, and he relocated to D.C.,

Aaron 3:32

I was about to say, because he's now tweeting when I'm awake. Sorry, he is now liking my tweets when I'm tweeting early in the morning East Coast time, so I knew he had moved.

Jeffrey 3:41

And I think at some point we'll have to have Melissa Hanham on because she has left to start Deteo, which is a kind of startup. Well, I don't really know how I would describe it. I better let her describe it. But we basically, it's a skeleton crew here at the moment down at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies.

I occasionally check in on Anne Pellegrino to make sure she doesn't have a cold or hasn't been hit by a bus because...

Aaron 4:09

You're decamping for Vermont.

Jeffrey 4:10

And I'm decamping for Vermont. Yeah, there's not going to be anybody here. So, yeah, anyway, that's all the stuff. Well, that's not even all the stuff. There's some other Middle Eastern research projects that we're expecting to drop relatively soon.

Aaron 4:27

Yeah, we've got to keep it quiet, even though I'm excited for it. It'll be a fun one.

Jeffrey 4:31

Yeah, so anyway, all that stuff is going to come out, which is just my way of apologizing that we're going to do yet another North Korea podcast. Oh, you're probably all listeners tired of North Korea.

Aaron 4:44

I'm tired of North Korea. Let the listeners in behind the curtain here. We struggled for a good 30 minutes, I would say, to try and figure out something to talk about other than North Korea, but then we ultimately decided we still have to talk about North Korea.

Jeffrey 4:56

Well, we had a whole bunch of great ideas, but they're all ideas that will be better next week.

Aaron 5:00

That's right. So that's why we gave the listeners a little bit of a foreshadow, is that the right word, for what's coming up next? Yeah, I think so. Just to...

Jeffrey 5:09

Just to apologize. Because really, I think I'm tired of North Korea too. You know, I'm not tired of North Korea as a country. I am tired of being in the same deadlock that we have been in since June and that many of us predicted would occur from the get-go when this whole process started in March. Like, I am tired of saying the same thing over and over again.

I don't know. How do you feel, Aaron? I mean, is this just what like life dealing with like Middle Eastern IR issues is like?

Aaron 5:48

Yeah, I mean, a little bit. Yeah, I mean, you're just in the stasis. There's no real movement. The issues are the same. And the conundrums, or at least fallacy, in how both sides are approaching this just don't seem to ever be reconciled. But I guess that's why they call it diplomacy.

Jeffrey 6:12

I guess. You know, so for listeners, every year, the leader of North Korea, in this case, Kim Jong-un, the last few years, gives a speech on New Year's Day. And that is the speech in which Kim Jong-un outlines the priorities for the coming year. And it's usually a very good indicator of what to expect. So in 2017, Kim made clear that they were going to do an ICBM test.

And hey, that happened. And in 2018, Kim made clear that he was ready to talk and that there was going to be a newfound focus on the economy and that they were going to shift away from testing, which was very politically provocative, to the mass production of these systems, which they did. So we're all kind of tuning in to see what 2019 holds.

And, you know, it's worth talking about the speech in some detail because doing propaganda analysis is important. It's a kind of big part of what we do. I know people focus on the satellite images a lot. But, you know, reading what the North Koreans say is as important. But my main takeaway is it's not really anything different than what the North Koreans have been saying at lower and less authoritative levels since the fall.

Aaron 7:34

As I read it, he seemed to be trying to strike a balance between... You know, continuing with some of the pledges he made in the 2018 propaganda speech, but also signaling some of his discontent about how the U.S. has handled its side in these weird negotiations that are going on with the Trump administration.

Jeffrey 7:55

Right, and I think, you know, the kind of... The important fact to keep in mind in interpreting what Kim Jong-un is saying is understanding where the North Koreans think the negotiations are at the moment. And that's hard to do because particularly people who are supportive of the president tend to misrepresent what happened at Singapore. And so then it becomes a kind of You know, it becomes a partisan food fight if you're trying to explain what the North Koreans think happened, because they think something very different happened, right?

Whereas Donald Trump continually says the North Koreans agreed to give up their nuclear weapons, which I don't think they did, and the North Koreans certainly don't think they did. You know what the North Koreans thought? Is that the Trump administration had decided to put the issue of disarmament aside and had instead accepted this formulation of denuclearization, which is like a process by which the United States removes its ability to threaten North Korea.

