I was in Brussels for the EU event this weekend but I won’t be in Washington for the meetings this week. Instead I will be here in Berlin and, in fact, when Mousavian is being introduced at Maryland I’ll be arriving at Herbert-von-Karajan-Str. 1, on occasion of Sir Simon Rattle’s presenting the long-awaited Samale/Mazzuca/Philips/Cohrs version of the completed Symphony Nr. 9 by Anton Bruckner. On February 24, they’ll be at Carnegie Hall where they will perform the American premiere of this work.

The focus of all the meetings in Brussels and Washington is on doing diplomacy with Iran, a subject which–to remain in central Europe for a moment–might have inspired Theodor Fontane a century ago to call it ein weites Feld, a pet phrase he used to describe a topic which was difficult to sum up in less than a 500-page novel.

On Saturday we had a good discussion on Iran in Brussels, and since I’m not going to be at any of the events in Washington this week, I’ve jotted down some notes from that discussion, and included a few points which came my way during some recent meetings in other Western capitals. A good deal of this may seem ho-hum to some readers who are following this subject daily at close range. But it might be worth reiterating for a more general audience because the recent escalation of the Iran crisis has perhaps deterred people from asking tough questions about what the advocates of “engaging Iran” exactly have in mind. Let’s hope the meetings this week will drill into these issues.

• Crisis management or conflict resolution?  At the Brussels EU meeting, Prince Turki Al Faisal Bin Abdulaziz Al Saud suggested in simple terms that what engagement means needs to be clarified: “Crisis management and conflict resolution are not the same.”  The recent escalation of the war of words and deeds–Iran beginning uranium enrichment at  Fordo, threats by Israelis to bomb targets in Iran, Iranian war games and threats to block the Strait of Hormuz and counter-posturing by the United States–has inevitably shifted attention away from the quest for what looks like the holy grail–an ultimate peaceful resolution to the Iran nuclear dilemma–and instead toward what’s called for right now to prevent a war with Iran during the first half of 2012. The interest of P5+1 states in preventing a war is not necessarily identical with the kind of commitment which would be required from them, and from Iran, to achieve a comprehensive negotiated settlement.
•  Are Iran’s Six Interlocutors on the Same Page?  So far, it doesn’t look like it. US-Israel shuttle diplomacy and the wave of bilaterals held by China and Russia with Iran the last two months suggest that none of the P5+1 wants a war with Iran. But it is far less clear that the U.S., the U.K., France, and Germany are on the same page about what a roadmap for a negotiation would look like and about what opening gambit they would present in any negotiation with Iran about the kind of ”comprehensive solution” which the EU’s last letter to Iranian leaders seems to imply would be the endgame. To say nothing about differences between the Western powers and Russia which have emerged in response to the Lavrov proposal back in mid-2011.
• What endgame do the players want?  That’s not clear either. Regardless of what Ashton’s October letter to Iran says is the desired outcome, at least a few important people in Washington will tell you they would prefer regime change to a negotiated solution. Likewise, in the trenches you will sometimes hear the view that the U.S. should go into any negotiation with Iran aiming for a 2003 Libya-type outcome–where Iran gives up its nuclear assets. My understanding is that Iran would never agree to that. On the basis of the Ashton letter, and the things in the Lavrov proposal which Western officials say they liked, I’m assuming instead that a negotiated solution would imply that the parties basically agree that, at the end of the day, the Islamic Republic of Iran 1.) would have a nuclear energy program under IAEA safeguards including the Additional Protocol, 2.) would retain some nuclear assets which support a cliff-edge nuclear weapons capability, 3.) would be enriching uranium, 4.) would not be subject to international sanctions, and 5.) would benefit from an imprimatur from the IAEA (“broader conclusion”) following from implementation of the AP, expressing  the IAEA’s confidence that Iran’s nuclear activities are exclusively dedicated to peaceful use. But is everybody who matters on board with this?
• Role of  top-level decision makers in the U.S. administration. After doing the rounds in Washington a  month ago, I take it as given that some key players are clearly not enthusiastic about launching any ambitious diplomatic initiatives with Iran at the present time. There will be no U.S. move in this direction unless some very senior officials in key U.S. agencies–at or just below the secretary level–take the initiative and assume the political risk. But is that going to happen in 2012?
• Iran’s obligation to suspend enrichment is at the crux of any negotiation toward a settlement. When Lavrov floated his Iran roadmap last year, Western states didn’t like the provision permitting Iran to resume enrichment and the heavy water (a.k.a. plutonium production-related) activities after suspending these activities for just three months. Were something like the Russian plan to go forward in the future, Western states would want Iran to demonstrate its credibility over a far longer period before the suspension obligation under UNSCR would be lifted. What’s more, some Western states would likely want the UNSC, where they have veto power–and not the IAEA, where they don’t–to be the ultimate arbiter of when and on what terms sanctions against Iran would be lifted. That would be a bitter pill for Iran to swallow.
•  The IAEA November report moved the goal post. When the IAEA put out its report on Iran’s nuclear weapons-related activities in November, there was a lot of fretting on the sidelines about the wisdom and indeed, the legality, of the IAEA having done that (during the IAEA board meeting the governors witnessed what sounded over my cell phone like  the Russian diplomatic equivalent of a hissy fit over this). But in fact, three months later it would seem that the IAEA report has re-framed the debate: We might argue about whether Iran is doing weaponization work now, but in the wake of the IAEA report there are not a lot of people out there who express doubt that Iran since 1989 has done work putting them on the cusp of a nuclear weapons capability. The IAEA report appears consistent with the view that in 2003, Iran took a high-level decision to suspend activities which could have only a nuclear weapons rationale, but also to continue with those dual-use activities which in theory could be explained, if they were to be exposed, by a peaceful application. So does the IAEA report imply that the 2007 U.S. NIE on Iran is now out of date? Nope.
• Lack of trust remains the biggest impediment to a negotiation. In May, 2010, Turkey, Iran, and Brazil negotiated the Tehran Declaration. The U.S. found the result wanting on two main points: there was no agreement by Iran not to enrich uranium to 20% U-235, and no legal assurances that Iran’s LEU would be taken out of the country as agreed. So the U.S. then had a choice to make: Renegotiate that deal with Iran to cover those two points, or instead scuttle it and impose UNSC sanctions. The U.S. chose sanctions over a renegotiation. Why? Two main reasons: They prior to this effectively squared the circle and persuaded Russia and China to agree to sanctions, and they concluded that Iran never intended to implement the Tehran Declaration in the first place but instead aimed to dodge imminent UNSC penalties. The U.S. might make that same choice again. To be sure, China and Russia haven’t agreed to further sanctions, but the U.S. has probably less confidence now than it did in 2010 that Iran’s leadership, having marginalized or eliminated moderate voices, is serious about negotiating a comprehensive solution.
• Why is the West confident sanctions will work? There is certainly evidence that the sanctions regime so far has hurt Iran’s economy but little to show that the sanctions would compel Iran to comply with UNSC resolutions. So what are the possible rationales for the West imposing new and more severe sanctions on Iran, as the West plans? Two possibilities come to mind: 1.) As diplomats suggested at the Brussels EU meeting, sanctions are prompted by the need of the nonproliferation regime to be credible. 2.) There is also the possibility that Western governments have information from people on the ground in Iran which provides them high confidence that imposition of draconian sanctions against Iran’s oil economy and central bank will result in political changes inside Iran, either because Iran’s hardline leaders fear a wave of popular opposition, or because they are confident that the new sanctions will prompt opposition forces in Iran to take matters into their own hands. Does the U.S. and its allies have such information? They’re not telling.
• A new Turkish-Brazilian thrust? Since last fall some people in Vienna will tell you they want to see a restart of an intermediated negotiation with Iran. Mostly you hear about Turkey but sometimes also Brazil. For sure, some Turkish diplomats have in recent weeks been keen, even premature, in saluting what looked like a restart of diplomacy based on an Iranian reply to the Ashton letter. But at the working level, both Turkey and Brazil in 2010 experienced first hand the difficulties of negotiating with Iran. Back then Turkey had a policy of “no problems with its neighbors.” They have problems now, including with Iran’s ally Syria. Brazil’s decision in 2010 to negotiate the Tehran Declaration was a presidential decision. Brazil’s current president might have a different appreciation of the cost and benefit of such an approach.

