The Security Council and the Test Ban

Jeffrey Lewis 0:01

Maybe I'll suddenly find my enthusiasm for the deliberative manner of the United States Senate.

Aaron Stein 0:11

You are listening to the Arms Control Wonk podcast, the leading podcast on arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament. I'm Aaron Stein, the co-host of the show, and the senior fellow at the Atlantic Council's Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East.

Jeffrey 0:25

And I'm Jeffrey Lewis, the founding publisher of the Arms Control Wonk blog. And a scholar at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey. Aaron, I'm coming in hot today because we have a heat advisory here in Monterey.

Other voice 0:38

It's going to be in the 90s.

Aaron 0:39

It's cold and overcast here over in Washington. The seasons are changing. I guess not for you.

Jeffrey 0:46

Well, no, this is really unusually hot for us. I was out in the valley the other day, and actually, it was pretty ugly. So we spent all day yesterday just hanging out at the beach trying to beat the heat.

Aaron 0:58

See, we have no sympathy for you over here on the East Coast because you're hanging out on the beach trying to beat the heat in September.

Jeffrey 1:05

Well, you know, it wasn't as fun as it might be. We really couldn't go out swimming because there was a pod of dolphins frolicking just off the coast and you really need to let them have their space.

Aaron 1:14

Was this before or after you tweeted a picture of yourself at the bar having a beer and reading the Carmel Pine Cone?

Jeffrey 1:20

That was after, that was my Friday night. I'd actually, my wife, we had date night that night, but she really wanted to go to the hot tub, and I had spent all day in the pool with the kids, and so I didn't feel like the hot tub. So I had a beer. Boy, it is a hard life, isn't it?

Aaron 1:38

I have absolutely no sympathy for you. Are you sure you can do the podcast today? I mean, are you rested and relaxed from over the weekend?

Jeffrey 1:48

I'm a little pruney from all the water.

Aaron 1:50

Right, right. You know, there was news, and there was news over the weekend, nuclear-related. Sorry to jolt you from your relaxation.

Jeffrey 1:58

Yes, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2310, which kind of sort of prohibits nuclear testing.

Aaron 2:06

Kind of, sort of is right. You know, I mean, and it kicked off. Well, I guess it kicked off a discussion, at least for us, about what what this all means. I mean, there's a backstory that we were talking about a little bit off the pod before this began. But how this came to be, what the Security Council resolution actually means and some of the Republican backlash against it.

Jeffrey 2:27

Yeah, well, I get to promote the... Actually, do we publish it anymore? WMD Junction?

Aaron 2:37

It's sort of gone dormant, but I think it's still linkable off of the CNS website.

Jeffrey 2:45

So I think so. Well, you know, we've had some leadership changes at the Non-Proliferation Review, and so I think Ian Stevens' departure and Josh Pollack's arrival, WMD Junction has been... Been a little bit dormant, but I suspect that we'll get better. And as a model of how great it can be, back in June of 2014, Ambassador Tom Graham wrote an article for us called A New Pathway to Prohibiting Nuclear Testing, in which he suggested that the Security Council, acting under Chapter 7, prohibit nuclear testing, which would be a sort of roundabout way of getting the same prohibition in the CTVT.

That's not what the administration did, by the way, but that's what caused all the problems.

Aaron 3:32

Right, so it comes against the backdrop of just – well, something that we talked about in our return podcast when the band got back together is about the Obama administration's sort of goals and as it comes to the end of his time in office about what he can do to advance, I think, probably some of the goals he articulated in the Prague speech in 2009.

And one of the things that was floated, at least in some of the reporting about it, was Through the UN Security Council, something like this, you know, trying to reaffirm or at least, you know, reaffirm the prohibition or at least the moratorium on nuclear testing, you know, against the backdrop that the U.S. Senate has not ratified the CTPT.

Jeffrey 4:12

Yeah, I think, you know, whereas Tom... I should call him Ambassador Graham. He's a really nice guy. Whereas Ambassador Graham, I think, wanted to use the Security Council to get a legal prohibition that would sort of fill in the gap between now and whenever the CTBT enters into force, assuming that it someday does. The administration thought, you know, the administration was asked repeatedly if they were going to adopt that idea, and they always said no, that they wouldn't.

