MIRVs!

Jeffrey Lewis 0:02

I got very excited and hung up. Because I'm an idiot. You are listening to the Arms Control Wonk podcast, the leading podcast on arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation. I'm Jeffrey Lewis, the founding publisher of the Arms Control Wonk blog and a scholar at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies in Monterey. Aaron Stein is still dealing with all of the challenges that accompany parenthood.

And so today I'm really lucky to be joined by Michael Krepon. Michael is a friend and mentor, but I think he's best known for founding the Stimson Center, and he's published a new book that I have a chapter in on MIRVs. How are you doing, Michael?

Michael Krepon 0:55

Life is good, and this is a treat.

Jeffrey 1:01

It's fun for me, too. So I... Agreed to write this chapter, but I never asked you, what prompted this? How come you decided we needed to be talking about MIRVs?

Michael 1:15

They're making a second coming. They're back. And it's not something that a lot of people dwell on. We're at the very front end of this with reports that China is Hasn't long last MIRVed. The part of the world that I work on, South Asia, I mean, if China does it, will India do it? If India does it, Pakistan most assuredly will do it.

So I thought it was time, time to take another look.

Jeffrey 1:59

Yeah, so I was, in my introduction, I was lazy. I probably should have defined them. But in some sense, I have a question for you about that. So MIRVs, right, for people who are listening, are multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles. It's the idea that you can put many warheads on a single missile, but maybe more importantly, that you can target them individually individually.

So is it the eye part of the MIRV, the independently targetable? Is it just the warhead numbers? What about that?

Michael 2:32

Yeah. I want to make a plug for the book, Jeffrey, because if people look at the cover, the picture on the cover, they will see what multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles look like. When they are headed toward their targets.

Jeffrey 2:56

Oh, yeah.

Michael 2:58

You remember, that's the picture of the Peacekeeper test at Kwajalein, this atoll in the Pacific that we aim at to test systems and to test accuracy. And right before the end of the world as we know it, if it happens, We're going to see something or somebody's going to see something like what's depicted on the cover of this book.

These white entrails, tight entrails, heading in different toward different targets. We blotted out the water from this picture to make it look like these MIRVs were Heading inland. But to get back to your question, so there are MIRVs, and then there's something without the I, multiple reentry vehicles, where you're not so interested in precise targeting in separate locations, but you are interested in having more than one warhead on a missile.

And MRVs, Can make sense if the object is to penetrate missile defenses and you don't really, you're going to hit or you're aiming at a built up area, a metropolitan city that really matters to your adversary. And you don't have to get too fancy with respect to targeting. We just want to, we just want to Penetrate the defense.

And that's why I asked you about China. And I asked you whether China needed MIRVs or whether it might be content with MRVs. What's your answer to that?

Jeffrey 5:13

Well, I was thinking, and then you got stuck by my terribly non-responsive, highly revisionist essay. Yeah. Yeah, you know, I mean, I think the thing that I kind of explored in the piece... Well, you know, the reason... So the reason I thought the project was so interesting... Is that you got to live through the first coming of MIRVs in the 1970s when the US and Soviet Union deployed them in it.

It struck me, or it strikes me looking at it historically, it'd be interesting to see how it felt for you to live through it, but it struck me that that was one of those things that the US and the Soviet Union did without thinking about it very much, that they did it because they could. And, you know, I think the argument that I made in the essay, whether it's persuasive or not, I don't know.

But I find a lot of that in Chinese decision making, that they do a lot of things because they can. And maybe it's a little different, whereas the US, we were sort of, we do things because we want to innovate. And I get the feeling that the Chinese spend a lot of time keeping up with the Joneses.

And so... I have this strange idea that it's sort of... There's no real reason for them to have them in a military sense, but I think it's inconceivable to me that they would pass because they seem compelled to have everything we have. But that only kind of answered your question.

Michael 6:56

Your argument, which... I would ask our listeners to check out. As I read it, I heard you say that the Chinese skipped the stage of MRVs. The Soviets didn't. And they took it step by step, but they moved quickly to MIRVs. But the Chinese... According to the Pentagon, they skipped a step. It's demonstrated a technology that keeps up with the Joneses, but they seem to be disinterested in accumulation.

I mean, it's like they don't need a 50,000-square-foot house. 5,000 will do to persuade everybody that they're a first class country. Is that on military matters? Is that a fierce summary of your argument?

