KCN-eh? September’s Other North Korean Developments

Andrea Berger 0:02

President Evil, the Commander of Grief or something. You're listening to the Arms Control One podcast, the leading podcast on arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation. I'm Andrea Berger, and I'm a senior research associate at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.

Alison Evans 0:24

My name is Alison Evans. I'm the deputy head of Asia-Pacific country risk at IHS Markit and I'm very excited to be the very first guinea pig.

Andrea 0:32

Yes, so we're starting a bit of an experiment really actually. So what I thought in relation to our chats about North Korea is that we are missing a whole lot of really important stuff that's going on. And we tend to have a huge focus on missile and nuclear developments, quite understandably. But in that, we lose all the fun other stories.

And so each month, at the end of the month, I'm going to rope in some unsuspecting poor individual like Alison Evans. That's me. To help do a review of North Korea-related news for the past month. So we're going to talk about the biggest story of the month. We're going to talk about what we think is the most interesting story.

We're going to talk about the story that you might have missed. And then we will end, hopefully, on some sort of humorous note with some quirky thing that the North Koreans have come up with. But let's maybe start with the biggest story of the month. And Alison, I'm going to throw it straight over to you to give me your view on what that was, because we've had a lot of them.

Alison 1:43

Yeah, I think that's the biggest issue here, is that when you said we're going to start with that, I thought, oh, there's been so many big stories. Whether it's the Hwasong-12 missiles fired over Japan or... The foreign minister of North Korea saying that they're going to test an H-bomb in the Pacific. Now, President Trump tweeting that they won't be around much longer if they continue this behavior.

So I think there's so many things there that we could pick apart. I'm not sure where you want to start. That's actually kind of the problem with having set priorities.

Andrea 2:17

The first question is what is the biggest story is because that assumes that there are only a few of them. And for us working in think tanks on North Korea, there is literally a story every day that results in an influx of media requests on things. You know, Trump's tweeted something or goodness knows Kim Jong-un has responded for the first time or, you know, you have an H-bomb test.

These are all things that have happened in the course of a month.

Alison 2:47

And I have to say, so I work for a private company and normally if things quiet down on North Korea, I have to go look at other countries. But every Monday for the past month or so, I've sort of come in and thought, oh, no, I got to work on North Korea again this week, which is not a bad thing.

But I think that kind of points to an increased frequency of incidents of provocative acts by North Korea. Bellicose rhetoric on all sides. And the problem there is an increased risk of miscalculation.

Andrea 3:18

So I never thought I'd say this, but actually I had for my biggest story of the month, the UN General Assembly. Which is normally not the place where the most interesting developments in the world happens, or with any great multilateralism comes slow decision-making and watered-down results, but really here this month we had some pretty extraordinary events being escalated, if you will, by rhetoric in the UN General Assembly.

Let's start there, because I thought the Trump statement was fascinating. Not for the reason that many journalists picked up on, which was Trump's threat to basically attack North Korea, which was framed in a responsive fashion, not totally unlike what previous U.S. presidents have said, just with less careful language. Yeah. But I actually thought his statement was more interesting for the Rocketman suicide mission part of the statement, which was so totally weird.

The Rocketman label for Kim Jong-un, I mean, I would love to... I almost said I would love to get into Trump's mind. I wouldn't love to get into Trump's mind. But I would love to know where that came from, if it was from Trump personally giving him that nickname.

Alison 4:45

Oh, I heard that it was actually from The Economist and a name for Kim Jong-il. It was on their headline or something like that. Oh, interesting.

Andrea 4:54

Maybe even on the front page of The Economist years ago. Okay. But either way, it seemed sort of the way he said it Appeared as if he was kind of glorifying what Kim Jong-un was doing. And it wasn't really an insult. It seemed almost to be, yeah, idolizing what he'd done, which I found really quite weird. But then also the suicide mission bit.

There was a great article by Ankit Panda, who writes for The Diplomat, in The Atlantic. And he was talking about, And his view that that actually has implications for deterrence, this idea that North Korea is on a suicide mission, which means its actions are not rational or deterrable. It's the kind of thinking that McMaster was talking about when he was saying that he doesn't think North Korea is deterrable.

