From Bone Saws to Ballistic Missiles

Jeffrey Lewis 0:02

So I like my f***ing orange annotations. You are listening to the Arms Control Wonk Podcast, the leading podcast on arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation. I'm Jeffrey Lewis. I'm the founding publisher of the Arms Control Wonk blog and a scholar at the Middlebury Institute of International...

Aaron Stein 0:24

And I'm Aaron Stein, the director of the program on the Middle East at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. It's raining out here, but you must be colder.

Jeffrey 0:32

It is also raining here. I am still in Vermont for J-Term. It has warmed up and there is this... Really cold rain coming down, everything is wet, and my goal is to finish the podcast, get in my car, and get home before everything becomes a nightmarish hellscape of ice.

Aaron 0:59

We were in the Poconos skiing over the weekend. When we left on Monday, it was three degrees. My car was literally frozen solid. I had to yank the door open.

Jeffrey 1:09

Wait a second. Isn't Isn't that where the Turkish dissident lives? He's like the mullah of the Bocanos or something. That's true.

Aaron 1:22

His name is Fethullah Gulen, and he's quite a controversial figure in Turkey, let's just put it that way. He lives up there. It also happens to be where you can ski on the East Coast if you want to go up to Vermont, and we didn't. It's a little too far, and so... Yeah, that's really all I really want to say about that.

Jeffrey 1:40

Yeah, you can pretty much ski any place you want here. As I said on Twitter the other day, Vermont is for people who watched the first 30 minutes of Empire Strikes Back and thought, that looks nice.

Aaron 1:52

Oh, yeah, and you found the Two Brothers Bar, which I hear that was actually, it really is started by two brothers.

Jeffrey 1:58

Yeah, so, but we're not really here to talk about skiing. We're not here to talk about Vermont. We're not here to talk about Turkey.

Aaron 2:08

No, we're here to talk about your team and you've been doing work in the kingdom of Saudi Arabia from bone saws to what'd you say on Twitter? From bone saws to ballistic missiles. There you go. The two Bs. God, you got... I knew this was coming because we had a January 4th type state of the pod. This is what we're going to do for 2019.

And this was one I was excited about because I knew that you guys had found something really, really cool in Saudi.

Jeffrey 2:37

Right. So for listeners who didn't see the Washington Post, we're recording this on Thursday. We found evidence in satellite images taken by our friends at Planet Labs of a large facility that appears to be a plant for producing solid-fueled ballistic missiles located in Saudi Arabia.

Aaron 3:05

Yeah, and perhaps the place to start is why you were looking at the missile base in the first place and then how you guys came about that and some of the cool things that you found in the satellite imagery.

Jeffrey 3:18

Yeah, I mean, so this is a crazy story. For listeners who kind of are dropping in, a couple of years ago, Sean O'Connor at Jane's discovered a new missile base in Saudi Arabia that no one had known about. They called it Al-Wata over the nearest populated place or after the nearest populated place. We started calling it Dawadmi because there's a kind of larger city there.

And in the wake of Sean's initial research, I found some contractor documents from the people who built the housing. Which revealed that it was a missile base. I mean, Sean knew it was a missile base because it looked like a missile base, and he's a pretty good image interpreter. But then it was kind of nice to get the confirmation in the contractor documents where we saw the housing section being built.

So this was like a known site to us. It wasn't really a surprise. But then over the summer, and I guess it was base 5-4-4, and you could just tell by the number what it does. Fabian. Fabian Hinz.

Aaron 4:32

It's one of your maniacal geniuses you got smashed over there.

Jeffrey 4:36

Well, we're trying to hire him back. I mean, at the current moment, he's unemployed, which is just absurd. That is absurd. That is absurd. Some people are just too good, you know? God. We're working on it. I'm just terrified somebody's going to snap him up. So Fabian is taking a look at that bass over the summer, and he's like, you know, I know this sounds weird.

But this base really looks like they've built a solid propellant missile plant. And we were all like, come on. First of all, that would be like that would be a big deal if somebody had sold Saudi Arabia a solid propellant missile plant like that would have leaked. And second of all, they wouldn't build it at a known missile base.

