The North Korean Missile Threat and Alliance Reassurance

Jeffrey Lewis 0:00

So it turns out I'm overbearing. You are listening to the Arms Control Wonk podcast, the leading podcast on arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation. I'm Jeffrey Lewis, the founding publisher of the Arms Control Wonk blog and a scholar at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.

Aaron Stein 0:26

And I'm Aaron Stein. I'm a senior resident fellow at the Atlantic Council's Rafiq Hariri Center for the Middle East and the co-host of the show. Aaron, you've been hard to get a hold of. I know. I've been a little busy these past couple of days. But in my defense, the North Koreans won't calm down. I mean, what's going on with them?

Jeffrey 0:44

They won't stop. Also, did you see on the blog? We got an angry, angry comment that I don't write anymore. I didn't actually see this. A person was enraged that I only do these podcasts.

Aaron 0:54

Well, you write. You just don't write for your own site. You write for somebody else.

Jeffrey 0:58

Well, you know, we also collaboratively do research. So I spend a lot of time serving as a glorified research assistant to Melissa and Catherine because I think that – I think they have a voice that's worth investing in.

Aaron 1:18

I think so. They're part of your OSINT sort of Jedi group that you're putting together there in Monterey. And the North Koreans are happily obliging by just not calming down. I would call them the younglings, but I'm afraid that they might show up with lightsabers and kill me.

Jeffrey 1:34

Right. We had to take these personality tests as part of a management training. No. Yes, it was horrible. So it turns out I'm overbearing. Really? Shock. But one person, I'll leave the person's name out, this sort of person, I didn't say it quite like this, but this sort of person who doesn't show anger but will cut your brake lines.

Right. Interesting.

Aaron 2:05

I wonder what they'd say about the North Korean leadership. You tried really hard to keep bringing this back to North Korea. I'm so impressed. I'm trying to pivot the conversation to the rocket launch over the weekend.

Jeffrey 2:19

There's nothing to say about the rocket launch. It was a rocket launch.

Aaron 2:23

Yeah. It was my reading it. It seems to be a repeat of the 2012 launch, correct?

Jeffrey 2:30

Yeah. It looks it looks like it's a little different. Like it might've been heavier. Just from looking at where things splashed down, they gave it a different name this time. I can't do Korean. Even in arms control won't fashion. I'm not sure I want to massacre the name. Kwangmyung Song?

Aaron 2:55

Yeah. Can I tell the listeners something? I tried to practice that at home beforehand and then just said, I'm just going to avoid it.

Jeffrey 3:05

Bright Star, right? They didn't call it the Unha, but it looks externally exactly the same, which doesn't necessarily mean there aren't changes underneath. There was one interesting little detail. Do you remember in 2012 how the South Korean Navy fished out the debris? I do. And this is the cool detail. Yeah, they detonated the first stage as it was falling. So the South Koreans couldn't do that. You think it's so Melissa and Katherine couldn't do photo analysis of it?

Well, as much as I would love to think that it's about us, I think they were really upset that the South Koreans fished out the debris, analyzed it. And also, I guess it was a year ago, might be two years ago now, time flies, the UN panel of experts said, Looked at the debris and they had a list of I should say a dozen, I actually think it was 14, but you know, it's kind of on the order of, of a dozen foreign components.

Most of which were either cannibalized scud parts or items that weren't controlled. So they had gotten things from the United States and South Korea and Japan and Europe that weren't controlled and had put them in the rocket. And so that was something that I think that they probably were not eager to help us analyze their rocket and figure out where the components are coming from.

So as the first stage was falling back into the ocean, they detonated it.

Aaron 4:37

It's like the missile equivalent of the green screen. Exactly.

Jeffrey 4:43

So, you know, that does lead to this. It's got a different name. It seems like it's a little heavier. They went to the trouble of blowing the thing up. So that at least raises the possibility that there are interesting changes. But in terms of like range, you know, people have said maybe it would go a little bit farther than an Unha 3 would have.

But I think I saw like 12,000 kilometers.

Aaron 5:06

Mm-hmm.

Jeffrey 5:06

The range for the Taepodong-2 from two-stage to three-stage is 10,000 to 15,000. It's more, but it's not a qualitatively different threat.

Aaron 5:21

It seems like it's the next developmental hurdle, perhaps, as part of a multi-stage program to further develop your missile capabilities.

