

at the June Summit is based. Thus, the Senate's consent to ratification of the START Treaty is crucial not only to the implementation of START, but also to the implementation of this latest agreement.

We need START ratified *now*. We cannot afford to wait until the Joint Understanding reached with Russia is completed in treaty form, as some have suggested. We need START in place so that we can lock in the reductions it requires, help ensure that Byelarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine move promptly to join the NPT, and get the benefits of openness and transparency that the START Treaty provides. It was no accident that both President Bush and President Yeltsin urged that START be ratified as soon as possible.

We will work as quickly as we can to reach agreement on converting the Joint Understanding into a treaty text that will be suitable for ratification by the U.S. Senate and the Russian parliament. But we cannot predict how long this process will take. We hope it can be accomplished in a few months. Delaying START ratification so that these treaties can be considered together would not be in our national security interest. Therefore, I urge this committee and the U.S. Senate to provide its consent to ratify START and to do so at the earliest opportunity.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Secretary Cheney. General Powell.

STATEMENT OF GEN. COLIN POWELL, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

General POWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do have a statement for the record which I would offer, and then make some summary remarks.

Chairman NUNN. Your entire statement will be part of the record without objection.

General POWELL. Thank you. First, Mr. Chairman, let me respond to your opening comments about some of the actions the committee took with respect to matters of interest to me and to the Secretary and to my colleagues on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I appreciate your support for making the vice chairman a *de jure* rather than just *de facto* member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Your support for general and flag officer flexibility, Junior ROTC, I think you will hear shortly from OMB that they are supporting that as well, at least that is my hope, in the next few days. And we will look at, very carefully, the suggestion the committee has made with respect to the CINC's initiative fund as well as joint duty credit matters and I appreciate your support of our efforts.

And on roles and missions, we are hard at work on that as well, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you to provide my assessment of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and to recommend strongly its ratification. I will focus my presentation in two major areas. The first is an assessment of the role of the treaty in this new era of East-West relations and the second is the impact of the START Treaty on U.S. national security.

The signing of the START Treaty and the announcement of President Bush's nuclear initiatives signaled the beginning of a new era as the world's two major nuclear powers move from a confrontational to a cooperative relationship embracing, among other things, a new framework for mutual and verifiable strategic arms reductions. The treaty represents the first time both sides have committed themselves to reduce their strategic forces and to use an agreed regime to account for and verify the reductions.

This new relationship has evolved even further since the signing of the START Treaty in July of 1991. The new START Protocol that was signed in Lisbon on 23 May of this year documented the evolving political and military relationships among the four former republics of the Soviet Union that are now parties to START. The Protocol acknowledges the sovereignty of these new states and establishes special relationships among them and with the United States. In agreeing to this Protocol and the associated legally-binding letters signed by their presidents, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine have agreed to join the Non-proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear states and to eliminate all nuclear weapons and all strategic offensive arms no later than the end of START's 7-year reduction period. This guarantees that as long as the nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles remain in these three states, they will be subject to START controls. The diplomatic achievement of Lisbon demonstrates the stability that START will provide as the states of the former Soviet Union develop their national identities and goals.

The Washington Summit Agreement, signed by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin on 17 June, builds on START and takes us an historic step forward. First, we move from 6,000 accountable warheads which will result in 9,500 actual warheads under START to 3,000 to 3,500 actual and accountable warheads. Second, we will eliminate land-based MIRVed missiles, the most destabilizing weapons in our inventories. Of enormous significance to me is that we have finally broken lock step, where for decades we have tried to match each other system for system, warhead for warhead. Within the range of no more than 3,000 to 3,500 warheads, each nation will now be able to design a force structure appropriate to its own strategic needs rather than just trying to stay in lock step.

We must never forget, however, that at these lower levels we are still vulnerable, as we would be at still lower levels. Our security will continue to rest on our deterrent forces. Therefore, we must retain a triad of strong, modern, complementary forces to insure that no other nuclear state or states ever see an opportunity to gain a nuclear advantage over us.

At the same time, it is important to recognize that this treaty, to be effective, must serve the national security interests of all parties. Both the START Treaty and the Agreement reached between the Presidents at the Washington Summit should give the Russians every reason to feel just as secure and comfortable behind their remaining nuclear fence as we feel behind ours. Stability comes from both sides feeling secure.