Who would be crazy enough to do that? And, you know, so it's like Fabian's like, I really think it is. And, you know, like he's very modest. So he didn't like push.

Aaron 5:32

He was just kind of like, yeah, it doesn't really make any sense. But like, you know, you should take a look at it.

Jeffrey 5:38

And then in the fall, when we had a little bit of a lull, we went back and looked at it.

Aaron 5:42

And yeah, he's right. I mean, you've been interested in the Saudi missile program for a while because it touches on one of the countries that you studied very closely and maybe the origin of the solar fuel missile plant.

Jeffrey 5:59

Yes. Well, I mean... You know, I am a person who's, you know, my doctoral work was on China's nuclear program. And as anybody who's ever gotten a couple of beers in me knows, I love telling the story of how the Saudis purchased DF-3 ballistic missiles from the Chinese. I think you've said it on the pod before. I know we have.

I'm not going to do it again. But it's a great story. It is good. It's really, it's a wonderful example of, Of the Saudis being devious and the State Department being really dumb. I shouldn't say it collectively because I'm sure there are people in the State Department who weren't fooled, but like some of the political appointees were fooled.

And so it's a great. Just situation, you know, that history of Chinese-Saudi cooperation. A couple of years ago, there were reports that the Saudis had bought DF-21s, which would be a much improved medium-range ballistic missile over the DF-3s they have. You know, I have no reason to not believe those reports, but we haven't seen a whole lot of corroborating evidence yet.

So, you know, it's just, it's a kind of question that I think all of us have wondered, which is, you know, the Saudis were one of the early buyers of Chinese missiles in the 1980s. You know, it still stands out as one of the longest range missile sales, certainly the longest range missile sold to a country that doesn't have nuclear weapons.

And, you know, why didn't the Saudis get the same deal the Pakistanis did? You know, in the 1990s, the Chinese were selling all kinds of production capabilities for solid-field missiles to the Pakistanis. Why did we never see those in Saudi Arabia? Now I think I can't prove that that plant's Chinese, but boy, it really looks Chinese to me.

Aaron 7:51

Yeah, so that's the good segue. So what tipped Fabian off to this? And then when you guys went and took a look at it, what were you looking at? Because this is in the Washington Post. I mean, I think the person who wrote it up is Paul Sohn. Am I pronouncing that correctly? Sohn. Paul Sohn wrote it up and they included an annotated image in there.

So maybe walk us through the image and how this all came to be after Fabian's correct diagnosis that this was a solid fuel missile plant.

Jeffrey 8:18

Yeah, well, so I mean, One thing is we knew this was a missile base. So to see any construction there, you know, is a pretty strong indication that whatever construction there is going to be missile related. And so that was one thing. There were really two things that get built there. It's actually more than two things if you really look around the area.

But there is what appears to be a production area. And those buildings... Are they really look like the kind of buildings you'd see in a solid propellant plant, you know, so they're high bay, right, they're really tall, which You know, if you know anything about producing solid propellant missiles, you know typically you've got the motor casing which is standing on end, so it's pretty tall.

And then you've got like a mixer with the fuel above it, right, and it can pour the fuel into the casing and around a mandrel which, you know, shapes the, determines the shape of the propellant. And, you know, it has those buildings, right? And like a good solid propellant plant, those buildings are pretty far apart in case one blows.

They don't want it to blow up the other ones, which the Iranians discovered.

Aaron 9:36

Yeah, that's one of the pods I wasn't on, but one of my favorite pods in the arms control podcast. Fabian is included in that one, too.

Jeffrey 9:45

Yeah, well, Fabian went a little crazy with solid propellant production infrastructure in the Middle East. He's been bird-dogging all the Egyptian locations and finding their analogs in pre-war Iraq. I mean, he's got a whole list.

Aaron 10:01

Yeah. So this is a side note. If somebody wants to fund his work.