Jeffrey 8:12

Yeah, I think so. You know, I think that When I look at the evolution of their force, I see that they were sort of, I think, always interested in this particular technology. But not for the reasons... Well, not for the reasons we were or not for the reasons that we said we were, but rather for that thing that you identified, that idea that there's this idea of being a first-class country.

And so the numbers didn't matter so much. And so they weren't looking at MIRVs and so for a long time didn't look at MIRVs. Because mostly that was about numbers, and they weren't interested in more numbers. But I think they were always super interested in accuracy. And ultimately, one of the interesting questions that I still have that I haven't answered yet is what we've done is we've seen them put multiple warheads on one system.

And it's that giant DF-5 liquid-fueled ballistic missile. And for years, I was shocked that they kind of didn't because for years, they just had this one warhead because it was this late 70s, early 80s vintage warhead. And, you know, they had developed this much smaller warhead in the 90s. And I figured they'd always put the most modern warhead on it.

But that would just, that literally left tons, I mean, literally tons of throw weight left over. So it always struck me that, you know, at some point, if they got... The accuracy to the point they would end up just putting multiple warheads. And I think that that's, in the end, what happened. So I think it's a fair summary that they weren't super interested in quantity.

They were interested in being seen as a first-rate nation. So having a little bit of the best things was preferable to them.

Michael 10:17

Let me take you back, Jeffrey, to the era that I am a part of. Because I was very much an observer and a participant in debates over the U.S. and Soviet decisions to Merv. This book has chapters, five country chapters. There's yours are in China. There's one by Feroz Hassan Khan and Mansoor Ahmed. Two very fine strategic analysts who know the Pakistan program.

We have coauthors for the India chapter, Jagannath Sankaran and Rajesh Basroor. They're awfully good. And that's the second nuclear age that we look at.

Jeffrey 11:22

And then there are two chapters

Michael 11:24

That go into the first nuclear age and the compulsions on the part of the United States and the Soviet Union. So the U.S. chapter is written by two younger academics who didn't live through that phase of our nuclear history. So that was really interesting to me, their take. That's Brendan Rittenhouse Green. And Austin Long.

Jeffrey 11:54

Oh, yeah.

Michael 11:56

The Soviet chapter was written by two heavyweights, Alexei Abaytov and General Dvorak, who were very much involved. And the compulsions were so different than the ones you wrote about, Jeffrey. The compulsions were Not to fall behind, to compete. The strategic forces were evolving in different ways, and the Soviets did have this throwing advantage. And they were turning out missiles like sausages.

That was the phraseology of the day. They were turning out 300 or so missiles every year. During the assault negotiations.

Jeffrey 12:55

And they were big bruisers.

Michael 13:00

And we were going a different way. And the way that we could compete and indeed seek advantage was through Mervyn. And we went down this rabbit hole big time. And of course the Soviets did too. So it, Back then, it was the fear of being disadvantaged and the pursuit of advantage. To me, that's what happened. And everybody, everybody knew what the consequences would be.

And when Henry Kissinger, he spoke at this famous press background in Vladivostok. And this was just two years after he and President Nixon and the Kremlin leadership said, you know, we're not going to block MIRVs. We're going to proceed with MIRVs. We're going to strictly limit national missile defenses, but we're going to do MIRVs. And only two years later, when Kissinger and the Soviet leadership Returned to this problem and tried to put a lid on it.

The lid was 1,320 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles that could be merged. That was the best they could do. And you're talking about a country, a country, you know, best How many missiles do they deploy a year?

Jeffrey 14:55

Oh, well, I mean, you know, onesies, twosies, some years, none. I mean, it's – at least for the nuclear-armed strategic missiles, they turn them out in very small batches. They also do this funny thing that the Russians in the U.S. don't do, which is – They'll produce a set of the missiles and they'll actually deploy them. So there'll be a unit, right?

And this missile will be deployed, but they'll keep flight testing it and keep making little changes to it. Lee Bin, a colleague of ours at Carnegie, he compared it to artisanal missile production.

Michael 15:35

This is a different world. And India is kind of like China. The two rising powers in Asia are so resistant, at least so far, to nuclear theology, to deterrence requirements. They move so slowly.

Jeffrey 16:09

Yeah, I have a great... Go ahead. Oh, I'm sorry to cut you off, but I had a great experience like that where, you know, I... So I have this kind of, you know, revisionist account of the Chinese, and often I would give this talk. And in a lot of nuclear states, and especially in Russia, it's met with a lot of skepticism.

