A big nuclear day today… BBC News is reporting that North Korea has handed over The Declaration; no word yet on its contents (excluding, of course, the continual stream of leaks over the past few months).
On a not-entirely-unrelated theme, Ian Black is reporting in the Grauniad (sorry, British joke) that according to “an adviser to Israel’s national security council” Syria planned to share the plutonium produced from its now obliterated reactor with Iran.
Israel believes that Syria was planning to supply Iran with spent nuclear fuel for reprocessing into weapons-grade plutonium from the site it bombed last September, and which is currently being inspected by the UN’s nuclear watchdog.
…
The Israeli adviser told the Guardian: “The Iranians were involved in the Syrian programme. The idea was that the Syrians produce plutonium and the Iranians get their share. Syria had no reprocessing facility for the spent fuel. It’s not deduction alone that brings almost everyone to think that the link exists.”
Now, I’ve been wrong about Syria a number of times recently (including, rather publicy, on Newsnight). But I’m going to stick my neck out again and say this story is awfully fishy.
The source’s argument seems to be that Syria doesn’t have a reprocessing facility, ergo it must be in cahoots with Iran. But Iran doesn’t have a reprocessing facility either—or at least not one that we know of.
Iran’s continuing work on the IR-40 reactor certainly makes me suspicious that it is interested in the plutonium route in the longer term but, right now, I’d be pretty surprised if it had significant clandestine reprocessing capability (and as regular readers will know I never give Iran the benefit of the doubt).
Moreover, Syria’s reactor wasn’t all that big, although there is definitely some disagreement on its exact size (see here and here). So, again, it seems unlikely—although not impossible—that the two states would share its very limited plutonium output.
On the subject of Syria, the IAEA inspection to Al Kibar finished yesterday. We wait to hear what it concludes.
Hey, the Kingdom of Lesotho doesn’t have a reprocessing facility either…or one that we know of. So, lets speculate about a Syria-Lesotho axis too. Does basic logic evade you?
Iranian policy line on Non Proliferation is to do evrything possible not undermine the NPT. Not because they feel moraly bound to it but simply because it is in their interests. The same can not the said about Israel and US.
It’s only logical that the Iranians were the dominant partner due to more resources, scientists etc. So instead of an alleged Syrian reactor we have now an Alleged Iranian Reactor (AIR). If it went critical we could call it Hot AIR…
To hass: Last time I checked, Lesotho did not have a NORK-made nuclear reactor on its territory. But if they had one, and Burundi had an active nuclear nuclear program, I would be entitled to wonder whether these two cooperated in any way. Let’s wait and see. We’ve had a few surprises in this field in recent years (mostly bad ones), we could have another. Does basic logic evade you?
kerbihan,
Take a look at this. We could have yet another surprise and learn there was no nuclear reactor…
Yossi,
That would be big news indeed. Like learning that Israel has no nuclear weapons. After all, who says that the Vanunu pictures were not doctored?
That said, the referred piece looks impressive. It would be interesting that you post the main arguments on this blog so that we have a lively discussion about it. Also, at first glance the piece does not seem to discuss the Albright analysis?
Also: apologies to all – undoubtedly numerous – Africa experts who read this blog – I should have used the example of Swaziland instead of Burundi. (Come to think of it, though, a Rwanda/Burundi nuclear arms race would be fun to comment upon. Alas, the Great Lakes folks prefer the weapons that actually kill people, that is, machetes and AK-47.)
A quick summary on flaws in the nuclear theory. Sorry for the bandwidth and horrible style.
Glossary:
ASR – Alleged Syrian Reactor
Box – The ASR building
WTF – Water Treatment facility (sister site 5km from Box)
Magnox – A type of nuclear reactor
CW – Chemical Warfare
Hard arguments:
1. Strike damage probably inconsistent with reactor
2. Construction time frame is probably too narrow
3. There is no return hot pipe to river?
4. There are signs Box was involved with explosives
5. Box was not tall enough for a Magnox reactor and there
is no good evidence for underground part of ASR
6. Reactor was not connected to heat exchangers?
7. Pumping station just another regional pump?
Could be for a CW emergency
8. Trench to WTF carried also a (dark?) liquid.
WTF was probably sewage facility for ASR -> not nuclear
9. Spent fuel pond located in a bad place
10. CW deal with Iran: reactors, pipes, heat exchangers
11. The ASR was an exceptionally small reactor
and could well could be a true research reactor
12. ASR possibly not designed by NK
CIA clip flaws:
1. Nork in CIA clip is diplomat not atomic administrator!
2. Some pictures are realistic model not photos
3. Problematic tying method of photos and overheads
4. CIA clip digitally processed too much?
5. “Core top” photo is actually bad evidence?
6. Internal photos don’t match?
7. Photos are of undeclared/model reactor in NK?
8. Hundreds tones of graphite gone with no trace in
post-strike images?
Soft Arguments:
1. The Syrians tried to buy a nuclear reactor most of this period
2. There is no evidence for significant link with NK.
Syria don’t have resources/scientists to do it alone
3. Box was not in the middle of nowhere and Syria
didn’t try to hide its purpose
4. Syria wouldn’t admit CW activity either…
5. Dismantling not an evidence for nuclear theory
6. Syria acted out of shame not guilt
7. Allowing a IAEA inspection is a political defeat
8. Asad have good reasons to tell the truth
9. Israeli attack is not evidence for nuclear theory and
the nuclear accusation could be just a political trick
10. Possible anti-aircraft position 4km away was target?
11. Box could be: CW facility, hardened missile base
There is some support for a nuclear Syria/Iran link!
From NTI chemical chronology for Syria 2000-2007 :
14 November 2005
Syrian and Iranian officials sign a “confidential strategic accord
. . .
which includes a sensitive chapter dealing with co-operation and
mutual aid during times of international sanctions, or scenarios
of military confrontation with the West.”
. . .
In return Syria will reportedly “allow Iran to safely store weapons,
sensitive equipment or even hazardous materials on Syrian soil should
Iran need such help in a time of crisis.”
—Robin Hughes, “Iran and Syria sign mutual assistance accord,”
Jane’s Defense Weekly, 21 December 2005.
Why this point was not raised in the current accusations about a nuclear Syria/Iran link? My guess is that neocons are weak on intelligence whether useful or harmful to their cause…