Jeffrey 5:34

Yeah, this really interesting thing is happening. As the North Koreans continue to do this, they've now had two successful launches in a row, people still sort of refuse to believe that they're capable of doing what they're doing. I keep hearing like, oh, they couldn't possibly turn this into an ICBM. It's like, really? It looks like a DF-4, which is the first Chinese ICBM.

Why not?

Aaron 6:06

Right. Just because they use cannibalized parts doesn't mean that they can't use those cannibalized parts to great effect as part of a broader program to improve missile development.

Jeffrey 6:15

Well, and it's also not clear to me, and I guess this is a conversation to have about foreign components. But, you know, sometimes they buy things because they can. You know, like It's not clear to me that if they couldn't buy some of these things in the commercial market, that they wouldn't be able to stand up a capability.

It's just that it's cheaper and more efficient. And so if you've got – I think one of the things is they had ball bearings that they cannibalized from Scuds. So maybe they've got a – Giant bin of perfectly serviceable... I don't know. So it isn't clear to me that if these sources of supply stopped, that that would be a showstopper for their program.

Aaron 7:00

Yeah. No, absolutely. I mean... These parts, as you said, that came out earlier weren't controlled. It brings up the policy aspects of this, something that we always talk about. It's like, how do you deal with this? It was another ho-hum launch, but nevertheless, it was another launch. People demand that the US does something, allies in the region.

We took some steps to try and do something, in quotes. Yeah.

Jeffrey 7:27

Yeah, let me say one more thing about the – one more thing that bothers me about that discussion, then we'll talk about that something we did. Sure. Which is making me crazy. So we'll have the calm part of the conversation. Okay. And then I'll start to rant. Okay. You know, sometimes people say that they can't – that this – that the unha slash thing I can't pronounce.

The K word. The Taepodong 2 series, we'll just call it. Okay. I keep hearing people say that it would not make an effective rocket because it takes so long to assemble it and fuel it. But the Soviets and the Chinese figured this out. And the Chinese with the DF-4, they kept them assembled in caves and they would roll them out, erect them, fuel them, and they planned to fire them.

So it isn't like you can't It isn't like it's impossible to come up with a workable operational concept for a missile like this. If I were the North Koreans... I would deploy 11 of these things in caves, roll out to launch sites, and then I would do a test from an above-ground building where I rolled it out, assembled, erected it, fueled it, and fired it just to make the point that I could.

Aaron 8:45

How about hidden tunnels? Can we say that word on the podcast?

Jeffrey 8:49

Yeah, that's what I'd do. They'd be caves. They'd be roll out to launch caves.

Aaron 8:52

Right. No, no. It's a good way to actually – That's what I'd do. Introduce uncertainty into the ability to preemptively target them or sort of preventatively target them. And so you instill a little bit of deterrence theory, right?

Jeffrey 9:07

Yeah, and I found – the US intelligence community found one of the Chinese sites and I found that it's not active today. But if you look at a satellite picture of it, it is really hard to see. If you don't catch them constructing them, you might miss them. Plus – You didn't push me on it. I said I'd build 11.

Why 11? Lowest double-digit prime number.

Aaron 9:35

How did you come to that?

Jeffrey 9:37

Because if you found 11 missile sites, wouldn't you assume there was a 12th somewhere?

Aaron 9:41

Yeah, of course.

Jeffrey 9:43

Yeah, so you'd be looking forever.

Aaron 9:45

Just to screw with US intel analysts?

Jeffrey 9:48

On 11, they'd be like, God, there's got to be a 12th. It's two brigades of six. It's two brigades of six. Where's the 12th one?

Aaron 9:53

Right, right, right. Just to waste man time.

Jeffrey 9:56

Well, if they found them all, right?

Aaron 9:59

Yeah. Just don't have them – if they develop cruise missiles, they shouldn't put them in trucks with phone numbers that don't work.

Jeffrey 10:07

Yeah, well, in North Korea, it would stand out. You'd be like, wow, we've got a delivery service. Right.

Aaron 10:12

Unless it was the show, I'm making fun of the South Koreans.

Jeffrey 10:16

No, I know, but it was the Taiwanese who did that.

Aaron 10:18

The Taiwanese, right.