Jeffrey 10:05

Yes. I mean, if somebody would like to give us money to hire the most talented open service researcher I've ever met, that'd be awesome. Like we can use him. So, you know, you've got these high bay buildings that are spread apart and pretty well bermed. And, you know, some people looked at it and we thought this too.

So the people who said this are not crazy. The buildings aren't as bermed as we would make them in the United States. But, you know, like in Iran, they weren't burned at all. They paid the price, right?

Aaron 10:37

They killed the whole solid propellant team.

Jeffrey 10:40

But unlike in most places that, you know, the Chinese are totally pathological about lightning rods. Like they put lightning rods up all over their solid propellant facilities. I guess they're afraid of a lightning strike. And this place has just got a ton of lightning rods. So, you know, really there are some buildings where it looks like they might make the motor cases and the nozzles and maybe do the final installation.

But then there are also these buildings that are tall that look like they'd be suitable for mixing the propellant and pouring it. And then what really drew Fabian's attention, and I think really did it for me, is there is a strange building... That is a one-half scale model of the giant solid-fueled horizontal test stand in China, in Lantian, China.

And it looks exactly the same. It's just like slightly... It's half the size.

Aaron 11:36

Yeah, and you mentioned that. I think they quoted you in the article about that, about what the tip-off was. The Chinese do something a little unique that gives it a signature.

Jeffrey 11:44

Yeah, we actually... And I'm not going to identify the person because I don't... I don't like this is really not a criticism of this person. And it just was a funny thing. Like one person looked at it and was like, I don't think you'd cover the part where the flame shoots out in a test because the flame would like melt the building.

Right. Or catch on fire like you do structural damage. And like the reason I'm not like I don't I'm like totally don't want to make fun of that person because he's exactly right. No one does that except the Chinese do do that. Right. They have these they cover the part where the flame comes out and they like spray it with water.

Why do they do that? You know, I have no idea. Their their test stands are weird. They also have one that they shoot through a hill. Like instead of carving out a gorge, they actually made a tunnel so it shoots through. I mean, you still, the optical signature is still there. I don't think it actually reduces the signature.

And in fact, if anything, it increases the signature because not only do you have this trench where you're going to get like burn marks, but now you also have this covered area, which is really quite distinct. And then you have all the infrastructure for spraying it with water and you can see the water runoff, which by the way, we can see in Saudi Arabia.

Right, and I actually don't know if the water runoff is coming from the plant or the or the or the test stand. It's a little bit unclear because it all runs into the same place. But like, this is a really weird thing that only the Chinese do, right? So like, the person who was like, ah, that seems weird to me, it's like, you're, you're right, it is weird. And the only reason you would know this, that anybody does it this way, is if you were like Fabian, because like, I studied the Chinese missile program. I didn't notice this either. Fabian actually got Really nice pictures of them doing the tests, which, you know, are online.

Like, once you know where to look for them, they're there. So, I mean, the test stand really is a... It bears a really striking resemblance to the Chinese one.

Aaron 13:46

So, this... I mean, it sort of all comes together, right? I mean, we know that there's a history of Chinese-Saudi collaboration on ballistic missiles, at least purchase, but the solid fuel plant... Looks like it's like a Chinese solid fuel plant. So what are the broader implications of this? I mean, I know you talk about this in the story, but fill us in.

Jeffrey 14:07

Well, and, you know, I think in the story we try to be pretty careful about the whole Chinese connection because it's possible that the that, you know, because the Chinese supplied the Pakistanis. You know, there are a lot of things like this could be, you know, and you can't rule out the possibility that the Saudis went to some third party contractor and were like, we'd like a test infrastructure.

And then that, you know, that third party contractor looked at the Chinese infrastructure and was like, OK, well, we'll build it like that. Yeah. And you certainly can't rule out the possibility that it was the Pakistanis who did it, maybe either with some Chinese assistance or just based on the information they had from the Chinese. And frankly, I don't think we can rule out that the Saudis went to a different country and got, say, a missile design.

