A shortish post—partly because I’m shattered from last night but mostly because you have lots of great new material to read from Andreas, Anya and Bob.
As has been hinted at before, BBC news is now reporting that
Russia is to deploy new missiles in a Baltic enclave near Nato member Poland, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev says.
Short-range Iskander missiles in the Kaliningrad region would “neutralise” the planned US anti-missile shield in Poland and the Czech Republic, he said.
According to FAS the Iskander has a range of about 300 km. Its aim, therefore, appears to be “neutralize” missile defense by destroying the interceptors at Słupsk in Poland rather than by evading them in flight as part of a bid to guarantee Russia the second strike capability it already has. The radar in the Czech Republic would appear to be out of range.
But, is Russia’s plan plausible?
The Iskander is (presumably) the same missile system that appears to have been used against Georgia. This is a conventionally-amed missile and I wonder whether it can defeat the silo-based interceptors that the US is planning to deploy. Obviously, it would be relatively easy for Russia to install a nuclear warhead but I haven’t heard about plans to do that. Have any readers?
In any event, it is, of course, much more of a political statement than a military one and I strongly doubt it’s a coincidence that this announcement came at the same time as the US Presidential election.
I don’t think that they have to be nuclear armed, though that would obviously be the easiest. If we assume that they have a 1 ton conventional warhead, a blast overpressure of 10 psi, which is enough to severely damage reinforced (but perhaps not nuclear hardened?) concrete structures, should destroy the interceptors’ silos. That corresponds to a radius of about 30 meters. If the Iskander does use GPS/GLONASS/inertial guidance, as the FAS website says, it should be able to destroy the facility without launching a nuclear strike. We should not automatically assume that Russia’s statements are all bluff and no bite; as we should have taken seriously their worries about this system as well as their proposal to use a Russian radar in Azerbaijan.
Hi,
There is two versions of Iskander.
From CRS report RL30427, page 8 (http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL30427.pdf) – version M for domestic use with the range of 400 km, and version E for export with range of 200 km.
Some other sources suggesting 500 For version M and 300 km for version E.
Come on! This is more of a farewell to John Rood. And nuclear Iskanders in Kaliningrad are not going to happen. The actual welcome to Obama is here.
I agree that the Iskander deployment to Kaliningrad Oblast is a bit of political theater designed to counter the equally political theater of the US’s intended GBI deployment to the Slupsk vicinity.
One might hope that adult persons on both sides would get together and figure out what the real issues, if any, are.
Nah, probably not going to happen.
Many Western intelligence services believe that Russia has had plans for a nuclear version of the SS-26 Iskander for more than a decade. (Look at the SS-26 as the Russian army’s revenge for having to give up the SS-23 in 1987.) And there is also widespread belief that the actual maximal range of the Iskander is beyond 500 km – in violation of the INF Treaty.
That will become clearer if or when Russia withdraws from the INF Treaty.
Iskander warheads shouldn’t be expected to have more than 500kg. With some terminal guidance they should have a CEP of better than 20m (SS-23 was 30m). To cancel out GBI silos they would have to be penetrator type (conventional) warheads.
Question is: Will the GBI silos be hardened? Then: Fixed-base GBI is a bad decision anyway. Just a question of time, till GBI will go (at least semi-) mobile.
And of course the Iskander could be nuclear armed!
Look at the SS-23. These warheads are still around and should perfectly fit the SS-26. And with the huge TEL the nuclear systems shouldn’t have no problem either. In the end the SS-26 is nothing else but a work-around for the INF restricted SS-23 (even though the Russians didn’t even care about that, as we know).
It is a provocative test of the new administration, which will do nothing, except end the missile defense program next year.
Supporters won’t have a chance against a Democratic WH and Congress.
The question will be ‘what will the Obama WH do when Russia refuses to remove the missiles after the program is ended, or, invades another former Soviet republic?’
Make no mistake, U.S. resolve will soon be tested by Russia, Iran and Al Q…
Remember your history.It is about to repeat itself.
The Russians need only to take the ‘eyes’ out of the system, i.e., the ground-based X-band radar, which is a fixed target and could be easily destroyed in a SS missile attack (with sufficient range).
The U.S. could not acquire, track and fix incoming BMs without it, unless they supplement it with an airborne component.
The entire US system is based on the assumption that their enemy cannot launch a pre-strike attack against these facilities,whether they are based in Poland, Alaska or elsewhere.(i.e., NK, Iran, etc.)
This would mark the second time in recent history that Russia has moved weapons into Kaliningrad to rattle the US and/or Europe. I don’t know that it “worked” last time.
> If we assume that they have a 1 ton conventional warhead, a blast overpressure of 10 psi, which is enough to severely damage reinforced (but perhaps not nuclear hardened?) concrete structures, should destroy the interceptors’ silos. That corresponds to a radius of about 30 meters.
Although the GBI silos in Alaska and California don’t appear to be particularly hard, ICBM silos are typically hardened to more than 1000 psi, 2000 psi being a number often cited.
Since the Polish installation is yet to be built, the silo design could presumably be beefed up.
But I have a different question: under what possible conditions would Russia actually launch the Iskanders against the Polish GBIs? My imagination fails to come up with an answer.
@Distiller:
I certainly agree that SS-23 warheads could still be around. But if that was the case, it would be in violations of the pledges made by Gorbachev and Yeltsin in 1991-1992, and in contradiction with all assurances given by the Russian reps at the CD and NPT conferences since the late 1990s.
I meant to say 1/2 ton warhead for the 30 m radius. And actually that is the ground burst overpressure needed to destroy a re-enforced concrete structure. Ground penetration is not needed unless the US hardens the silos to the same requirements as its ICBMs silos, as Allen Thomson points out. However, what does that tell the Poles?
As to Allen’s last question, how about the same circumstances for which we keep our ICMBs on alert status? Of course, that does boggle the imagination.
> As to Allen’s last question, how about the same circumstances for which we keep our ICMBs on alert status? Of course, that does boggle the imagination.
General nuclear war? Well, yes, if that’s the case, it does boggle the imagination. And I can’t imagine that, in such a circumstance, the GBIs or the Iskandrs are going to matter a whit.
Not that we’d care.
I think that everybody — the USG, the Russian government, and the commentariat — is currently wigging out on this matter. Or, at the very least, the governments are using the EuroGMD issue as a cover for what their actual aims and concerns are.
The AA-60 nuclear warhead is said to fit on the Iskander. Adittionally there is a HE penetration warhead to destroy hardened tagets.
For that matter — why have the GBIs in Poland in the first place? Under what circumstances would Iran launch an ICBM at the USA, inviting immediate annihilation?
I think Anya L. is right. The real welcome was in Medvedev’s congratulations telegram.
The missile defense program seems to be a real threat to Russian deterrence, i.e. the sacred MAD that saved our civilization. GWB may not care but Russian leadership is rational and don’t seek wars. They must deploy effective countermeasures for the US BMD sites.
Allow me to throw a little cold water on Obama’s enthusiasts. There is a certain sociological dynamics we saw in action here in Israel. A progressive leader is many times afraid to be perceived as “unpatriotic” or even worse “weak” so he acts just like the un-progressive one that preceded him. I guess the Kremlin is not sure yet if Obama is going to be Obama or a GWB copy.