By now, you have undoubtedly seen press reports claiming that North Korea may have conducted a pair of clandestine nuclear tests in April and May 2010.  The reports are based on a forthcoming paper by a well-known Swedish radiochemist, Lars-Erik De Geer.

I don’t buy it. At least not yet.

Look, I would be the first person to jump at the possibility that the CTBTO’s IMS detected a well-hidden nuclear test. I am one of the few cranks out there who believes the  DPRK may explore boosted fission weapons, which De Geer believes accounts for the pair of alleged tests.  But, as I told Nature’s Geoff Brumfiel, the paper  ”doesn’t feel right to me.” (Science & Global Security has made available an advance copy to me; the issue will be published in March.)

What follows is my best accounting of what I see as some methodological problems with a very interesting, but ultimately unpersuasive paper.

Let’s get a bunch of stuff out of the way first. De Geer is a well-respected Swedish radiochemist with strong ties to the CTBTO.  He’s also a pretty nice guy and has been generous in sharing a bunch of radiochemistry on the Chinese atmospheric nuclear testing program with me.  He’s not a bad sort, even if there are a lot of people in Vienna wondering why he just published this paper without workshopping it a bit at the VIC.

The paper was also peer-reviewed.  Although I believe some of the problems I will outline ought to have been raised in peer review, it seems plausible that one or more peer-reviewers were so focused on the very difficult radiochemistry calculations that they didn’t step back and think about the paper in context.  I don’t know anything about radiochemistry, so it’s easy for me to think about the paper in context.  That’s all I have.

Questionable Methodology

My concerns about the paper are simple to explain.  The paper relies on radionuclide monitoring to detect a nuclear explosion, but the general view among experts has been that radionuclide monitoring is imprecise enough that it should only be used to screen events. So, for example, if there is a seismic event, then the presence of xenon or other fission products might help persuade states to seek a special inspection.  But it doesn’t work the other way around. That is why, for example, the South Korean government cited the lack of seismic activity as a reason to dismiss the xenon measurements when they were initially reported in 2010.

De Geer revisited the 2010 debate and found two interesting sorts of data: xenon measurements at a national radionuclide monitoring site near Geojin (South Korea) and an IMS site near Takasaki (Japan) and barium/lanthanum measurements at CTBTO IMS sites near Usurriysk in Russia and Okinawa in Japan.  (Only lanthanum was detected at Ussuriysk.)  All these measurements occurred between 13-18 May 2010.

De Geer, in general terms, makes two arguments — one relating to analysis of xenon isotope ratios at Geojin and Takasaki, the other relating to the presence of fission products barium/lanthanum at Ussuriysk and Okinawa.

My understanding, based on conversations with radiochemists and a review of the pertinent literature, is that the backgrounds for xenon releases are so bad (and getting worse) that atmospheric mixing essentially eliminates the possibility of using isotopic ratios to
discriminate among xenon sources. Japan and South Korea have large numbers of nuclear reactors.  The background should be quite poor. Even the most encouraging results — studies in 2006 and 2010 that list Martin Kalinowski as the lead author — indicate that it is not possible to discriminate xenon from a explosion against that from a load of fresh fuel that has been exposed for only a few days.  As we will see, there is a plausible scenario for a fresh fuel load at the same time.

I am also uncomfortable with how De Geer approached the task of modeling the xenon ratios.  De Geer clearly modeled a hypothesis of a single test — but the isotopic ratios indicated rejection of his hypothesis.  So he then postulated a second test, placed it in the same chamber to explain the unusual xenon ratio, and adjusted the time between tests to produce the correct xenon cocktail for release.

There is no a priori reason to assume North Korea would conduct a pair of tests separated by a month in the same chamber – previous DPRK tests branched off a main tunnel into separate chambers —  other than that just happens to fit the data.  As one colleague noted, this is rather less like Occam’s Razor than Occam’s Toothbrush.

Finally, De Geer places enormous confidence in atmospheric transport modeling – using weather data to infer the location and source term of the radionuclides.   De Geer was a coauthor on a paper claiming that the CTBTO station in Yellowknife, Canada, had detected xenon from the 2006 DPRK test.  There is some discussion within the technical community about whether it is possible to exclude other sources, including the relatively nearby medical isotope production center at Chalk River. (There are many sources of xenon, including routine reactor operations and the  production of medical isotopes.  Chalk River is a massive producer of medical isotopes and some experts think the xenon detected at Yellowknife might have been from the 2006 DPRK test, Chalk River or some combination of both.)

De Geer’s observation that the station at Okinawa detected the fission product barium is intriguing.  (Lanthanum alone is not — a spike in Germany in 2004 turned out to be from a military contamination exercise.)  Taken together the barium/lanthanum readings at Okinawa and Ussuriysk  do seem to indicate fission.

If the reading at Okinawa is not a false positive, then something interesting happened.  That appears to be one reason why Frank von Hippel, who is quoted skeptically in the Nature article, notes that there must have been some sort of fission explosion.

Modeling Alternative Hypotheses

My colleague Ferenc Dalnoki-Veress and I are currently working to formulate and test a series of these alternate hypotheses.  The most promising candidate so far is Japan’s fast breeder reactor at Monju, which began operations with a fresh load of fuel on May 6.  Shortly thereafter, on Thursday and Friday, there were a number of alarms — reports differ about how many and what type — that seem to indicate problems with the fuel and leaks of radioactive gas.

Japanese authorities reassured the public that these were false alarms, but perhaps they were mistaken.  Monju suffered a serious accident in 1994 that Japanese officials attempted to cover up.  The resulting scandal kept Monju shuttered for fifteen years — until May 6, 2010.  The pressure on certain Japanese officials not to admit further problems must have been immense.  As it was, Japanese officials delayed announcing the false alarms and were issued a verbal reprimand.  What if the alarms weren’t false?

I am not saying this is what happened.  Ferenc and I are going to model this and other scenarios.  Perhaps, at the end of everything, a DPRK test will still be the most likely source.  But the existence of a plausible scenario that would be very difficult to distinguish from a nuclear explosion — a fresh load of unusual fuel exposed for only a few days — that was not examined in De Geer’s paper suggests that perhaps it would have been best to delay publication.

Ferenc and I are going to start churning through a series of questions.  Once the paper is released, you are invited to participate! Our work  is focusing on three questions:

1.  Modeling a series of leaks from Monju that might account for the fission products and the xenon, as well as continuing to develop other plausible hypotheses such as radioisotope production at the DPRK’s IRT-2000 reactor.

2. Attempting to recreate De Geer’s atmospheric transport model with different software and data packages to try and gauge the uncertainty in the modeling.