Jeffrey 10:20

Who deserve to be made fun of. There's no doubt about it. Right, right. Okay, but we should talk about, speaking of making fun of the South Koreans. We should talk about that.

Aaron 10:31

Yeah. We have to talk about that. I mean, because missile defense becomes sort of, well, if you can't find them on the ground, you have to shoot them down as they're coming back. They're coming there as a reentering or at least in mid course flight.

Jeffrey 10:41

Well, so let me ask, let me ask you about this. So you, you do, you do Turkey.

Aaron 10:48

Yeah. That's, that's my job.

Jeffrey 10:50

And, and we put they were what? Pack three batteries, weren't they?

Aaron 10:54

Yeah.

Jeffrey 10:55

Yeah. In, in Turkey. Did that make the Turks feel better?

Aaron 11:01

It did, I mean, but only because they demanded it. And the threat from the Syrians at that time, you know, a PAC-3 could have actually helped in some respects. But it made the Turks extremely nervous because there weren't enough batteries. And so they actually requested a higher number than what we were willing to give. And so it was sort of a Band-Aid on a gunshot wound.

Jeffrey 11:22

Ah, okay. Yeah, I mean, I was just in Tokyo, and I was staying in Shinjuku, and Kyle Mizukami asked me about this, and I felt like such an idiot. He was like, so did you go see the THAAD battery? It's like a tourist site now? Well, apparently, I think it's a THAAD battery. I should look it up.

It might be a PAC-3 battery. I think it's THAAD. In Shinjuku, and the Japanese have a kind of history of doing this, right, is that they, whenever the North Koreans... Do one of these space launches, the Japanese park a missile defense system in public.

Aaron 11:59

Right. And they actually always threaten to shoot it down too.

Jeffrey 12:02

Right. Which is crazy because it has no capability against this particular missile.

Aaron 12:07

No.

Jeffrey 12:07

And I've spent, I don't know how many days on Twitter trying to explain, I think they're PAC-3s. Yeah, they're PAC-3s. I'm looking at a picture of them now. Anyway, the US did this too. Bush did this in 2000 – whenever it was. I think it was Bush. They talked about how they turned on the missile defense system.

It's crazy because first of all, the rocket is heading in a different direction.

Aaron 12:39

Well, you should tell listeners that. I mean I can conceptualize the map based upon some of the stuff that you put on Arms Control Walk about which way the missile flies.

Jeffrey 12:47

Right. So the Earth is round, right? And so you fire something toward the equator to achieve a circular orbit, right? It's got to be a great circle, right? You can't fire like due west or due east. I mean you could if it was a missile and you wanted to come back down but not if you want to get into orbit.

And so they fired it southwards in the direction of the Philippines so they could put the thing in orbit.

Aaron 13:21

So if you just conceptualize it on a map, it basically just goes south down towards the equator, sort of southwest.

Jeffrey 13:30

Right. And it's a space launch, so it climbs – I shouldn't say it goes straight up because it doesn't go exactly straight up. But it goes much, much more closer to straight up than a missile launch would. And so if you're sitting in South Korea, you'd actually have to be sitting – I mean it would depend on the system.

But you'd have to be very, very close so that about – it would take like a minute to detect it. And then you've got a couple of minutes to intercept it while it's boosting. We don't have any missile defenses that do that.

Aaron 14:06

Right, so it's hitting it in boost phase, whereas THAAD is mid-course and PAC-3 is upon re-entry.

Jeffrey 14:14

Well, THAAD is technically terminal, but I think it has a little bit of... It's high altitude.

Aaron 14:19

High altitude, right. Between terminal and as it's re-entering. Between SM-3 and PAC.

Jeffrey 14:29

You'd have a better chance, I think... I'd have to look at what the engagement altitude at the top is, but I think you'd have a better chance at hitting the satellite.

Aaron 14:36

Once it was in orbit, then you would – the space launcher.

Jeffrey 14:39

Right. Exactly. This is crazy. But obviously you're in South Korea. Like North Korea is not going to use an unha against South Korea. Like it's too close.

Aaron 14:49

Right. So PAC would be a better one. But for a missile, of course, not for a space launch vehicle, although those terms are obviously sometimes used interchangeably when it comes to the North Koreans. Right.

