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Quite a few of my friends have been urging me to write something about the “new” images of Iran’s space center that have shown up recently on Google Earth.

The trouble is, I hate rehashing stuff I wrote about almost two years ago when I “discovered” the facility—much like Columbus “discovered” America—and wrote about it in Jane’s Intelligence Review (see Geoffrey Forden, “Smoke and Mirrors: Analyzing the Iranian missile test”, JIR, April 2008, pp. 47-51; I have never understood how the editors pick titles for my papers).

Perhaps the most interesting part of the imagery now, given the connection between these two countries’ missile programs, is the similarity between a building at North Korea’s launch site and one at Iran’s. For those who would like to examine the site themselves, let me replicate the coordinates I published in the open literature for the first time nearly two years ago:

35.234440° N, 53.920798°E.

Comment [8]

For reasons not worth going into, lately I’ve been reading an awful lot about ballistic missile warfare. Today’s cutting-edge theater missile made in Russia, China, or the United States is a precision battlefield weapon, suitable for attacking military bases or formations. Or crushing the occasional civilian vehicle, but hey, stuff happens. (See: SS-21 Debris In Georgia, Revisited, June 10, 2009.)

It wasn’t always this way.

Until pretty recently, in fact, missile warfare was the ballistic equivalent of area bombing. Thousands of inaccurate V-2s — like the one shown above at Peenemünde White Sands, apparently — battered London and Antwerp in 1944. Iraq and Iran targeted each other’s cities with ballistic missiles in the 1980s, culminating in a series of demoralizing attacks on Tehran in March and April 1988. After the USSR withdrew its regular forces from Afghanistan, the Red Army unleashed Scud barrages against mujahideen fighters for a time. And Iraq famously employed its “stretched Scuds” against Israel, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Qatar in January and February 1991.

This last episode is remembered as the baptism by fire of the Patriot missile. Despite an initial perception of success, upon close examination, the first time out was a ringing failure. Upgraded systems appear to have worked better in the next war against Iraq in April 2003, despite a handful of friendly-fire incidents. (Update: see also Patriot Performance in Iraq, March 1, 2005, and the DSB report on this subject.) But in the ceaseless competition between offensive and defensive weapons, perfection is simply too much to ask.

The late, distinguished physicist Wolfgang (Pief) Panofsky sketched out the implications of this fact for defense against nuclear attack as clearly and crisply as I can recall seeing anywhere in a June 2001 article in Arms Control Today:

Nuclear weapons, however, profoundly changed the relationship between offense and defense because they increased the explosive power of a payload of a given weight and size by a factor of one million—a very profound change indeed. The demands on the performance and reliability of defenses against an attack by even a single missile carrying a nuclear weapon must therefore be extremely high for the defense to be considered effective. When the Germans attacked Britain during World War II with primitive ballistic missiles, none were intercepted, but the damage was limited because the missiles carried conventional explosives. Had they carried nuclear warheads, a single missile would have devastated London. Defense against ballistic missiles is therefore a totally different problem depending on whether such missiles carry conventional or nuclear payloads.

One might say that missile defenses can be asked to reduce levels of tolerable harm. They cannot be asked to prevent any and all intolerable harm. For that, of course, we have nuclear deterrence.

Because of space limits, I couldn’t include the lengthy quotation above in my first column at the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, where Panofsky’s work was published many times. For that, of course, we have blogs.

(See also: “Pief” Panofsky, renowned physicist and arms control advocate, dies at 88, September 25, 2007; and In memoriam: Pief Panofsky, October 2, 2007.)

Comment [11]

Yes, yes, it is shameless, but I can’t resist pointing out that NPR is running a boatload of analytical, talking-head-driven pieces on Iran this week.

(At least in this instance, NPR is not the Congressionally mandated bureaucratic process, but the nationwide radio network backstopped by the french fry purchases of your childhood.)

Monday morning’s piece was Iran And The Bomb: U.S. Keeps Options Open. In the afternoon, we heard Uncertainty Surrounds Iran’s Nuclear Capability, which may shed some additional light on the issues explored earlier here.