You know, the idea that there must be more missiles there somewhere because they're not doing it right. And I gave this talk in Singapore once, and... And I was I was next to an Indian scholar. And about halfway through the talk, he actually slapped his head and said, it's exactly like ours.

Michael 16:49

Yeah.

Jeffrey 16:50

Sorry to cut you off.

Michael 16:51

They haven't bought in. Yeah. No, not at all. Pakistan is different. And, you know, Pakistan reads U.S. They read U.S. Army field manuals. And they're playing back those field manuals from the 50s with respect to tactical nuclear weapons. And they compete hard against India. And in some respects, they're out-competing India. It's mind-boggling. But Toby Dalton and I did this monograph On a normal nuclear Pakistan, which was, by the way, not well received.

Jeffrey 17:41

Well, Toby's in trouble again.

Michael 17:42

I don't know if you saw this. What has he done now?

Jeffrey 17:47

What has he done lately? He and George wrote this, I thought, very reasonable and only slightly provocative piece on Pakistan and India. Right. It's going over like a lead balloon in India, as far as I can tell. I haven't had a chance to really read it carefully to see why people are screaming. But I think it amounts to them sort of saying... Well, Toby's used to it.

Michael 18:11

Yeah. Toby's used to it. But in this normal nuclear Pakistan, I left the math to Toby because he understands this stuff better than I do. But, you know, Pakistan has four plutonium production reactors. India has one decrepit plutonium production reactor. And Pakistan's outcompeting India on nuclear. New warheads by a significant margin. And if India mers to follow China, the authors of our India chapter believe indeed this will be the case, mostly from a technological push without heavy political oversight.

It's not a new decision. It's just a continuation Of things we've already done. That's the way they present how this will unfurl, but it'll unfurl very slowly. And the Pakistan chapter by Feroz and Mansoor suggests that Pakistan's gonna go down this route too. The key for me, the veteran of the first nuclear age, Is whether these Asian countries will get so infected by the viruses of the first nuclear age that they will go deep into counterforce targeting.

So counterforce, a nuclear weapon can kill a city. We call that countervalue targeting. And the same weapon, even if it's poorly produced, Guided. If the warhead is big enough, you can use it against a military target. We call that counterforce targeting. And what happened as a result of that dynamic during the first nuclear age, seek advantage, avoid being at a disadvantage.

You wound up with thousands, thousands of new warheads. What do you do with them? Well, you're also getting Better accuracy.

Jeffrey 20:40

What do you do with it?

Michael 20:42

You target the other guy's strategic forces. You target the other guy's conventional capability. You target ports. You target shipyards. You target war-supporting industry, production facilities. You target tons of things, thousands of things. And once you get infected with that counterforce targeting virus, then turning that ship around so that there are less warheads than there are targets, which is absolutely essential to get deep cuts.

That is really hard. So my question to you is, Do you think these Asian countries, let's talk about China first. Do you think China will be infected now that it's going to have better accuracy and it can have more warheads? Do you think it will be infected by this counter force targeting virus?

Jeffrey 21:59

Yeah, so I don't know. But there are things that strike me as being relevant to answering that question. So one thing is that what used to be called the second artillery, which controls the nuclear-armed missiles in China, also has in recent years become very fond of conventionally armed missiles. And even though there are something like 100, maybe 200 missiles, Nuclear-armed missiles.

In the past decade, they've deployed several hundred, now maybe up over a thousand conventionally-armed short-range missiles. And so in one sense, they did absolutely get infected by that idea of Using accuracy for this kind of counterforce targeting. It's just that they did it with conventional missiles. And so that raises this really interesting choice. And I literally, I mean, I'm truly uncertain as to the answer because what's happened is, you know, for years I argued that there was no reason to think China's nuclear posture would change as long as the bureaucratic structures that made decisions looked basically the same, right?

Well, And we just happen to be living now in one of these periods, and it probably won't last very long before we get an answer, where those bureaucratic structures have changed. The nuclear R&D people have lost almost all their power, and the second artillery has been promoted, and it's now this thing called the PLA rocket force. And so my question has always been, Given that the PLA rocket force loves conventional missiles and has generally seemed to dislike nuclear-armed ones, is it bad news that they're more powerful?

Because does that mean that now that the scientists are out of the picture, their nuclear doctrine will come to look like their conventional missile doctrine, and yes, they're going to get infected with this idea? Or is it the opposite? Is it that they hate nuclear weapons for the same reason that the US Air Force and the US Navy hate nuclear weapons?