Seek to usurp the prerogative of the Senate. And so they settled on a much more modest course in which they would just, you know, get this much, much more general resolution, one that wasn't under Chapter 7 and one that wasn't legally binding. But, you know, Washington, given that it is like nobody cared about that distinction.

Aaron 5:09

Right. It's asking for the political debate to actually recognize nuance in what a U.N. Security Council is and isn't and which chapter it's filed under, which, given our current political discourse, I don't think there's much hope for. But this is not exactly what the ambassador on WMD Junction was pointing out, because he was favoring the legally binding option filing under Chapter 7.

In order to – just to try and undermine Senate blockage of ratifying a treaty.

Jeffrey 5:43

Yeah, I think – it's funny. There are two pieces here. One universe of concerns or comments relates to – Graham's proposal, like should the executive on national security matters take what I would call the Dick Cheney route, which actually I agree with, which is to say, you know, Congress is a very interesting debating society, but it's not central to U.S. foreign policymaking.

It has an extremely limited role. And as much as possible, you should push it aside and move forward without it, which, you know, frankly, is my view. I'm a fan of unitary executive. It's probably the only place Dick Cheney and I agree about anything. But then there is this whole other universe of questions, which is, you know, like the wisdom of the politics of it.

And I guess we should talk about that first. Like, I think the administration, I really don't understand why they chose to do this, because The resolution is nice, but it just simply calls upon states not to test nuclear weapons and commends those states with moratoria. So you don't really get much oomph out of it. It's at most a kind of small PR win in the Security Council, like, oh, look, we're doing something.

But then you allow Republicans to accuse you Of secretly pursuing this Graham proposal. So you get all the political downside. And then, you know, what happens is when they do what they plan to do all along, right, like a rooster taking credit for the dawn, Corker and Tom Cotton and, you know, the rest of these clowns all put out statements saying that it was like their pressure that forced the administration to scale back its secret plan to usurp the prerogative of the Senate and then issue this watered down resolution.

And so You're handing your opponents this club to beat you over the head with and then allowing them to declare victory. And what you get is this nice resolution. And if we were a normal country with a normal political process, it would be a good thing to do. But it just seems...

Other voice 8:00

I don't know.

Jeffrey 8:01

Unless you're envisioning it as a stress test for ratification, just to see where the Senate is on this stuff, I didn't understand the...

Aaron 8:11

I mean, was it a secret where the Senate was on its understanding of the CTBT and its value for U.S. national security? And I'm just going to reiterate something you said because I completely agree with it. It's like, Well, there's a back story to this, which you promised to tell me on the pod because I don't actually – I haven't been fully read in on the back story to this.

But why they chose to go with the non-binding resolution instead of the binding one, even though by going for non-binding, you just hand your political opponents the mechanisms to attack you. Without actually getting anything for those attacks. They may have judged, by the way, Jeffrey, that the only people who are really seriously paying attention to this are you and I and listeners to this show, and that they could weather the political storm because there's not much there.

Jeffrey 9:01

Well, so, I mean, that's my frustration, which is, you know, if you think it's important to get a legally binding prohibition on nuclear testing, like, Maybe it makes sense to have this fight with the Senate. The threat from the Republican side was that they would withhold funding for the CTBT, that they would deliberately try to sabotage the CTBT, and particularly the international monitoring system, as a kind of punishment.

Aaron 9:35

That's just such nonsense, what's going on with North Korea. But anyways...

Jeffrey 9:40

Well, that's exactly what I'm thinking is, you know, like and admittedly, I give I probably give terrible political advice because like I tend to be of the like burn everything approach, you know, like I. Well, you know, it's not it's it's basically how I am in everyday life, which I'm sure makes me a real charm to deal with at work.

Like I actually I was at CSIS and I got a job offer to move internally. And it was for like, you know, at the time, you know, like a Maybe it was like a 10% raise, but I really wanted a substantial raise. And so I turned down the 10% raise and stayed in my job and then hung out six months and then found another job.

Because they wouldn't, like, give me the raise I wanted. And I just, I'm just generally like that. Like, I like the fight, you know? Like, you know that thing about, you know, wrestling with a pig? Like, you get dirty and the pig likes it? I'm the pig. I like it. So, you know, like, I have always been of the opinion, sorry, to close off this longer thought, that, like, you know, my political advice to the president, whether it's on foreign or domestic policy, Would be to constantly use the inability of Congress to act to steadily erode Congress's authority and power.