3. Determining how much freedom De Geer permitted himself by allowing two tests in a single chamber separated by a month.  With tests separated by anywhere from 1 day to 1 year, is there any xenon outcome one couldn’t engineer?

The overall goal is to try to assign some sort of confidence judgement for the hypothesis of a pair of DPRK tests in a single chamber, relative to other explanations.  Nuclear testing may turn out to be the most likely explanation.  But  policy-types should not take this at face value just yet.

Why Didn’t the USG Reach the Same Conclusion?

I should say, in closing, that I am also worried about publication bias.  Shortly after the xenon detection at Geojin, the ROK dismissed the possibility of a North Korean test on the basis of a lack of any seismic data.  The  United States looked into the issue as well and also dismissed a North Korean test, though on what grounds I do not know. Of course, no one publishes negative results and, in this case, there is good reason official inquiries were conducted on a classified basis.  Still, I would like to understand why other competent radiochemists reached a different conclusion than De Geer.  Perhaps De Geer’s work is better, but perhaps it is also simply an artifact of his very carefully engineered scenario and choice of modeling tools.

As a policy analyst, rather than a technical expert, I can’t referee debates about atmospheric transport modeling or the analysis of xenon isotope ratios.  But a policy analyst should be sensitive to areas where technical experts disagree about the confidence of certain tools and models.   We can observe that there are significant uncertainties in the data and tools brought to bear on this problem.  De Geer concludes “The probability … that a low-yield underground nuclear explosion was carried out on 11 May 2010, or possibly, the day before, is significant.”  I think our task now is to ask “Significant compared to what?”

Sorry to poor Josh Pollack for my stealing of his inspired image choice when this controversy first appeared in 2010.

The Obama administration has now expressed its support for a Code of Conduct for responsible space-faring nations, picking up where the Outer Space Treaty left off. The primary purposes of a Code of Conduct are to affirm norms to mitigate debris, help establish traffic-management procedures and increase safety for space operations. The European Union and the governments of Japan, Canada, and Australia have already expressed support for an initiative along these lines.

With the Obama administration’s declaration of intent, debate over a Code of Conduct has become sharper. It is hard to make the case against strengthening norms for responsible behavior in space, but the outlines of domestic and international criticism are now evident. One set of arguments finds the Code of Conduct lacking because it is insufficient. In this view, the Obama administration should focus on a treaty that bans weapons and warfare in space. This critique is voiced most strongly by Moscow, Beijing, and by some U.S. analysts who note that space-warfare capabilities are advancing, especially those inherent in U.S. theater missile defense systems.

These arguments are weak for several reasons. A treaty banning weapons that can be used in space is neither feasible nor verifiable, since many essential, multi-purpose military capabilities can be used to interfere with, disable, or destroy objects in space. Some of these capabilities, such as land- and sea-based ballistic missiles, have existed for over half a century. Their number has declined greatly, but they are not going to be eliminated any time in the foreseeable future.

Other capabilities that could be applied to space warfare, including theater missile defense interceptors, are growing in number. Concerns that hundreds of TMD interceptors could be used as KE-ASATs are over the top: the use of only a few of them would produce destructive pin-ball ASAT effects by means of debris fragments. China demonstrated this folly in 2007. Adherence to a space Code of Conduct would effectively end this particular practice. It would not, however, end BMD testing that avoids the creation of undesirable debris fields.

Banning all military capabilities that can be directed against satellites isn’t feasible. Banning weapon systems “dedicated” to the ASAT mission isn’t consequential, because so many technologies and weapon systems could be used as potential ASATs. Russia and China have proposed a treaty that adopts an Alice-in-Wonderland approach by banning “any device placed in outer space, based on any physical principle, specially produced or converted to eliminate, damage or disrupt normal function of objects.” This definition is both too narrow and broad at one at the same time – a rare feat. It does, however, have the virtue of clarifying how difficult it is to define and ban space weapons.

No agreement can foreclose wars of aggression or lesser forms of deliberate mischief making in space. But a Code of Conduct can clarify wrongdoing and facilitate corrective responses, while setting norms that reduce the likelihood of devastating accidents and grave miscalculations.

Beijing and Moscow are ramping up their space warfare capabilities as they call for a treaty that they know won’t be negotiated. The Pentagon is not sitting still, either. The relevant choice before us is whether to set norms for responsible behavior by major space-faring nations, or to maximize flexibility to engage in space warfare.

Some critics in the United States oppose a Code of Conduct because it seems too much like a treaty that could impede U.S. war fighting in space. For example, Dean Cheng and Baker Spring at the Heritage Foundation argue that a Code of Conduct would jeopardize the U.S. ability to engage in testing of both space weapons and space combat doctrines. In their view, a Code of Conduct would diminish American security without creating widely accepted norms. John Bolton has echoed this line, calling the pursuit of a Code of Conduct “mindless.”

These critiques dwell on potential rule breakers, especially China. If, as critics assert, a Code of Conduct would not be helpful for norm setting, how would its rejection improve the conduct that they find most objectionable in others? An analogous argument could be made against highway traffic regulations. There are speeding limits and other rules to promote highway safety, but not everyone abides by them. Would we be safer by dispensing with traffic regulations?

To be sure, rule breaking in space can be far more consequential than anarchy on the highways. As a practical matter, if China and Russia play by their own rules, the United States will, as well. A Code of Conduct will fall short unless it includes the three most important space-faring nations. India, a rising space power, also has a rare opportunity to get off the sidelines and to help shape and join this compact.

Another argument used against the Code is that it is unnecessary because it is superfluous. If, indeed, a Code of Conduct would merely reaffirm what is widely acknowledged as responsible behavior, why oppose it? In actuality, an effective Code of Conduct would both reaffirm some existing norms, such as debris mitigation, while extending them to the realm of space traffic management.

Yet another argument against the Code is that it does not impose severe penalties or sanctions for misbehavior. Critics fail to clarify how their desire to impose penalties or sanctions can be advanced by opposing a Code of Conduct. Without rules, there are no rule breakers.

Some critics worry that a Code could lull the United States into a false sense of security when China is increasing its military capabilities in space, on land and at sea – especially China’s growing sea-denial capabilities against the U.S. Pacific Fleet. These concerns were also expressed in the 1970s, when the Soviet Union placed satellites in orbit that could sometimes track U.S. surface combatants.

Back then, Washington and Moscow tested anti-satellite weapons infrequently before shelving them. During the Cold War, the notion of protecting surface navies by preemptively attacking satellites was widely dismissed as being extremely dangerous, especially because satellites were intertwined with the nuclear deterrents of both superpowers.

Yet another argument against the Code is that it should not take the form of an executive agreement, thereby avoiding the Senate’s powers of advice and consent. This ignores considerable precedent, including the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement, the 1989 Dangerous Military Practices Agreement and the 2002 Hague Code of Conduct, which established comparable practices for operations at sea, on the ground, in the air, and related to ballistic missiles. These executive agreements were negotiated during the presidencies of Richard Nixon, George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush.

With one Cold War receding in the rear-view mirror, it makes little sense to invite a new one, if it can be avoided. The United States and China have the ability to interfere with or destroy satellites. As was the case with the Soviet Union, mutual capabilities to engage in space warfare constitute a basis for restraint and deterrence. This reality will exist with or without a Code of Conduct. This reality also makes a Code of Conduct all the more essential to affirm responsible behavior and to facilitate appropriate responses if others act irresponsibly.