It stops threats, but also the United States would remove various forces. And the North Koreans are never very specific about which forces those would be. But the North Koreans thought the United States basically agreed to take the pressure off Understanding that as relations improved, then North Korea's nuclear weapons would recede into the background. And the example that I came up with, which actually got pinched by someone, was that, you know, the North Koreans think that they struck a deal to basically be like Israel.

If they stop talking about the nuclear weapons, we'll stop complaining about them. You know, some of my friends, actually, Vipin Narang thinks India is a better example. And I think Vipin and I have both agreed to say Israel or India. With double I's. Rather than belabor the fine nuances between which one is better. I love Vipin. But, you know, so the North Koreans say, and I think it's true, feel like They didn't get follow through on the deal they thought they had, which is that like exercises will stop, sanctions will come off, relations will dramatically change, and they will get all of that in exchange for an end to provocative tests and a kind of series of gestures in which they close some facilities to make like good news stories.

But never having to actually fork over nuclear weapons.

Aaron 10:31

Yeah, I wanted to talk about those gestures because the way at least that I interpreted the speech again was that Kim framed those gestures almost as if concessions. And that those gestures were then meant to elicit, I guess, positive inducements from the U.S. side. And that is where ultimately he signaled his discontent, is that in return for dismantling the engine test site or the offer to close the nuclear test site as well, he was expecting something more out of the United States, whereas the sanctions in particular...

Jeffrey 11:07

Yeah, this is the paragraph that I think is getting, I wouldn't say wrongly interpreted, but people are sort of really seizing on, and I think the context is very important. And I'll use the translation that the North Koreans gave, which is sort of fine.

Aaron 11:27

Funny. It's always slightly mangled.

Jeffrey 11:29

That's not important. It doesn't matter in this context, I think is the answer. Accordingly, we declared at home and abroad that we would neither make and test nuclear weapons any longer, nor use and proliferate them, and we have taken various practical measures. Now, Much of that, as James Acton has pointed out, comes from the April 20th statement in which North Korea said it wouldn't use or spread nuclear weapons.

We already knew that they wouldn't test them. Actually, that's in that same statement. But the kind of the would neither make and test, like make it should be, you know, make nor test, but make is new. And so some people were sort of wondering, like, is that a new pledge? And I think in context, it's clear that it's it's not because the context of this is saying these are the things North Korea has already done.

And those things have not been responded to. So, you know, my my view is make and test is is a reference to closing Punggye-ri and possibly a reference to the offer to close Yongbyon. And use and proliferate is definitely from that statement that James identified. And we have taken various practical measures, then very much emphasizes the three kinds of things that were either done or put on the table, which is closing Punggiri, sort of dismantling the engine test stand at Sohei, and then putting Yongbyon on the table.

So, like, in context, it's not a great... It's not a great thing to hear because it's not him saying, this is what I will do. It's him saying, this is what we have already done and you have not paid for these things yet. And he is slightly exaggerating what they've done. As he should. As he should. It's exactly right.

As he should because he's negotiating. That's right. He's not supposed to talk down his offer. And I think people are taking the fact that he's exaggerating what he has done instead of being a kind of typical negotiating stance. They're sort of trying to see in that... Some possibility of a new pledge. But it's not. It's like, look, this is what we've put on the table, and if you, the United States, were willing to respond to that, bilateral relations will develop wonderfully at a fast pace.

Aaron 13:58

But if you don't... Well, I think within this context, I mean, before we get to that, because I know where you wanted to take that, before we get into the context of this sort of art of the deal, if you will, I think that's why they're shunning lower-level discussions, because they don't feel like they're... They're prepared to undertake them yet because they don't see, at least from the way they understand it, you know, reciprocal measures from the United States, their reward for the measures that Kim just sort of hinted at in the speech.

Jeffrey 14:25

Well, I think that's right. I mean, I think that the North Koreans, well, I don't know if they think this or if this is just how they've decided to play it, but Donald Trump is going to give them a different deal. Then is going to be offered at the working levels. You know, whenever Pompeo shows up, he is like, okay, I need you to give a declaration or I need you to like cough up some nuclear weapons or, you know, he wants to do like working level talks that will concretely discuss North Korea's disarmament, which is what he has publicly promised will happen.

