Assad’s Chemical Weapons

Jeffrey Lewis 0:10

You are listening to the Arms Control Wonk podcast, the leading podcast on arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation. I'm Jeffrey Lewis, the founding publisher of the Arms Control Wonk blog, and a scholar at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.

Aaron Stein 0:25

And I'm Aaron Stein, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council's Rafik Kariri Center for the Middle East.

Jeffrey 0:33

So Aaron, the North Koreans don't make a podcast today. This is a hell of a way to knock the North Koreans off the front page.

Aaron 0:45

They even tried to cause a ruckus. And with stuff that's happening in my neck of the woods, we don't even have like, we can't even talk about North Korea. They just aren't even that important today.

Jeffrey 0:56

Is that a little Rex Tillerson joke?

Aaron 1:01

Maybe a subconscious Rex Tillerson joke. That was one of the best statements I've ever seen out of the State Department. I actually enjoyed it.

Jeffrey 1:08

Yeah, yeah. No, today we're going to talk about the much more distressing story about the apparently large-scale chemical weapons attack in Syria.

Aaron 1:19

Again.

Jeffrey 1:20

We lost our question and answer episode. Possibly for the best, because one of the questions was, what do we make of the success or failure of the deal after the first large-scale chemical weapons attack in 2013 to get Syria to give up some or most of its stockpile of chemical weapons and join the chemical weapons convention? What do we make of that?

Yeah, you know, and the...

Aaron 2:03

That question that we did lose in the podcast that we'll never see the light of day because of sound recording issues. I think we ultimately came down on that the chemical weapons deal in 2013, even though it was handled badly, was a good thing because we said it degraded their capabilities to carry out sort of sophisticated chemical attacks.

And they were relegated to using chlorine. Well, you know, on April 4th, obviously the Syrian government made us look stupid, even though nobody saw that. They carried out what looks to be a Nerve agent or sarin, although it hasn't been completely confirmed, attack around the Khan Sheikhoun city, or sort of little village, I should say, just north of Hama, which is a very active front in the Syrian conflict at the moment, where the Let's say the insurgency has pushed back Russian and Syrian forces.

It's been quite the battle for Russians and Syrians to try and basically get back to pre-status quo conflict lines from just a couple of weeks ago. And that's where you saw the chemical weapons attack. I guess yesterday, we're recording this on April 5th, April 4th. On what looks to be sort of the backstaging grounds of where the insurgency was amassing to push forces down, And then on the front lines, it's all a little blurry right now.

We don't quite know. They either carried out chlorine attacks or even sarin attacks on the front lines as well. All in all, it looks like a very sophisticated and well-carried out chemical weapons attack to try and facilitate regime and Russian gain.

Jeffrey 3:33

I suppose one question we have to discuss is why we think it's Saren. I mean, that just seems to be both the scale of the casualties and then the symptoms of the victims. Is that how you're making the judgment that it's... Is it possibly Saren or probably Saren, I guess, is my question to you.

Aaron 3:56

You can never be definitive just looking at YouTube pictures or stuff that's coming out, but it's probably sarin, I think. From the pictures that come out of dead children, of dead people, pinpoint pupils, foaming at the mouth, no obvious signs of shrapnel or outside killing to them. And then I think it was Reuters yesterday quoting a senior U.S. official speaking, you know, on the record, obviously, but not said that the U.S. intelligence community suspects that it's sarin.

And it was sarin in August 2013. You know, so it's not as if the Syrian government doesn't have practice or expertise in how to use or employ these weapons.

Jeffrey 4:35

Yeah, and I guess I saw a report that there are samples being taken, soil samples, and so those are being sent to laboratories in Europe. So we will, I think, eventually know exactly what it is we're looking at. And I guess we both then expect that it will turn out to be sarin. And I think what's – you know, what I took away from that – Twitter is awful.

The Internet is awful. And not surprisingly, the Russian trolls and Assadist trolls have magically appeared, you know, to advance this sort of ridiculous claim that, you know, this was a Syrian regime strike on a rebel chemical facility. But if it's sarin, sarin precursors are kept separately. And so an airstrike wouldn't have mixed them and given the sort of nice, effective distribution that we're seeing now.

Is that how you're... Don't you agree, Aaron? Sorry.

Aaron 5:38

Yeah, I mean, absolutely. I mean, these weapons mix, these weapons work by mixing chemical precursors, you know, and the idea that... The insurgents could be storing the precursors in a warehouse, not mixed, and that crude airstrike could magically put them together and then kill upwards of over 100 people. It doesn't pass the Ehrenstein BS meter. We're off the charts in terms of nonsense when it comes down to this.

