USAF Organizational Culture and Reform

The Wonk—or more accurately Jeffrey—has been writing for a while about the organizational problems faced by the US Air Force in its handling of nuclear weapons (see this, this and this). In summary, Jeffery’s oft-repeated argument is this:

Heads are going to roll — officers will lose promising careers, regular guys will get the blame. This process has already started, with the squadron commander in charge of Minot’s munitions crews.

If I have one bit of advice to Secretary Gates, it is this: Call an organizational theorist, like Charles Perrow, or a like-minded political scientist, like Scott Sagan, immediately.

Apportioning blame reassures the public and makes you look tough. But, if this accident represents a broader organizational pathology rather than mere negligence, disciplinary actions won’t solve the problem any more than screaming at someone who is sick.

Anyway, Jeffrey is too modest to tell you this himself but it seems this message is getting through. (OK. He probably isn’t too modest but I’ll save his blushes anyway).

A recent GSN article reported on the progress of the Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Management. I missed its creation back in June when I was on holiday and it doesn’t appear to have been reported on the Wonk either.

I’m not sure the members of the task force are exactly what Jeffrey had in mind. But, I do take as very positive what SECDEF Gates said about its role. It’s a long quote but well worth including in full:

During the course of the investigation [Admiral Donald’s completed enquiry into the shipment of nuclear weapon components to Taiwan], other issues indicating a decline in the Air Force’s nuclear mission focus and performance became apparent. Rather than an isolated occurrence, the shipment of the four forward-section assemblies to Taiwan was a symptom of a degradation of the authority, standards of excellence and technical competence within the nation’s ICBM force. Similar to the bomber-specific August 2007 Minot-Barksdale nuclear weapons transfer incident, this incident took place within the larger environment of declining Air Force nuclear mission focus and performance.

Specifically, the investigation identified systemic issues associated with this decline. First, the investigation identified commonalities between the August 2007 Minot incident and this event. Both events involved a chain of failures that led to an unacceptable incident. The investigation determined the Air Force does not have a clear, dedicated authority responsible for the nuclear enterprise and who sets and maintains consistent, rigorous standards of operation. The investigation concluded that these shortcomings resulted from an erosion of performance standards within the involved commands and a lack of effective Air Force leadership oversight.

Second, the investigation found that the failures that led to the mis-shipment could have been prevented, had the Air Force’s inspection and oversight programs been functioning effectively. The investigation also determined that the lack of a critical self-assessment culture in the Air Force nuclear program, and inspection processes that diminish ownership at the command level, make it unlikely that systemic weaknesses can be discovered and addressed. Overall, the Air Force has not been sufficiently critical of its past performance, and that has led to recurring problems of a similar nature.

Third, the investigation confirmed a declining trend in Air Force nuclear expertise similar to findings in other, earlier reports.

This lack of expertise contributed to involved commands overlooking the problems that led to the misshipment.

Years ago the career path for Air Force personnel in the nuclear field was well established and prestigious. However, the overall mission focus of the Air Force has shifted away from this nuclear mission, making it difficult to retain sufficient expertise. The Air Force has not effectively compensated for this diminished expertise through training and active career management.

The report makes clear that these problems and mistakes have their roots in decisions made over a period of at least 10 years. Nonetheless, many of the problems leading to the Minot and nose cone incidents have been known or should have been known.

Action is required on two fronts: first, fixing the structural, procedural and cultural problems; and second, ensuring accountability. In terms of addressing the problems, the Air Force already has taken initial steps. However, I believe an outside perspective is required to ensure sufficiently far-reaching and comprehensive measures are taken.

All this talk of the “degradation of the authority, standards of excellence and technical competence”, “systemic weaknesses” and “structural, procedural and cultural problems” must have been hard reading for the Air Force. But, it’s spot on.

Anyway, let’s see whether anything concrete comes from the task force.

PS IISS has an interesting (freely available) profile on Gates’ performance at the Pentagon so far.