You know, he wrote that article in Foreign Affairs in which he said they were going to get a deal with North Korea that was stronger than the JCPOA.

Aaron 15:07

It's so absurd.

Jeffrey 15:08

But yes, it would include access to key North Korean military facilities. It's just obscene, which, you know, and and so, you know, and famously when he was doing this to Kim Jong-un, Kim Jong-un took out his phone and waved it in his face and said, you know, you should call your president. So, you know, I think that the North Koreans have decided that meeting with, and this is why they've refused to meet with poor Steve Biegun, who I know people really respect Steve Biegun, but like he's an idiot if he thought the North Koreans were going to like meet with him to give up their nuclear weapons.

Aaron 15:40

Well, it seems like Pompeo was trying to retroactively resurrect what should have happened before the Trump-Kim visit. Right. Right. Do you know what I mean? Right. So he's sort of like trying to pretend it never happened and say, let's go back to working level and then you can have the big meeting later. It's like what when you've already given the big meeting, why would you give anything to the lower levels?

Yeah, that's right.

Jeffrey 15:58

You just wait for Donald Trump to show up and give you whatever you wanted. And so, you know, and Kim goes back to that, right, because he says, I am ready to meet with the U.S. president again any time. And will make efforts to obtain without fail results, which can be welcomed by the international community. Which, again, sounds really great and, like, nice and forward-looking, but it's...

I'm only going to meet with Trump. You know, Steve Biegun can, like, stand at the f***ing DMZ with his boombox playing Peter Gabriel all he wants.

Aaron 16:32

But, like... Our younger listeners may not know what that reference is. Well, they should... They should. Yeah, yeah. Google it. But I think that's where it comes to where you were hinting at before I took us off the sidechance, is that Kim made clear in the speech he was willing to again meet with Trump. And Trump has been clear that he's prepared to meet with Kim.

Jeffrey 16:59

Yeah, although, you know, it is interesting. Kang Tae-ho? Kang Tae-ho? No. Oh, I've done this. I've messed this up because... Conteo is someone else that's part of the geolocation thing I just did. Oh goodness, the defector from London. Just said he doesn't think Kim will do a second summit without sanctions relief. Tae Young Ho. Tae Young Ho.

Aaron 17:29

It's all Korean to me, man.

Jeffrey 17:30

Well, Kang Tae Ho is, in a later podcast, it's a name that's been on my mind a lot.

Aaron 17:37

Yeah, that's for the listeners. He's foreshadowing the wonky DPRK two-year project.

Jeffrey 17:42

Yeah, yeah. Kang Tae Ho was a plant manager. Of an important defense facility in North Korea. But Tae Yong-ho, who was a diplomat who was posted to London, who actually met in London at a track two, who later defected, he doesn't think Kim will take a second summit. I'm not sure I agree with him. But he is sort of of the mind that, like, having given Kim one summit, he's gotten what he really wanted, and that, like, absent sanctions relief, he doesn't think Kim will give Trump what he wants.

Although, again, I'm a little skeptical of that.

Aaron 18:27

What does Trump want? I mean that seriously. I mean, is it really actually clear if the president and his staff are aligned on the ultimate outcome of this?

Jeffrey 18:37

No, I don't think they are at all. I mean, I think Trump... I mean, we talked about it in the lead up to Singapore. But, you know, there's this passage in Fire and Fury, the much maligned Michael Wolff book that, you know, I get it. It's a collection of anecdotes by like a bunch of serial liars. And like none of it is true.

But like the problem with the entire Trump team is none of it is ever true. But I think one of the insightful things is how excited Trump was about the visit to Saudi Arabia. Not because he had any particular reason. Affection for or love of Saudi Arabia, but because he wanted to change the narrative from his troubles at home. And I think for Trump, like, this is a little bit like when Hillary Clinton greatly exaggerated the process of democratization in Burma, you know, the process that led to a horrible genocide. but it was like her one success.

You know, it was like the one thing she did as Secretary of State that she could point to that was like, here's a big win. And I think this is it for Trump. This is all he's got. And I, you know, I think he wants to have a meeting because it changes the narrative away from whatever news week he's having in D.C. You know, it looks on face like a victory.