You know, one thing that I think is important is that chemical weapons are a fixture in Middle Eastern conflicts. We tend to view it here in the United States as they didn't use chemical weapons against invading U.S. forces. This is the Iraqis. But the Algerians, the Egyptians, now the Syrians, and then the Iraqis have a demonstrated history of using chemical weapons, and in many cases for counterinsurgency operations.

The Soviets in Afghanistan, you know, used... Yellow Ray, so variants of chemical weapons as well. The taboo for chemical weapons to achieve military gains in these types of conflicts isn't all that robust. And so I don't think it should be surprising that chemical weapons are employed on the battlefield, especially when the Syrian government forces are really attrited.

I mean, they've been going through seven years of civil conflict. And they are facing multiple fronts right now, even though they ostensibly are quote-unquote winning because they are the dominant force on the battlefield at the moment.

Jeffrey 7:15

Yeah, I still remember my wife, when she worked at Physicians for Social Responsibility, they brought in some Iranian chemical weapons victims, you know, individuals who'd been exposed to chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War. And so, you know, even 20 years later, a lot of these people have really serious health problems. And it's just, I guess, a reminder that even though we don't think of this as something that happens all that often, that certainly if you're living in Iran...

Or any number of other Middle Eastern states, this is not World War I, right? This is not 100 years ago. This is recent history.

Aaron 7:50

Exactly. I mean, I think what is different about this is that this is the first sort of large-scale attack Since the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1993. That was Ghouta in August 2013. But again, this period in recent Middle Eastern history in terms of conflict is dominated by US-led conflicts, but sort of intra-Arab conflicts, those that don't involve the Israelis, chemical weapons aren't exactly, you know, sort of an anomaly on the battlefield.

Jeffrey 8:18

One question I had for you, Aaron, is do you think that the... Sarin that the Syrians used do you think that that is material sarin that they, sarin that they held back as Momar Gaddafi did when he reached his disarmament agreement? Do you think it's new production that they have commenced since 2013, which you know is four years ago, and so a couple of years in the interim is probably enough to reconstitute a capability?

I mean, I suppose you can spin out, you know, other hypotheses that get a little bit conspiratorial if it came from someplace else. But what do you think about the likely origins of the sarin?

Aaron 9:08

I think they held it back. The Libya case informs me here is, you know, he did hold, Gaddafi held some mustard agent out in the desert, badly degraded and poorly stored. But nevertheless, you know, it was his insurance policy. I would suspect that Bashar did the same thing. And one thing that I always think of is that CJ Shivers piece about EOD techs in Iraq that were being exposed to mustard in Iraq as they were disposing, sort of stumbled upon ordnance after the invasion.

Is that the assumptions about the quality of Iraqi chemical weapons were off and that they were sort of better made than we presumed.

Jeffrey 9:56

And if we assume... No, I'm sorry, I didn't mean to cut you off, but I think this is an important thing that we don't often discuss, which is we had assumptions about their chemical weapons stockpile that turned out to be wrong. You know, we just assumed that... The Iraqi chemical weapons were terrible. And they weren't, right? They preserved them really effectively.

And so I do think that we... It's totally plausible. I also think that the Syrians probably held some back.

Other voice 10:29

I mean, it's also possible that

Jeffrey 10:31

The Syrians knew that there were chemical weapons stockpiles in rebel hands, and maybe the rebels didn't know where they were. And then once the regime took them back, they gained access to them. And so, you know, in that case, you can imagine that the Syrians wouldn't wouldn't have declared them to the OPCW. So, yeah, they could either have deliberately held them back as as Gaddafi did, which I guess is probably most likely they could have retaken existing stockpiles that they had not declared to the OPCW, which I think probably is second thought.

And then third is they could have reconstituted the production capability. Either way, we got some sarin.

Aaron 11:04

Exactly. And, you know, one thing I is I do think they held them back. And the fact that they use that suggests weakness to me. You don't use these if you are conventionally capable of fighting on multiple fronts. And, you know, if you're just imagining the Syria map, you know, in your head, you know, that's what I stare at most of my days.

It's quite clear that this front was reactivated recently by the rebel-led insurgency. To make it even more complicated, the two main actors that are active on this front, one is al-Qaeda, which is trying to sort of subsume this element of the Syrian insurgency and bring everybody under its umbrella as the vanguard of the anti-Assad revolution. And the other, which is actually guaranteeing safe access for journalists now, and probably who inspectors or teams from Turkey would be taking soil samples from, They aren't al-Qaeda, but they are a group called Ahrar al-Hasham, which is revisionist jihadists, if you will.

So they believe in the Islamic State. They do cooperate with al-Qaeda, but they increasingly have antagonistic relations with it. So you're just in this very weird mix, and they reactivated this front recently. And the regime has been making a lot of gains, but they'd like to push out to the Euphrates. You know, it's on the other side of Syria.

