ArmsControlWonk.com

I’ve been thinking a lot lately about how to size US nuclear forces, whether to some number of targets, or capabilities or with some other metric. (Hint: some other metric.) More on that soon, but I wanted to share a funny story I came across.

The late-Clinton force sizing construct was “lead and hedge” — i.e. to “lead strategic arms control efforts toward START II or smaller force levels, but retain the ability to hedge by returning to START I levels.”

The concept, straightforward though timid, was impossible to translate for a Russia which, in the mid-1990s, had rather fewer hedge-fund managers than it does today. David Ottaway and Steve Coll offered a very funny, contemporaneous account in the Washington Post:

[Secretary of Defense William J.] Perry called the new policy “leading and hedging.” The United States would continue to lead the way toward smaller nuclear arsenals and lower alert levels but would hedge by maintaining its ability to rebuild nuclear forces quickly and by keeping some of its nuclear missiles on Cold War-style alert.

This proved hard to explain to the Russians. When Perry and [Assistant Secretary of Defense Ashton] Carter first outlined the new policy to Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev at a meeting in New York, an interpreter translated “lead” as “dominate.” There was not an obvious Russian word for “hedge”; sometimes it came out as “shrubbery” and other times as “ability to break out from treaty commitments.” The mix-ups soon became lore in Moscow.

Lead and tend shrubbery. Come to think of it, that may not make any less sense than our current approach.

Comment [3]

I generally avoid posting about subjects unconnected with the essential subject matter of this blog, but Jib Jab’s 2008 election song is so funny I can’t resist.

Their 2004 election song had the immortal line about George W “you can’t say nuclear, that really scare me.”

Comment [1]

The wits are out with their own doctored images of Iran’s recent missile launch.

This is my favorite so far, but there are lots at Boing Boing, Danger Room, and the Economist.

Warning, there is some sort of recurring theme about kittens that makes me vaguely uncomfortable.

Comment [14]

Standing on the metro this morning, I noticed the above.

I wasn’t really sure whether the artist was warning against the subpop indie rockers or CBGB favs, but the iPod remained dance-punk free for the duration of the ride.

Comment [10]

Remember that reality-based community comment from the anonymous Bush Administration official?

Well, “history’s actors” are at it again, still working to determine whether the current Administration policies on nuclear energy will spur proliferation.

Let me back up.

Dr. Kerry Kartchner (who incidentally wrote a good book on START) sent an e-mail to his colleagues in T/ISN*, following-up on a May 19 meeting “to discuss a public diplomacy strategy to get out the message on what we are doing to promote the responsible expansion of nuclear energy around the globe.”

(A friend of wonk who must remain anonymous happily forwarded said e-mail to yours truly with witty commentary.)

The e-mail, which I have posted below sans email addresses, includes a draft public diplomacy (PD) strategy that I have posted online. Both make for an interesting read:

“Kartchner, Kerry M”
05/23/2008 04:21 PM

To: “Humphrey, Marc A”, “Carnahan, Burrus M”, “Uhre, Katharine L”, “Harbaugh, Erin E”

cc: “Daniel, Jody L”,

Subject: First Draft of PD Strategy for Responsible Expansion of Nuc Energy

I need help filling in: “key themes” and “misconceptions, criticisms”. Comments by COB Wednesday. (I will be tied up with the PSI conference through Wednesday).

-Kerry

PD Strategy for Responsible Expansion of Nuc Energy.doc>>

The draft PD strategy is amusing for at least two reasons:

First, the strategy includes “an interview with the Post reporter who authored the rather unhelpful front page article last Monday.”

That would be a reference to Joby Warrick’s article, Spread of Nuclear Capability Is Feared, Global Interest in Energy May Presage A New Arms Race (May 12, 2008; Page A1). It’s possible that this article is the reason that ISN is drafting a strategy in the first place.

I guess the lesson is that although you can’t catch flies with honey, you can by making their life miserable on the front page of the Washington Post. Anyway, Ms. Parillo eagerly awaits her invitation to the proposed “roundtable discussion at the State Department” for NGOs.