There's a lot of rumors about Ukraine. But maybe the Ukrainians wouldn't sell them certain things. And so then they went to the Chinese or the Pakistanis. And so maybe it's like a mix and match. Like, you just don't know. So I want to be really careful. Like, I would like a good hypothesis is that this is just a Chinese plant that's been built there.

And I'll talk about the implications of that. But like, we don't know that yet. Right. But I think the implication of that is, you know, that if that's true, then the Saudis are on the same technical trajectory as the Pakistanis were 20 years ago. Right. They're importing missiles and missile production capabilities. And, you know, Pakistan in the 1990s wasn't a huge technological powerhouse.

And yet Pakistan was able to import that assistance and then stand up a domestic missile industry. And so, you know, Saudi Arabia could be on that same trajectory. Which is important because, you know, even if these particular missiles are short or medium range, it really does open up the door to much longer range missiles in the future.

Aaron 16:02

But they can't build a car, right?

Jeffrey 16:05

Yeah, you know, an example I don't like, yes. Right.

Aaron 16:10

But listeners, that's a joke on Fareed Zakaria. You know, who I don't, you know, yeah. Yeah. I'm just joking because we talked about that previously on the podcast about how that's a bad comparative variable for a country's technological progress and ability if they devote resources to develop either a missile or nuclear program in this case. Because, you know, the concern put out there is that if they are on the trajectory of the Pakistanis, they begin to stand up.

You know, with foreign assistance and indigenous missile program out to longer ranges what are those missiles for? Yeah.

Jeffrey 16:44

And, you know, I mean, I, I don't think we should just, I don't want to pick on Fareed Zakaria, but I do think that we have underestimated the ambitions of the Saudis. And if you under end, if you underestimate the ambitions, you need to be careful not to underestimate the capabilities because particularly in an era when you can import technology You know, you may find that countries do a lot more than you're expecting.

And so, you know, like, I think it's a couple of things that are important. I mean, one is just getting our perspective on Iran's missile program aligned correctly. You know, like, we always talk about Iranian missiles and Iran's decision to build missiles in isolation of other regional powers. Correct. Which, you know, it's like, oh, well, we don't I mean, like we don't like Iranian foreign policy goals.

And so we imagine that missiles are part of this malign Iranian intent. But like the reality is more complicated than that. Right. These are military capabilities that are actually pretty broadly spreading through the region. And so, you know, I mean, the reason the Iranians got the missile program in the first place is that the Iraqis were hitting them.

Right. Yeah. And then the Iranians in the 80s. And when the Iranians and the Iraqis started hitting each other with long range missiles, that's when the Saudis went to the Chinese and were like, gee, we need some of those too. Right. So, you know, I think we need to keep in mind that, yes, Iran is building missiles and, you know, handing them over to their proxies in Yemen and firing them at Riyadh, which is like a big deal.

It's extremely big deal. You can understand why the Saudis would be pissed off about that. But we also have to keep in mind that that behavior exists in a context in which Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Syria, Egypt, Turkey, and, you know, Yemen, including the Iranian proxies, all have domestic missile programs of their own of varying capabilities.

And so when we say, like, we want the Iranians to stop building missiles, which we do. Oh, and I left Israel out. Yeah. Right. Yeah. It's very hard to imagine a situation, I think, in which you're going to get the Iranians to do more than they've already done, which is limit the range of the missiles to 2000 kilometers.

If you want to address missiles below that range, that's going to require addressing all of these regional missile programs. And, you know, people like demand that the Iranians stop. But, I mean, do we actually think that if the Iranians came up and said, you know what, we agree to a region-wide ban on missiles, like, do we think that the Saudis would join that ban?

Do we think the UAE would join that ban? Do we think Israel would join that ban? I mean, it's, I think it ends up being pretty complicated.

Aaron 19:42

Yeah, I mean, absolutely. Yeah, and one of the things, the interesting things about the dynamics of proliferation is obviously the link to North Korea and perhaps in the Saudi case to China, but also internal about how a lot of them came from, you know, the scud proliferation comes from inside the region, you know, one step removed from the North Koreans.