And that, in a UN General Assembly speech, is really quite clear. Extraordinary and confuses a lot of the messages that the U.S. is putting out about the circumstances in which it would contemplate certain military action on North Korea and where it sees this whole crisis going.

Alison 6:13

Yeah, and I think perhaps even you could say it's a bit dangerous if that's the forum when you're thinking about having a clear message for the many other member states that don't feel so strongly about sanctions, don't feel the same way as the US, let alone South Korea, Japan about sanctions. Potential nuclear North Korea. And yeah, where there is ambiguity about what the US message is with regards to potential preemptive military action, let alone in response to North Korean aggression, especially when China's also had to reiterate what its position is, that If push comes to shove, you know that China will have to step in to prevent any US military action if it's preventive, especially to do with regime change.

Andrea 7:03

Yeah, you could imagine that if you were sitting there and you were from countries that are represented in the United Nations that are skeptical of the US approach to East Asia or just internationally, that Trump's speech would actually... Really confirm a lot of the negative perceptions they had about what US aims in the region were. And, you know, in particular, this idea when you follow it up with a Trump tweet about how Kim Jong-un is not going to last much longer.

That the US really might be about regime change. This has been an interesting set of mixed messages in particular in the past few months, because you have, on the one hand, a clear attempt to reiterate in certain formal statements that North Korea is not going to be the target of regime change by the United States. Tillerson recently, in some of his explanatory statements about New UN Security Council resolutions was saying, no, we are not striving for regime change in North Korea.

But then you have those tweets like Trump that just totally go across that. And if you're an external, external analyst, you're left thinking, well, okay, what actually does the US want to achieve in the region?

Alison 8:26

And I think it also pushes North Korea's behavior to become more provocative. I definitely think a motivation is that North Korea is becoming more confident in its advanced and advancing weapons capabilities. But the other side of that is where you have those mixed messages that you've been talking about from Tillerson, McMaster, other parts of the White House that...

There is this message that potentially North Korea is not deterring the US. So then just by default, North Korea has to do more and become more provocative in its weapons testing in order to achieve what it wants.

Andrea 9:03

This was, I think, particularly fascinating and potentially illuminated by Kim Jong-un's Phrased in the first person in response to Trump and some of the recent statements out of not only Trump's mouth, but the White House in general. And that in itself was such a fascinating development that Kim Jong-un put out a statement that was in effect a right of reply to what had been said of the U.N.,

Alison 9:37

And I think, so obviously, because I look at country risk, I'm thinking about the domestic implications here. And a lot of other messaging has come from Ri Yong-ho, for example, foreign minister or representatives to the UN. But I think there's also an understanding that Kim Jong-un has to Be clear that he is the head of the government.

Whether, you know, there's factions in North Korean leadership, they also want to make it clear externally and internally that he's the face of the government, he's making these decisions. And I think it was interesting releasing a photograph with five other decision makers around the table earlier this year, but then to follow that up with this individual statement, you know, to directly face off against Trump.

Andrea 10:27

It's unusual as well, because normally the messaging and iconography around Kim Jong-un is so tightly controlled. And this came out, you know, there was a little bit of a lag, but it came out quite quickly after Trump's General Assembly speech. Speech. And I wonder how much of it had been pre-prepared and planned in anticipation for something like that being said, or whether it was really an kind of on-the-fly decision in North Korea to release a statement from the leader himself, because there had been such a, in Kim Jong-un's own words, insulting statement made about North Korea and him personally in the UN General Assembly that the response had to come from the highest level of leadership.

Alison 11:12

Yeah, and that points to two things. First of all, that you have these two very strong leadership figures who have very clear ideas about what they want to do in any given moment. And secondly, that the shortening periods between these different incidents also give the North Korean leadership, the North Korean government and military, who like to calculate every single act and what the potential outcomes Responses might be as much as possible, they now have less time to do that because of how things have changed over the past six months.

Andrea 11:43

And that's why it feels like the volume is getting just so much higher always, because we don't really have time to adjust to it. And that applies to the policy responses too, I think. You look even... I'm a sanctions geek. And so when I look at sanctions and after some of the recent provocations by North Korea, I had journalists coming to me saying, do you think there's going to be a new UN Security Council sanctions resolution?