And so this front is just popped up. And they made, you know, the rebels made some gains. And I think they used chemical weapons in ways chemical weapons are employed, which when, you know, like the Iraqis did in the late 1980s, which is to hit the front and rear lines to try and facilitate rapid advances because you're facing manpower shortages.

Jeffrey 12:56

Well, now, I wonder if it's not so much weakness. I mean, obviously there's a component of weakness in the sense that they found that they needed this particular capability and chose not to do without it. But I wonder what you make of the political argument, because I know the president was very quick to blame President Obama, which, you know, I do think that we've discussed this before, and maybe this is now the time to discuss this again.

You know, we do think that President Obama bears some of the responsibility for this. But, you know, what I imagine is there was the issue of the president's comments in the campaign. Where he would sort of faintly damn Assad, saying he's brutal or a bad guy, but then he would proceed to launch into this talking point, Trump would, about how Assad was killing ISIS.

And at the time, we knew that was a euphemism, right? Assad is killing ISIS is what the... Syrian government was saying to justify their attacks on the non-ISIS opposition. And, you know, this idea that they were killing terrorists is how they justified the military offensive that accompanied the gassing at Ghouta in 2013. So, you know, from my perspective, if you're Assad...

And you hear all of that rhetoric in the campaign. Don't you think you are entitled to return to using these weapons? Because, you know, you've been using the chlorine barrel bombs and no one has done anything about that. And the guy who wasn't doing anything about that has been replaced by a guy who's basically cheering you on.

Right. And encouraging you to go out and, quote unquote, kill ISIS, which, you know, Assad and everybody else in Syria knows is is actually a euphemism for killing a much larger group of human beings. So I my my question is, is whether or not this is really, you know, driven by a sense on the part of the Syrian government that no one is going to hold them responsible for busting out any stockpiles of chemical weapons that they held back just as long as they're winning.

Aaron 15:10

You know, Bashar al-Assad is a stupid man. You know, I was in Turkey last week, and the Secretary of State, Tillerson, was there. You know, we did not coordinate our trips.

Jeffrey 15:22

Yeah, well, I mean, you know, then if Bashar al-Assad is a stupid man, then at least Rex Tillerson is picking on someone his own size. Right.

Aaron 15:32

No comment on Rex there, but, you know. There was a change in US policy, both by Nikki Haley at the UN and by Tillerson himself. And speaking in Ankara on March 30th, he said, Assad's long-term status will be decided by the Syrian people. Nikki Haley said that same day, our priority is no longer to sit there and focus on Assad getting out.

So at a time when the U.S. position was showing at least recognizing what was de facto U.S. policy and ultimate flexibility on the future of Assad, March 30th, those comments, April 4th, he used his chemical weapons, flipping the debate here in Washington about what to do about it. I don't think Bashar was testing. I mean, he may have been testing Trump and he may have made a mistake.

It's hard to get into that man's mind. But I tend to think of him as a short-sighted thinker. And I know that what short-sighted is in the right way is a reactionary thinker. And that he saw flexibility from the United States, but then he also needed to employ chemical weapons to try and enhance an offensive. And so the two things came together and somebody decided that it was time to break out the sarin card again because they need all the help they can get.

Jeffrey 16:51

Yeah, that seems really persuasive to me. So here you have a pressing need, the chemical weapons can play this role, and then you get this nod and this wink that says, we're not out to remove you. And so you think, yeah, okay, I'll do that.

Aaron 17:22

Until after the first chemical weapons attack. And so that really flips my brain around. As Russia helped midwife the original chemical weapons deal in August 2013, Syria is a member of the chemical weapons convention. We all forget this. It became a formal member, I believe, in October 2013. And on the front lines where Russian advisors and perhaps artillery are, they turn around and use sarin gas.

You know, what's Moscow doing over there?

Jeffrey 17:54

So, I mean, don't you think that that's, I mean, well, okay, I guess that goes to what you think the motivation of the Russians for agreeing to the chemical weapons deal was. I mean, in my view, you know, the Russians were motivated at that moment by a desire to head off a substantial U.S. intervention, which seemed likely given what President Obama had said.

You know, he had established that red line and the Syrians had crossed that red line. And so then there was this sense that the United States now would take action. Now, we know with hindsight, President was, you know, furiously trying to find a way to not make a good on that threat, you know, and ultimately engaged in that ridiculous farce where he asked Congress for an authorization.

Knowing full well that the Republicans in Congress would be the people we just saw debut their health care bill, which is you actually ask them to do something, and then they arrange their circular firing squad.

Aaron 18:59

They're in each other's light of fire.