I mean, the North Koreans aren't testing nuclear weapons and missiles. I mean, we we don't we don't. Think that that's a particular oh I don't know what the right way to say that is, because I don't want to denigrate. I like it that they're not testing them, but you know, like, that was a that was a that was low-hanging fruit given the given the situation. But whatever, that's what he's got. So I think he wants to do another summit so that he can have the pageantry associated with it, you know. And I think he doesn't care, you know, he's I I I will say this, I believe he is a traditional pre-World War II Taft-style isolationist Republican.

And I think he wants all of those troops out of South Korea, and he does not give a crap about defending South Korea. And so I think for him, if he could get a nice photo opportunity and get U.S. troops out of South Korea, I think he'd be very, very happy.

Aaron 20:55

Oh, that actually, when we were talking, we missed that. Let me ask you about that. The concern about funding for U.S. trips in South Korea also popped up over the Christmas holiday. Do you think it's linked to that?

Jeffrey 21:07

Sort of, yeah. I mean, I think the Trump people had been saying they wanted the South Koreans to pay more. I mean, well, I should say this. I think this is a very dangerous moment for the relationship because while I tend to think that Moon Jae-in is a far more pragmatic and centrist political figure, Then a lot of the American commentary paints him as like, I don't think he's just like a straight hard lefty.

A pretty big part of his base is very anti-American, you know, and he swallowed that fad deployment, which is why I think he's more centrist than people give him credit for. But like, I think there's a pretty big portion of Moon Jae-in's base that would love to see the United States leave. And so whatever he's willing to do in a kind of centrist way, he ain't paying more.

Like, you know what I'm saying? Like he's not going to pay more than Park Geun-hye paid. Like that's just not like, no. Right. And I do think that the Trump administration was pretty tough on them and wanted them to pay more. And they had 10 rounds of negotiations and it went nowhere. And, you know, the last reporting I saw is the U.S. said, well, why don't we roll over the SMA, the Special Measures Agreement, for another year?

And the South Koreans were like, well, you know, why don't you... You know? Scott, I got your intro. So, you know, I do think that... That's a real danger. And honestly, the place that I wanted to spend most of the time talking about the Kim speech, although we haven't gotten there yet, is I think Kim is really adroitly exploiting this.

Because if you look at the speech, the portions about South Korea are very positive. You know, all the progress that's been made. And again, I think they exaggerate the progress that's been made, but like, whatever, it's a New Year's speech. It's, you know, you don't tell it like it is, you tell it like you'd like it to be.

But, you know, underneath that veneer of positivity and, you know, Moon Jae-in said he thought it was a very positive speech. There are these subtle appeals to nationalism and they are implying that That the critics of the re-approachment between South Korea and North Korea are not good Koreans. So there's a point at which, and again, the translation is a little weird, but there's a point at which he suggests that all Koreans should be conscious of the fact that it's Koreans who are the masters of peace on the peninsula.

Right. And that and, you know, suggests that it's outside forces that are the ones that are responsible for the tense situation on the peninsula. And so, you know, that's really saying that people who are and that you've seen this in North Korean propaganda all through the fall, like the people who are critics of Moon Jae-in in South Korea, the North Koreans paint them as toadies of the Americans and the Japanese.

And so what causes me to be uncomfortable is About the current moment and the nature of this speech is when he says, look at all I've done this year, right? I've promised not to make and test the weapons. I've promised not to use and spread them. I don't think that is so much him saying like, hey, this is a good deal, take it.

I think he is talking to other audiences, including a lot of South Koreans, and he's saying, when this all collapses, it's not my fault. Look at what I put on the table and look at who made the decision to walk away from it. Right. So I think he I think Kim is positioning Trump to be the guy holding the bag and be the person who is responsible for the collapse of those negotiations.

And I think that it's, you know, a very effective way of painting the fundamental villain in terms of tension on the peninsula as not being North Korea, but being the American presence that, you know, he is going to assert is what is maintaining the sense of hostility. So, you know, that, you know, we say, like, what does Trump want?

Like... I think, you know, Kim is maneuvering Trump into a position where it looks like it's American forces that are the problem. And I think maybe he's hoping that, you know, Trump will do what he has done in Syria, which is just take him home. Which is one reason I don't expect the North Koreans to go immediately back to like missile testing and nuclear testing.