Second, as you can see from his email, Dr. Kartchner needs a little help filling in the “misperceptions” section, particularly correcting “myths” that the spread of nuclear power will lead to nuclear proliferation or that the US seeks monopolize the market for nuclear energy technology.

For now, the “reality” is marked as TBD — to be determined — which I think kind of sums it all up.

Misconceptions and Our Response

(1) Myth: The United States opposes the rapid growth in global efforts to develop nuclear energy.

Reality: The United States supports creating a viable alternative to the development of complete enrichment and reprocessing technologies for states seeking to develop or expand their civil nuclear energy capability.

(2) Myth: Promoting the global spread of nuclear energy will necessarily lead to proliferation of latent nuclear weapons capability.

Reality: tbd

(3) Myth: The United States is seeking to monopolize global trade in nuclear energy technology.

Reality: tbd

Now I know, “TBD” is just bureaucratise for “find the appropriate boilerplate”. And GULAG was just an acronym. Sometimes ill-fitting bureaucratic language perfectly conveys, if only though though its awkwardness, the gap between the stated policy and our much maligned friend, reality. That’s one reason why 1984 is a good read.

One wag suggested that perhaps Dr. Kartchner was having trouble rebutting the claim that nuclear power won’t lead to nuclear proliferation because, well, it will. Same goes for denying that you want to monopolize the market when. of course, you do.

I, on the other hand, make no claim about the inner mental world of any State Department official. I prefer to think that Dr. Kartchner and his staff are just too busy, what with so many Proliferation Security Initiative meetings to attend and whatnot.

So, why not help a guy out?

I know that he wants suggestions by Wednesday, but I still invite readers to comment on their own “realities” to rebut the myths, the best of which we can send to Dr. Kartchner.

And, for those readers currently employed in ISN — and we have many — you may want to make sure that your snide submissions don’t too closely resemble something you might actually write in a memo.

Enjoy!

*One recipient, Katherine “Katie” Uhrey, works in the Office of Commercial and Business Affairs, outside T.

Comment [4]

I’m off on holiday for a couple of weeks and then have a conference out in Monterey so my posting may be a bit sporadic (read non-existent) until I get back. I hope to visit the museum at Los Alamos on my travels (assuming I’m allowed to) so I might have some good pictures to share on my return.

In the meantime I leave you with a story that broke in the UK this morning about the cause of an accident on a UK nuclear submarine in 2002:

A nuclear submarine crashed after tracing paper was used to mark its course, it has emerged.

HMS Trafalgar ran aground during a training exercise off the coast of Skye in November 2002.

A Royal Navy board of inquiry criticised the decision to put tracing paper over charts so student officers could not draw on them.

It said the tracing paper obscured vital information that could have prevented the crash.

Classic.

It reminds me of when the Royal Navy was awarded the Ignoble Peace Prize a few years back ‘for ordering its sailors to stop using live cannon shells, and to instead just shout “Bang!“’.

Comment [4]

The Second CWC Review Conference (2008) has a nice website and some excellent live blogging by Cheryl Voss and Daniel Feakes.

Somehow, though, they both missed (I stand corrected). Cheryl Vos noticed an extraordinary statement by the Dutch Foreign Minister regarding his hopes and dreams for the OPCW:

One of the world’s best ice hockey players, the Canadian Wayne Gretzky, once said that a good hockey player plays where the puck is; but a great hockey player plays where the puck is going to be. The ambition of this review conference should be to turn the OPCW from a good player into a great player. Understanding the future and preparing for it are key. I wish you a most productive conference.

All of this raises the natural question, of course, do the Dutch play ice hockey?

The answer, as the picture above suggests, turns out to be “yes” — though not very well. That’s a Dutch goalie, letting a pick slip by, in a 3-1 loss to mighty Kazakhstan.

Wonders never cease.

Comment [4]

My blog post on Gordon England and nuclear weapons spending (DEPSECDEF Deeply Confused, March 29, 2008) made Al Kamen’s In the Loop in the Washington Post.

While England Slept

Usually, witnesses at congressional hearings enlighten lawmakers on the inner workings of their departments. But not always.

Take Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England’s appearance recently before the House Appropriations energy and water subcommittee, in which ranking Republican David L. Hobson (Ohio) asked about something that appears to have been bothering him for a while.