Jeffrey 14:59

So just – I mean it's just this crazy thing. So like the US and the South Koreans are talking about putting THAAD in. And THAAD is of no use against an UNHA, right? Because if it was – if they did use it as an ICBM, then they would use it against the United States. So the THAAD system would have to be in the US.

Towards the end of flight. So THAAD, if you have THAAD in South Korea, it has no capacity to hit the rocket when it's boosting. Right. And if you do use it as a terminal defense in the U.S., it probably can't deal with the speed of the warhead coming in. With a little asterisk that says if they use a crappy...

They could use a crappy reentry vehicle that slows way, way down, and then you might be able to hit it. So it's weird because the only thing THAAD would be good at – oh, and by the way, THAAD, high altitude, no good for those SS-21s, the KNO-2s that the North Koreans are building, these short-range, solid-fueled missiles that can hit Seoul.

So this report that I was telling you about – The report to Congress on theater missile defense architecture options for the Asia-Pacific region from the late 90s. You know, if you put four THAAD batteries, you can cover kind of like Busan and like the southern part of South Korea. But like that's the least valuable thing. At least from my perspective, that's the least valuable missile defense investment.

I would much rather spend money to improve Seoul's defenses against the new short-range solid-fueled missiles. Or spend the money on dealing with, I'm going to call them UNHA-derived ICBMs, whether those are mid-course defenses, the disaster in Alaska. Yeah. It doesn't work and it's a mess, but whatever, like that kind of system, like something like that, but with actual capabilities.

Right. Or if you're going to like light money on fire, you know, like fool around with boost phase defenses, which will probably never work. But, you know, I mean, if you're lighting money on fire, have fun. I just I don't understand. And I guess this is what I what really gets me is I I don't understand the desire to do something symbolic.

And I mean I guess I do like governments don't want to be seen as saying like, well, it's a rocket. There's nothing we can do. Like I get why politically that's a problem. But the analyst in me just recoils at like – so I got an idea. We'll put out a press release about deploying THAAD. Even though THAAD has no capability against this missile, it will make people feel better.

I find that really insulting.

Aaron 17:47

Well, it's just – I mean it – It's purely symbolic, like putting a PAC-3 on the middle of a mountain so everybody can see it when the missile is traveling southwest.

Jeffrey 18:00

Yeah.

Aaron 18:00

To make the population feel good, or at least in this place, it's about alliance reassurance. It's about the U.S. has got South Korea's back, so to speak, and will pledge to defend it from North Korean aggression. But – I think you're right. It completely undercuts you when that symbolic action is – it's not only just symbolic. Actually, it really is symbolic in that the system being deployed has absolutely no capability against the potential threat.

In a way, it undermines the intention, which is to tell the South Koreans that we will defend you in case the DPRK attacks.

Jeffrey 18:37

Yeah, it's so weird to me. And I think a little bit – it comes up when you talk about – we have this promise to – or we maintain the capability to forward deploy bombers in Guam. Right. Which just makes me crazy because the earth is round. And to get from Missouri to North Korea does not require going anywhere near Guam.

Aaron 19:02

You've done this before. I think I've seen this graphic pop up in the Twitter feed.

Jeffrey 19:06

Yeah, I've made – like I've taken screenshots of globes. Like, okay, here's Missouri. Here's a straight line to North Korea, and Guam is way the hell over there.

Aaron 19:18

Right.

Jeffrey 19:18

We would never – if we're going to drop a nuclear weapon on North Korea, it is not coming from Guam.

Aaron 19:25

Yeah.

Jeffrey 19:25

Like why this makes people feel better. But you could. Yes, you could fly – I forget how far out of the way it is, but I think you fly way the hell out of the way to Guam, touchdown, have a cup of – I can't even have a beer. So you have a cup of coffee, get back in the plane, and then fly all the way back to North Korea, drop the bomb, and go home?

That's insane.

Aaron 19:48

Yeah. Right, because in real wartime, they would just fly from Missouri. I mean we all know this. They make aerial refueling. They train for these types of missions all the time and that's what they do.

Jeffrey 19:58

They literally practice. Well, like there was the – do you remember there was the military exercise where we had bombers show up?

Aaron 20:06

I do. I do. Right? Like bingo to bomb. Right. It flew around the globe and it sort of escorted by South Korean – I think it was escorted by South Korean and US fighters. It made a really low pass and dropped a dud. It dropped a – what do they call it? A dummy warhead. Yeah. Just right in the middle of a test field and then just flew home.