Cause like, just sit back and watch this collapse, man. Like you don't have to do anything. Like sit there in your weird suit on your weird chair and just, just enjoy the show. Like somebody, somebody, somebody get fatty, a thing of popcorn.

Aaron 26:28

I mean, I've also wondered sort of on our side, you know, How, as the sillier season begins, with the start of the primaries, like, oh my god, shoot me in the head. How, when Trump comes under fire for this, what his reaction will be? Because it's obvious that he will be criticized for foreign policy. Does he become defensive and try to hasten along, get a big pageantry?

Does he make a unilateral concession, thinking that it's a big spectacle and show? Or does he get aggressive in the way that we've been concerned about on this podcast before and try and, I don't know, say that the North Koreans aren't holding up their end of the deal and we need to get tougher?

Jeffrey 27:17

Well, I'm certain that that is what Bolton wants, right? Bolton wants this to collapse and then revert to hostility. I think Pompeo does not want this to collapse because I think Pompeo knows if this whole thing collapses, Trump's not going to be like, I was an idiot. He's going to say, well, this was all Pompeo's idea. Right?

I mean, Pompeo has ridden this tiger to, you know, to being the dumbest secretary of state in the history of the Republic, which is really saying something.

Aaron 27:51

It's true. It's an interesting fellow.

Jeffrey 27:54

Yeah. Well, he's just not qualified, but, you know, he's like... He's an incredible toady, you know, like nobody could lick Trump's boots quite as clean as Mike Pompeo. And it it has paid off. He is the secretary of state. You know, his what like him or not, his portrait is going to hang right there. You know, you know, it's like like it doesn't matter.

Doesn't matter how how how dumb and incompetent Tillerson and Pompeo are there. You know, they're going to be right there with, you know, George Marshall. Wait, wait, what's George Marshall? I gotta double check this, because I know he was very briefly Secretary of Defense, but I think he was also yeah he was yeah he was Secretary of State for two years after yeah during Truman. Like, it's just is what it is, man. so I don't know.

Aaron 28:52

Yeah, I mean, this is going to be one of the stories of 2019, along with the other podcasts.

Jeffrey 28:57

Well, I mean, I think Trump might well pull out troops. I mean, like, it's not a... I think that's not a zero chance. I mean, there is no cost-sharing agreement at the moment, which I don't fully understand how that works. My understanding is there is a reserve fund, so there are some funds that can be drawn down.

But, like... At some point, you know, there was an email sent out to employees, like, civilian employees, saying, like, you're going to get furloughed if there's no deal. So, like... I mean...

Aaron 29:31

It's not unlike the current status in the United States as... You know, it's not like the current status in the United States. Yes. Who knows when the government will reopen?

Jeffrey 29:41

Yeah, I'm worried this could be a while.

Aaron 29:44

Yeah, of course.

Jeffrey 29:45

Yeah. But... So like, I don't know. So I see Kim as sort of very artfully, Arranging this situation, you know. It's not like he's saying I'm, it's not like he's holding out an olive branch. He is pointing to the olive branches that are on the table and have been on the table, and he is restating his position, which is like, this is enough to earn sanctions relief. And if you don't do that and this whole process collapses, it's not because I'm I didn't make an effort.

It's because you, the foreigner, showed up on the peninsula and you are the one who's trying to maintain this, you know, constant sense of tension. And I think there are a lot of South Koreans are going to buy that. I think they're wrong, but I think they're going to buy that. And I think there's every chance that, you know, Trump's response to that is to blame someone else, whether it's Pompeo or maybe Moon.

Bolton hopes it'll be all about Kim. But, you know, I think it's equally likely the troops come out.

Aaron 30:51

This is gloomy, man. I mean, I guess we got to go there, right? I mean, there's just no, it's gotten very, very silly in Washington. And it's very, very unclear about what it is that he'll do. I mean, the rails seem to have ultimately come off. I think that was sort of the other story during our break is the sort of Twitter meltdown, even worse than normal.

And the rails have just come off. Yeah, they have.