“Over a quarter of the Department of Energy’s budget is focused on nuclear weapons,” Hobson said. “Your department develops the strategy for using these weapons, for what [operations], how many are needed and that sort of thing.”

The problem, Hobson said, is that his subcommittee “is left in the position of having to come up with the money to pay for them, often taking funding away from energy programs or funding for levees. And I heard some complaints that Defense asks for the pie in the sky sometimes because they don’t have to pay for it; it doesn’t come out of your budget, so ask for everything. . . . Do you think this current arrangement makes sense?” he asked.

“Mr. Hobson, I guess I was not aware that we were not paying for these programs,” England replied.

“You’re not,” Hobson said.

“I guess that’s a surprise to me,” England said. “I mean, I always thought we were funding these development programs and funding the DOE labs to do this work for us. . . . We’ll look into that, sir.”

Jeffrey G. Lewis, who writes the blog ArmsControlWonk.com and found this conversation, asks: “Shouldn’t the Deputy Secretary know whether or not his department is responsible for the lion’s share of nuclear weapons development costs?”

Well, maybe. Not essential, but it probably wouldn’t hurt.

To England’s credit, of course, he admitted he did not know rather than trying to make it up as he went along.

Comment

French nuclear power company Areva has a cartoon touting the the reprocessing of plutonium though as far as I can tell they use neither “reprocess” or “plutonium.”

They stick to “recycling” and “fuel” to make it sound green and friendly.

The have another video set to, no kidding, Funky Town by Lips. (second Areva ad)

Comment [2]

I was reading some recent RRW testimony, when I noticed that Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England was not aware that nuclear weapons programs were largely funded out of the Department of Energy budget.

I often mistake esoteric facts for common knowledge — call it the curse of the wonk. But, shouldn’t the Deputy Secretary know whether or not his department is responsible for the lions share of nuclear weapons development costs?

REP. HOBSON: Well, you will find a lot of differences within Congress in the manner in which both NNSA and the Defense Department approached RRW, and that’s why there’s pushback on RRW, as you see it today.

But let me ask another question, too, because this — RRW is really not probably something you’ve worked on, but it’s something that really needs to be looked at, and what we do with the stockpile in the future and how we handle it.

Over a quarter of the Department of Energy’s budget is focused on nuclear weapons activities or dismantling them, monitoring them and extending their lives. I’ve often wondered if this arrangement made sense. And what I mean by that is, your department develops the strategy for using these weapons, for what their operational requirements are, how many are needed and that sort of thing.

Yet the Energy and Water Subcommittee is left in the position of having to come up with the money to pay for them, often taking funding away from energy programs or funding for levees. And I heard some complaints that Defense asks for the pie in the sky sometimes because they don’t have to pay for it; it doesn’t come out of your budget, so ask for everything.

Is this arrangement — do you think this current arrangement makes sense, or what, if anything, will be lost by requiring the Defense Department to actually pay for what they’re requiring? Will we get more bang — kind of a bad word, but more bang for our buck if we looked at it that way rather than having Energy and — you guys just say, “Oh, we want this,” and the guys over at [N]NSA just kind of bow and scrape and say, “Yeah,” because it doesn’t come out of your budget, it comes out of their budget, which comes through Energy and Water?

MR. ENGLAND: So Mr. Hobson, I guess I was not aware that we were not paying for these programs —

REP. HOBSON: You’re not.

MR. ENGLAND: — with Department of Energy, because — okay, I guess that’s a surprise to me. I mean, I always thought we were funding those development programs and funding the DOE labs to do work for us. So I though there was a money transfer to DOD (sic) to do this. I guess I’m surprised —

REP. HOBSON: There may be some minor monies, but the majority of the money comes out of Energy and Water accounts.

MR. ENGLAND: So —

REP. HOBSON: You provide — you build the delivery systems. The weapons and the weapons development is funded by Energy and Water. And those labs are basically funded out of Energy and Water.

REP. CRAMER: If the gentleman would yield, it’s a Defense function, but Energy picks up the tab.

MR. ENGLAND: So Mr. Hobson, we’ll look into that, sir. I wasn’t aware of that.

Comment [8]