I'm a fan of the unitary executive, and so I have viewed this kind of obstructionist Congress as an enormous opportunity to diminish this institution that I don't place an enormous amount of value in. Of course, I'm a big fan of the unitary executive. Jesus, we're about to elect Donald Trump, so... Maybe I'll suddenly find my enthusiasm for the deliberative manner of the United States Senate.

Aaron 11:22

Especially if, well, are we a nonpartisan show?

Jeffrey 11:26

Yes, I think we're a nonpartisan show.

Aaron 11:28

Yeah, we're a nonpartisan show. I think there's interests in placing checks on the executive, especially if you have the, oh, fecal material moment where an orange person's elected to the president.

Other voice 11:39

I think that may make us an anti-partisan show.

Aaron 11:42

Oh, I like that.

Jeffrey 11:44

But, you know, I think what you're getting at is... For the record, as much as my liberal friends hate Donald Trump, my conservative friends hate him more.

Aaron 11:51

I'm terrified by Donald Trump. You know, my backup plan is Porto and I'm the apprentice and learn to make wine.

Jeffrey 11:58

Anyways, we've gotten off track. But, you know, what I think I would come back to say is, you're right, no one cares about this. But if you look at the way Tom Cotton spun it, and he's sort of an excellent, you know, weathervane for the stupid and hateful. You know, he referred to the CTBTO, incorrectly I might add, as a UN body.

Aaron 12:22

Right, you're an agency.

Jeffrey 12:24

Yeah, well, body agency is important. The fact is that he falsely associated with the United Nations because it feeds into this kind of conspiracy theory that's very popular among his base. And so, you know, I think if you're the administration, if you're going to go this route, freaking go. You know, do it and get something good for it.

I'm a little unpersuaded that it makes a lot of sense to sink this political capital into a resolution that is... You know, kind of at best inoffensive. I don't think it's negative. It would be a good resolution if we weren't a broken country.

Aaron 13:00

Right. And I'm just reading it. You know, he sort of ascribes what the president and the U.N. Security Council was to do as sort of like an affront to the protection of the Western Democratic Alliance, you know, in undermining the ability of the United States to project sort of deterrence and extended deterrence to its and its allies, you know, through Something, I think it gets to a broader question, is about, like, what is the status of the CTPT?

What was it ever trying to address? And by bringing it back up in the way that we have, I mean, as we're going in circles talking about it now, is, are we shortchanging it? I mean, is it time to have the fight, or is the Senate really ever going to pass this?

Jeffrey 13:41

Yeah, I don't think the Senate's ever going to pass it. Aaron, have you read You're probably obligated to lie. Have you read Bill Perry's memoir, My Journey at the Nuclear Brink? Of course.

Other voice 13:59

I don't believe you!

Aaron 14:02

I can't confirm or deny.

Jeffrey 14:06

Well, I did! I did read it, and you know, one thing that's really interesting about the memoir is how civil and polite he is. He, he, with Only one exception, as far as I could tell, Grinds no access. there was this like group of people in the, the, the 70s and 80s who, who argued that we shouldn't invest in high-tech weapons, that instead we should like, like just have more soldiers under arms. And apparently he's really aggravated with those people, and so his irritation shows through. Just a North Korea model. Yeah, yeah, there was, there was like this, this whole like, like they didn't want to spend money on, you know, like The B-2, they wanted to buy, you know, like, I don't know, like more B-52s or something.

Like, I admit, I have not given their argument much consideration because it seems on its face kind of a silly historical moment. He does get a little aggravated with them. But the only place his irritation on a political level shows through is on the issue of the CTBT. Where he sort of says that he's not a very effective advocate for the CTBT because he thinks it's such an obviously good thing for U.S. security that he has a tendency.

He doesn't do this. He says he has a tendency to do this, to ascribe purely partisan motives to people who oppose it, which is about as angry as he ever gets in the book, which I wish I could be that relaxed. So, yeah, I do think, though, I mean, all kidding kind of aside, that Regardless of the original sets of concerns about the treaty, and some people did sincerely have them.

Arnie Cantor and I used to argue about the treaty all the time, and Arnie had very specific objections that we can talk about or not talk about. But I think today the treaty has become such a partisan issue that unless a Republican president wants to see it ratified, It's just not going to happen. And I think the merits don't matter at all at this point.