And they're going to keep them confined to their little strategic ghetto and that this form of infection is only going to play out on the conventional side. And I truly think it could go either way. I mean, I'm obviously hopeful that to the extent that the second or the rocket force rather goes crazy, that they go crazy with conventional weapons, not nuclear ones.

But I really don't know. And it's not like an I don't know, like it's a punt. I mean, I think it's a question we can bound.

Michael 24:35

It's an open question.

Jeffrey 24:37

Yeah.

Michael 24:38

And they may not know themselves.

Jeffrey 24:42

I had this great conversation in China that I always think about. I don't want to say who it was, because it's a good friend. But we were talking about this idea of the sprint to parity, that someday China, if US nuclear numbers came down, China would sprint right up. And it was actually, I was sitting at a bar with two Chinese friends, and the first person was mocking the idea, saying, this is silly.

We don't need those kinds of numbers. We would never do that. That's ridiculous. And our other friend kind of looked wistful at And I had to ask him, like, what are you thinking? He was like, you know, it never occurred to me we could have the same number. And you could see he was just kind of mulling it over.

And, you know, I didn't take that story to mean that there's a secret plan to sprint to parity so much as there is this idea, like, once you have all these warheads, once you have MIRVs, once you have accuracy, I like your metaphor of being infected with a virus because it must be tempting. But they're so smart.

Michael 25:42

And they've realized so far that usable weapons are more important than weapons you dare not use. So they could help all of us rethink this situation. I know there's great angst about prompts, precision-guided conventional weapons. Weaponry. But the truth of the matter is these weapons are useful. They've already been used. They will be used more. Inventories will grow.

Technical advances will happen. You don't succeed at arms control. Conventional arms control. If something's really usable and Indeed, you have used it and intend to use them in the future. Nuclear weapons, there's a chance. Strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, there's a chance that sanity will prevail. It's prevailed so far for about 70 odd years. But it's certainly not a given.

Let me let me. Paul, one of those threads that you mentioned, Jeffrey, because it's the R&D folks in India who are the big problem. Those guys are the drivers. They make unbelievable promises. They hardly meet them. Or if they meet them, they meet them a couple of decades later. But they do have power in that system. They still do.

And of course, the military doesn't on strategic nuclear matters. Pakistan, it's a different story. Of course, the military runs the show, makes their decisions, and is oriented toward counterforce. And explicitly so with respect to nuclear capabilities. So the shortest range nuclear weapons in Pakistan's arsenal, this missile called the Nasser, it's only 60 kilometers in range, but it's explicitly focused on counterforce mission.

And if you look at the farthest end of the spectrum, This missile called the Shaheen 3. Yeah. 2750 kilometers. Why do you need to go there? I mean, you've already got Bombay covered, right? Oh, we have to get to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Look on your maps, everybody. It's off the coast of Thailand. And why the Andamans?

Because... There's a base there, and it's part of the strategic command. It's where the Navy hangs out in one of the places where the Navy hangs out in India. So there's an explicit counterforce rationale for the Sheen 3. And you've got to figure there's a counterforce rationale for the missiles in between, and It helps explain why they're producing warheads at such a significant rate.

It's probably more than 10 a year. And it could be, you know, Toby thinks it could be much more than 10 a year, which is more than your Chinese friends are making every year. It's certainly more than what the Indians are making every year. And hopefully it's more than what the North Koreans are making. But they're doing this out of a counterforce inclination, even though their space program is pretty weak.

And if they are serious about counterforce, they're going to need help from your friends in China. So here's my next question. Can you conceive of China helping... Pakistan with intelligence, surveillance, targeting information against India? Yeah.

Jeffrey 30:47

Yeah, I can. That's not a happy thought, but yeah, I sure can. Yeah, I definitely can, actually.

Michael 30:58

Well, this is one of the issues that we We raise in this edited volume. I think there are lots of them. We got to think ahead. We got to start putting our minds, applying our heads and our minds to these issues. Because if in the second nuclear age, these Asian states were growing nuclear arsenals, get into the counterforce business, then It gets ugly.

Jeffrey 31:38

Yeah, I think one of the things I'm really struck by, and I see a lot of it in the way North Korea talks about things, about nuclear weapons, but I also see it in Chinese conventional doctrine, and I wonder about Pakistan. There's this enormous emphasis on, especially in North Korea, on Using nuclear weapons early to destroy ports and airfields and leadership facilities so that an attack will stop.