Domestic critics of a space Code of Conduct from the Left want an ambitious new treaty that cannot be scoped properly, is not verifiable, and is unacceptable to the US Senate. Critics from the Right want maximum flexibility to develop and use space warfare capabilities. Their approach was tried during the Bush administration during which there was ASAT testing, a satellite collision, and a huge increase in the space debris population. Critics from the Left and the Right have not made a persuasive case against the Code of Conduct. Nor have they offered a better alternative.

An example of Nixon’s insularity and Kissinger’s stroking methods occurred on April 23, 1971, when Nixon met with Kissinger and Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman to get up to speed on the SALT negotiations. Kissinger buoyed Nixon with his assessment that the Soviets, “to all practical purposes, [have] given in on this SALT thing… they have yielded 98 percent. They’ve practically accepted our position on the SALT.” Over the next thirteen months, with the Pentagon and Hawks on Capitol Hill like Senator Scoop Jackson raising alarms against the impending deals, Kissinger shifted his argument, railing against weaklings in the executive branch and Doves on Capitol Hill for undermining US leverage in the negotiations.

Both Machiavellis wound up outfoxing themselves more than the Kremlin in these negotiations. Kissinger’s use of a back-channel to Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin to circumvent the interagency team led by Ambassador Gerard Smith caused repeated perturbations. Soviet negotiators, who were clued into the back-channel, periodically attempted to use this inside information for advantage. Kissinger and Nixon often fulminated about the consequences of their own tactics. Take, for example, their conversation on March 11, 1971:

That son-of-bitch [Dobrynin] is just taking your letter [Nixon to Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers Alexei Kosygin dated February 17, 1971] without telling Smith he’s got it, and feeling out whether Smith is willing to give more.

Domestic subterfuge can be forgiven if absolutely necessary in the pursuit of clearly advantageous outcomes. In this case, subterfuge and duplicity did not produce better outcomes and contributed to a significant domestic backlash against SALT just two years after the Congress voted near-unanimously to support these accords.

Nixon is in charge at high-level interagency meetings in which he adheres to his talking points, follows a set agenda, and is in a listening mode. He also demonstrates a sure grasp of the politics of SALT. But on matters of substance, Nixon occasionally appears tentative and sometimes befuddled in private meetings with Kissinger.

For example, the last big unresolved issue in the Interim Agreement was whether to include SLBMs and how to deal with older Soviet subs. Here’s a conversation between Nixon and Kissinger on March 31, 1972, less than two months before the Moscow summit:

Kissinger: You know, with [Secretary of State William] Rogers – Rogers said to him [Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin], ‘We want SLBMs in SALT, one way or the other.’ So, Dobrynin asked him, ‘Well, what do you mean?’ Rogers said, ‘Well, I don’t know any details. ‘I’m just telling you.’ And—

Nixon: That’s the trouble—

Kissinger: That—

Nixon: Dobrynin does know the details.

Kissinger: And Dobrynin does know the details, because I had told him our position [short break]

Nixon: I am inclined to think that the SLBMs shouldn’t be included…

Kissinger: Well, no, we’ll get them – no, we’ll get them included now.

Nixon: Do we want them included?

Kissinger: Frankly, I don’t think we do, but I – but we – I don’t see how we can go against the [Joint] Chiefs of Staff.

Between them, Nixon and Kissinger owned the franchise of books offering sage advice about international relations, but they made many questionable calls in these negotiations. Take, for example, a memo on July 13, 1970, sent by Kissinger to Nixon titled, “Implications of a Limited SALT Agreement,” in which he discussed how an interim agreement and an ABM deal might play out:

With the Soviet ABM limited, we would run into increasing pressure to curtail or terminate our MIRV programs. On the other hand, we would be largely relieved of the most immediate concerns of the most immediate concerns over Soviet capabilities for a neutralizing strike against Minuteman silos, and gain some time to adjust our posture…

Unlike the [1963] test ban treaty which served as a trigger for substantial increases in certain military programs, a SALT agreement is likely to add momentum to the general shift in priorities from military to civilian programs

These projections proved to be entirely wrong.

In their defense, Nixon and Kissinger were caught in a bind. Soviet strategic modernization programs were ongoing during these negotiations; US counters were in the offing. The Nixon administration did not entertain the option of deep cuts as a counter to the Soviet missile build up. It did consider ACDA’s “Stop Where We Are” proposals, but these were opposed by the Pentagon and deemed strategically unwise and politically unacceptable by the White House. US negotiating options were crafted before the Intelligence Community began to fully appreciate the extent of the Soviet missile buildup.

Nixon and Kissinger were not clear at the outset of SALT what outcomes they were angling for. Nor were they able to align negotiating ends and diplomatic means when, beginning in 1971, the Pentagon began to raise increasingly trenchant warnings about this mismatch. Nixon and Kissinger weren’t about to consider major changes in US proposals at this point, which would have meant sacrificing SALT before the elections. Instead, they kept existing options in play until the prospect of the Moscow summit loomed.

One cardinal rule of diplomacy is not to negotiate against a deadline, especially without your negotiating team and your own translators. But Nixon and Kissinger could not resist closing historic deals in Moscow while members of the US SALT delegation were cooling their heels in Helsinki. The outlines of this story have been well told, but the devil, as Paul Nitze liked to say, is in the details. There are many damning details in this volume.

The SALT I negotiations were a train wreck of confusion, duplicity, mismanagement and mis-steps that nonetheless resulted in historic accomplishments – the first compacts between two ideological foes to impose guidelines on their strategic arms competition. The ABM Treaty, now widely reviled in Republican circles, was a significant achievement. The Congress and American taxpayers would not support efforts to erect a nation-wide defense against Soviet missiles, and industry was incapable of delivering an effective product, regardless of cost. After wandering all over the map on missile defenses during the negotiations, Nixon reluctantly accepted these facts and removed one driver for the arms race.

Other drivers remained, and were unimpeded by the SALT I Interim Agreement. The nuclear arms race was extraordinarily hard to tame in the early ‘70s. The Nixon administration couldn’t do without MIRVs, and Moscow couldn’t do without its strategic modernization programs. The issues under negotiation were too complex, the negotiators were starting from scratch, and very powerful constituencies were distrustful of any result and well positioned to limit the limits. The Interim Agreement was deeply imperfect, but it laid the groundwork for better results over time.

How, then, you might well ask, could such a defective US negotiating process still result in historic agreements? To paraphrase the Jack Nicholson character in “A Few Good Men,” if you can’t handle irony and paradox when it comes to the Bomb, you can’t handle the truth.

There was an overflow crowd. It was a rare treat to see a classroom’s worth of middies in attendance — plus, if my eyes did not deceive me, one or two cadets.

For those who couldn’t make it, the video is now online. The whole thing runs just under an hour and a half, including the Q&A. See if you can’t spot the cameo appearance by Pollack the Elder!

Update | Jan. 25. Global Security Newswire’s Rachel Oswald has covered the event. Some highlights on the policy front:

Any serious suspicions by other governments that New Delhi conducted nuclear weapons technology deals with the Khan ring could negatively impact India’s chances of concluding new atomic trade agreements with nations such as Japan and Australia or winning membership to the exclusive Nuclear Suppliers Group, [Pollack] asserted….

Indian purchases of nuclear weapons technology on the black market would not necessarily constitute a breach of any international commitments, Pollack said. New Delhi is not a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and is still in the midst of an effort to join several other arms control regimes.

India’s reputation as country that does not engage in nuclear proliferation has been central to its negotiation of civilian atomic cooperation pacts with foreign governments that would otherwise have balked at trading with a nuclear-armed state that has not signed the NPT accord.