Do you know what I mean? So this has been going on for a very long time. And the Saudis... I mean, in a way, are playing catch-up, but I think what you said is perfectly accurate, is that they appear to be extremely ambitious about what they want out of this program, which is an indigenous capability.

Jeffrey 20:20

Yeah, well, I think that's the second thing. I mean, if the first kind of implication of this is that there is a regional arms race underway and that you can't really understand it if you only talk about the missiles we don't like or the missiles that are used for foreign policy goals we don't like, you actually have to talk about all of them.

That's one thing. But then the second thing is, boy, the MTCR, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and other measures to inhibit the spread of ballistic missiles Doesn't seem to be working very well. No, it's crumbling. You know, like, you have an MTCR which is supposed to be a supplier's cartel, right? So it's all the countries that can build on the inside agreeing to voluntary guidelines that really reduce the chance that they would sell outside. But the problem is, outside is already North Korea and Iran, yeah, and Pakistan.

And the Chinese are actually technically outside. They sort of have agreed to abide voluntarily in the hopes of getting in. But because they've been doing that for like 20 years and the United States has never let them in. Like, they don't have to do that. Like, that's the thing they do to, you know, because they were hoping to get a different, like, outcome.

If you have all those states outside of the supplier's cartel, like, it ain't a cartel.

Aaron 21:38

No. No, it's not.

Jeffrey 21:41

You know, it's like, you and I could start growing marijuana that doesn't make it a cartel.

Aaron 21:47

Especially not where you're in your new home state.

Jeffrey 21:52

I mean, I guess you get a greenhouse. I don't know.

Aaron 21:54

I don't know.

Jeffrey 21:55

You know, but like you got to, you, it really is this point where like if the Saudis could purchase such a capability kind of regardless of whether it was the Chinese or someone else, the fact is like that technology is out there. And yes, it is hard to scale motors going from, you know, small diameter to larger diameter.

But it's not impossible, and we've already seen, you know, India went to really large diameter solid fuel motors. North Korea has gotten to pretty large-scale diameter solid-fueled motors. Before they blew up their entire rocket team, the Iranians were working on really large-diameter solid-fueled motors. Sorry to keep laughing, but it's a great story. I know, it's so grim.

Aaron 22:38

Well, they never found his head.

Jeffrey 22:41

I mean, like, they blew themselves up. But the point is, and Israel obviously has really large... Diameter solid field motors, and there are things in Egypt that make us wonder if they were working on it. I don't know that they're there yet, but like that technology is out and about. And so, you know, as we imagine designing ways to address proliferation, The supply side strategies aren't working so well.

If you have to shift to demand side strategies, that's not real popular in America at the moment because demand side is asking the Iranians nicely if they'd stop and what they would like in exchange for that, which seems to be out of vogue.

Aaron 23:28

Well, it's called diplomacy, but we don't do that. We issue 12-point demands that are unrealizable. But I digress.

Jeffrey 23:34

I'm thinking about holding my breath until the Iranians give up their missile program. I might even stomp my foot while I'm waiting. I want them to know I'm really committed to this outcome.

Aaron 23:47

You could hold a conference in Warsaw. It's a brainstorming session in Warsaw, Poland. But the story, ultimately, I think the kicker is it links it to questions about Saudi's interests in large civilian power plants and whether or not these two things are linked.

Jeffrey 24:07

Yeah, and I think that's a complicated answer. Me too. You know, you have to have a little sympathy for the Saudis here. Like, the Iranians are turning over long-range missiles to their proxies in Yemen, and those proxies are proceeding to fire those missiles at Riyadh. You know, they don't do it all the time, but they do do it.

And the Saudis, like, they just take it, you know? Like, I love, like, these people are all like, you know, like, Like Mike Pompeo, you know, it's all, you know, all this tough talk, you know, and it's like, oh, you're such a tough man. By the way, are the Iranians firing rockets at Riyadh? They are, right? Are we, what are you doing about that?