It's become like taxes or abortion or, you know, one of a series of issues where like it's a test of your bona fides as a Republican to be against it. And so then at that point, it's, you know, as we see, right, those partisan preferences are rather stronger than the policy preferences. Witness Donald Trump, who doesn't actually believe anything Republicans believe other than That Obama wasn't born here.

But unless I think you get a Republican who changes that attitude, then the merits don't matter. Even though, you know, I think the merits are utterly clear.

Aaron 16:51

Yeah, the merits are completely clear, particularly at a time where You know, I think the North Korean case is instructive here. You know, I think at this point in time, if you could, I mean, not saying that we could, but if you could get a moratorium on North Korean tests, you would take it. I mean, instantly, because it just freezes at least some of the diagnostic elements of their program in its infancy.

And I still think that there is value in that, particularly given, at least from a national security perspective, The volumes of data that the U.S. has and a lot of the technological advances that we can bring to the table to where we don't actually have to test in a way that people sort of conceptualize it. Big explosions either in the atmosphere, hasn't been done in a very long time, or at least underground.

Jeffrey 17:36

Yeah, you know, it's interesting. I often hear people say, like, well, you could build a nuclear weapon without testing. And while that's True that you could build a big Nagasaki-type implosion device without testing, and it would probably work. You know, there is this much more interesting trend that we've seen, which is states like North Korea's first test tends to be of a compact device that they can put on a missile.

Aaron 18:02

Right. The route to proliferation is not the Manhattan Project.

Jeffrey 18:07

Right. And as the North Koreans discovered, if you make that step, you may well end up with a device that's not reliable and doesn't work. Because their first test didn't work. And so there was an enormous cost to us, I think, in a security sense of their first test, because they went from having a design that they thought might work to having a design that they realized was really disappointing, and understanding why that design was disappointing, and then have made this series of steps toward a device that I think they're pretty confident in.

The other thing is, And again, I think people tend to lump all nuclear weapons together. Like fission devices are terrible, and that that is a horrible thing to have dropped on a city. But thermonuclear weapons are worse.

Aaron 18:50

It's an order of magnitude higher in the explosion, and you only get there by incremental design change.

Jeffrey 18:57

Yeah, and as our friends in India discovered, the first time that you test a thermonuclear weapon, you may be disappointed by the results. So to me, there are real gains that a country gets early on in its testing program. I tend to think when you've done 1,000 or more nuclear tests like the US has, The value of those tests kind of levels off, and so, you know, we're in a good spot to stop.

But, like, I would really like North Korea to stop testing. I really don't want India or Pakistan to continue testing. And then we can get to, like, what happens if the big powers start testing. Because, you know, we have that geo for non-pro site.

Aaron 19:40

Right. You know, you're segueing me right into the next thing. Is... When I was at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, then named Monterey Institute of International Studies, it was widely presumed at that time when I was at school, it was just a couple of years ago, that the big powers were not going to test any longer.

Yes, the US and China had not ratified the treaty, but more or less everybody was observing the moratorium. And for the first time as I can remember, you know, I'm sorry, I'm still not on the Slack channel, but my Twitter feed is telling me that there are concerns that this moratorium amongst the big powers is under strain.

I wouldn't call it severe strain, but sort of like a mild strain, if you will.

Jeffrey 20:28

Yeah, so I want to be careful about it because the Geo for Non-Pro thing is an experiment and I'm on the red team, but I will say this. Bill Perry has repeatedly in the New York Times, in his book, and in other settings, said that he is worried that Russia will resume nuclear testing. So one of the things that we did as part of the Geo for Non-Pro crowdsourcing experiment, everyone should get an account, is we purchased satellite images of the Russian nuclear test site at Novaya Zemlya.

Which, by the way, are quite rare because it's way the heck up north. So we've got some nice color pictures from Planet at a couple of meters resolution. Big shout out to our friends at Planet who have a pretty amazing satellite constellation. But we also wanted some very high resolution images. And so we tasked, at great expense, an Israeli satellite to fly over and take pictures.

Aaron 21:26

There's a conspiracy here. I can do this. There must be a Mossad conspiracy here. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah.

Jeffrey 21:33

Yeah. Yeah. Certainly working with the Zionists. Right. They have nice couscous. I love Israeli couscous. It's big. So, yeah, people are like, you know the Israeli MOD will see those pictures. Like, yeah, actually, we're putting them online. Like, anybody can register for an account and, like, pin them. Like, it's okay.