Should Japan or Australia put credence in the suspicions that India was Khan’s fourth customer, it could make the two countries — both strong proponents of nuclear nonproliferation — think twice about signing atomic pacts with India, Pollack said at the Carnegie event.

Tokyo and New Delhi are presently in advance negotiations for a trade accord that would allow Japanese civilian atomic technology to be exported to India (see GSN, Oct, 31, 2011). A key obstacle to date to the conclusion of a trade deal has been Japanese nonproliferation concerns.

In December, Australia’s ruling party decided to permit uranium export negotiations with India, a controversial decision that ended a decades-long Labor Party policy. In making the case for the reversal, the Australian government compared India’s sterling nonproliferation reputation to that of Pakistan (see GSN, Dec. 6, 2011).

It would be difficult for Canberra to uphold that distinction should it conclude that India was on the other side of some Khan network transactions, Pollack said. “Maybe the Australians should rethink their rationale.”

New Delhi is also seeking entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group, an elite 46-nation export control organization that promotes nonproliferation standards for atomic trade by all members (see GSN, July 18, 2011).

“If India has plants full of stolen centrifuge technology that it is not acknowledging, then that’s embarrassing” for the Nuclear Suppliers Group’s reputation, Pollack said, adding that the organization wants candidate countries to be “like-minded.”

He said the Indian Atomic Energy Department could put to rest suspicions of improper dealings with the Khan network by providing “credible disclosures about the origins of the uranium enrichment technology, if they care to deny it that is.”

“That’s what I’d like to see — some sort of representation from the Indians,” Pollack continued.

For an explanation of what I mean about the Australian rationale for dealing with India’s nuclear program but not Pakistan’s, see Defense Minister Stephen Smith’s remarks of December 8, 2011. In particular:

Pakistan does not have the same record [as India] so far as proliferation is concerned. There have been serious expressions of concern about proliferation in the past.

Indeed. But there is now, at a minimum, a cloud over the idea that India’s proliferation record is impeccable (setting aside the matter of CIRUS, of course).

One reason that Japan ought to be concerned about India’s potential connection to the Khan network is A.Q. Khan’s record in Japan. For decades, a Japanese trading company played an important role in supplying his network by acting as a straw buyer. Ring magnets, maraging steel, machine tools, and other supplies from Japan flowed into the network. Where did they all end up? Are any in India? If I were in the Japanese government, I would be acutely curious.

When discussing India’s bid for NSG membership, what was in the back of my mind was the American “food for thought” memorandum circulated to NSG member states last May. As it says:

Our interest in permitting the full membership of countries that have demonstrated responsible nonproliferation and export control practices and the ability and willingness to contribute substantially to global nonproliferation objectives is already reflected in the factors for consideration. Specifically, we refer to:

– “Be supportive of international efforts towards the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles,” and

– “Have in force a legally-based domestic export control system which gives effect to the commitment to act in accordance with the [NSG] guidelines.”

[snip]

…The factors for consideration… that address a candidate’s obligation to have made a legally binding non-proliferation commitment, and have the ability to supply NSG-listed items stem from the group’s desire for “like-minded” partners. Given the exchange of highly sensitive technical data, commercial information, and frankness of the work of the NSG, the group wanted to ensure that the issue of participation in the NSG was focused on candidates that shared the same goals and commitments to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Food for thought, indeed.

Update | Jan. 26. A transcript of the event has become available.

Also, now that I’ve repaired the graphics in my slide presentation, you can view it here.

A few words about the pictures. Slide 31 shows just a label. But you can find the entire graphic in this ISIS report from 2008.

Slide 32 shows a table from this 2010 IPFM blog post. What I’d planned to say about it was roughly this: In recent years, Srikumar Banerjee, who was then the Director of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) and is now chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission of India (AECI), has made occasional remarks about the Indian centrifuge program. Based on these remarks, Alexander Glaser, Zia Mian, and MV Ramana of IPFM compared the pattern of India’s centrifuge development to that of Pakistan, which has been based on four different early URENCO designs.

This just goes to show you that my ideas about India as Khan’s fourth customer are perhaps neither quite so original nor quite so outré as some may imagine. On the other hand, it’s possible to read too much into Glaser et al.’s comparison. As I stated at this point during the presentation, India’s centrifuge program was indigenous in origin. Along the way, it appears to have incorporated foreign-origin design information and equipment. But it does not necessarily involve any exact copies of foreign centrifuge designs. Both the differences between the G-2 and the centrifuge design of ca. 2006 and the need to modify the UF6-resistant flow meters (see slide 23) suggest as much.

Lastly, I should provide credit for the nice image on the final slide, which I used as punctuation. This is a detail from the article illustration by Jeremy Enecio. It comes from his blog.

Update | Jan. 31. Carnegie has posted a nicely formatted transcript.

Both Toby and I raised a similar question about the possibility of politics in North Korea, which I thought might temper ever so slightly Pollack’s stark but ultimately compelling conclusion.  You can read the reviews, as well as Pollack’s response.

For the purposes of a blog post, I wanted to pick up on a question posed by Pollack to illustrate why politics might matter.

Then I want to share a picture of Kim Jong Un wedged into tank.

In his response to the essays, Pollack notes that “There has been very little commentary in the immediate post–Kim Jongil period on the nuclear weapons program …”

Although Pollack is primarily interested in what drives the DPRK to possess nuclear armaments, I’ve been wondering about the impact of the post-Kim Jong-il period on what’s been called “onward proliferation.”

I wrote  a short op-ed for Kydodo News on this very topic, which also came up at a meeting I attended recently.   And, while Kim Jong-il was still alive and kicking, Joshua Pollack — Jonathan’s son – considered carefully the question of why North Korea sells what it does to whom for the excellent blog, 38 North.

In the United States, politicians openly compete, often using specific policies to distinguish themselves from their opponents. A perfect example is Mitt Romney’s sudden hostility to the use of a mandate to expand access to health care.  If President Obama is for something, chances are that Republicans need to be against it.  It works the other way too, of course.  Contrast is such a good thing that candidates may actually exaggerate their degree of disagreement, despite the fact that Robert Gates could quite comfortably serve both George W. Bush and Barack Obama.

In North Korea, competition is not open and, as far as I can surmise, concerns competing patronage networks more than ideological groups.  This is not an unusual state of affairs.  Political parties in  the United States used to be more ideologically heterogenous, or so I am told,  especially in the machine politics that dominated urban areas.  Even today, the role of interest groups preserves some ideological heterogeneity within political parties and the political beliefs of one’s parents remain an excellent predictor of partisan affiliation.

Proliferation in North Korea, as far as I can tell, is a family affair conducted by one of these patronage networks.  This blog has taken a special interest in one Jon Byong-ho and his son-in-law (maybe) Yun Ho-jin, who Josh Pollack described as the “dynamic duo” of North Korean proliferation.  It was Jon who is alleged to have written that letter to AQ Khan.  And it is Yun who seemed to be in charge of procurement for North Korea and its clients. These two characters, along with a few others, appear responsible for many of North Korea’s more objectionable activities involving ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons.

Jon is also a senior figure in the DPRK regime, among the ten most influential North Koreans, as far as DPRK-watchers can infer from issues of protocol, including pictures of who gets to stand with Kim Jong Un, committee memberships and laundry lists like the  funeral committee for Kim Jong Il.  North Korea’s proliferation activities are more likely structured to support Jon’s machinations in Pyongyang, not the other way around.  Whether Jon sees proliferation as a source of hard currency to buy influence or strategic technology to impress fellow hawks, or both, is difficult to say.