A significant portion of the security benefits results from the treaty's reciprocal verification provisions. From the outset of the START negotiating process, one of our key objectives was to create a comprehensive verification program. We have succeeded. The result is an extensive and intrusive regime that will give all parties confidence that the treaty will be executed as written. The START verification mechanism is essential to fulfilling the objectives of the Washington Summit Agreement, as well as the objectives of the START Treaty itself.

The START Treaty provided a critical foundation for the follow-on reductions including the President's Nuclear Initiatives of September 1991, the additional State of the Union Initiatives in Janu-

ary of this year, and the reductions agreed to at the Washington Summit. START also serves as a backdrop for our efforts to provide further stability by exploring the potential for Global Protection Against Limited Strikes, GPALS by ballistic missiles on the United States or its allies. As we witnessed during the Washington Summit, the two presidents formed a group to jointly develop the concept of a Global Protection System and to explore the potential for sharing early warning information, establishing an early warning center, cooperating in development of ballistic missile defense capabilities and technologies, and developing a legal basis for cooperation.

The synergistic effects of the START Treaty, the nuclear initiatives, and the potential for effective ballistic missile defenses, will give both sides confidence that they can restructure their forces in a more stabilizing manner, assuring that the national security interests of both sides are met.

Although it seems unlikely that the nuclear forces of former Soviet Union will increase in the future, a ratified and fully implemented START Treaty provides a legal and enforceable mechanism to ensure reductions, to permit comprehensive verification, and to place limitations on future ballistic missile development. We consider that it is essential that any capability to grow to higher force levels be constrained and that forces be reduced wherever possible by formal agreements which bind governments—not just by political statements of those who happen to be leading those governments at any one point in time. The August 1991 Soviet coup attempt and the fall of President Gorbachev last December underline the importance of such negotiated agreements.

START meets the stated need to constrain strategic forces in a formal way, subjecting signatories to the rule of international law.

I would now like to shift focus to the impact of the START Treaty on our national security and on our military capability.

I and my colleagues on the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the START Treaty achieves our original 1982 strategic arms reduction goals which were to first, enhance deterrence and achieve stability through significant reductions in the most destabilizing nuclear systems—ballistic missiles and, especially ICBMs. Second, to maintain an overall level of strategic nuclear capability sufficient to deter conflict.

Third, to underwrite our national security. And, fourth, to meet our commitments to our allies and to our friends. Despite tremendous changes since 1982, these goals remain valid in 1992.

The Chiefs and I have examined the capabilities of our post-START nuclear force to meet these goals and to determine the military sufficiency of our nuclear forces. To make this assessment, we analyzed several measures of effectiveness such as the level of damage expected, the numbers and types of survivable warheads, and our reserve force posture. When we compare the level of damage against the smaller target base that results from the START reductions, we determine that our modern, more capable weapons systems will allow us to maintain approximately the same levels of damage and target coverage that we can achieve today. When we examine the mix of weapons in the case when all of our forces are generated to full alert, we determine that even though

the aggregate numbers of weapons declined, the percentage of survivable warheads increases because of the high ratio of submarine and aircraft warheads compared to ICBM warheads. Of the land-based and sea-based missiles on a day-to-day alert, the percentage of survivable warheads will also increase in the post-START force. The percentage of reserve weapons remains approximately the same. Our military judgment of all these measures is that national security is enhanced for both the United States and the republics of the former Soviet Union as a result of the START Treaty.

Further, the START reductions coupled with the additional reductions and restrictions agreed to at the Washington Summit, will reduce the target base already shrunken by the collapse of the former Soviet Union. Because of these changes, and the reciprocal nature of the treaty, both the U.S. and Russian deterrent forces will remain sufficient even at lower force levels.

START achieves these goals in a balanced and verifiable manner using a carefully devised mixture of numerical and geographical restrictions, constraints on future development, measures to enhance stability, abundant notifications, and a comprehensive verification regime, including on-site inspections in each country. It does so without constraining conventional forces or impacting U.S. development of defenses against ballistic missiles.

Let me provide what I believe are some of the more significant achievements of the START process and the START Treaty.

First, START provides for large cuts in weapons and delivery systems, especially those considered most dangerous and destabilizing, namely, heavy MIRVed ICBMs. In fact, START represented the first step toward elimination of all MIRVed ICBMs.