Jeffrey 20:27

Yeah. It was 2013.

Aaron 20:27

Right.

Jeffrey 20:29

I'm getting old. 2013 does not seem like that long ago, but it is.

Aaron 20:38

We've had this conversation.

Jeffrey 20:39

From Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri to South Korea, dropping inert munitions there as part of the exercise before returning to the mainland. Notice they did not stop in Guam.

Aaron 20:49

I've had this conversation offline with Joshua Pollack, Arms Control 1 contributor as well, about how the toolkit is so antiquated. You don't have to deploy in Guam. You probably wouldn't deploy in Guam and it actually erodes the deterrent that you're trying to build if you just follow the same script every single time. It's like, well, North Koreans do something provocative.

We're going to go park a B-2 in Guam. Right.

Jeffrey 21:13

It ceases to be reassuring and if you're the North Koreans, you're like, yeah, that's worth it.

Aaron 21:17

Exactly. And then if you really do mean to do something, so what if you actually do mean to do something and you put the bomber in Guam, the North Koreans don't actually take you seriously.

Jeffrey 21:26

Yes, that's a very, very good point, right? We actually attacked them and they're like, but you were following the script.

Aaron 21:34

Yeah, you were in Guam. That's normal.

Jeffrey 21:36

If you wanted me to stop, you should have told me you planned to do something.

Aaron 21:41

That's policy option C in the playbook. We've seen the playbook. Right. Yeah. But – Well, so smart people – well, let's go. Interested people in South Korea obviously get that THAAD wouldn't work and that they should probably do something else and that the Guam deployment is symbolic. And so you get crazy policy options from the usual suspects inside South Korea's defense establishment or sort of like on – that's not the right word.

Like trying to push the defense establishment to develop their own independent nuclear weapons capability for deterrence.

Jeffrey 22:20

Yes, we've got the umpteenth Chosun Ilbo op-ed calling for the U.S. to return nuclear weapons to South Korea. Right. Which, again, is one of those crazy ideas because why would you put nuclear – wow, this gets to another – I find it so fascinating that we're focused on having the nuclear weapons in theater. Like if it were 1955, that would make a lot of sense.

Because in 1955, it was really hard to get someplace. And so it made sense. Well, in the 50s, we had this crazy idea, right? We put our bombers really close to the Soviet Union so they could get there. But there was the famous bomber study where it occurred to people like, oh, but if they're really close to the Soviet Union, then that means the Soviet Union can target them.

Oh, they would be much safer in the United States and we could just fly there and refuel them. Like, yes. Yes, that's right.

Aaron 23:19

Yeah, the bomber study is sort of an interesting piece of Cold War history that I really like, by the way.

Jeffrey 23:25

Right. Well, so, I mean, so what makes me crazy, though, is that we never learned that lesson. And we continue to make this argument that a forward presence of the weapons, right, in this vulnerable way Has this kind of inherent value. And it just, I think what it is is there's something that bothers me about the fundamental contradiction of saying that there is a suboptimal defense posture that makes our allies feel better.

Right? Like, oh, let's, and I guess, I guess, you know, I don't know, people like to analogize. Maybe it's like buying a, Like you're really, Oh gosh, can I tell the story? Cause it involves a friend. I, I, I guess it's like buying really exorbitant and outrageous gift, right. And wasting money to like show how much you care about someone.

But I have a friend and she was dating this guy who did that. And she was like, you're an idiot. It's like I don't want you to waste all your money. Like I don't – like that's – no, that is the worst possible thing you could do and I've always kind of admired her for being like, no, you moron.

Like that's not romantic. That's stupid. That's how you're going to manage our money. Like no. Like get away from me. I kind of feel like that's the same thing here.

Aaron 24:58

But isn't the counterargument is that the ally who's demanding it doesn't think it's a stupid idea that they like this – Which weapons were in South Korea? As a NATO guy who does Turkey, which weapons did we forward deploy in South Korea?

Jeffrey 25:12

Gravity bombs and artillery-fired atomic projectiles.

Aaron 25:17

Right. So the same menu that was in Turkey. I mean we got rid of the projectiles, but the bombs are still there. By the way – Yes. Catherine Dill is doing a great research project.