That makes it very difficult to imagine how the  leadership transition could affect proliferation.  At least two sources (one , two) describe Jon as an ideological conservative, especially compared to someone like Chang Song-taek. (By the way, I know my Romanization of Korean names is inconsistent and am open to suggestions about fixing that.)  Chang may emerge as a sort of regent being married, as he is, to Kim Jong-il’s sister.  But Jon, too, is reportedly cl0se to the Kim family and is a part of the so-called “1980 Group” that rose to power with Kim Jong-il.  Whether Chang and Jon will act as allies or enemies is not clear to me — and, in North Korea’s opaque system, it may not be entirely clear to them, either.    There are people who follow such things very closely who certainly will have plausible answers to such questions, but I think it is important to understand that the internal politics of an authoritarian system are almost certainly opaque to the participants, as well as the outside world.  There will be an inevitably jockeying for influence in North Korea, even if only within the context of the preservation of the Kim regime. But many will play their cards close to vest.  We should not expect to do better than the participants in handicapping the horse-race.

North Korea’s approach to proliferation, therefore, may be determined by factors that we simply cannot see and that are, to a first approximation, not “strategic” in any geopolitical sense.   We can not predict them, I suspect, based on a “rational” model that places international interests ahead of domestic ones.

It is perhaps the case that better informed North Korea watchers could do much to answer some of the questions sketched here.  They are certainly invited to do so.

***

Ok, enough of the intellectually heavy stuff.  Let’s look at a pictures of Kim Jong-un wedged into tank.

“Yo, I am stuck.  If you don’t get me out of here, I am going to open a can of juche on your asses.”

There is also, I have been told, a picture of him wedged into a fighter jet — but the images released from his only visit to a KPA Air Force Unit that I could find didn’t deliver.  There is, however, a picture of him looking at a giant fish.

“Yo, what are the rest of you guys gonna eat? Just kidding with you.  It’s all good.”

Personality matters in the politics of the subcontinent, as personality shapes ambition and policy preference. The personalities that matter most are India’s Prime Minister and Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff.

Prime Ministers Lal Bahadur Shastri and Morarji Desai were disinclined to advance India’s nuclear weapon programs, as was Vikram Sarabhai, the head of India’s Atomic Energy Commission. Their successors thought differently about the Bomb, and India now has a nuclear deterrent. A civilian, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, jump-started Pakistan’s nuclear weapon programs after Pakistan’s disastrous 1971 war with India. After his demise, Pakistani decision-making relating to the bomb has been the province of the Army Chief and a few, trusted advisors.

In the world’s largest democracy, decisions on national security also rest on very few shoulders. As V.R. Raghavan has written in the Nonproliferation Review, there has been a shift in Indian decision making “from a collegial and consensus-based process to decisions arrived at by a small group of individuals based in the prime minister’s office.” Partly for this reason, Kanti Bajpai has worried in Inside Nuclear South Asia that a future Indian government led by a more assertive leader of the Bharatiya Janata Party might be more inclined to resume nuclear testing or to pursue a more bellicose approach to Pakistan. A novice Congress Party leader might also seek to prove his or her mettle by being more hawkish toward Pakistan.

A surprisingly diverse group of military officers have risen to become Chiefs of Army Staff in India and Pakistan, in part because promotion to the top job is usually, but not always, based on time in service. Otherwise, it is hard to explain the elevation of the current Indian Chief of Army Staff, who has filed suit to extend his tenure. When longevity dictates promotion, personalities will vary and surprises can result. Pakistani political leaders have also been surprised when they skipped down the seniority ladder to pick Army Chiefs, as Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (Zia ul-Haq) and Nawaz Sharif (Pervez Musharraf) learned to their subsequent regret. Likewise, in a country where civil-military relations are badly skewed, it is usually unwise for Pakistani political leaders to extend active duty service for their Army Chiefs. The book of political expediency in Pakistan typically does not have happy endings.

Crises become more likely when risk-taking personalities become Army Chiefs during the tenure of weak, uncertain, or unseasoned Prime Ministers. An inexperienced Rajiv Gandhi was not paying close attention when K. Sundarji planned to carry out very large-scale, multi-staged exercises in 1986-7. Some believe that Operation Brasstacks was designed to prompt a war with Pakistan before it acquired nuclear weapons. A crisis in 1990 was also sparked in part by large-scale military exercises, this time designed by Mirza Aslam Beg at a time when two weak Prime Ministers, Benazir Bhutto and V.P. Singh, held office. The Kargil crisis was abetted by Nawaz Sharif’s disinclination to ask very hard questions of his military briefers and his inability to put the brakes on Musharraf’s plan for an audacious land grab across the Line of Control in 1999.

The late, great Indian strategic analyst, K. Subrahmanyam, wrote that “changes in Army Chiefs of Staff in Pakistan are as important as changes in heads of government.” Subrahmanyam’s reasoning remains unassailable, since effective command of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal rests in the hands of Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff.

The next combination of a weak Prime Minister and a bold Army Chief is more likely to occur in Pakistan than in India. The last Indian Army Chief slightly reminiscent of Sundarji was General S. Padmanabhan who, like Sundarji, hailed from the south, wrote fiction based on military plans, and chafed at the bit to “sort out” Pakistan. After an attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001 carried out by extremists based and trained in Pakistan, Padmanabhan was kept firmly in check by Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh appears to have been much less inclined to consider a military response after the 2008 attacks on iconic targets in Mumbai, again carried out by Pakistani extremists.

This track record does not tie the hands of a future Indian Prime Minister. But it is notable that two veteran politicians representing coalition governments across much of the Indian political spectrum have held tight reins on the Indian military despite severe provocations. These mass-casualty assaults were directed against targets that extremists within Pakistan find most objectionable — India’s secular democracy, economic growth and cosmopolitanism. The attacks backfired, steepening Pakistan’s decline while advancing India’s standing, partly because Indian Prime Ministers placed a higher priority on maintaining economic growth than on waging war with Pakistan.

As noted, New Delhi’s future restraint after severe provocations is not foreordained. If New Delhi decides to strikes back, the Indian Army Chief is unlikely to be in the driver’s seat; he will be following orders. In contrast, Pakistani Army Chiefs are disinclined to take orders from civilians, except ones they agree with.

Sad news today, as Bruno Tertrais has emailed me to say that Thérèse Delpech, doyenne of the French strategic studies community, has passed away.

The last time I saw Thérèse, my wife and I were standing at the TGV station in Avignon, trying to figure out how to purchase a ticket with a North American credit card.  (We ended up stealing the short ride to Aix.)

We found ourselves in Avignon after touring  the decommissioned French fissile material production facilities at Pierrelatte and Marcoule.  I had met Thérèse at several meetings over the years, but that trip to Provence was the first time I really understood how special she was.  I was seated at a lunch with a few French experts, including Thérèse and Bruno Tertrais.  Thérèse could be combative in meetings, so it was with a little trepidation that I sat down.  The previous time I had seen Thérèse was in Paris where she was not very impressed by some of things my traveling companions were saying about nuclear weapons. “Well, it is your deterrent,” I remember her saying, with “your deterrent” sounding exactly like “your funeral.”

Lunch turned out to be pure magic.  Thérèse enjoyed talking about wine and philosophy as much as nuclear weapons.  That lunch is one of my favorite memories, as Thérèse turned her formidable intellect to all the things I really find interesting in life.   (The wine was also excellent!)  By the end of that trip, I was completely charmed. The next thing I knew, we were all in Avignon, with Thérèse troubleshooting the TGV before bidding us farewell.