Jeffrey 31:13

I mean, I think a lot of it depends on what Kim does, you know, because the place he doesn't end, you know, because he ends with some nice talk again. But toward the end, he does make a threat. Right. Right. After he says he's ready to meet with Trump, he says, but if the United States does not keep the promise it made in the eyes of the world and out of miscalculation of our people's patience, it attempts to unilaterally enforce something upon us and persists in imposing sanctions and pressure against our republic.

We may be compelled to find a new way for defending the sovereignty of the country and the supreme interests of the state and for achieving peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula. What's that new way? No f***ing idea.

Aaron 31:53

No idea. It's sort of reminiscent of when they put out that cryptic message that they tested a new weapon and we all sort of freaked out a little bit on Twitter for about 30 seconds before we kind of realized what it was.

Jeffrey 32:04

Yeah, I mean, I think, though, that's a pretty good sign of... That's a pretty good... That's a really good comparison here. Because over the fall... Generally speaking, the North Koreans have taken a pretty cool attitude toward the whole thing. They haven't done anything nutty. The propaganda's been pretty muted. But there were these increasingly difficult statements made at lower levels.

You know, attributed to officials in the foreign ministry. And I think, you know, one was a think tank person. And, you know, they're official, but they're made at a lower level, so they don't have Kim Jong-un's words. But they all said basically the same thing. And I think Kim showing up at that weapons test was very similar, which is it's him reminding us that, you know, they could...

Start highlighting these things again, they could resume testing. And they didn't. They didn't make a big deal. They didn't actually show the weapon. They didn't identify the weapon. They did a really good job of making it hard for us to figure out where the hell he was. We're still not sure where he was. Don't know what it was.

You know, it's like this phrase, a new way. It's vague enough that it's not obviously a threat, but if you're sentient, you should see it. That the possibility of things going back to the way they were is there. And I think that's what he was aiming for. Could we call it opacity? I like neo-opacity. It's really interesting, though.

As I've used that, I've really discovered how few people even remember that literature. Really?

Aaron 33:42

Yeah.

Jeffrey 33:42

It's like the boombox. Yeah, like... People... You know, opacity was coined or picked because it was the opposite of transparent. And so the idea was, it's not that you didn't know that Israel and India had nuclear weapons. Like, India did a test in 1974. We know they had nuclear weapons. It's that they chose to be opaque about the size, composition, nature of the program.

Right. And so it's really weird. Like every time I say that, you know, this is like neo opacity with North Korea, people like, well, that's not possible because we already know they have nuclear weapons. And it's like, that's not what opacity meant. Right. Opacity is about. It was a political decision on top of a lot of other things, too, that involves the U.S. Yeah, it's about allowing... And, you know, the India case and the Israel case, yes, they're very different, right?

Yeah, they're much different. Israel was very much oriented toward the United States. In India, it's a different kettle of fish. But in both cases, though, you know, the fundamental idea was... You know we have this capability. You're not supposed to be confused about that. But if we never, ever, ever talk about it, if we never, ever, ever mention it, then we're not rubbing your nose in it, and you can pretend it doesn't exist.

Aaron 35:12

Fight club. Right.

Jeffrey 35:15

Which, I mean, it sounds silly, but it's true. If you go back and look at how the Egyptians approached Israel, they didn't insist on Israel's disarmament as part of Camp David. Right? No. And what pissed the Egyptians off in that period was the possibility the U.S. might sell Lance missiles to Israel. Like, from the Egyptian perspective, I shouldn't speak for a whole country, but, you know, I mean, that generation of policymakers are dead, so they can't really object.

But they seem to react when they were forced to take a position publicly. Right? I mean, the problem with the Lance sale to Israel was it was in the paper. And if it's in the paper, then they got to like throw a screaming fit about it. And the point of opacity was the nuclear weapons aren't in the paper.

You're not testing them. You're not showing them off. You're not threatening them. And you basically allow everybody to pretend they don't exist. That is exactly what North Korea is doing. Right? I mean, Kim Jong-un is like, ah, I'll stop making ICBMs. Like, okay, well, I can see all the vehicles at Sanamdong. How do I know you're not making ICBMs?

Well, I'll blow up the test stand. Okay, the test stand has nothing to do with making ICBMs. But I get it. You're going to like stop testing them so they stay out of the paper. And the only time you're going to appear in the paper is when you're blowing something up. You're giving it away. And so you're going to create this positive thing that Moon Jae-in can spin and that Trump can spin.