They've called an emergency session. What's going to happen? And I was like, well, we only had a sanctions resolution like yesterday. A week and a half ago. We can't possibly have another one yet. There's going to be fatigue. And just because everything is back to back to back right now, you have a new heightening of the rhetoric and tension on a daily basis.

Almost the policy response process can't And especially the multilateral aspect of it, right? Because so many of these dimensions of policy should have a strong multilateral aspect and coordinating multilateralism takes time, which simply is not what we have the luxury of enjoying right now.

Alison 12:55

Yeah, but before you even get to that implementation, there's the signaling of the UN Security Council unanimously agreeing to these so soon after one another. And for me, that also pointed to the change in China's position, you know, with North Korea's weapons testing in May and September, timed while Beijing is hosting these big high-level conferences, the One Belt, One Road initiative and the BRICS conference.

And that's clearly done, at least in part, to embarrass or punish China for having agreed to these new UN sanctions. And with this sort of deteriorating relationship between China and North Korea anyway, I think that also points to how China is trying to toughen up on North Korea, but will still kind of have to walk a thin line of being wary, obviously, of U.S. unilateral sanctions that will, secondary sanctions that will target Chinese businesses and Chinese banks.

But not go so far as to implement any sanctions that would undermine the economic well-being or social stability, not only of North Korea too much, but also that community on the border in China, which relies so heavily with trade. I don't know if you agree with this, but for me, I think the government in Beijing likes to fight domestic fires, you know, and do the one after the other.

And obviously, there's a whole host of issues that China is dealing with at the moment. But one of those is the. Security situation in Xinjiang, so they're dealing with an ethnic minority in the Western. I just don't think that the government in Beijing wants to economically support and subsidize a region where there's a linguistic and ethnic minority in the Northeast as well.

Andrea 14:47

That's a good point because there's been a, again, in the chain of big stories. One of the big stories last week was about the Chinese central bank supposedly instructing other banks within China to faithfully adhere to UN Security Council sanctions. And without going into it too much, Trump... Trumpeted that straight away as being this evidence that China was coming around and he praised them for it.

And while that's all fine, there's been such confusing reporting over that supposed instruction by the Chinese. The Chinese MFA, from what I understand, denied that such an instruction had been given, yet other media reports were quoting from people who'd seen the document. So, you know, there's this... I think there's a big question still over whether or not that was sent.

Does it reflect just a desire by Beijing to get out of this uncomfortable spotlight that Washington has put it in, in terms of being seen to not be faithfully implementing sanctions or doing its part? If you just send a letter out to banks, is that enough? Do they plan to follow up on it? What does that mean for the types of considerations that you raised over China's traditional hesitations over sanctions implementation?

And I think it's probably too early to tell. So maybe when it comes to our October podcast, we'll have to reflect on this if we've had more information about what exactly the Chinese are up to in this respect. But that could really be one area that we have to watch. What did you put as your most interesting story of the month?

Again, plenty of material to choose from.

Alison 16:37

Yeah, certainly. And this was also something that I think might have been missed in some Western media outlets. And that's the whole aspect of what's going on with North Korea's neighbors. You know... Especially given all of the interesting language coming out of the United States, as well as North Korean media, which is kind of par for the course, calling people very strange names.

But of course, South Korea and Japan have been watching this very concerned, you know, missiles flying over Hokkaido. And I think the important thing there is what it means for their domestic politics and how it's impacted South Korean President Moon Jae-in in his first few months. You know, he came in on a campaign, obviously focusing domestically on anti-corruption campaigning because of the impeachment of former President Park Geun-hye.

But when it comes to North Korean policy... Very much in contrast to the stronger line from, you know, the US ally and talking about kind of reconciliation or better North-South relations. And he hasn't been able to follow through on that just because of all of these weapons tests, including, most importantly, the nuclear test, which has even brought up the subject of potentially US nuclear weapons being stationed in South Korea again.

That's very controversial. But that's also been voiced by different parts of South Korean politics in the public. And so I think that shows how divisive the issue of North Korea is, where you have liberals and conservatives kind of changing positions on whether you should be more conciliatory or hard a line on North Korea.