You know, and it's like, well, I'm issuing demands, you know, like, oh, you're very tough. So I can understand if you're the Saudis, that's getting old. You can totally understand if you're the Saudis, you would want the ability to put a rocket on Tehran in response. I'm not sure it's a good idea, but... Like, I get the impulse, so I get that.

So I can see a purely, innocence maybe not the right word, but you don't have to want a nuclear weapon to be annoyed that your enemies have a capability you don't. On the other hand, you know, if you were gonna build a nuclear weapon, you would need a plant like this, right? You probably wouldn't want to drop them off an airplane.

You'd want to put them on a missile. You probably wouldn't want to use an old crappy Chinese liquid-fueled missile. You would probably want to use a solid-fueled missile. And you wouldn't want to be buying your missiles abroad. You would want to be making them yourself as much as you could in the chance, in the event that you got cut off.

And so, you know, what I always tell students, for example, is the way I think of it is missile programs and nuclear programs, it's not a causal relationship, but they are correlated. And so if a country has a really robust missile program, you got to at least consider the nuclear piece. And so, yeah, I would think on balance, it would make me more nervous to go ahead with the nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia.

Aaron 26:26

Yeah, I mean, I don't know really how to feel about that because, I mean, there's two sides to this. It's... I mean... The 1-2-3 agreement in isolation I was never really opposed to, you know?

Jeffrey 26:44

Me neither, although I'm starting to get nervous.

Aaron 26:48

That's about what I was supposed to... That was literally what I was about to say. But now I'm starting to get nervous because other pieces of the puzzle are starting to fit in there. And then you have declaratory statements from, you know, Bin Bonsal. And so... Bin Salman. Sorry. You know, and so... When you add declaratory statements with interest in general nuclear technology, and then, I mean, is it clandestine or just very on the down low development of indigenous missile capabilities?

You really have to start scratching your head about what it is that they're thinking about giving themselves options from a policy perspective.

Jeffrey 27:33

Yeah, I think that's right. And, you know, my guess is, like all governments, there are probably a whole bunch of people in the Saudi government who just like nuclear power because some people like nuclear power. There are probably a whole bunch of people in the Saudi government who think it's a great idea because it's seen as something that's kind of technologically advanced.

There are probably some people who want to do it precisely because they don't like being told that there are things they can't do. There are probably people who want to do it because the Iranians want to do it. And then there are probably people who want a bomb.

Aaron 28:01

Yeah, I totally agree.

Jeffrey 28:03

And, you know... Like, the whole point of nuclear cooperation agreements historically has been to find a way to make possible cooperation while also imposing some requirements that provide a level of assurance that nuclear programs aren't turning into weapons programs. And so, you know, you see debates about, like, for example, enrichment and reprocessing. You know, like... Most of us would like to see the Saudis agree to at least the language that the UAE agreed to, in which it agreed to a first approximation, forego enrichment and reprocessing.

Yes. So, you know, you can kind of understand it, but like, I don't know. I don't think the Trump administration is going to drive that hard of a bargain with the Saudis. And so you're going to have to like consider the bargain that they actually come back with. And, and it's tough, right? Because it's like, you know, you have some evidence that causes you to worry.

You have some statements by officials. You know, I, I, I don't think it's purely tactical. Like, I think they truly believe the Iranians are going to build nuclear weapons no matter what. I don't, I don't know that that's true, but I think that I just think they might be more skeptical than I am, and so they might have convinced themselves of that fact.

You now have the missile program. And I think, like the dissident murder, there's a willingness to transgress international norms. Exactly. So it's like, if something matters enough to them, I mean, I guess this is abstractly true, but you have a real demonstration of the fact that You know, the crown prince is willing to run the risk of some isolation.

He's willing to break a few eggs to make an omelet. And, you know, that doesn't make me feel great.

Aaron 30:05

No, that's exactly right. I mean, the transgressing of norms with the killing of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi in Istanbul... This is another data point, actually. Something that was sticking out in my mind as I was reading it is that they were willing to do this. They were willing to absorb the costs of an unwinnable war in Yemen.

