Iran’s reported proposal for negotiations on a wide variety of issues with the P5+1, including hints of direct talks with the United States, is fueling speculation that Tehran may have turned over a new leaf of cooperation (even as it stands firm on its refusal to suspend uranium enrichment and conducts a raft of missile tests). The WaPo’s David Ignatius, for example, has a piece today discussing a recent interview with Iran’s foreign minister, Manouchehr Mottaki. Ignatius’ conclusion is that:
The Iranians are signaling that they want talks with the West — and hinting that they are ready for a serious dialogue with the Great Satan in Washington.
That may be true—I would welcome it—but I’m skeptical it means Tehran is any more willing to compromise on the nuclear issue at this juncture. It would mark a significant shift in Iran’s posture, which is hard to explain. Why now?
I think this is more likely a tactical shift. By showing a bit of leg, the Iranians can convey the appearance of cooperation and get through the waning months of the Bush administration to see what the next U.S. administration will bring to the table.
I am curious to know what “a compromise” would be from your point of view ?
They’re kicking the can down the road. Every month that Iran keeps enriching uranium is a month closer to an Iranian nuclear weapon.
Given that we are already (probably) deterred from attacking Iran, a nuclear weapon becomes the key to Iranian hegemony over the Gulf.
If the US cannot stop Iran from crossing this red line, then the local governments will hasten to cut their own deals with Teheran. The US will be negotiating withdrawals from Bahrain and Qatar as well as Iraq.
On the plus side, the Saudis will be nicer to their Shiite minority.
“Every month that Iran keeps enriching uranium is a month closer to an Iranian nuclear weapon.”
John Bragg obviously knows something is going on that the IAEA has said cannot happen – LEU being redirected for further enrichment to HEU without the Agency’s knowledge. Give John the post of DNI, immediately!
Considering that the US routinely has nuclear weapons in the region, in addition to a military presence in Kuwait, Iraq, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and the Emirates ( ie all of them bar Saudi and Iran itself ), I’m curious as to how it is that the US isn’t already the hegemonic power in the Gulf.
Iran already has the full spectrum of diplo-political-commercial relations with every state in the Gulf, bar Bahrain, so I’m not entirely clear as to what exactly will be different.
For those looking to find up to date scientific information on Iran’s nuclear research my latest version of my Iranian nuclear bibliography is out and can be found : http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/nuke/biblio.pdf. The bibliography contains much new material including references to shock wave research, carbon fibers and composites and nuclear waste treatment. It makes for cery interesting reading and I’ll be glad to answer any questions concerning this material.
Ummm…actually the idea of a “shifted posture” was made up by the press – the Iranians have been making nuclear compromise offers and seeking negotiations with the US for a long, long time. Rmember the 2003 fax which was ignored and lied about along with all of Iran’s other attempts at opening to the US ?
On the other hand, it does seems that the US has given the green light for the EU to at least start negotiating with Iran without observing the “no negotiations until enrichment is suspended” precondition.
According to the VOA :
The United States says the incentives offer Iran a chance to begin nuclear negotiations without initially suspending its uranium enrichment program.
Difficult to see where this will end up. The Iranians won’t give up enrichment, and Israel won’t permit the US to get along with Iran since that would challenge Israel’s regional ambitions and strategic value to the US.
“Every month that Iran keeps enriching uranium is a month closer to an Iranian nuclear weapon.”
Maybe the US should have listened to their overtures through the Swiss in 2003 instead of admonishing the Swiss to stay out of the way then.
Of course in 2003 the US probably expected to be in Tehran within 18 months.
Cernig—I don’t know. My knowledge of physics encompasses carpentry and is taxed by plumbing. But I doubt that the Iranians would build a secret nuclear complex (Natanz 2002) so that they could pursue IAEA-legal research and electricity production.
Dan—Yes the US is the hegemon in the region. That has been explicit since the Carter Doctrine. The US implicitly or explicitly guarantees the external and internal security of all of the states you listed, plus Jordan, Israel, Egypt and Turkey. That relies on the US being able to punish and deter threatening actions.
That ability is lost if Iran has a nuclear weapon. If Iran’s existing capabilities make a strike on Iran “madness”, then a strike on a nuclear-armed Iran is unthinkable.
If a punitive strike on Iran is unthinkable, then the US cannot retaliate against Iran for aggressive or other hostile actions.
If the US cannot retaliate, then we cannot protect.
If we cannot protect our security partners, we won’t have them for long. An emir or two slow on the uptake might suffer the fate of the Shah or of Sadat, but CENTCOM and the Fifth Fleet will be ousted from the Gulf.