Andrea 18:22

So tell me what you think of this theory, because I've been debating it in my own head, and I'm not sure whether it's accurate. But I look at what Moon Jae-in has been doing, and I observe that in terms of his dialogue with the United States, he definitely has done well. Something of a 180 from his campaign politics.

He campaigned on what some people are calling moonshine platforms, with a warming of relations to North Korea. He wanted to have this big high-level summit with Kim Jong-un. And Trump and the White House criticized him for that. They told him it was naive. Transcripts or readouts of the call between Trump and Abe were leaked saying how crazy Moon was to be pursuing this line.

And partly as a result of that clear, obvious discord between the White House and the Blue House in South Korea, He has come around a little bit to the U.S. narrative, right? So he's gone towards South Korea will support full sanctions and pressure on North Korea because it is not the right time to be engaging in dialogue efforts with the North.

But while I see him doing that, I also see still bits of the Moon Jae-in kind of original sentiment poking through. So, for example, he, I think it was just this week, maybe, agreed to a humanitarian aid package for North Korea, which was something that had been cut off under the Park Geun-hye government. And he was criticized in the media for having renewed humanitarian aid to North Korea, and especially given the timing.

And that's going forward anyways. Similarly, you look at his statement from the UN General Assembly, and it's all very much about the open hand still to North Korea, about trying to incorporate them in the Pyeongchang Olympics. And there's still kind of that open door that he's leaving, at least rhetorically, to more With Pyongyang if they ever seem willing.

So I wonder if it's kind of a temporary 180 that's being done just to smooth things over a little bit with the United States rather than really a total change of heart by Moon.

Alison 20:55

Yeah, I mean, I think that's right. If only because I think this sort of 180, as you've called it, is just by necessity. You know, Moon Jae-in came in as such a popular president. And in a way, people were almost wondering how he would get away with some of the not just diplomatic, but economic policies that he wanted to implement for North Korea that he How can you push China to implement sanctions when you're going to perhaps not reopen the Kaesong Industrial Complex, but at least pursue other kind of economic projects between the two Koreas?

And that just has not been possible. And I think... It is by necessity, you know, that North Korea has both backed Moon into this corner because in order to retain some of that public support, not that a large portion of the South Korean public really care what North Korea is doing with their weapons testing. I think life goes on as usual in Seoul most of the time, but just because he has supported Moon has faced so much criticism from the conservatives and more right-wing people in the National Assembly that the Cheong Wa Dae, the Blue House, has had to change their line in order to also have a public front against North Korea, that the U.S.-South Korea alliance is still strong.

You know, you mentioned... The call with Abe being leaked, but also I think a US senator let it be known to the press that in a conversation Trump had said, well, if people start dying, they're going to die over there. And that kind of message just really undermines the public view of the security alliance. I think military-military exchange between the US ROKs Fine, they're still coordinating, but it doesn't play well in South Korea, obviously.

And so I think in order to counterbalance that criticism that Moon has faced from Trump's tweets saying that he is appeasing North Korea, He's just had to take a much stronger line. But as you said, in the smaller, less obvious ways, the World Food Programme and UNICEF humanitarian funds that you mentioned will go ahead and be out of the headlines in a week or two.

They'll be forgotten. And I think... Those inter-Korean exchanges that the Cheong Wa Dae and the Moon administration can kind of get away with will go ahead because their ideology and their kind of view of how to ameliorate the situation is just any exchange or any kind of non-military bargaining chips that you can gather better.

Andrea 23:53

Yeah, it's interesting you mentioned Kaesong, because one of the things I found most interesting about the new UN Security Council resolution that was passed in mid-September was that it prohibits joint ventures between foreign companies and North Korean companies. And I wonder what the implications of that will be for Kaesong.

Alison 24:18

I wanted to ask you about this, actually.

Andrea 24:21

Yeah, ultimately, you know, you think about... And furthermore, there's a ban on textile imports from North Korea. So those two things aligned together make me wonder how it's now practically possible to restart Kaesong if you wanted to. And I'm not convinced it would be politically palatable or internationally legal anymore. For Moon Jae-in to restart that zone?

Alison 24:48

No, certainly not now. But I think back in the spring this year when he first became president, that might have still been a possibility. I thought the workaround was maybe that this was not international exchange. It was, you know, the two Koreas are still... One country, that's how you get around the financial sanctions. But because I don't really understand the nitty gritty of the sanctions, that's why I wanted to ask you about that.