Tuesday morning brings us Could Deterrence Counter A Nuclear Iran?. You may notice that no fewer than two ACW’ers are featured therein. Yep, shameless.

Just one additional observation: this segment concerns a hypothetical situation. It’s one that, with luck and good sense, can still be avoided.

Update. Wednesday’s morning’s segment concerns extended deterrence, AKA the “nuclear umbrella.”

The series goes all week. Here’s the overview.

Comment [14]

Gregory Kulacki and I have published a paper on the history of China’s space program, A Place for One’s Mat: China’s Space Program, 1956–2003, as part of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences Reconsidering the Rules of Space project:

Chinese scientists and engineers use a particular phrase to describe why China made such significant investments in space programs. They explain their motivation to make China a spacefaring nation with the phrase yi xi zhi di: “a place for one’s mat.” The English analog is “a seat at the table,” the difference explained by the fact that people in ancient China sat on mats on the floor, not in chairs. The fundamental idea is that China deserves a place among
spacefaring nations. Throughout the history of the Chinese space program that has meant taking technical cues from the leading space programs—usually the United States.

Chinese efforts have been shaped by political, bureaucratic, and technical realities. In particular, the political turmoil of the Mao era and subsequent efforts to restore stability to the Chinese economy deferred many of their objectives to the present day.

We do not for a moment believe that we have written a definitive history of China’s space program. We do not present the complete chronologies of every space program and piece of technology discussed in the original Chinese sources, but instead have selected as case studies three important decisions and accomplishments: (1) the launch of China’s first satellite in 1970, (2) the launch of China’s first communications satellite in 1984, and (3) China’s first human spaceflight in 2003. A comprehensive history should address many other issues and events, such as the influence and the role of Soviet assistance and China’s military space programs, but a comprehensive history is not our objective. We aim to demonstrate how the available history can help foreign observers better understand Chinese intentions. These three difficult efforts to establish China as a major spacefaring nation demonstrate strong philosophical and political aspirations that go beyond the acquisition of instrumental military or technical capabilities. Although the motivations in the Chinese space community conflict and overlap, all parties appear to have a sense of the importance of space to China’s view of itself and its place among nations.

Comment [2]

I was famously quoted in the New York Times (and in Newsweek) as saying about the failure of the April 5th, 2009 satellite launch attempt:

It’s got to be embarrassing. I can imagine heads flying if the Dear Leader finds out the satellite didn’t fly into orbit.

Not too many people have noted the if in that quote — though I certainly wanted to emphasize it at the time. It turns out that the Dear Leader has not found out his satellite splashed into the sea: North Korea still maintain the satellite made it into orbit. One can certainly understand his advisors’ reluctance to correct that impression. I can even imagine Kim going to his space center to listen to it beep as it goes over head.

Unfortunately, its becoming clearer and clearer that North Korea really did achieve everything they need to to launch a two stage missile quite a distance.

Comment [6]

Following up on Geoff’s apt reference to the technology campaign trail, here’s more on Iran’s Fuel Manufacturing Plant, or FMP.

We’ve got the wonkporn interior photos, including shots of equipment that happened to be next to politicians.

We’ve got statements to the news media about future plans.

We’ve got multiple assessments of the significance of the facility. Because context is always good.

Update: Here’s even more context.

And did I mention the interior photos? Come check ‘em out.

Comment [10]

No, not the switch from an offense-dominated world to a defense-dominated one — you might remember that idea from the 1980s, kids — but the switch from a Republican administration to a Democratic one, and what that means for ballistic missile defense.

It’s been the major theme of the week over at TotalWonkerr.com.

Are You Down With OLC?

The eponymous Paul Kerr kicked things off by relaying an analysis of a recently released but generally overlooked Bush Office of Legal Counsel memo from November 2001, courtesy of an anonymous friend. The analysis starts with a clear statement of perspective:

“I’ve read the whole memo, and I think my head is about to explode.”