There is something strange about finding out how much you enjoy someone’s company only to never see that person again.  I noticed that, recently, Thérèse had been traveling less and was cool about committing to a conference I’ve been planning.  It never occurred to me, although it should have, that there might be a reason she was staying close to home.  Thérèse was such a presence that I simply couldn’t imagine one day she would be gone.  It would be like waking up in Paris only to see someone had taken down the Tour Eiffel.

Thérèse was a very special person.  She will be missed.

In the best lyric category, Josh Pollack’s strong preference was “Crawl Out Through The Fallout” by Sheldon Allman (1960), but nobody submitted this entry. The opening stanza:

Crawl out through the fallout, baby
When they drop that bomb
Crawl out through the fallout
With the greatest of aplomb
When your white count’s getting higher
Hurry, don’t delay
I’ll hold you close and kiss those
Radiation burns away

I am extremely partial to “Harvest for the World” by the Isley Brothers (1976). Granted, a bit on the generic side, but I’m a sucker for the lyrics, the spangled bell bottoms, and the guitar riffs. Here’s a sample lyric:

Dress me up for battle, when all I want is peace
Those of us who pay the price, come home with the least
Nation after nation, turning into beast
When will there be a harvest for the world

Again, no takers. As for the actual submissions, our panel of judges was particularly impressed by the following entries:

Anon’s choice of “The Russians,” by Sting:

How can I save my little boy
From Oppenheimer’s deadly toy?
There is no monopoly on common sense
On either side of the political fence
We share the same biology
Regardless of ideology
Believe me when I say to you
I hope the Russians love their children too

Alex W. scored highly with Weird Al’s “Christmas at Ground Zero,” perhaps in honor of the season.

Francois Heisbourg also received kudos for nominating Guy Beart’s “Le Grand Chambardement.” Josh Pollack advises readers to watch this video: “Although the audio track is a bit on the quiet side, you’ll get a sense of the almost [Tom] Lehrer-like spirit that animates the song. Jaunty rhymes juxtaposed with ghastly lyrical images. Beart’s affect is much closer to deadpan than Lehrer’s mischievous eye-gleams, though.”

The judges were partial to lyrics involving imagery of the Bomb as a burning sun. Kevin scored with the Dubliners’ “Sun is Burning.” Ditto for Diamond Dave, with Pink Floyd’s “Two Suns in the Sunset”:

The rusty wire that holds the cork
that keeps the anger in gives way
And suddenly it’s day again
The sun is in the east even though the day is done
Two suns in the sunset
Could be the human race is run

Re made the top tier with Iron Maiden’s “Brighter Than a Thousand Suns”:

Out of the universe, a strange light is born
Unholy union, trinity reformed
Yellow sun its evil twin
in the black the winds deliver him
We will sleep to souls within
At a siege a nuclear gust is riven

Amazing lyrics. Who knew that heavy metal could be so heavy? Turning to the best adapted lyric category, our panel of judges was extremely impressed by Andy’s take on Cake’s “The Distance.” Original lyrics:

Reluctantly crouched at the starting line,
engines pumping and thumping in time.
the green light flashes, the flags go up.
churning and burning, they yearn for the cup.
they deftly maneuver and muscle for rank,
fuel burning fast on an empty tank.
reckless and wild, they pour through the turns.
their prowess is potent and secretly stern.
as they speed through the finish, the flags go down.
the fans get up and they get out of town.
the arena is empty except for one man,
still driving and striving as fast as he can.
the sun has gone down and the moon has come up,
and long ago somebody left with the cup.
but he’s driving and striving and hugging the turns.
and thinking of someone for whom he still burns.
he’s going the distance.
he’s going for speed.
she’s all alone
all alone in her time of need.
because he’s racing and pacing and plotting the course,
he’s fighting and biting and riding on his horse,
he’s going the distance.

Andy’s adaptation:

The missile is crouched, the launch is on line,
the fuel is pumping and thumping in time.
the green light flashes, the rocket goes high
churning and burning, it tears through the sky.
it deftly maneuvers and muscles for rank,
Mox burning fast on an empty tank.
reckless and wild, it hits the apogee
its package is ready to spread mass agony.
as its speeds to the finish, the package heads down.
the people have no time, they can’t get out of town.
the bunker is empty except for one man,
still sitting, and thinking, his face in his hands.
the sun has gone down and the moon has come up,
humanity now just a drop in a cup.
in the bunker he watches the clock as it turns,
while thinking of someone as the city burns.
it’s going the distance.
it’s going for speed.
it’s all alone
all alone for the final deed.
because it’s racing and pacing and plotting the course,
on its way to deliver the ultimate force,
it’s going the distance.

Theo Kalionzes received very high marks for his adaptation of Bob Dylan’s “Subterranean Homesick Blues.” The original lyric:

Johnny’s in the basement
Mixing up the medicine
I’m on the pavement
Thinking about the government
The man in the trench coat
Badge out, laid off
Says he’s got a bad cough
Wants to get it paid off
Look out kid
It’s somethin’ you did
God knows when
But you’re doin’ it again
You better duck down the alley way
Lookin’ for a new friend
The man in the coon-skip cap
In the big pen
Wants eleven dollar bills
You only got ten.

Now here’s Theo’s “Subterranean Nukesick Blues”:

Yukiya’s in VIC
Mixing up the deluge
I’m on the pavement
Thinking about the centrifuge
The man in the dulband
Hands up, who me?
Ahmadinejad says its for peaceful energy
Look out kid
Its somethin’ they did
They ain’t gonna duck down the alley way
Lookin’ for a new way
Everyone knows the NAMs still an ally
The man in the White House
With the big pen
Wants eleven dollar bills
They’ve got twelve man.

Kapowski scored heavily with his adaptation of Def Leopard’s “Pour Some Sugar on Me.” The original lyric:

Love is like a bomb, baby, c’mon get it on
Livin’ like a lover with a radar phone
Lookin’ like a tramp, like a video vamp
Demolition woman, can I be your man?
Razzle ‘n’ a dazzle ‘n’ a flash a little light
Television lover, baby, go all night
Sometime, anytime, sugar me sweet
Little miss ah innocent sugar me, yeah

Kapowski’s revision:

Tryin’ to move a bomb, baby, like Abdul Q. Khan
Livin’ like a baller ’til my cover’s blown
Lookin’ like a scam, but I don’t give a damn
Sell a turnkey program to someone in Iran?
Razzle ‘n’ a dazzle in Uranium’s aglow
Better take cover, baby, it’s about to blow
Sometime, anytime, for a small fee
For all your ‘tomic needs, baby, just call me, yeah

Melissa deserves props for her adaptation of “Whatever Lola Wants”:

Whatever Jong-il wants
Jong-il gets
And little bomb, little Jong-il wants you
Make up your mind to have no regrets
Design yourself, enshrine yourself, go BOOM!
He always gets what he “aims” for
And your heart’n soul is what he came for

Lastly, Nick Ritchie’s nomination of Senator John McCain for his riff on the Beach Boys classic, “Barbara Ann” (“Bomb, bomb, bomb, bomb, bomb Iran…”) was very tough to ignore.

It’s a damn near-impossible task to pick winners, but that’s why they pay our panel of judges the big bucks. The winners are Anon with Sting and Andy with his adaptation of “The Distance.” To receive your prizes, contact me (krepon@stimson.org) with your mailing addresses and the inscriptions you would like in your books.

