I am preparing a case study on the Dora Farms strike at the onset of Operation Iraqi Freedom. I came across this priceless calculation by General Tommy Franks and one of his subordinates:
“What the probabilities of mission success with a single aircraft?”
Buzz didn’t hesitate, “A single aircraft gives us a probability of .5.”
Again, I thought before speaking. Normally, I was a glass-half-full optimist, but tonight there could be no risk of failure. “What does it take to get to one hundred percent—two planes?”
“Probability of success goes to 1.0, General.”
“Buzz” is Michael Moseley, now Air Force Chief of Staff.
Really, is it this hard? .5 squared is .25 or a seventy-five percent chance of one or both aircraft getting through. A third F-117 would have brought the chance of mission success to nearly ninety percent.
I don’t even want to begin to explain the concept of independent errors—one of the many mistakes that bedeviled Desert One.
Of course, the entire strike was based on bad dope: No matter how many aircraft CENTCOM assigned, they couldn’t compensate for Saddam not being anywhere near the target.