Andreas Persbo, over at the blog formerly known as Verification, has had a couple of nice posts recently about the role of the IAEA in verifying disarmament in North Korea (or lack thereof) and the resulting Japanese frustrations.
Just thought I’d share.
DPRK’s leadership must be smiling after the recent concessions by the U.S. for a late and incomplete nuclear declaration. After all, they now have operational nuclear weapons and thus a credible deterrent. The Agreed Framework gave the U.S. a leg down from the start and the diplomats, no matter how talented they might have been, had no chance of securing a favorable outcome for the U.S. Diplomacy is certainly a two-way street and DPRK never really cooperated.
Some argue that the DPRK was nowhere near having enough material for a bomb before the collapse of the Agreed Framework. They would say that (a) certain individual(s) within the US administration carry all the blame. None mentioned, none forgotten.
Andreas – And, of course, in the US administration’s unseemly rush to settle things by the end of the year they’ll be falling over themsleves to prove just this i.e. in order to ‘verify’ the recent declaration they will show that the DPRK did indeed have “nowhere enough [separated] material for a bomb before the collapse of the Agreed Framework”.
How the parties are going to agree on the details of verification methodolgy is indeed a very interesting question and yes, KCNA, has carried some fairly ascerbic comments regarding the IAEA. Equally strong remarks have, however, been made against three of the other parties (US, Japan, South Korea).
The DPRK may have perfectly well founded reservations about the IAEA’s involvement in the verification process and, similarly, there may well be a perfectly legitimate rationale to the US’s apparrent reluctance towards Vienna’s involvement but the current verification arrangement runs the risk of not givng sufficient confidence to the international community regarding the verification findings. Inclusion of the IAEA in the verification process would no doubt bring additional problems and tensions and may indeed slow down the process but it would surely help in promoting a more widespread acceptance of the findings. In a case such as this it is important not just to do the job right, but to be seen to be doing it impartially. Remember also that in the September 2005 statement the DPRK committed to returm to IAEA safeguards, to comply with this independent verification is going to be necessary – best do it now I say.