The stream of dual-use goods is virtually endless, and so has been the internal debate at the NSG about whether items should be listed or not. That’s even more so right now, because as I explained in this report published by Carnegie last month, the NSG has launched a comprehensive review of both its lists, and the decisions it makes about what to control and how to do it will profoundly impact how we attack procurement threats in years to come.

One of the items which is not on the NSG dual-use list is a chemical substance which Iran has been keenly and furtively trying to import since the mid-1990s. This is anhydrous hydrogen fluoride, or AHF. (The term “anhydrous” is just a fancy way of saying that hydrogen fluoride [HF], otherwise known as hydrofluoric acid, is more or less pure, having less than 400 ppm of water.)

Iran needs AHF to process UO2 into UF4 for two programs that the UN Security Council says should be suspended: uranium enrichment and the Arak heavy water reactor.

The open literature on Iran’s nuclear program contains a few misleading references asserting that back in 1985, when the U.S. and China were negotiating a bilateral civilian nuclear cooperation agreement, the U.S. believed that efforts by Iran to import AHF were a tell-tale signature of Iranian interest in reprocessing, and that China therefore agreed not to supply AHF to Iran because the NSG controlled exports of AHF.

In fact, some papers in my files, authored in 2003 by scientists from the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, spelled out for anyone who cared to know that AEOI wanted AHF for two reasons: First, to produce F2 gas by an electrolysis process, and then use the F2 to fluorinate UF4 and generate UF6; and second, to use HF to hydrofluorinate UO2 to produce UF4 (also known as green salt), which would be subsequently reduced to uranium metal in a reduction vessel. These disclosures match findings in John Garver’s recent and comprehensive tome on Sino-Iran relations, namely, that China before that had “supplied Iran with blueprints, test reports, and design information” for a UF6 production plant and a second plant to produce uranium metal. In 2005, the AEOI reported in fact that the uranium conversion plant it built at Esfahan using Chinese technology features both chemical processes. UF4 can be processed into UF6 in Building 101C, or instead into uranium metal in Building 104.

Garver points out that when the U.S. in 1997 objected to China about its plans to sell AHF to Iran, the Chinese riposted that the transaction was perfectly legal because AHF wasn’t on the NSG dual-use list. That might have been just a tad disingenuous since China at that time was not a member of the NSG anyway. But the Chinese statement was correct.

It’s also correct today. AHF is still is not on the NSG list, regardless of its critical role in UF6 production in some enrichment programs, including Iran’s. If Iran wants to use its Chinese technology to provide the F4 in UF4 or the F6 in UF6 for enrichment feedstock or uranium metal fuel, it needs the AHF.

China-Korea-Thailand-UAE-Iran

Iranian procurement agents were not deterred by assurances which China provided to the U.S. in 1998 that planned sales of AHF to Iran would be indefinitely “suspended.” Customs intelligence files of at least three Western governments testify to repeated efforts by Iran–some successful, some not–to import Chinese-origin AHF for a period of nearly 15 years. In the beginning, Iran tried to import the AHF directly from Chinese producers. As time went on, Iran added transit destinations to hoodwink export controllers.

In December 2004, while Iran was negotiating with the EU-3 over a deal to suspend its enrichment program, Iran announced that it had approved construction of its own AHF production plant, also at Esfahan–a point that stuck in the craw of EU negotiators who saw that step as a demonstration of bad faith by Iran. Until that plant was up and running, however, Iran would need to import AHF and throughout the last decade they kept trying to get their fingers on it.

Iran’s AHF production plant, with a capacity of 5,000 tons of AHF/yr, far more than what is needed to produce UF6 at current rates in Esfahan, was scheduled to be finished and working in just two years. Some intelligence information however suggested that Iran encountered delays. For whatever reason, Iran has continued to try to snag large amounts of AHF, and to disguise its efforts by organizing complex transactions involving multiple transit points. In 2008, for example, in Thailand, the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines loaded a large consignment of Chinese AHF onto a Liberian-flagged vessel bound for the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas on the Persian Gulf, with an intermediate stopover in the UAE where it would again change hands.  Before that, Iranian procurement agents had arranged for the AHF to be purchased from a Chinese producer by a Korean firm, and then forwarded to Thailand. Western customs intelligence agencies got wind of the transaction, and the AHF was intercepted in the nick of time at the Port of Dubai before it headed to Iran.

NSG List vs Catch-All Approach

So why, if AHF is a potential bottleneck in Iran’s designs to produce UF6 for its centrifuges, and Iran is going to great lengths to deceive us about its efforts to import the stuff, isn’t AHF on the NSG dual-use list?

AHF is just one of many items which could be considered nuclear dual-use and which are not routinely controlled. The way the NSG works, all 46 members must agree to put an item on a control list. In some cases, business pressure groups in key NSG states object to their governments and an item may be left off the list. (That’s why my report last month urged that the NSG closely monitor efforts by these lobbies to interfere with consensus-formation during the control list review).

There are a lot of companies making AHF, in a lot of countries worldwide. Producing it doesn’t require much if any proprietary know-how. And its nuclear use accounts for just a fraction of demand. These data from NNSA suggest that any efforts to put AHF on the NSG list would kick up a fuss, because uranium fuel processing accounts for just 3% of global use of HF. A major consumer is the petroleum industry–which would not be amused by a new requirement that AHF be subject to nuclear-use controls whenever it was sought for use in a gasoline refinery anywhere in the Middle East.

Furthermore, there’s the China factor to consider. By its own admission, the biggest producer of HF in the world is a U.S. firm, Honeywell. But according to industry market intelligence for this sector, there is now a shift underway in HF production away from advanced industrial countries. One reason for this globalization may be that making this stuff is a nasty health hazard. AHF is highly toxic and corrosive. If you breathe it in, deep in your lungs the gas precipitates to hydrofluoric acid. China presently makes HF cheaply and with comparatively little oversight and has half of the world’s fluorite reserves used to make HF. According to one market survey, “the growing tight supply of fluorite resources forced the tycoons in [the] fluorine chemical industry… to transfer the production of HF to China, and establish their plants there successfully.” (In one case, this process may have been just a little too successful: a German AHF producer last year sued its Chinese partners for secretly building 12 unauthorized AHF plants in China using the German firm’s technology.) Would China consent to tightening controls on AHF?

AHF is on the control list of the Australia Group because it is also identified as a precursor for nerve agents containing fluorine. My NSG report recommended that the NSG intensify contacts with the Australia Group and other multilateral export control arrangements in the interest of efficiency. Perhaps the CWC people have a best practice or two that would help the NSG keep AHF out of the wrong hands.

Just because AHF is not on the NSG control list, that doesn’t mean no one at the NSG is paying attention to it. Given repeated attempts by Iran to import it, AHF is on a so-called “watch list” of unlisted items which the U.S. government has provided NSG members to trigger catch-all controls for shipments to Iran.

The “watch list” is there to flag NSG members to halt exports of non-listed goods to suspicious end-users. But if Chinese-origin AHF is headed for Iran via non-NSG intermediate destinations like Thailand, it won’t be stopped if the intermediary entrepots have no catch-all controls on their books. What’s more, catch-all controls won’t be effective unless they are applied by all NSG states themselves when they are needed. South Korea is a member of the NSG; that 2008 transaction involved a South Korean AHF vendor.

In years ahead, the NSG will be challenged by a massive global trade increase in unlisted goods. That means that effective application of catch-all controls will be absolutely critical to halt proliferators–something for the NSG to think hard about as it reviews its control lists over the next three years.