The OLC memo proposed a novel doctrine: the temporary, unilateral suspension of selected provisions of a treaty, in this case the ABM Treaty.

(This was just a few weeks after the Pentagon decided to forgo certain tests in order to avoid violating the treaty, and just a few weeks before the U.S. simply withdrew from the Treaty. So the proposed doctrine was never tested or deployed.)

I followed up by recalling some of the legal contortions at the Department of State in the 1980s — there’s that decade again — to reinterpret the Treaty to permit testing that most experts agreed was clearly banned.

Defense Acquisition: What Is It Good For?

I also called attention to a new GAO document that gently suggests to the Obama administration that it should have MDA do more to take combatant command priorities into account, try to measure its own progress, and consider operations and maintenance — not just acquisition — in planning and budgeting.

In other words, MDA should operate as a military program, not a political program.

Strategic ballistic missile defense expresses a worldview in ways most weapons systems do not. It’s unilateralism. Acquiring, testing, and deploying strategic BMD just seem to fit with at-will revision of treaties like peanut butter goes with jelly. And the philosophy of an administration does more to shape BMD’s budgetary footprint than do military requirements as defined by the Armed Services or Office of the Secretary of Defense.

So you want to know where BMD fits into the Obama vision. Don’t we all? It’s not mentioned in the White House’s FY 2010 budget book. Smacks of multilateralism to me.

Random Thoughts: Shallow, Medium, Deep

Other stray missile defense thoughts include an inquiry into the whereabouts of the Sea-Based X-Band Radar, a look at short-range missile defense in Israel, and Paul’s Aristotlean proof of the nonexistence of the ballistic missile threat.

Secretary Gates almost seems to agree.

And there’s oh-so-much more. Check it out.

Comment [1]

Last September, George Perkovich and I published an Adelphi Paper, Abolishing Nuclear Weapons, which attempted to identify the challenges of getting to zero and how they might be overcome. Most of all, however, it called for serious international debate on the subject.

We have made an effort to catalyze such debate with our new book Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: A Debate. This book reproduces the original Adelphi Paper, followed by 17 responses from officials, analysts and authors representing 13 countries (nuclear-armed states and non-nuclear-weapon states). The volume ends with a concluding essay by George and me. And, it’s all available free of charge from here!

We made a real effort to have a broad spectrum of opinion with authors including Jonathan Schell, Sir Lawrence Freedman, Frank Miller, Scott Sagan and President Ernesto Zedillo.

As well as a lot of content, there are also some great pieces of writing. Let me share a couple of my favourites.

Sir Lawrence Freedman on the need for greater public engagement:

As things stand now, if governments start dragging their feet, it is hard to imagine vocal demands and public demonstration to get the process back on track. If nationalist politicians start to insist that their country is being duped into putting national security at risk, it is just as likely that demands to slow down would follow. As long as talk of abolition remains the diplomatic equivalent of easy-listening elevator music, and as political leaders remember to assert their belief in a world without war and weapons—and, while they’re at it, no more poverty and disease either—few will pay attention. Only as the talk becomes serious will public debate open up, and properly so. Depending on the political system, dissent from the official line may be vigorous and open or cryptic and furtive. In all cases, the course of the debate will be influenced by the interaction with whatever happens to be on the public agenda at the time and the passing concerns of the moment.

Zia Mian on the problem with framing the disarmament debate in terms of security:

Some arguments that policy makers may advance for abolition will certainly conflict with long-standing official narratives of national security that have served to justify a role for nuclear weapons. These arguments may trigger debates about what, if anything, could fill the nuclear-weapon shaped hole that would result from the abolition of nuclear weapons. The pursuit of disarmament may become tied to the search for reassurance through technological, strategic, and political substitutes for nuclear weapons. Other arguments for abolition may claim that eliminating nuclear weapons would not actually undermine the security calculation of a nuclear-armed state, but would in fact strengthen its position relative to rivals and in the international system. Such an argument could complicate efforts by some other states to make a case for disarming.