And as you said now, with the new sanctions in the summer, they're so much stricter. I don't think there's any possibility, is there, to reopen the Kaesong Industrial Complex?

Andrea 25:24

They could try to get an exemption under the clause. And there is, I think, a case-by-case approval system by the UN Sanctions Committee if you did want to have some form of cooperative project. But I'd have to look closely at that. And I think it would probably just be seen to be politically acceptable. Unpalatable as well. You would certainly invite questions from other countries.

If China and Russia and whoever else are going to start shutting down their joint ventures, With North Korea and be pressured to stop purchasing textiles from the country, then reopening Kaesong, is that going to be very well received or is that going to be viewed as a double standard? I think it probably would be viewed in the latter fashion.

So I think it... Unfortunately, I think Kaesong might be moving towards death rather than merely in a coma.

Alison 26:19

Mothballs, all those textiles.

Andrea 26:21

Yeah. I had those... Maybe this is an exaggeration on most interesting, but I thought one of the really fascinating developments this month has been the number of countries that have expelled their North Korean ambassadors or downgraded diplomatic relations with North Korea. So my mental list is I think Spain, Peru, and Mexico declared the North Korean ambassadors in their countries persona non grata.

From my understanding, that means a new ambassador can still come in to replace them. But it was a form of really high protest over the nuclear test in early September. Kuwait, I think, downgraded relations with North Korea and sent home four or five diplomats. Egypt promised it would cut off military ties in reaction to the Trump administration denying Egypt aid over Egypt's links to North Korea, particularly in the military space.

And then you had, most bizarrely, the Philippines promised or announced that it was going to suspend all trade relations with North Korea. Allegedly to comply with UN sanctions. And that one mystified me because UN sanctions don't require you to cut off all trade with North Korea. But that seems to be the Philippines' interpretation. So you've got this slew of countries that have made strong diplomatic protests or have actually scaled back their relations with North Korea.

I don't doubt that there was maybe a lobbying effort by some governments On their foreign counterparts to take those sort of steps, because they seem to have all come quite quickly. And I'm not sure that Peru is necessarily inspired by Spanish diplomatic protests or Mexican diplomatic protests or, you know, the actions of the Philippines. So there must have been some level of behind the scenes coordination on this point.

Alison 28:27

How quickly do you think that happened? Because, of course, we can always go back earlier this year to the apparent assassination of Kim Jong-nam in Malaysia. And that could have made quite a few countries think twice and sort of started the ball rolling on this. I would be surprised if it was something that happened within, you know, a week or two of the nuclear test, for example.

Andrea 28:51

It's probably worth distinguishing by country here. I think the Egyptian story is a different one that's come about primarily because the U.S. actually did put its feet to the fire to say, if you continue to have a military relationship with North Korea... You will have costs associated with that decision and it will be you know u.s suspension of aid and what have you philippines i honestly don't know i think personally that probably has something to do with the current filipino administration you know president rodrigo duterte and

Alison 29:31

You know, he's another one known, unique and known for quick decision making, let's call it, and bold statements.

Andrea 29:39

But also, I think probably the Philippines came under some pressure because it was as media outlets started reporting more on who North Korea's Main trading partners were in terms of volume and value, the Philippines was actually fairly high on that list. And I think that brought it some embarrassment that it wasn't open to defending the

Alison 30:02

Yeah, and I think it was probably a relatively easy win for Duterte's administration, having had some friction with the US-Philippines relationship earlier this year around their military exchange. But then when it comes to Spain, Peru and Mexico...

Andrea 30:20

I'm not sure that, you know, those are simple declarations of the ambassador being persona non grata, giving them a certain number of days to leave the country. I don't think that will have been coordinated very far in advance. It may have been that there was... A outreach campaign by some governments, maybe Washington, maybe Seoul, who knows, to say, okay, at the next major provocation, consider taking these sort of actions to demonstrate your discontent with developments on the Korean Peninsula.

But I don't know that this will have been coordinated super far in advance of the H-bomb test. I think it, yeah, will have been A fairly short notice kind of diplomatic protest. But yeah, so what was the story? You kind of hinted at the story you thought was missed, which was the broader regional story about how everything that's happening between Trump and Kim Jong-un is impacting domestic politics in Korea.