Jeffrey 19:00

You know, I mean, as... That does not ultimately relieve the president of his responsibility to... Like, if the president thought it was a good idea to enforce that red line, then the president needed to enforce that red line regardless of what Congress thought. And if the president didn't want to do it, you know, shuffling that off to Congress just struck me as being, like, vaguely ridiculous.

So I... You know, but the Russians didn't know that, right? So the Russians thought... That this was going to be a change and that the Obama administration was going to do something like, I think, using air power, right, to target the Syrian regime. And that ultimately that might be a lot harder for Assad to hang on. Right.

And so my guess is that they brokered this agreement to head off that airstrike. You know, they don't... I mean, it wasn't any profound objection to murdering children with chemical weapons. It was just literally getting through that particular moment of danger. And now that they... Well, I don't know if I'd say they have a green light, but they think once they thought they had a green light because of the comments about not removing Assad and how great it was that Assad was, you know, quote-unquote, killing ISIS...

Once they had that, then the deal is so what?

Aaron 20:16

Yeah, I mean, I think that they reacted to what they thought would be strikes on the regime by offering to essentially realize the end goal of the red line. You know, the red line was, if we see a whole bunch of these things moving around, we're going to do something. And then that got jumped up into military action.

But I always viewed the goal of, but the US was very clear that the goal of the red line was not regime change. And so if your goal is not regime change, then what becomes the point of the strike? And if the point of the strike is to, quote, unquote, deter, I always worried that what are you deterring, first of all, which is future use of chemical weapons, but if he's not going to give them up and you're not going to topple him, you set yourself on a pathway to regime change, which is basically what a lot of people in the administration argued, and I was sympathetic to that argument.

I am also sympathetic to the idea that the – The chemical weapons deal with Russia did make Russia a party to Syria in ways it wasn't before. It made them a more overt actor. It did legitimize Assad as sort of a party to the deal. And ultimately, it was his government that acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 2013.

Therefore, an indirect recognition that he is the sovereign power in Syria. But the goal is to take chemical weapons off the battlefield. The goal is not regime change. And I still think this to this day is that the deal is imperfect, but every arms control agreement is imperfect. And I think the leverage that we have now stems from Syria being a chemical weapons You know, acceding to the Chemical Weapons Convention, even the weak enforcement powers that the OPCW has, and that Moscow was on the effing front line, you know, as they carry out the sarin attack, and that it was Moscow that basically midwifed the regime to make the initial declarations.

So the U.S. held up its end of the bargain. It's now on Moscow's terms to deliver its client. And if it can't, then we need to start looking at ways to punish Moscow.

Jeffrey 22:31

Well, I think if we go back and we're re-debating the wisdom of strikes, I do think we should separate two different things. So one question is, do you use force against regime targets, like leadership targets? And I do understand the concern that once you start doing that, then you are on this path to toppling the regime. But there's a corollary to that, which is one of the things I found frustrating about how the Obama administration approached this, and I think it contrasts with how, for example, the Clinton administration approached the war in Bosnia, is that if you don't have this credible use of force That makes the side you're negotiating with think that they might lose, then the ability to get a peace deal, I think, is reduced.

And so the way I look at it is, if your goal is to not remove Assad, if you ultimately want Assad to sign the peace deal, You're trying to simultaneously convey two things, right? One is, if you sign, we can live with you, which is actually not that easy for the United States to do because we had a disarmament agreement with Gaddafi and that went sour.

The situation with Saddam was just a lingering sore for, you know, a decade. So, you know, you do have to convey, yes, I'm prepared to take this thing off the table if you're willing to come to terms. But I do think you also simultaneously need... A credible threat that if you don't come to the table, then you might very well lose.

And so it's in your interest not to try to get a victory on the battlefield, but rather to agree, because you know you're going to survive if you agree, and you're not sure you're going to survive if you don't. So that's one set of concerns. But if you're thinking about an airstrike to punish them for the chemical weapons use...

You don't have to target the regime. You could choose to try to target the military units that were involved in the chemical weapons use, either the ones that conducted it or the units that engaged in the follow-up operation in order to take advantage of the casualties created by the chemical weapons use. And I think the place we disagree and probably should talk about it is I understood giving Assad a pass on murdering those people in order to get as much of the chemical weapons stockpile out of Syria.

That strikes me, as you say, as basically a good deal. That you're going to get way more stuff out of Syria that way than you would by bombing it. And so that's an efficient trade. But I still felt like... It made sense to try to hit the military unit that had been involved in order to try to reestablish deterrence.

Because I would like local commanders to feel like if they engage in a chemical weapons use, they are very likely to suffer a pretty serious bombing raid and not only be denied the benefits of that chemical weapons use, but also they themselves might die. So my frustration is that, you know, we've kind of We've, we've sort of given the, the individual unit commanders a pass in order to get the bulk of the stuff out.