Second, START recognizes the importance of crisis stability, and thus encourages the more stabilizing and survivable systems, while discouraging traditional "first strike" systems such as heavily MIRVed ICBMs that are silo-based. It does not preclude modernization, but rather channels future development towards more stabilizing systems.

For the treaty parties, START provides a tremendous increase in visibility into the other side's strategic posture. There are over 80 different kinds of notification which cover each system and facility from cradle to grave, and a dozen different kinds of inspections, ranging from verifying Reentry Vehicle counts to ensuring that an eliminated facility is no longer really of treaty interest.

Requirements to expose heavy bomber and mobile ICBM systems on demand to National Technical Means, full-time monitoring of mobile ICBM production facilities, controlled conversion and elimination of treaty-limited systems, and an on-going dialogue in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission in Geneva are but a few of the verification measures established by the treaty. In short, while we will have fewer delivery systems and warheads, we will have equal or greater confidence in our ability to respond in any strategic crisis involving the former Soviet Union.

The impact of START's achievements is already being felt. Since the central limits were set in 1987, the strategic planners on both sides have structured modernization and force development plans within the confines of these limits. Thus, the force structures of each side have been anticipating the START constraints.

The START Treaty took approximately 10 years to negotiate. While this alone does not guarantee that there are no flaws in the treaty, it attests to the complicated nature of both the process and the relationship between the sides. There are those who would suggest that the recent collapse of the Soviet Union and the recent presidential initiatives render this treaty obsolete. Such assessments overlook the enduring value of the treaty and do not recognize the need to codify the agreed START limits on strategic offensive arms. The bilateral Summit deMIRVing Initiatives will be codified by additional agreements between Russia and the United States which will draw heavily on START Treaty provisions.

START is a balanced treaty. It is a fair treaty. By emphasizing openness, START enhances predictability in an era of rapidly changing force structures and developing relationships. It provides a solid foundation for enhancing stability and allowing the United States to better fulfill our National Military Strategy for the 1990s, and for doing so at significantly reduced force levels and cost. The Joint Chiefs and I have reviewed the military sufficiency of our forces during the drawdown schedule resulting from the START Treaty and into the post-START period. In our judgment, those forces will be militarily sufficient. In fact, the START reductions come at a time when the target base is reduced as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Our analysis of the reduced target base, of target coverage, damage expectancy, survivable warheads, reserve weapons, and the status of day-to-day and generated forces, all suggest that our national security is enhanced and deterrence is improved as a result of the START Treaty.

Accordingly, as the principal military advisor to the President, National Security Council, and on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I recommend ratification of this treaty as soon as possible. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.

[The prepared statement of General Powell follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN. COLIN L. POWELL, CHAIRMAN JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I appreciate this opportunity to appear before the Senate Armed Services Committee to provide my assessment of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and to recommend its ratification.

I will focus my presentation on two major areas. The first is an assessment of the role of the treaty in this new era in East-West relations—the second is the impact of the START Treaty on U.S. national security.

NEW ERA: FROM ARMS RACE TO ARMS REDUCTION

The signing of the START Treaty and the announcement of President Bush's Nuclear Initiatives signaled the beginning of a new era as the world's two major nuclear powers moved from a confrontational to a cooperative relationship embracing, among other things, a new framework for mutual and verifiable strategic arms reductions. The treaty represents the first time both sides have committed themselves to reduce their strategic forces and to use an agreed regime to account for and verify the reductions.

This new relationship has evolved even further since the signing of the START Treaty in July 1991. The new START Protocol that was signed in Lisbon on May 23 of this year documented the evolving political and military relationships among the four former republics of the Soviet Union that are now parties to START. The Protocol acknowledges the sovereignty of these new states and establishes special relationships among them and with the United States. In agreeing to this Protocol and the associated legally-binding letters signed by their presidents, Byelarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine have agreed to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear states and to eliminate all nuclear weapons and all strategic offensive arms no later

than the end of START's 7-year reduction period. This guarantees that as long as the nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles remain in these three states they will be subject to START controls. The diplomatic achievement of Lisbon demonstrates the stability that START will provide as the states of the former Soviet Union develop their national identities and goals.