Jeffrey 25:32

Who? Bush only meant out – as far as we can tell, Bush in 1991 only meant to take the AFAPs out. Oh, really? Didn't mean to take the gravity bombs out. Of South Korea? Yeah, they messed up.

Aaron 25:46

There was a screw-up in the American stewardship of our stockpile in terms of sending things around.

Jeffrey 25:50

I'm shocked. No, no. They meant to leaf the gravity bombs. I know. But then people misinterpreted the removal of the AFAPs as a complete removal. And the North Koreans said, oh, you've met our demands. Okay, we'll come back to talks. And then they had to decide like, so do we go out there and say like, no, no, no, canceled the talks.

We're leaving the gravity bombs.

Aaron 26:19

They're like, no. You respond to the first Khrushchev letter, not the second one?

Jeffrey 26:23

Yeah, well, they would... It's actually an example of prospect theory, where they didn't want to take the gravity bombs out in order to get the North Koreans into talks, because they didn't like the precedent that set, and they kind of were... They didn't really value the gain of getting the North Koreans into the talk. Right. But once the North Koreans were into talks, they feared the loss of it far more than they...

In theory, they should have been neutral, right? Getting the North Koreans to talks has the same value... The day before and the day after they make the announcement. But prospect theory tells you that's not true, that the day after they make the announcement, you'd be much more bought in and concerned about them walking away than you were the day before.

And that's exactly what happens. We think, we're not completely sure yet, but we think they didn't mean To take them all out and they just at the end of the day didn't want to have to they floated a trial balloon with Don Oberdorfer in the Washington Post but at the end of the day they didn't want to come back out and say like yeah yeah yeah all those good feelings those talks everybody's happy everybody's celebrating like here's a big bucket of cold water the gravity bombs stay right yeah right well you know but but it's so I'll play devil's advocate now I mean with the talks having gone nowhere since 1991 or at least not the way that we had wanted them to go

Aaron 27:41

The flip argument is that the South Koreans say put them back in to exact concessions out of the North Koreans to denuclearize, to nuclearize, to denuclearize.

Jeffrey 27:52

I would say, one, the North Koreans never believe we took them out.

Aaron 27:55

That is true. I was about to say, we could talk about this all day and the North Koreans don't believe us.

Jeffrey 27:59

Yeah, and I think as unreasonable as the North Koreans are, it's not hard for me to believe that they are sincerely unreasonable.

Aaron 28:07

Look, I study a part of the world that's based upon conspiracy theory. So I get it. Reality doesn't matter half the time. It's just what everybody thinks is going on.

Jeffrey 28:16

So I think that it gets you nowhere with the North Koreans. It provides no particular capability to Because everything we want to do, we can do from the U.S. And then the most important thing is – and I saw a colleague – I would say he stole it. He didn't really steal it. He had the same idea as I did and kind of would want to tease, but it probably wouldn't come off as teasing.

But for years I've been saying, do you remember when South Korea had the riots about U.S. beef imports? I do. Right? Yeah. Okay. If they did that over hamburgers – What are the riots going to look like when we put in nuclear weapons? It's all well and good for the crazy guys at the Chosun Ilbo or maybe MJ Chung when he's running for president, say that stuff.

But in terms of actually getting this past South Korean society as a whole, what a freaking headache for no reason.

Aaron 29:26

No, absolutely. I mean – so it gets my head spinning, right? Because obviously I don't want to put in the – to reintroduce American nuclear weapons. But then the fad issue as we talked about is complete nonsense otherwise. I mean have the North Koreans completely tied our hands here? I mean what are we supposed to do? Because people always ask for a policy response from the United States government.

Jeffrey 29:48

Yeah, I think we like – you know, the policy response, it's – the problem is we don't like it, right? Yeah. The policy response is like we can't stop them. I mean unless we want to attack them, like our choices are to do what this administration and for the last year or so the previous administration did, which is do nothing.

Right. In which case they're going to keep testing rockets, keep testing nuclear weapons. Right. And eventually they'll develop a thermonuclear weapon that they can put on an ICBM.

Aaron 30:19

And they can sort of hit my hometown of Los Angeles.