And then, you know, we find ourselves in this, this current situation.

Aaron 25:58

So I, I, so I, I agreed with the strike at the time and I don't agree with the strike now, if that makes sense. But here's where I think we slightly differ is, well, one, I don't think there is a norm against chemical weapons use in the Middle East. I mean, history tells us there is not But there is a global norm and sort of, I hate to use the word taboo, but a taboo against the use of WMD.

And so what do you do when Syria overtly uses WMD? My concern is a strike reinforces the erosion of the norm. And I think about Libya and With the regime change there, and I think about the disastrous invasion in 2003. 2003 being the invasion under the purported effort to dismantle the WMD program that had largely been dismantled.

And in Libya, he still had mustard agent, as we later learned, but it didn't deter invasion. Invasion is not the right word, airstrikes. Do you not undermine the norm By not relying on the multilateral institutions that are already in place to try and deal with proliferation issues first. And that's why I think the goal now should not be kinetic action, but to try and build upon things already in place, like the OPCW through the CWC.

Because ultimately, what you're trying to do is to use tools to deter, you know, without circumventing it with unilateral, near unilateral American action. You know, in 2013, we would have gone to strike alone. We would have had the French sort of in a mop-up role. Maybe the Turks do something, but it largely would have been a U.S. strike.

You know, does that reinforce the norm against use or is it the U.S. circumventing norms to try and enforce our own?

Jeffrey 27:54

Well, let me ask you whether you think that's actually likely that the United States is going to use force. I think we've seen in the last 24 hours two really tough statements. One statement by the president, who said this.

Other voice 28:11

That crosses many, many lines beyond the red line. Many, many lines.

Jeffrey 28:15

And then the other statement by U.N. Ambassador Nikki Haley, who said this.

Other voice 28:21

In the life of the United Nations, there are times when we are compelled to do more than just talk. There are times we are compelled to take collective action. This Security Council thinks of itself as a defender of peace, security, and human rights. We will not deserve that description if we do not rise to action today.

Jeffrey 28:48

So what do you think that means? Do you think that the Trump administration, having sung the praises of Bashar al-Assad, is genuinely horrified by the sight of all these dead children and that they are going to go down this route? Or do you think this is just... This is just sort of empty, tough talk.

Aaron 29:11

So it is a whiplash moment, right? Because again, on March 30th, they signaled that Bashar was all good, right? And this goes back to the stupidity of Bashar al-Assad. Ultimate time of flexibility with the United States.

Jeffrey 29:25

It frustrates me because you know the, the, you know, the President sort of stands up there and says, yes, he's killing ISIS, and then you know you have this pile of dead children and it's like, you stupid, you didn't realize that's what that meant, like when you said killing ISIS, like you meant this pile of dead children. Yeah, sorry. Yeah, I'm really, really angry about this. Yeah, and you.

Aaron 29:48

The whiplash, with less than a week, policy just being made on the fly. I interpreted both as new red lines, and I said, uh-oh. That was my initial reaction.

Jeffrey 29:59

Well, you said it went beyond. It was beyond a red line. Yeah, I mean, Trump's... It's worse than a red line. What does that mean?

Aaron 30:07

Right, it's beyond a red line.

Jeffrey 30:10

I wish I could do a Trump voice. My red lines, they're so red you wouldn't even believe. They're so red they're not even red.

Aaron 30:16

Right. And so what is he going to do about this? And it seems that the policy is actually not that different from what I think is the best way forward, which is to try and hang this on the head of the Russians and to internationally shame them for either tacitly being involved in or, worse, helping a large-scale chemical weapons attack by a client state.

So no, I don't think that the U.S. will strike.

Jeffrey 30:44

What do you think that strategy looks like? How do you put pressure on the Russians? Because I will admit I am skeptical. I would rather fly some cruise missiles into buildings. But you tell me.

Aaron 30:57

I personally would like to fly a cruise missile into Bashar al-Assad's glass house on top of his f***ing hill. I mean, it would make me feel great. You know, to watch that video on CNN would warm my heart, especially if you see so many dead children. But then I – so I don't know if the piece will be out by the time, but in a piece I wrote, you know, like it or not, Syria is a member of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

And I think the United States should call for an on-site inspection inside of Syria. And I actually think the Russians have backed themselves into a corner by endorsing the bogus conspiracy theory that this was a magical chemical precursor warehouse that the Syrian regime just happened to hit. And in doing so, call for a ceasefire in that area to facilitate inspection.

And you have to ground the regime's aircraft. And when they ultimately determine what is obvious is that sarin was used or some sort of nerve agent, Is that you sanction Russia. Those airplanes fly with Russian spare parts. Their front lines are sustained by Russian logistics. It is Russian shipping that moves in and out with weapons. It's Russian banking that processes these payments for the regime.