And they're satisfied with that. Like that is opacity.

Aaron 36:46

Yeah. I mean, I think as we wrap up here, the question is, if we were being serious on the U.S. side, is opacity something that we could live with, especially if the South Korean government is prepared to live with it? Yes, yes, yes, yes, yes. And I think that's ultimately where people misunderstand your point when you worry about the dangers of diplomacy.

It's not the talks. It's the danger of self-delusion.

Jeffrey 37:10

I think that's right, because Kim ain't given these weapons up. So if your goal is to minimize the damage that the arsenal has, or that the arsenal does to the stability of the international system, you know, like, Israel has nuclear weapons and, you know, Egypt never built them. And, you know, Syria really only made one effort much, much later.

You know, so, like, I wouldn't say that the Israeli program... Had no cost to regional security and proliferation. It did, but it didn't have as big of a cost as we all feared, you know. And especially at the time, if you go back and look at the literature, yes, right. So you know, like, I don't think Japan will build a weapon, and and I think that we could imagine a situation where the Moon administration, you know, doesn't Gets far enough with North Korea that if they're ever replaced by conservatives, that South Korea doesn't build a weapon.

Like, well, that's a pretty good deal, you know? And it's interesting, like, I get criticized by certain quarters of the non-proliferation community for saying that, as though, you know, living with opacity would be like a death knell to the non-proliferation regime.

Aaron 38:31

You know what I think was harmful? Yeah.

Jeffrey 38:34

The six nuclear tests? Those were pretty harmful. You know what else I think was harmful? The ICBM tests? That was pretty harmful. You know what else is harmful? The 65 nuclear weapons worth of fissile material? That's harmful. Admitting that those things are there and then trying to mitigate the damage... I don't actually think is harmful. I think it is helpful.

And, you know, some people are disappointed that we can't do more, but, like, they're the people who are perpetually disappointed with every time proliferation agreement because it's not a humiliating rebuke for people who want the bomb.

Aaron 39:14

So, we struggled to come up with a topic when we started this day, and now we've spent 40 minutes on Kim Jong-un's New Year's Eve address.

Jeffrey 39:23

Well, we're nothing if not long-winded, Aaron. Yeah.

Aaron 39:26

I guess we did have a lot to talk about, about this topic. You know, as we sit here and talk, I actually thought this would be a short podcast, but it's a relatively long one. And I think it's the way, if you're correct, and it would be logical for Kim to do that, to try and set himself up as the good guy in this equation, is quite fascinating, something to watch out for as we move forward in this, particularly as the president I mean, we'll get distracted by other things in the domestic environment around here and how he sort of balances his domestic troubles, the re-election campaign, and efforts to try and portray himself as a great statesman.

It may be a topsy-turvy 2019, even more topsy-turvy than... I mean, everything's relative in the Trump era. Even more topsy-turvy than it has been for the past two years.

Jeffrey 40:20

F***ed up, dude.

Aaron 40:22

You're much more concise. But yeah.

Jeffrey 40:25

All right. Well, this was fun. Do you want to remind listeners of the joys of becoming a Patreon patron? Absolutely. What's the lingo here?

Aaron 40:38

I call it Patreon. So as we indicated at the top of the show, we have a very, very busy 2019 coming up. We are gearing up for a whole bunch of episodes. And if you would like to talk more about those episodes in a private Slack channel, You can join if you head on over to patreon.com slash acwpodcast.

And if you have a .edu address and are a student, it's $3 a month to get in the slack. For everybody else, it's $5. And we are sporadically rolling out a second, smaller podcast, about 10 minutes in length. Far less winded, usually just one person talking about a non-proliferation disarmament or arms control event that we are talking about privately and think is cool to talk about for a podcast.

That is called Brilliant Pebbles and is for our subscribers only. So with that, Jeffrey from my new office, it's been good chatting. Yeah, it's been great talking to you. And good luck in Vermont. I guess the next time we check in, you'll be really freezing your ass off.

Jeffrey 41:37

Yeah, we'll see.

Aaron 41:38

Yeah, I want pictures of cocktails in the snow, no more whales.

Jeffrey 41:41

Yeah, I can drink again.

Aaron 41:42

I'm very excited. All right, have a good rest of the day. Bye.