I have just returned from Berlin where I attended a meeting at the Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung. The meeting discussed a forthcoming report on the future of nuclear weapons in Europe. Specifically, it discussed whether now is the time to have a phased and incremental debate on what to do with NATO’s short-range nuclear forces. NATO’s tactical arsenal comprises some 2-300 nuclear gravity bombs deployed in Western Europe.
Does the Alliance need these weapons? Our chief wonk, Jeffrey Lewis, made his point of view reasonably clear back in June (see the entry NATO Nukes Not Secure and the discussion following it). I don’t have a personal opinion on whether tactical nuclear weapons matter for European defence, but it would seem to me that if you do want to get rid of them, now would be a good time.
While some politicians represented at the Foundation meeting seemed to question the utility of having these weapons around, the technocrats stressed the Alliance’s belief that the gravity bombs have a deterrent value. It was said that Alliance members are convinced that it is necessary to keep U.S. nuclear weapons on European soil.
One participant said that it is either “the present force structure or nothing”. Once the U.S. weapons are gone, he said, they won’t come back. And so, there was considerable concern of the proposed forward deployment of Russian weapons. Several argued for retaining the gravity bombs as a political counterweight.
On the other hand, there are discussions here in Britain, and elsewhere in Europe, about whether or not tactical nuclear weapons are “low hanging fruit” ripe to be picked in advance of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. And indeed, recent consultations amongst Alliance members seem to indicate that there that there is considerably less attachment to these weapons than previously assumed. In other words, the member states are not as convinced as the technocrats think.
The problem is that no NATO member is willing to be the first to make the proposal. This came across strongly in the coffee breaks. Presumably, members fear that other parties would interpret such a proposal as a signal of weakening commitment to the Alliance in a time of great military challenges.
And it would need to be an Alliance heavyweight that makes the first move, and preferably one where weapons are presently deployed.
If a member picks up the ball, it would seem to me that NATO’s 2009 summit – which also marks the Alliance’s 60th anniversary – would be the perfect venue to reach a decision. Whether a removal of tactical nuclear weapons from Western Europe would have a significant impact on the 2010 NPT review conference, however, is a matter very much open for debate.
I think any proposal to remove the weapons from NATO would have a much greater impact on perceptions of NATO unity and perceptions of the U.S. commitment to NATO than it would on the NPT review. This would be a distant 4th issue, at most on the NPT list (1: ratify CTBT; 2: extend START, 3: commit to eliminate all nukes in the long term).
The question then becomes whether it is the right time to start a debate about the U.S. commitment to NATO and perceptions of NATO unity. Other issues that come up in 2009 may raise similar questions, and this may just add more fuel to a fire. Besides, although Russia always links the two, it is unlikely that unilateral NATO move to remove the weapons would affect Russia’s deployments of non-strategic nukes, and a negotiated outcome could prove to be too time consuming, not to mention it would further elevate the profile of these weapons and fuel the firey discussion about NATO unity.
Too much cost, too little benefit to raising it now.
remind me, someone, what NATO is for now the USSR is done with and now that the US is more communist (nationalized banks, insurance companies etc.) than Russia?
Thanks!
Agree with anon. It’s basically a non-issue that only a small cadre of experts (those who were at the Berlin conference) are concerned – and even obsessed – with.
These weapons are certainly not indispensable from an extended deterrence point of view. But withdrawing them would carry important political risks in terms of transatlantic unity, and in terms how Russia and Iran perceive the Alliance. Also, some Turkish generals would immediately argue then that Ankara needs its own national deterrent.
And for what benefit? The Article 6 crowd would pocket the concession and then say, “thanks – now about those other nukes…”.
Meanwhile, would the same Berlin experts please worry a little more about the increasing Russian reliance on theater and battlefield nuclear weapons? Of course the topic is more difficult, there is less documentation around, etc.
And before anyone says “why don’t we make a deal with Russia, we take out our short-range nukes and they take out theirs?”, a reminder: three successive US administrations (Bush1, Clinton, Bush2) have tried a negotiation with Moscow on this particular issue, but to no avail.
Regarding the Euro-leaky-pseudo-missile “shield”, alls I gots to say is Vive La France!!! I guess when you have a Italian model wife, it helps in removing the testosterone from one’s foreign policy.
I will eat snails and drink some Chablis tonight!
Very sensibly, the Times is calling for shelving BMD in Europe
Thanks for your thoughts, people. I’d also like to draw your attention to an article in the Economist that is mirroring some of your views.
Wow — the Obama thaw in the new cold war!
NATO in Europe is those 300 bombs!
Firstly: They are U.S. bombs, meaning they serve U.S. interests, which are not neccessarily EU interests.
Then: What is NATO after the Soviet Empire is gone? A mere coalition of the willing. Nobody gives **** about NATO in reality. All the new East-European NATO members want U.S. troops, not some NATO troops. The U.S. is seen as the guard against Ivan, not NATO.
Thus: Of course one could say nobody is threatening EU with invasion, wherefore bombs? But that is not the right question. I think the right question is, should these bombs be U.S., or should they be EU.
The EU won’t come around answering that question and getting out of the fine featherbed, that the U.S. is doing the dirty deed in case.
And: The EU will never get closer as long as crucial security questions are shuffled off to a third party.
So these 300 U.S. bombs should go, but they should be replaced by 300 EU bombs.
The same goes for BMD.
Any European ‘need’ for these tactical nuclear weapons blows apart the foundations of the NPT (non-nuke Euro allies can’t even trust the umbrella, they have to have US bombs on their own soil?), and demonstrates a lack of faith in NATO’s Article V. They have no military purpose – the US would use Trident subs well before it would hand over control of free-falls to European allies to unreliably deliver in vulnerable ageing aircraft. I think you’ll find that NNWS at the NPT see the existence of these tactical nuclear weapons a bigger issue than is often assumed by those of us in NWS. And once we’ve got rid of them and establish a decent relationship with Russia we have a chance of tackling their more dangerous deployments. Without this signal, we have no hope.
IHT has an editorial about what the point of NATO is, along the lines I posted earlier
I think it’s time to abolish NATO, or subsume Russia into it too.