We have tools to turn the heat up on Moscow. If they're serious about... Holding them to account for their client state, carrying out another chemical weapons attack, short of kinetic action. I don't know what you think.

Jeffrey 32:45

Well, look, I would like the Russians to, I mean, I would like a lot of things. I mean, obviously, I would like to see Bashar al-Assad and the people around him in the dock at the Hague, right? Like, that's what I would like to see. And if I can't see that, you know, I will settle for some horrific and grisly ending.

But it seems that we're going to get neither of those, that the Russians aren't willing to toss him overboard. And so, yeah, I want to turn up the pressure on the Russians in order to cause them to prevent him from doing this kind of thing again. But I just don't know. I mean, the one silver lining, if you could call it that, which I'm not really crazy about calling it a silver lining, but You know, I was really struck at this piece the other day.

I'm avoiding your question, but I was really struck by this piece the other day where apparently Trump was reportedly super frustrated about the INF violation.

Aaron 33:51

He was? I didn't see this piece. I'm surprised he knows what the INF is.

Jeffrey 33:55

Well, they were sort of discussing Russian behavior, right? And Trump apparently was frustrated that the Russians were doing this because I think he felt like it was interfering with what I gather is a sincere desire on his part to improve the relationship with the Russians. And so I wonder if we're experiencing a Jimmy Carter-like moment where this initial enthusiasm for a better relationship with the Russians gives way to a more realistic assessment of what the situation is.

Now, the problem with Carter is, you know, Carter was so... Rigid and moralistic, right? That he really took this personally, and I worry that Trump is going to, like, take this personally, and so then you know his love for Vladimir Putin is going to turn into this kind of, you know, sense of personal hurt and betrayal, which probably is just as bad as, as the love but maybe we're starting to see the beginning of a reorientation where some of these clowns realize that Putin is not our friend. I hope so. I mean, this, you know.

Aaron 35:05

I also don't think we should make the response options binary. So in addition to turning up pressure through calling for an inspection, through mechanisms that already exist, anticipating Russian hostility and nonsense in the UN Security Council, is the Russians... Don't seem to view Syria as a binary. They see it as a pressure point in the broader conflict.

Why don't we see this as a pressure point in the broader conflict? We have assets in the Baltics. We fly planes over the Black Sea. We have a bunch of tanks in Poland. We have things that we can do to mess around with them that takes us beyond Syria. That tells them that, hey, no, beyond the fact that you meddled in our election, we recognize you for what you are, which is facilitating chemical weapons attacks inside of a civil conflict that you helped perpetuate.

Yes, you are part to the conflict and you are part of the solution to solving Syria, but that doesn't mean we have to get along or like you.

Jeffrey 36:12

And if I can be earnest and angry one more time, let me emphasize very strongly that these dead children who have been killed in this horrific chemical weapons attack, these are the very refugees that the president is acting like a demagogue about. These are those people. And so since we've both already sworn, I guess, Scott, you can bleep this one time.

You know, f*** you, Nikki Haley, and your crocodile tears. Right? Because these are the same people that you are trying to force to stay. In this country. And the consequence of your choice is that these people are being subjected to this kind of treatment and all other manner of horrific abuses. So I think one of my ongoing frustrations with people who were very cavalier about intervention in Syria, which, you know, even though I think a strike is a good idea, you know, I'm not at all cavalier about it.

It appalls me when somebody is willing to drop incredible amounts of ordnance and thinks that we need to do everything we possibly can to protect the Syrian people in terms of using force, but then they turn around and aren't willing to lift a finger to help deal with the refugee problem that's being created.

Aaron 37:48

Let me ask you one question.

Jeffrey 37:49

I'm a barrel of fun this morning, aren't I?

Aaron 37:52

It's the afternoon here in D.C. I've had all day to deal with it. What would you strike now? Let's say the president does authorize strikes. What would you hit?

Jeffrey 38:05

I would hit three classes of targets, and obviously this will depend on whether we have the information to do so. So I would definitely strike any target associated with the military unit that either used the chemical weapons... Or that moved through that area to take advantage of the gains. So the goal is to try to punish the unit that was involved in the operation, and to do so in a way that puts at risk the benefit of having used the weapons in the first place, so that they don't get a tangible on-the-ground benefit.

That, I think, is the most important thing. I think it probably makes sense to try to target sites that are connected with any chemical weapons that have been held back. We may or may not know where those are, and so if you don't know, you can't hit them. But since the sarin is kept in a binary form, you know, I do think that it's plausible to imagine using force to try to degrade any known stockpiles of either the chemical weapons or, you know, frankly, the, the rockets that they that they use, right, to deliver them.