In addition, St. Anthony’s International Review has also joined the debate by publishing an excellent critique of our Adelphi Paper by Elbridge Colby and a response by us. Again, all available free of charge and worthwhile too because this exchange really helps crystalize an important aspect of the wider debate, in my opinion.

Enjoy.

Comment [23]

The most recent edition of Survival has a section on “Reinforcing the NPT”. One of the articles, “The Problem with Nuclear Mind Reading”, is by me (non-printable proof available here), and the other, entitled “Exposing Nuclear Non-Compliance”, is by former IAEA Deputy Director General for Safeguards, Pierre Goldschmidt (available for free here).

My article asks the question: Should we care why a non-compliant state has violated its non-proliferation undertakings, or instead focus on what it has done? My answer is that we should focus on actions not intentions—not least because the IAEA is not tasked with assessing intentions and it would be effectively impossible for it to do so.

If the topic sounds familiar to Wonk readers it probably is. The article grew out of my first ever posting on this blog and has been the subject of a few since then. [And was the subject of a talk James gave at the New America Foundation, which you can view on YouTube. — Jeffrey]

Anyway, like every other idea in non-proliferation, it turns out not to be so new. Its origin? The Acheson-Lilienthal Report. Where else? (The creators of South Park captured the feeling nicely in this episode, to which the title of this post is a tribute).

I was rereading A-L the other day, which as many of you will know, proposes international control of the fuel cycle (or rather, “dangerous” activities) by an Atomic Development Authority. The following passage described the inspection function of this body:

…the Authority will be aided in the detection of illegal operations by the fact that it is not the motive but the operation which is illegal. Any national or private effort to mine uranium will be illegal; any such stockpiling of thorium will be illegal; the building of any primary reactor or separation plant will be illegal. This circumstance is of very great importance for the following reason: It is true that a thoroughgoing inspection of all phases of the industry of a nation will in general be an unbearable burden; it is true that a calculated attempt at evasion may, by camouflage or by geographical location, make the specific detection of an illegal operation very much more difficult. But the total effort needed to carry through from the mine to the bomb, a surreptitious program of atomic armament on a scale sufficient to make it a threat or to make it a temptation to evasion, is so vast, and the number of separate difficult undertakings so great, and the special character of many of these undertakings so hard to conceal, that the fact of this effort should be impossible to hide. The fact that it is the existence of the effort rather then a specific purpose or motive or plan which constitutes an evasion and an unmistakable danger signal is to our minds one of the great advantages of the proposals we have outlined.

A lesson that, in my opinion at least, is still very relevant today.

Comment [9]

If you are like me, you were no doubt very excited about the first-ever CTBTO on-site inspection exercise at Semipalatinsk. (Rebecca Johnson turned in a some wonderful dispatches for the Bulletin, while Oliver Meier had a nice write-uP for Arms Control Today.)

Well, Andreas Persbo actually got to participate. Andreas will be in town this week, so I am hosting him for a meeting on Wednesday, along with David Hafmeister and James Acton to discuss how the CTBT can be verified.

Please RSVP

Is the Nuclear Test Ban Verifiable?

The 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty bans all nuclear explosions for military or civilian purposes, but the question remains: can we verify compliance with the Treaty?

Last year, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization held a very successful mock “on site inspection” at the former Soviet nuclear test site near Semipalatinsk, in Kazakhstan.

The panelists, including VERTIC’s Andreas Persbo — who participated in the inspection exercise — will discuss on site inspection to explore the scope and reach of verification measures in light of a changing international political and security environment.

Start: 01/28/2009 – 10:00am
End: 01/28/2009 – 11:30am
New America Foundation
1630 Connecticut Ave NW, 7th Floor
Washington, 20009
United States

Participants

Featured Speakers
Andreas Persbo
Senior Researcher
Verfication Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC)

Dave Hafemeister
Senior Technical Advisor
Arms Control Association
Former lead technical-staff on nuclear testing, Department of State

James Acton
Associate, Nonproliferation Program
Carnegie Endowment for National Peace

Moderator
Jeffrey Lewis
Director, Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Initiative
New America Foundation

Comment [9]