Jeffrey 30:22

Yeah, they'll get there. Or we can start haggling with them. And it's not like I think haggling with them is going to lead to a dramatic change in their behavior. And I don't actually think they're going to give up any capabilities that they already have. But having said that, I think that they – what we can do is we can delay the development of some of these capabilities.

Yeah, it's bribery, but what the hell? Like sometimes you pay bribes, right? And you just try to manage the situation for as long as it takes for that government to go under. Yeah. Which sucks as advice. I get it. I always write, it's like telling a kid, what you need to do is eat your vegetables. It's like my doctor.

My doctor's like, you need to lose weight. I'm like, thanks, doc.

Aaron 31:20

But yeah, I don't see missile defenses being the solution either. I am actually a fan of theater missile defenses for protecting aspects of, say, forward deploy U.S. troops. The PAC-3 comes to mind when we were preparing for the invasion of Iraq in 2003. But for defense of a city like Seoul against an adversary like the DPRK, I find missile defense to just be throwing money into the wind, and it just will not work, and it will not protect the city.

So the idea of using it to reassure, I think it's the Guam argument all over again. It's not a proper way to reassure an ally.

Jeffrey 32:07

Well, I do think – I think I would say a couple of things. I mean one is that, yeah, if you're trying to get strategic – Assurance in terms of protecting populations. I think that's probably totally unachievable. I do, I do realize that there is some value in having a capability against the kind of missile threats you will one faces.

And so particularly for Seoul And I always forget, what's the bigger system than Iron Dome? There's a slightly higher altitude version. I think it's David's Sling. David's Sling, and then it's like Gideon's Trumpet, right?

Aaron 32:45

Something like that. And then the highest altitude one is Arrow 3. This is what happens when you go to Bible school. I can't remember all of these things. These Old Testament illusions.

Jeffrey 33:01

So, you know, I'm super worried about the solid-fueled short-range ballistic missiles the North Koreans are making. And I think they're making those to target, you know, ports and airfields and military bases. And so, yeah, I would throw a lot of money at that. I guess I don't care if they put in a couple of FAD batteries in order to protect Busan against, like, no-dongs.

Aaron 33:23

Yeah, sure, of course.

Jeffrey 33:24

Like, sure, that's fine. But yeah, it is a little weird. Like you get to the end of this and it's kind of like there's just not that much capability there.

Aaron 33:34

No, look. There's a role for missile defense. I mean don't get me wrong. I mean it's an entire system. I mean if let's say – You can identify these sites before launch. Even if they build them into tunnels, you can find the tunnels. Hopefully, you can target them. It's a whole list. The listeners don't need us to go through.

But when it's the primary tool of your reassurance along with forward deploying in Guam or you've run out of policy options on the military side and so it just runs – it's running us in strategic circles. Yeah. Where nothing new is coming out. No real effort to address this problem is coming out, even if that effort to address the problem, as you said, is buy off the North Koreans.

Hey, Aaron. Yes? My 10 o'clock is here. Oh. So we're going to end the podcast on that note?

Jeffrey 34:31

Well, you know what? Here's a happy note.

Aaron 34:34

Okay.

Jeffrey 34:36

The satellite is tumbling.

Aaron 34:40

Give the listeners like two minutes and me. What does that mean when you say it's tumbling?

Jeffrey 34:44

So apparently they didn't get it in quite the orbit that they wanted and it doesn't look like it's stable. And so there are early reports that the satellite is tumbling. And so while this is the second consecutive successful launch they've had and we have this terrible note, they are still in this slightly small way. The incompetent North Koreans that we've grown to love and mock.

And even though we shouldn't, even though I wrote an article about how we shouldn't mock them.

Aaron 35:14

We can still mock them a little bit. Just a tiny bit. Just a tiny bit. Just a tiny bit. As we close here, I mean. This is the stuff that gets you guys going. I mean they've made your new year, haven't they? So we can mock them a little bit because every month they have something new for you guys to analyze.

Jeffrey 35:30

I'm so tired. Next up, Iranian space launch. Yeah. February 16 to 18. They put out the NOTAM today.

Aaron 35:36

Excellent. So all the listeners can look forward to our next podcast about space launches just with my part of the world. We'll talk about Iran. Awesome. All right. So thanks everybody for listening and thanks Jeffrey for putting up with me and my lack of response to your email last week.

Jeffrey 35:51

Have a good day, Aaron.