Alison 31:24

Yeah, so I was able to talk about South Korea, but we didn't really talk about Japan. And I think the important thing there is that Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, even during his first stint as Prime Minister and now his second starting in 2012, has been pushing for an expansion of the geographic and operational mandate of the self-defense forces.

And of course, Japan's neighbors like South Korea and China, they see that as a remilitarization of Japan. So it's not very popular there. But for conservatives, nationalists, the sort of group that's called the Nippon Kaigi in Japan, which Abe is a part of, they have been pushing for this to give... It's a so-called normalization of the self-defense forces, which would give it a range of capabilities and status equivalent to other countries' armed forces.

And in that sense, of course, it's unsettling to have North Korea's missiles flying high over Hokkaido. But on the other hand, it's a boon for them because it sort of plays in their favour that they can seek to not only increase Japan's ballistic missile defences, but also look for more offensive capabilities for any kind of conflict scenario, even if that's very low possibility.

Andrea 32:45

It's interesting because for Japan and for others, I mean, North Korea is the universally accepted bad guy pretty much right now. And few would argue if you had a Japanese official telling you that North Korea's actions were deeply threatening to Japan. I mean, overflight is extremely provocative. And so if you were looking for... A way to bolster an existing case that you were making for the type of expansion of operating area or the types of capabilities within Japan, this would be an excellent case in point for you.

I think the South Koreans are doing the same, not to jump back to South Korea, but At the beginning of this month, the South Koreans announced that they're going to do an investigation into whether or not South Korea should start to build its own nuclear submarines. Now, there's a whole bunch of logistical and technical issues with that because it does have a nuclear agreement with the United States that puts certain restrictions on what it can do.

Alison 33:54

But having said that, there was also the revision of the agreement with the United States that limited the warhead and the missile.

Andrea 34:03

Yeah, for missile testing, which Moon Jae-in apparently asked Trump to amend in a phone call, and that was granted. So, you know, they're looking like they're going to upgrade payload weight on some of their missiles, which were formerly... Restricted. So yes, you're absolutely right on that front. And it's been interesting that this situation has been partly used as a justification to advance indigenous military capabilities in US allied countries in East Asia.

It's something we've talked about a little bit on the podcast before, but not really in great depth. That's an important trend that you're super right to point out.

Alison 34:43

And I think it also points to the unpredictability or at least perceived unpredictability kind of on all sides that means that even if, you know, the US-Japan and US-South Korea security alliances are steadfast and watertight, it still just makes good sense in terms of domestic politics and how The Moon administration or Abe administration appears domestically to start improving their own defensive and offensive capabilities.

Andrea 35:15

Yeah, everyone's got to look strong on defense. And it's the classic case in domestic politics in so many countries. So in terms of stories you may have missed, I had a different one. And I feel like, unfortunately, so much of what I've said has been about the UN General Assembly. And maybe this is just really... Because I like the UN.

Alison 35:37

You love the UN and sanctions, it's your thing. And sanctions.

Andrea 35:40

So this one is about both, which is from the North Korean foreign minister's speech in the UN General Assembly. We focused so much on Trump's speech, but there was a really interesting part of the foreign minister's speech where I read it and went, hold on a second, what is he talking about? So I'll read it out. He said, the DPRK...

Has organized a National Damage Investigation Committee to make comprehensive study of total damages inflicted on our republic by all kinds of sanctions. The committee will thoroughly investigate and compile all physical and moral damages imposed upon the DPRK by the U.S. and its followers and those countries that submitted to the U.S. coercion. Read China. When this racket of sanctions and pressure reaches a critical point, thus driving the Korean Peninsula into an uncontrollable situation, investigation results of this committee will have a huge effect in holding those accountable.

Now, I went back after I read that and I was like, did I just miss them announcing some sort of sanctions damage investigation committee? And I can't find it. So I'm not sure if this was intended to be a new announcement by the North Korean foreign minister, but it's pretty interesting. So here's my kind of hypothesis about what might happen with this.

