The most recent edition of Survival has a section on “Reinforcing the NPT”. One of the articles, “The Problem with Nuclear Mind Reading”, is by me (non-printable proof available here), and the other, entitled “Exposing Nuclear Non-Compliance”, is by former IAEA Deputy Director General for Safeguards, Pierre Goldschmidt (available for free here).
My article asks the question: Should we care why a non-compliant state has violated its non-proliferation undertakings, or instead focus on what it has done? My answer is that we should focus on actions not intentions—not least because the IAEA is not tasked with assessing intentions and it would be effectively impossible for it to do so.
If the topic sounds familiar to Wonk readers it probably is. The article grew out of my first ever posting on this blog and has been the subject of a few since then. [And was the subject of a talk James gave at the New America Foundation, which you can view on YouTube. — Jeffrey]
Anyway, like every other idea in non-proliferation, it turns out not to be so new. Its origin? The Acheson-Lilienthal Report. Where else? (The creators of South Park captured the feeling nicely in this episode, to which the title of this post is a tribute).
I was rereading A-L the other day, which as many of you will know, proposes international control of the fuel cycle (or rather, “dangerous” activities) by an Atomic Development Authority. The following passage described the inspection function of this body:
…the Authority will be aided in the detection of illegal operations by the fact that it is not the motive but the operation which is illegal. Any national or private effort to mine uranium will be illegal; any such stockpiling of thorium will be illegal; the building of any primary reactor or separation plant will be illegal. This circumstance is of very great importance for the following reason: It is true that a thoroughgoing inspection of all phases of the industry of a nation will in general be an unbearable burden; it is true that a calculated attempt at evasion may, by camouflage or by geographical location, make the specific detection of an illegal operation very much more difficult. But the total effort needed to carry through from the mine to the bomb, a surreptitious program of atomic armament on a scale sufficient to make it a threat or to make it a temptation to evasion, is so vast, and the number of separate difficult undertakings so great, and the special character of many of these undertakings so hard to conceal, that the fact of this effort
should be impossible to hide. The fact that it is the existence of the effort rather then a specific purpose or motive or plan which constitutes an evasion and an unmistakable danger signal is to our minds one of the great advantages of the proposals we have outlined.
A lesson that, in my opinion at least, is still very relevant today.
Another article full of NPT hypocrisy. Full of stuff designed to keep those with nuclear weapons safe from those without. Nary a mention of enforcing Article VI of the treaty.
The first part of your post I agree with wholeheartedly: the precise reason why a state may not be in compliance is irrelevant and the process should be geared to returning them to compliant status. This has been very effective in the past with numerous states, many of whom have gone on to have happy, healthy, peaceful nuclear programs.
The second part of the post, however, is based on expanding the already shaky assumption of “first-class” and “second-class” states. Presumably, the declared nuclear states would not be subject to the intrusive, continuous inspections of all aspects of industry, nor would they have to surrender control of their fuel cycle to an international agency. This is just the sort of solution that appeals to the powerful: everyone else will be under our tight control, but we will be exempt from our own laws.
I predict this will not receive a very favorable response from the non-nuclear states. Moreover, I think the arms-control emphasis, at this point in history, should be on those who actually have the offending weapons rather than on those who don’t.
Created at the dawn of the Atomic Age, the 1946 Acheson-Lilienthal report is almost without parallel in its clear perception of the non-existence of so-called “civilian” nuclear energy:
The development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes and the development of atomic energy for bombs are in much of their course interchangeable and interdependent. From this it follows that although nations may agree not to use in bombs the atomic energy developed within their borders the only assurance that a conversion to destructive purposes would not be made would be the pledged word and the good faith of the nation itself. This fact puts an enormous pressure upon national good faith. Indeed it creates suspicion on the part of other nations that their neighbors’ pledged word will not be kept. This danger is accentuated by the unusual characteristics of atomic bombs, namely their devastating effect as a surprise weapon, that is, a weapon secretly developed and used without warning. Fear of such surprise violation of pledged word will surely break down any confidence in the pledged word of rival countries developing atomic energy if the treaty obligations and good faith of the nations are the only assurances upon which to rely.
Such considerations have led to a preoccupation with systems of inspection by an international agency to forestall and detect violations and evasions of international agreements not to use atomic weapons. For it was apparent that without international enforcement no system of security holds any real hope at all.
In our own inquiry into possibilities of a plan for security we began at this point, and studied in some detail the factors which would be involved in an international inspection system supposed to determine whether the activities of individual nations constituted evasions or violations of international outlawry of atomic weapons.
We have concluded unanimously that there is no prospect of security against atomic warfare in a system of international agreements to outlaw such weapons controlled only by a system which relies on inspection and similar police-like methods. The reasons supporting this conclusion are not merely technical, but primarily the inseparable political, social, and organizational problems involved in enforcing agreements between nations each free to develop atomic energy but only pledged not to use it for bombs. National rivalries in the development of atomic energy readily convertible to destructive purposes are the heart of the difficulty. So long as intrinsically dangerous activities may be carried on by nations, rivalries are inevitable and fears are engendered that place so great a pressure upon a system of international enforcement by police methods that no degree of ingenuity or technical competence could possibly hope to cope with them.