So I try to hit the infrastructure that supports if any of it's left. And I would, you know, I'm more hawkish on this one, because I'm mad, and we've let this go a long time. I would consider regime targets... That are affiliated with the chemical weapons program. So, you know, there are people. And I presume that those people who are important people have houses, and they have offices.

And I would probably target those, because I would want the people who are involved in not just the sort of on the ground use, but the strategic decision making of the regime to feel some of that pressure. I wouldn't, you know, I don't... I think absent a commitment to try to topple this government and replace it with something else, which brings us into direct conflict with the Russians, you know, I, I wouldn't, I wouldn't go beyond that, but I do, I still do think it's important to establish the principle that there will be some painful reaction to using these.

And I, you know, I don't know. I take your point that there are diplomatic things to be done, and it's certainly worth trying to make the Russians pay a price. But I just – I don't know. When you use a word like redline or beyond a redline, and then that thing gets crossed, I don't know how you can not do anything.

You could do both.

Aaron 40:49

You could do a few strikes and then pair it with sanctions and calling for an inspection.

Jeffrey 40:56

I should also say, I don't think, I don't in my own mind exaggerate the impact of like 72 hours of airstrikes. Just like I don't think that that would dramatically change things on the ground. You know, it would be some punishment. They wouldn't like it, but it would hardly be a dramatic change. I think it's also true that the Syrians would suck it up and tolerate it precisely for that reason.

Aaron 41:20

At this point, they're winning the war. I mean, they are weak, but they are winning the war and the insurgency in this pocket will consume itself. That's why I'm surprised they used it. You know, they're so dumb.

Jeffrey 41:30

Yeah.

Aaron 41:32

Al-Qaeda will consume this element of the insurgency. I mean, you already have U.S. strikes in the area, both on Al-Qaeda-related targets. And what is a change? This happened towards the end of the Obama administration, is on infrastructure, Al-Qaeda infrastructure-related targets. It's the expansion of the war against ISIS to include Al-Qaeda. And these dumb people in Damascus prompted Donald Trump to set a new red line, perhaps accidentally, but maybe not.

Our president is hard to figure out sometimes. And now putting back on the agenda either strikes or punitive measures against Damascus and, as I would like, something on Moscow on the sanction side. You know... It's dumb policymaking over there. And maybe they felt emboldened, but they certainly made a mistake. That's a hell of a mistake to make, especially the cruise missile winds up somewhere inside of the baskets.

Make everybody feel better.

Jeffrey 42:31

I don't know. You know, I think I just I take this stuff. We were discussing this on the Slack channel. You know, I the the the images just, you know, it's such a such a trite thing to say as a parent. But like as a parent, they really bother me. It really, really bothers me, I think, in a visceral way.

And so, at least from my perspective, it informs both a desire to do a lot more in terms of trying to marry force to real diplomatic efforts to get a settlement to stop the fighting. But also my strong support for treating refugees with dignity and care.

Aaron 43:12

I'm just going to, we're wrapping up. I read two psychological studies today about people exposed to chemical weapons. One is particularly about the Iranian population and one is just in general. And the instances of PTSD amongst those exposed are sort of, On par or exceed those of veterans who have actually seen heavy combat. And then one of the recommendations in the psychological journal is that those exposed, like in the initial triage of treatment, must immediately undergo psychological counseling.

And then I think about this conflict area inside of Syria. None of these people will get that. In addition to the Russians bombing hospitals, the regime bombing hospitals, and sort of the primary effects of chemical weapons, it's the psychological toll that these weapons will have on people, like in addition to just living in a war zone and nowhere to go.

You know, Idlib, even in places, I mean, there's a lot of violence in Idlib. But even in places where they aren't bombing so much, but just consumed by rebel infighting, it's just tremendous. And then these people can't get out. They're the weakest of the weak. And even those people that do get out, they're being told by everybody that they can't go anywhere.

So they're just stuck in a prison, either in open-air prisons inside of territories in Syria or in Turkey or in Lebanon or in Jordan. And they just can't leave. And so I just, you know, this is just seven years into this war, and you still have innocent children on these front lines that can't escape now being gassed again.

You know, it's just a horrible, horrible state of affairs. That's all I have.

Jeffrey 45:01

Yeah, I mentioned it earlier in the podcast, but it was really, really eye-opening to talk to actual victims of chemical weapons attacks. And, you know, I think... Something that we lose sight of because of the way that international conflicts are covered. We lose sight of the fact that the people who are being gassed aren't parties to the conflict.

They're just people. You know, they're just people trying to go about their daily lives. They may... Like the regime or dislike the regime or like the regime more than the opposition or like the opposition more than the regime, or maybe just want it all to be over. Like they may have those opinions, but they aren't, you know, they aren't the people who are being subjected to this Aren't driving the conflict.