Aaron 21:55

That's a plug.

Jeffrey 21:56

Yeah, like, I'm, yeah, like, somebody just mounted a giant DDoS attack on our site. Like, people can see the pictures. It's okay. That's what we do. So I would just encourage people to look at Perry's statements and then go look at that test site and start pinning things. And, and, and my enthusiasm for the CTBT is now substantially higher than it was six months ago.

Aaron 22:25

I want you to say more, but I'm not sure that you're ready to go there.

Jeffrey 22:29

Well, I can't because I'm, I'm the red team and we need to let the crowd finish pinning it. But let's just say interesting happenings at the Novaya Zemlya test site. And we're actually working up a presentation now, and it'll be a great podcast when we're done.

Aaron 22:45

But then this actually leads you to one of the counterarguments to the CTBT is that, well, people are hedging. And that if you forever bind yourself into this, even though the Russians have ratified the treaty, then you're stupid. So I don't know the result of that. The GEO for non-pro analysis and your own red teaming of it.

But will this not, are you concerned that it will actually undermine support for the CTBT when the findings are published?

Jeffrey 23:15

So, no, I'm not. Because I think it's clear that the Russians are hedging. So they haven't made a decision yet. But what they're doing... So I understand why Perry is worried that they will test. But if you look at what Perry says, he tends to say... You know, they have the option to resume testing and he thinks they're having a debate and he thinks that ultimately it's going to be up to Putin to decide what he wants to do or not.

So, like, I'm all about, I'm all about a UN resolution that raises the cost of them testing. Because I want to discourage that. And I'm also all about finding better ways to do confidence building and ultimately verification, because I'm also worried about false alarms. I should say, one of the reasons we're doing this is, you know, we had a false alarm in 1997 where there was an earthquake near Novaya Zemlya, and we, like, demarched the Russians for violating the CTBT they had just signed.

Aaron 24:13

Do you want to know what a good way to do that, though, is you can defund the CTBT on Monitoring Network.

Jeffrey 24:18

Oh, yeah. Yeah, that's great. Great job, geniuses. And like we demarched the Russians and it turned out it was an earthquake, which made us look like idiots in the U.S. And we're certainly worried about a false alarm again, right? Because we see the same kinds of signs that might lead you to incorrectly assume that an earthquake is a test.

Mm-hmm. But, you know, so look, they're hedging, you know, we hedged. The Bush administration made a big push early on in its first term to increase test site readiness at Nevada, right? So everybody hedges. We hedge, they hedge. But for me, right, the way to deal with hedging is to have a really strong prohibition on testing that's verifiable.

So, like, while I think the treaty is verifiable... I have long pushed the administration, by the way, with no success, to think, I have lots of good ideas, and the people... No one likes them.

Aaron 25:28

We just listen to this podcast while jogging. We're not actually looking for advice.

Jeffrey 25:32

Yeah, right. It's like, no, no, just more jokes about penises, please. The actual policy is not helpful. So, look, Republicans say that the treaty is not verifiable. I don't agree with them. I think the treaty is verifiable. But I also recognize that you can always improve verification. So much like the Reagan administration did with the threshold test ban treaty, you know, they basically said this treaty is not verifiable.

And then they sent Paul Robinson to negotiate a verification annex to the treaty that strengthened it. And actually, some of the things he negotiated with were good. He also, they had a big complaint that there was no definition of nuclear explosives. Which is a lot like people saying there's no definition of zero in the CTBT. And then they negotiated this circular definition.

It's like a nuclear explosive. It's a canister with a nuclear explosive in it. Like, okay, Paul. It's not exactly the definition. It's not quite as circular as I'm mocking it, but it's fairly unhelpful, I think. But I do think, like, if your concern is that they're hedging, then... The U.S. and the Russians and, you know, maybe the Chinese.

Other voice 26:47

And, you know, if you include the Chinese, the French are easy, and the British use our test site.

Jeffrey 26:52

You know, they could negotiate a list of permitted and prohibited activities that would replicate a list that allegedly existed in 1996 but we have apparently lost. And they could do test site confidence-building measures because one thing that comes really clearly through when you look at that test site and see all the worrying things is also how easy it is to monitor.