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Jacques Costeau, speaking before a UN conference in 1976 stated it more directly:
…human society is too diverse, national passions too strong, human aggression too deep-seated for peaceful and warlike atoms to stay divorced for too long. We cannot embrace one while abhorring the other; we must learn, if we want to live at all, to live without both…
Amen to that.
I must respectfully disagree. Arms control, non-proliferation etc are at heart political issues and because of this intentions matter if we are to broker, or at least first try and broker, political solutions. Take Iran. Admiral Blair stated in the annual threat assessment to the Senate Intel committee that Iran’s missile programs and the like are what he called “Iran’s strategic deterrence.” (I admit that he also, in a clear contradiction, also stated that Iranian programs are meant as a shield behind which Tehran may seek to dominate the Persian Gulf which is a form compellence).
If you buy the argument that what Iran is trying to do is to deter US attack, the possibility of which arises given aggressive US strategic posture in the Middle East, then such an assessment of intent is crucial for developing stable long-term solutions. One might also argue that the same applies in the case of North Korea.
If the United States withdraws the threat and engages in a meaningful attempt to secure regional peace along the lines of the Baker-Hamilton report then it might be possible to broker a political solution in the Iran case. Integrating North Korea into the political and economic architecture of Northeast Asia and providing space for would be reformers in the North Korean leadership would obviate the need for a deterrent esp given that external constraints assist the internal case for a “army first” policy.
Ignoring intentions and automatically invoking the punitive might actually make the situation worse by augmenting the internal case for developing strategic deterrence.
Intentions matter, especially if these intentions arise from our own strategic postures. Ignoring intentions is just a fancy way of ignoring our own culpability for nuclear proliferation.
If nuclear non-proliferation can be seen as a normative principle, presumably we in the arms control community think that non-proliferation is a moral good, then we should be always aware that our first task as moral agents would be to deal with our own contributions to the problem.
Focusing on the actions of others, for instance by ISIS, is easy and immoral.
The great value of this blog is that it generally does not do that; it is rare for a non-proliferation analyst to also delve into the gritty detail of US nuclear posture as the ACW does quite regularly.
How many times has ISIS produced a paper about US nuclear posture?
A reader, let’s call him or her NP, had trouble posting the following comment. I am reproducing it here:
MarkoB: I actually don’t think there is much clear blue water between us. First, I agree with you 100% that arms control and non-proliferation are essentially political issues and I view my paper as making a political argument. Second, in the paper I say explicitly that the US must take Iranian intent into account when negotiating directly with Iran. My focus in the paper is on the Security Council and Board of Governors. For them to take intent into account, when they—as organizations—no means of assessing it, is a recipe for inaction and leads to the degradation of the deterrence value of safeguards. To me, this is a key political element in the effectiveness of non-proliferation.
NP (via Jeffrey): I agree entirely. Indeed see footnotes 18 and 36 of my paper.
James: See NP’s comment re A-L plan.
AEL: Does it really strike you as impossible to care about non-proliferation and disarmament? Given I recently published a book called “Abolishing Nuclear Weapons” I would respectfully suggest that your hypocrisy charge is misplaced.
NP: Fair enough. In which case the “A-L Plan” begins with multilateral disarmament.
But that only reinforces my conclusion that the barrier to implementing such safeguards would almost certainly be the states that have nuclear weapons, declared or not, and not the states who aspire to them. The Iranians, for example, would be delighted to give up weapons they don’t have in exchange for the Great Powers giving up weapons they do. The Great Powers would not be so enthusiastic, though they would eagerly adopt the Report’s logic to the extent of denying others the fuel cycle.
I believe that global nonproliferation efforts are reaching an impasse that cannot be resolved without a serious attempt at global disarmament. Any proposal to internationalize the fuel cycle for the “have-nots” will receive a significant push-back.
It seems to me that the problem with saying that you’ll treat all non-compliant actions the same without attempting to assess intent, is that even starting with the best of intentions (sorry!) such a policy will inevitably founder upon rocks of Realpolitik.
Who thinks that a hypothetical violation by, say, Japan would or could ever be treated identically to the same violation by say, Iran?
(However, perhaps I misunderstand you, and you are merely saying that the reports by agencies like the IAEA should not take into account intentions, but the consequences decided by bodies like the Security Council should still do so?)
As an almost entirely unrelated aside on A-L, it’s a little known fact that the edition eventually leaked/published was actually somewhat, and at times substantially, different from the original Top Secret version that was circulated to policymakers. Much was redacted for reasons that are not always entirely clear in retrospect. One of my favorite paragraphs of it, which was redacted in the published version, goes as follow:
I have a copy of General Groves’ copy of the original, Top Secret report, if anyone is interested. It is part of the Correspondence (“Top Secret”) of the Manhattan Engineer District microfilm collection issued by the National Archives, Roll 2, Target 4, File 10, Tab G. I hadn’t myself realized it was substantially different from the published version until quite recently, when I started finding passages in it that were missing from the published version.
Glancing over the section quoted in the original post, I don’t see any differences, but I thought that the fact of missing passages might be something of more general interest, since we’re on the subject of A-L.