The Washington Summit Agreement signed by President Bush and President Yeltsin on June 17 builds on START and takes us an historic step beyond. First, we move from 6000 accountable warheads (equalling up to 9500 actual warheads) to 3000-3500 actual and accountable warheads. Second, we will eliminate land-based MIRVed missiles, the most destabilizing weapons in our inventories. Of enormous significance is that we have broken lock step, where for decades we have tried to match each other system for system, warhead for warhead. Within the range of no more than 3000-3500, each nation will design a force structure appropriate to its own strategic needs.

We must never forget, however, that even at these lower levels we are still vulnerable, as we would be at still lower levels. Our security will continue to rest on our deterrent forces. We must retain a triad of strong, modern, complementary forces to insure that no other nuclear state or states ever see an opportunity to gain a nuclear advantage over us.

At the same time, it is important to recognize that this treaty, to be effective, must serve the national security interests of all parties. Both the START Treaty and the agreement reached between the Presidents at the Washington Summit should give the Russians every reason to feel just as secure and comfortable behind their remaining nuclear fence as we feel behind ours.

A significant portion of this security results from the treaty's reciprocal verification provisions. From the outset of the START negotiating process, one of our key objectives was to create a comprehensive verification program. We have succeeded. The result is an extensive and intrusive regime that will give all parties confidence that the treaty will be executed as written. The START verification mechanism is essential to fulfilling the objectives of the Washington Summit Agreement, as well as the objectives of the START Treaty itself.

The START Treaty provided a critical foundation for the follow-on reductions including the President's Nuclear Initiatives of September 1991 (PNI I), the additional State of the Union initiatives (PNI II) in January of this year, and the reductions agreed to at the Washington Summit. START also serves as a backdrop for our efforts to provide further stability by exploring the potential for global protection against limited strike (GPALS) by ballistic missiles on the United States or its allies. As we witnessed during the Washington Summit, the Presidents directed a high-level group to jointly develop the concept of a global protection system, and to explore the potential for sharing early warning information, establishing an early warning center, cooperating in development of ballistic missile defense capabilities and technologies, and developing a legal basis for cooperation.

The synergistic effects of the START Treaty, the nuclear initiatives, and the potential for effective ballistic missile defenses, will give both sides confidence that they can restructure their forces in a more stabilizing manner, assuring that the national security interests of both sides are met.

Although it seems unlikely that the nuclear forces of the former Soviet Union will increase in the future, a ratified and fully implemented START Treaty provides a legal and enforceable mechanism to ensure reductions, to permit comprehensive verification, and to place limitations on future ballistic missile development. We consider that it is essential that any capability to grow to higher force levels be constrained and that forces be reduced wherever possible by formal agreements which bind governments—not just by political statements of those who lead those governments. The August 1991 Soviet coup attempt and the fall of Gorbachev last December underline the importance of such negotiated agreements.

START meets the stated need to constrain strategic forces in a formal way, subjecting signatories to the rule of international law.

START'S IMPACT ON MILITARY CAPABILITY

I would now like to shift focus to the impact of the START Treaty on our national security and our military capability.

I and my colleagues on the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the START Treaty achieves our original 1982 strategic arms reduction goals which were to:

— enhance deterrence and achieve stability through significant reductions in the most destabilizing nuclear systems—ballistic missiles, and especially ICBMs

- maintain an overall level of strategic nuclear capability sufficient to deter conflict
- underwrite our national security
- meet our commitments to allies and friends.

Despite tremendous changes since 1982, these goals remain valid in 1992.

The Chiefs and I have examined the capabilities of our post-START nuclear forces to meet these goals and to determine the military sufficiency of our nuclear forces. To make this assessment, we analyzed several measures of effectiveness such as the level of damage expected, the numbers and types of survivable warheads, and our reserve force posture. When we compared the level of damage against the smaller target base that results from the START reductions, we determined that our modern, more capable weapons systems will allow us to maintain approximately the same levels of damage and target coverage that we can achieve today. When we examined the mix of weapons in the case when all of our forces are generated to full alert, we determined that even though the aggregate numbers of weapons decline, the percentage of survivable warheads increases because of the higher ratio of submarine and aircraft warheads compared to ICBM warheads. Of the land-based and sea-based missiles on a day-to-day alert, the percentage of survivable warheads will also increase in the post-START force. The percentage of reserve weapons remains approximately the same. Our military judgment of all these measures is that national security is enhanced for both the United States and the republics of the former Soviet Union as a result of the START Treaty.