The North Koreans do a damage investigation and put some kind of monetary value on the damage that the U.S. has caused them from sanctions. Much in the way that the U.S. is currently fining foreign entities for their digressions on North Korea sanctions and seizing assets that were semi-controlled by North Korea or directly controlled by North Korea. And I wonder if what North Korea is going to try to do is to do an asset seizure of its own variety.

And I know this is controversial and probably quite unlikely. But, I mean, let's assume that they're able to... Have cyber attacks on Bitcoin sites or into financial institutions, which are both things that they have been attempting recently. And perhaps what they're going to try to do is to demonstrate that they can get Money out of other parts of the international financial system, maybe the U.S. financial system equivalent to the type of debt they're owed for the evil U.S. imperialist sanctions regime.

I don't know. I hope that's not the case, but I just thought this was an interesting framing and, again... Were there saying they're going to hold those accountable for whatever those damages are. I wonder what's coming down this road for them once this hypothetical, well, it's not hypothetical, this apparently new investigations committee reports back in North Korea.

So I thought that was one a lot of people missed.

Alison 39:00

Yeah, no, I certainly missed it. And I think that's a really interesting hypothesis, because just when you thought expropriation risks in North Korea couldn't get any higher. And I think you're right to point out there's not much there. But in the cyberspace, there's a lot, you know, North Korean cyber attacks have also affected military service in South Korea.

And in the financial sector, there are attacks on banks in Bangladesh.

Andrea 39:26

Got 81 million out of Bangladesh.

Alison 39:27

Exactly. And, you know, that's an easy way for the government to make money and extract those fines. If that's how North Korea perceives it, that's a great way to have this headlined up now. He said it up front to then down the line say, well, that was a legitimate theft.

Andrea 39:47

Yeah, it would be. Well, OK, I don't want to make it happen just because we're talking about it. So don't give them ideas. I'm not going to purport to be that influential that I give them ideas on this stuff. But I just I looked at that and said that, you know, they must have an intention for what this is going to turn out in terms of their rhetorical campaign and the escalation of these sorts of disputes about over sanctions and U.S. hostile policy generally.

So yeah, that was my random, quite niche, interesting story of the month. And we promised to end on a funniest slash quirkiest slash weirdest story. Mine is as... Some of our Arms Control Wonk followers who may unfortunately listen to what I say on Twitter will have seen is North Korea winning gold at the circus. So the North Koreans are very pleased indeed that they have outmastered everyone at the circus.

And I thought that was a pretty adept statement. Metaphor for what is happening right now in broader international relations with North Korea.

Alison 41:05

Yeah, the under-16 football teams seem to be doing very well too, if you're reading North Korean media. I haven't followed the football team. Well, my favourite thing was one of the names that Ri Yong-ho also mentioned in the UN Security Council, right? Of what US President Donald Trump has been called by his own people, one of them being the Lion King.

I saw that.

Andrea 41:31

I had never heard that before.

Alison 41:34

No, so I looked it up, and I think, I mean, I might be quoting the wrong person, but in February this year, Ron Clinton Smith had an article on Medium.com titled Donald Trump, the Lion King.

Andrea 41:49

But where lion is spelt?

Alison 41:51

L-Y-I-N apostrophe.

Andrea 41:54

Right.

Alison 41:56

Yeah, according to the New York Times, Donald Trump is a proven liar. But, you know, the Lion King, as in the movie. I'm looking at the Medium article right now. But the film, The Lion King, was a favorite of mine growing up.

Andrea 42:14

No, I absolutely love this. And when I first read that, I think the North Koreans framed it as this is what Trump's own citizens call him. President Evil, the Commander of Grief or something. Maybe it is referring to the Medium article.

Alison 42:33

Well, I think it kind of has to be because the other, you know, funny word that came up recently was that they called Trump a dotard, which is like some... Spiked. And, you know, I'm sure that's because there's some like... Pre-war dictionary that the propaganda translators are using in North Korea so when you have kind of old school insults coming up but then this play on words the Lion King I think that has to come from Someone who's a native English speaker.

Andrea 43:09

For sure. But either way, I think Scott is now obligated to end this podcast by fading in the Lion King soundtrack. So with that, we'll end it here. Thank you so much for listening and tune in again next month where we review October's North Koreans. Thank you, Andrea.