Jeffrey 30:28

Well, and in fact, I mean, in a trivial way, that killing contributed to us writing this piece precisely because it had sort of sat on the back burner as... Fabian thinks it's a solid-fueled missile plant. I looked at it. I looked at it quickly. But that seems like a lot. That would be a surprise. But once I was surprised that they had murdered a dissident, I was like, you know what?

They actually might be willing to do this. And then I looked like, oh, yeah, they did. So the murder changed my perception of their willingness to try certain things. And it reminded me that I really needed to take a careful look at that facility.

Aaron 31:11

Yeah, and I think that's a good place to bring this full circle is raise money for Fabian because he does great work. And don't underestimate them.

Jeffrey 31:21

Look, I understand. If you don't want to give the money to the Middlebury Institute, just give the money to Fabian and he can hire me and I can go work for him.

Aaron 31:31

You guys have a cash machine going on over there. Come on, you can't scrounge together a salary?

Jeffrey 31:37

You know, everything is complicated. Hey, and I, before we go, I have to say, I mean, and I know that like all our work is a running commercial for them, but like our friends at Planet Labs, you know, like they, we, we went to them and, and, and said, you know, Hey, there's a spot we want to look at.

And, and, and, you know, sure enough, those are, those are pretty Planet Lab pictures at less than 80 centimeters.

Aaron 32:03

They're the real OGs there, man. They are doing work and helping you guys out and helping the whole community out. It's really cutting edge, both with their imagery and how to annotate it and analyze it. Yeah, that's great.

Jeffrey 32:15

Oh, annotations. I like my orange boxes, and I have now had both NPR and The Washington Post delete my beautiful annotations and replace them with their own.

Aaron 32:26

Oh, yeah, we were meant to cover this, but I forgot to bring it up. So you prefer orange. The Washington Post used yellow.

Jeffrey 32:31

Yeah, I think the Washington Post ones, I mean, they might have been going for like a retro 90s feel. You know, yeah, okay. So it was like fond memories of my childhood. Yeah. So I liked that. But, you know, the reason we pick orange, and I guess people hate the orange, but it's like nice contrast against brown desert and green trees.

So when you're really looking at a satellite image, you're getting a bunch of colors that And orange is the highest contrast background color. And so I get it, people might not like orange, but it's the one that I find makes it easiest to read the annotations, which I think is beautiful in its own way. You know, when something is, when that information conveys to you with little friction, to me, that's an aesthetic thing.

I find that beautiful. So I like my f***ing orange annotations.

Aaron 33:29

Except that orange... Don't go with yellow or... I think some people use white. Orange is the new black.

Jeffrey 33:37

Well, I mean, I don't get to pick, right? I mean, that's the thing. You annotate the images, you turn them over to a news agency, and they make their own choices. And they look nice in their own way, right? Like, they're designed for their purposes. So it's just a difference of aesthetic choice.

Aaron 33:51

I just... God d***, I like mine. Yeah. With that, I mean, I think you want to get out into your sea of white before it ices over, correct?

Jeffrey 34:02

That's my goal. I would like to get home without dying.

Aaron 34:07

That's important. So I think with that...

Jeffrey 34:08

Although, you know, we found a salt fuel missile facility, so maybe my life is complete.

Aaron 34:12

Yeah, maybe it is. And it's great work. And I think there's more to come, upcoming. So stay tuned for more Arms Control Wong podcasts. So if you enjoy the podcast and would like to contribute to it, you can head on over to patreon.com slash acwpodcast. And for $5 a month if you are a normal person and $3 a month if you are a student and have a .edu address you get access to our Slack channel where a lot of these things are discussed in private in more detail and a lot of cool people are contributing to that and we have a separate podcast shorter called Brilliant Pebbles about 10 minutes long and about cool non-proliferation things that we just don't talk about for 30 minutes because they aren't worth a full pod but nevertheless worth a conversation.

You get access to that as well. So with that, Jeffrey, good luck getting home and hope it does nice over. Thanks. I'll do my best to get home safe. And thank you for listening.