And you know, the Chinese don't do that with nuclear weapons, but they definitely talk about the same thing with conventional weapons have the same idea. It's kind of, kind of a Kind of an analog to our own shock and awe approach, if you remember that particularly awful idea, where they really think that if they use a lot of force very early on in a conflict, it can be decisive.

And the thing I worry about is in a world with MIRVs, right? So you've got large numbers of accurate nuclear weapons, right? Gosh, there's such an incentive to go first, right? I mean, the more accurate they are, the more vulnerable they are sitting in their garrison, and the more valuable they are if you use them first. And so I don't know.

Lately, I've been despairing of strategic stability in an era of high technology.

Michael 33:19

High technology and plenty? Yeah, we're supposed to try to like...

Jeffrey 33:26

As we get on in these podcasts, we're supposed to try to end them on a happy note, but I can't even see a happy horizon here.

Michael 33:35

Well, the trend lines are not going in the right direction in Asia and on the nuclear side. But they're growing at a fraction of the rate That they did during the first nuclear age in the superpower competition. I think if we're gonna end this on a positive note, I'm betting on wisdom in India and China. These are countries that are really focused on economic growth They view power in terms of economic growth.

They view domestic tranquility in terms of economic growth. The decision-making, as I look at it from a distance, and you know it way better than I do with respect to China, but I see intelligence behind the decision so far. And I... I'm counting on that. What we have to be careful with, it seems to me, is that these trend lines, while they are moving up slowly, accuracy, numbers, physical material, transferability to bond making, and the like, those trends To pull in the direction of changes in doctrine that are not good, that are not wise.

Jeffrey 35:36

Yes.

Michael 35:38

But these countries have the object lessons of the United States and the Soviet Union. They've seen what really bad decisions are. Can result in. They can result in thousands of these godawful weapons that you can't use. So in that sense, the United States and the Soviet Union have clarified things for Beijing and New Delhi. And we got to count on that.

We got to count on their They've made wise decisions so far. And they're going to be pushed and pulled. U.S. missile defenses, I gather, were now in the process of a third national defense site. DARPA is looking at multiple warheads on interceptors. Yeah. Yeah. I mean, the theater stuff. I mean, China is going to be tested. And India is going to be tested because China and Pakistan collude.

Jeffrey 36:59

Yeah.

Michael 36:59

And you've predicted they're going to collude some more. I worry.

Jeffrey 37:03

That's for sure.

Michael 37:06

So the wisdom that's been demonstrated so far by Beijing and New Delhi will be tested. But maybe they'll be smarter than we were.

Jeffrey 37:18

Well, that's a really – You know, that's a really interesting answer to the question I started with about why you wrote the book. I take the implicit message to be at least in part to encourage cooler heads in New Delhi and Beijing to prevail. Is that a fair summary?

Michael 37:44

Well, you've got to use the indirect approach. I mean, if you say – You should not do this.

Jeffrey 37:52

Yeah, that's a good point.

Michael 37:53

You must not do that. That works real well.

Jeffrey 37:59

So, yeah.

Michael 38:00

We're laying it out and we'll see what they decide.

Jeffrey 38:05

Have you gotten any feedback yet?

Michael 38:09

It's been quiet. Whereas the book or the monograph on normal nuclear Pakistan I mean, Toby and I just got hammered right away from both India and Pakistan. We got hammered from India because we were suggesting to Pakistan unusual steps they could take to change their image, to put India in a very uncomfortable situation, and to advance their case.

But India hated being relinked with Pakistan. And India hated that their path toward NSG membership, nuclear supplies group membership, might become more complicated. Pakistan, they just hated it because we just took apart all of their talking points, which are just awful. And don't advance their case because they're not true. This book has been different. No shoulds, no musts.

Please think about this. And I think they are.

Jeffrey 39:37

Well, I think it's a really great book, and I'm really honored that you asked me to contribute a chapter.

Michael 39:45

It was great working with you, and thank you for doing that. We need to conspire more often.

Jeffrey 39:57

Yeah, well, next time I'll try to turn the thing in on time. Listeners right now are wondering just exactly how late Jeffrey can turn a book chapter in. You don't want to know. Thanks for doing this, too, Jeffrey. I enjoyed it. Oh, it was great. It was wonderful having you on. Thank you for listening to the Arms Control Wonk podcast.

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