Further, the START reductions coupled with the additional reductions and restrictions agreed to at the Washington Summit, will reduce the target base already shrunken by the collapse of the former Soviet Union. Because of these changes, and the reciprocal nature of the treaty, both U.S. and Russian deterrent forces will remain sufficient even at lower force levels.

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START'S ACHIEVEMENTS

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For the treaty parties, START provides a tremendous increase in visibility into the other side's strategic posture. There are over 80 different kinds of notifications which cover each system and facility from cradle to grave, and a dozen different kinds of inspections, ranging from verifying Reentry Vehicle (RV) counts to ensuring that an eliminated facility really is no longer of treaty interest.

Requirements to expose heavy bomber and mobile ICBM systems on demand to NTM, full-time monitoring of mobile ICBM production facilities, controlled conversion and elimination of treaty-limited systems, and an on-going dialogue in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) in Geneva are but a few of the verification measures established by the treaty. In short, while we will have fewer delivery systems and warheads, we will have equal or greater confidence in our ability to respond in any strategic crisis involving the former Soviet Union.

The impact of START's achievements is already being felt. Since the central limits were set in 1987, the strategic planners of both sides, have structured modernization and force development plans within the confines of these limits. Thus, the force structures of each side have been anticipating the START constraints.

The START Treaty took approximately 10 years to negotiate. While this alone does not guarantee that there are no flaws in the treaty, it attests to the complicated nature of both the process and the relationship between the sides. There are those who would suggest that the recent collapse of the Soviet Union and the recent presidential initiatives render this treaty obsolete. Such assessments overlook the

enduring value of the treaty and do not recognize the need to codify the agreed START limits on strategic offensive arms. The bilateral Summit demirving initiatives will be codified by additional agreements between Russia and the United States which will draw heavily on START Treaty provisions.

CJCS RECOMMENDATION

START is a balanced treaty and a fair treaty. By emphasizing openness, START enhances predictability in an era of rapidly changing force structures and developing relationships. It provides a solid foundation for enhancing stability and allowing the United States to better fulfill our National Military Strategy for the 1990s, and for doing so at significantly reduced force levels and cost. The Joint Chiefs and I have reviewed the military sufficiency of our forces during the drawdown schedule resulting from the START Treaty and into the post-START period. In our judgment, those forces will be militarily sufficient. In fact, the START reductions come at a time when the target base is reduced as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Our analyses of the reduced target base, of target coverage, damage expectancy, survivable warheads, reserve weapons, and the status of day-to-day and generated forces, all suggest that our national security is enhanced and deterrence improved as a result of the START Treaty.

As the principal military advisor to the President, and on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I recommend ratification of this treaty.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, General Powell. You spoke on behalf of the Joint Chiefs. Are there any separate views of the Joint Chiefs on this subject? Any separate views that we need to know about?

General POWELL. No, there are not, Mr. Chairman. In fact, when we testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Chiefs attended with me, in a separate panel and each service representative's views are as I have just described.

Chairman NUNN. Let me start. We will keep time and let the clerk notify each of us as our time expires. General Powell, this relates to the B-1 and the conventional role versus strategic nuclear role, paragraph 28 of Article 5 of the START I Treaty prohibits the basing of strategic offensive arms outside each party's national territory. However, the agreed statement to the treaty states, "With respect to heavy bombers, the provision of paragraph 28 of Article 5 shall not preclude the temporary stationing of heavy bombers outside the territory of the party for purposes not inconsistent with the treaty." That is the exact quote.

According to the new bomber road map, the Air Force is now looking to the 97 B-1 bombers as the mainstay for conventional bombing missions in regional-type contingencies. The Air Force proposes to spend a considerable amount of time to upgrade the B-1's conventional capabilities. That request is before us now. We evidently intend to exercise the new, greatly liberalized excluding rules of START II to declare all of our B-1s as conventional bombers.

However, in what many might consider a somewhat odd arrangement, the B-1 will continue to count as a nuclear bomber for purposes of START I, as I understand it, since we do not intend to spend money to remove its nuclear carriage. As a result, our conventional B-1 bomber fleet will be subject to the basing restrictions of Article 5, as qualified by agreed statement 8.

If we are to have complete freedom of action, to use the B-1 bomber as a conventional bomber in a future contingency like Desert Storm and maximize its sortie rates and effectiveness by using forward bases, it seems to me to be critical for us to under-