This post is from November 2006. Facts and links may have changed since. See more from that month

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NORK Nuke Missile?

So, my initial speculation about the cause of failure for North Korea’s nuclear test—remember that I thought the NORKS tried to reduce the size of the warhead with fancy implosion techniques—seems to have gained some credibility. (See So, Like, Why Didn’t It Work?, October 10, 2006)

Andrew Koch called my hypothesis “the most popular working assumption inside the U.S. intelligence community at the moment” which, you know, is kind of cool.


Underground facility at Hagap, once thought an HE testing site.

Anyway, this was something I’d been thinking about since the IC began noticing that the NORKs were doing an assload of implosion testing and Lowell Jacoby confirmed North Korea “had ability to arm a missile with a nuclear device.” (See also “Can North Korea Mate a “Simple Fission Weapon to the Taepo Dong 2?, April 30, 2005.)

As an aside, I gave Jacoby a hard time about that, but he’s actually a pretty nice guy. Sorry about that.

Something else that makes me sorry: How quickly the news that North Korea tried and failed to design a warhead small enough for a missile gets translated into, “N.K. can put warhead on mid-range missile – experts.” Or so sayeth David Morgan with Reuters:

North Korea has the ability to put a nuclear warhead onto a medium-range missile and threaten its regional neighbors, especially Japan, some U.S. experts believe.

[snip]

U.S. intelligence determined over a decade ago that Pyongyang was trying to develop a warhead for its medium-range arsenal but had yet to overcome the engineering obstacles.

[The experts] said those hurdles appear now to have been surpassed.

What? It. Didn’t. Work.

The NORKs didn’t jump the hurdle; they ran smack into it.

The bomb did produce a yield of a couple hundred tons—something I wouldn’t want dropped on my house or even in my neighborhood. And, maybe dud was a somewhat careless description. But given the inaccuracy of a Nodong and the small yield, the nuclear threat recedes below that posed by the hundreds of North Korean artillery pieces that “threaten all of Seoul with devastating attacks.”

Claiming that North Korea can arm a Nodong with a nuclear weapon is the same as claiming the Tapeodong-2 can fly thousands of kilometers. No, it can’t. The range of the Taepodong is about 40 seconds of powered flight before it explodes. North Korea can arm a Nodong with a nuclear weapon that is little more than a gi-normous dirty bomb.

I don’t mean to say that the North Koreans will never solve these problems. With enough testing they will, which is a reason to seek North Korea’s return to the NPT, adherence to the CTBT, the Clinton-era moratoria on missile testing and some sort of nouvelle Agreed Frameworok. The Reuters headline doesn’t help those efforts by giving an exagerrated picture of North Korea’s capabilities relative to the actual performance of North Korea’s strategic programs.

Jeffrey Lewis

Writing on ACW 2004–2026

Dr. Jeffrey Lewis is a Senior Research Scholar and the William J. Perry Lecturer at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation. He is also a Distinguished Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. Jeffrey is a member of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine's Committee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC), which conducts dialogues with counterparts in China, Russia, and India; a member of the Science and Security Board of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, which is best known for setting the "Doomsday Clock"; and a member of Anthropic's Frontier Red Team. From 2022 to 2025, Jeffrey was a member of the U.S. Secretary of State's International Security Advisory Board.

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