You know, they're not combatants, and by and large, they're not parties in any important way. You know, they're the prize that the combatants are fighting over, right? The combatants are fighting over the right to control them, but they're, you know... They're deeply innocent in a way that I think we forget. It's like, well, there's a conflict in Syria, so we imagine everybody's on a side.

But most of these people aren't on a side. You know, they're just trying to get through their day-to-day life. And, you know, one group or another is rolling through town. And then, you know, one day, you know, they're dead from a sarin attack. So...

Aaron 46:32

I think in both degrees, something has to be done. It's just varying degrees about how you inflict pain to try and win concessions.

Jeffrey 46:43

Last point. Ultimately, we need a diplomatic agreement. We need a settlement. My frustration is that we're not going to get a settlement As long as Assad thinks his odds are better on the battlefield.

Aaron 46:57

They are better. I mean, the Russians changed the game when they came in on 9-30-2015.

Jeffrey 47:03

Right. So Syria, actually, I give a very depressing talk to our incoming class shortly after that intervention, because, you know, we had the satellite images of the construction at the airfield.

Aaron 47:14

Yeah. Yeah, that's right. You were the first to put it out there. That's right.

Jeffrey 47:18

Yeah.

Aaron 47:19

Yeah.

Jeffrey 47:20

And, you know, the students were all, I think, waiting for that, like, peppy, like, how do we save these people in Syria talk? And I was like, no, no, you don't understand. The scarring around this airfield dooms the people of Syria. Because what it means is, you know, we don't think Assad can win. But Russia's not going to let him lose, which means this is going to go on and on and on and on.

And so it's not that I'm a crazy warmonger, but I think the reason that you've got to be able or willing to use force is not that you're going to win on the battlefield, but that you've got to make it worth Assad's while to stop fighting.

Aaron 48:00

I do think we're in the endgame in Syria. Before the attack... You think Assad's going to win? No, I... Idlib will consume itself. I mean, I really believe that. And the rebels sort of launched this offensive that prompted the chemical weapons attack, largely as a flail. It was actually al-Qaeda that started the offensive, and the others jumped on board.

And But the U.S. is about ready to begin the assault on Raqqa. It should start in the next couple of weeks. That city will fall in about eight months. And the U.S. will essentially control northeast Syria. The regime is pushing out and will eventually hit the Euphrates River. And then you'll have two points of contact between the regime and essentially what is U.S. and Kurdish forces.

And then you have the south. The south is very important to the regime because it's the invasion point from Israel. That's why most of their military garrisons are down there. And so they're going to want to take back the south, basically to shore up that defensive line against an Israeli invasion. The north, Idlib is such a cesspool where this attack took place.

I think it'll devour itself. I don't think the conflict ends, but you have... It's a tacit de-escalation that just solidifying of what is a frozen conflict along all these territories. And so Assad can't take back all of Syria in my mind, but he may try. And again, the chemical weapons use is very worrying because it suggests that they're screwy, that they really are dumb.

But you can see an end. You know, not a verified peace agreement, but at least Syria being sort of carved out into different little blocks with just long front lines that just skirmishes that go back and forth in perpetuity.

Jeffrey 49:57

God, what depresses the hell out of me is that given the current conflict, that's our happy ending.

Aaron 50:03

Yeah. Yeah. No jokes today. It's not good.

Jeffrey 50:08

Yeah. Yeah. Well, despite the depressing topic, Aaron, thanks for joining me.

Aaron 50:14

Hey, my pleasure.

Jeffrey 50:16

Scott, do you want to say anything about how things are going over on the Slack channel?

Other voice 50:20

The Slack channel is going great as usual. I'm getting increasingly uncomfortable talking about ballistic missile defenses because we have people in there who I think actually built them. So I'm rapidly becoming a very intimidating place due to people's expertise. But it's a lot of fun to be there. A lot of smart people, very active right now.

Jeffrey 50:39

I'm I'm having so much fun on the Slack channel. It is a virtual equivalent to me of what I imagine that, like, II, SS, or CFR were back in, you know, the salad days of networking in meatspace. It's just an incredible group of people. Yeah, it's been really great. So if you like the podcast, consider making a donation through Patreon for a mere $3 or $5, Scott.

Other voice 51:10

It's $3 to access the Slack channel. At the $5, you're just showing your generous support of the network.

Jeffrey 51:16

Right. So for a mere three simoleons, you can come play. Three simoleons a month. So if you like the podcast, do consider supporting us that way. And frankly, even if you're not going to support us, consider leaving us a review on iTunes. It's one of the ways that we promote the podcast and push it up the charts a little bit and help people find us.

And even if you don't do any of those things, thanks for listening.