You know? When you can't see it, when it's this vast mountain range in your head, you're like, how would I monitor it? But then when you actually see the test site, you're like, oh, look, right, it's a winter hellscape. There is a town. People have to live in the town. There is one dock and one airfield, and there is a water reservoir, and There are tunnels that are probably for subcritical nuclear experiments that have certain signatures associated with them.

And there are other tunnels that I worry about are hedging for nuclear experiments. And so when I actually see that test site, and I think this is the value of open source work, I don't have a problem imagining how we would verify activities at the site. And then the classic arms control thing you do is you say all activities must be at the site.

And so If we get wind of an activity someplace else, we don't have to verify it. We only have to know that it happened and it's prohibited. So to me, it makes verification seem more practical and tangible. So yeah, maybe they're hedging, but the way to solve that is better verification.

Aaron 28:17

Are you rattling the tin cup for more funding for Geofanopra?

Jeffrey 28:21

No, Gio for non-pro is – no, that's all squared away. I'm always happy to rattle the tin cup for my idea of – I used to call it send Linton to Moscow. My plan was just to make Linton Brooks go negotiate a verification protocol for the CTBT. That way he could come back and Republican senators who voted against it in 1999 could say, well, we sent a nice Republican out and he fixed it.

That makes them feel better about their lives, that's fine. I think it probably would strengthen the treaty. And actually, I've talked to some Republicans about it, and I kind of get a wary, like, I don't really want to verify this treaty. It does seem like a good faith effort. It's Democrats who hate the proposal. Really? I didn't know that.

Yeah, well, because it's like... Treating the Republican objections with good faith... Recognizing that some of them were not made in good faith, but I think some of them probably were. You know, like I think, you know, like I say, Arnie and I used to argue about this, and Arnie had, I think, you know, legitimate concerns. I think treating them in good faith, some people feel like, is criticizing the treaty.

I just, like, whatever. I don't feel that way. So I, you know, I would... Maybe now it's been too long, but, you know, find your, like, not insane...

Aaron 29:45

Republican, and you know, ship that person off to Moscow. Then this leads us right back to the sort of where we started this podcast, and a good place to wrap up is if you're going to have the debate about it and you're going to do something about it, don't go for the half-assery, you know, push to, to try and, you know, and if there are legitimate concerns, to try and, as you just were saying, to address them in a way that makes sense.

I like the idea that you could use open source, probably what our intelligence agencies already do to begin with, but you could sort of make flat that process to where people who, let's say, are not as well-versed on nuclear issues as most, but nevertheless have to advise somebody about making a decision, say, in the Senate, can just get a sense of what it would take and how it's not all that difficult to begin to make conclusions.

To verify aspects of it built upon all of the other verification mechanisms that are already in place. And so you don't make stupid decisions like to defund the CTPTL.

Jeffrey 30:49

Yeah. Although, you know, I mean, I guess it all comes back to, like, I think this stuff would be easy if our political system weren't broken. Broken, and so none of this stuff is easy.

Aaron 31:01

So you just caught me off on the knees, man. That was a positive note to end the podcast. But in my head as I was going through that little soliloquy of mine was that requires that our political leaders and their staffers aren't just completely off in spaceland making up nonsense arguments and are dealing with all the fact.

Jeffrey 31:20

Yeah, you know, this is like my recurring joke about any hard policy challenge in Washington is I always say like, well, there's good news and bad news. The good news is it's only going to take a little bit of courage to solve. The bad news is that means it's hopeless.

Aaron 31:39

I think you gaffed earlier in the podcast. You said that the birther issue is still alive. Donald Trump ended it. So maybe if we can end the birther issue in that wonderful way at his own hotel just down the street from where I'm speaking to you now, we can move forward on the CTBT. What do you think?

Jeffrey 31:56

Yeah, I'll grudgingly go along with your happy note, Aaron.

Aaron 32:00

I'm trying to steer us back in the right direction. But I'm going to take that happy note and thank the listeners for listening. And Jeffrey, it's good to be back. Podcast number three of The New Regime.

Jeffrey 32:15

It is fantastic.

Other voice 32:18

Podcast number four. Just so you know. I got those hours counted real carefully.

Aaron 32:27

Remember some podcasts he talked in. Dynamite drop in there, Scott. Podcast number four. With that said, thank you again, listeners, for tuning in. Thanks, Jeffrey. Thanks, Scott.