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At left, is an Iranian numerically controlled lathe milling machine forming cooling channels in a rocket engine.

It is impossible to tell the scale of this engine — and therefore impossible to uniquely link it to the Safir second stage.

However, machining these channels, as opposed to using a corrugated insert, is a major technological change from SCUD technology.

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David Wright and Ted Postol have done a really first rate job of analyzing the U’nha-2 and Safir development programs, as exemplified by their excellent article on the U’nha-2. But I think it is important to at least consider an alternative: these missiles represent a much larger portion of indigenous production than just assembling components. This is not to say that Wright and Postol are wrong in their conclusions, only to consider the question.

An International Missile Development Consortium?

North Korea is widely viewed as not testing their missiles enough before they sell them to “client” states. The Nodong missile, which forms the basis for the Shahab-3 and its variants, was tested successfully just once before “being sold to Iran and Pakistan.” This is an unreasonable flight test program and has led many to conjecture that North Korea is either buying complete missiles from Russia, missiles already engineered and developed, or missile components. That could, of course, be very possible and has unfortunate implications for the West’s relationship with Russia. Another alternative of this basic idea, just a small variant really, is that North Korea bought the production line for an obsolete or canceled missile system and modified it to fit its own special circumstances. With this head start, it then formed an international “consortium” with Iran and possibly Pakistan to continue the development. Moving its development program into other countries would have significant advantages for North Korea. For one, while Iranian missile launches are controversial, they do not appear as controversial as the DPRK’s missile tests. This is even more true for Pakistan where any controversy is mainly a regional one.

Such a development consortium would not be the first one ever created. The one I am most familiar with is the Badr 2000/Condor II development program where Iraq, in essence, funded the development of the missile by several other nations. Iraq received a number of contributory production plants that increased their capabilities considerably while failing to produce the desired missile. If North Korea bought the equipment for an obsolete or canceled production line, this would undoubtedly violate many of the rules of the MTCR but might not be as suspicious a violation, especially in a country suffering from the economic catastrophe that was Russia in the 1990s, as selling missile components. After all, most of the equipment could be considered dual use and could appear in separate manifests etc. All the subterfuges proliferation profiteers have used in the past. Importantly, it is much, much easier to reverse engineer a production line than it is to reverse engineer a missile component. After all, once you know the production line components, it is quite easy to buy similar or even exactly the same production equipment else where. The difficulty in reverse engineering is to infer the production scheme.

Too Advanced for Purchasing Production Lines?

An Iranian welding the Shahab engine injection head.
This illustrates the shop-floor know-how that is so
important — and so hard to acquire.

If this happened for the Nodong missile, is it possible it could also happen for an SS-N-6? In fact, it seems even more likely to me that it would happen for these more advanced missile components. The world is full of SA-2 engines, as Iraq showed by purchasing these engines in late 2002 ( see UNMOVIC’s Compendium, volume IV, p. 581.) The closer they get to strategic weapons, the more they come under the control of various treaties. (I’m not sure if SS-N-6 missiles ever came under any of the START etc. treaties, do any of you wonk-readers know?) It is possible that makes them harder to illicitly dispose of. It makes their production lines, however, that much more valuable.

( See my posting on estimating the costs of just the know-how associated with the Badr-2000. That alone was worth $75 million.)

What Proliferators Want

Proliferators, just as would-be producers of civilian products, want access to the technology and they are very seldom satisfied with just components. In fact, the financial inducements needed to entice developing countries into foregoing civilian technology transfer have to be considerable. It seems unreasonable that both Iran and North Korea would voluntarily put themselves into the situation David and Ted suggest, that they only have a finite number of components, and make themselves susceptible to the types of international restrictions that would eventually shut off their missile programs.

Comment [23]

I’ve been asked to try to express the significance of the Sejil launch. At first, I was given a choice for what was the most significant aspect, from a technical point of view:

-The staging?

-The fact that it was a solid propellant missile?

-A reportedly new guidance system?

All of those are, of course, very important. But I wanted to give a slightly different twist to them. In my opinion, the two most important technical “advances” represented by the Sejil are not readily apparent on the launch pad. Or perhaps I should say they are hiding in plain sight:

1) The launch of Sejil confirms, if we needed confirmation, that Iran has two major missile development groups; one a liquid propellant group and this one, a major solid propellant developmental group. Certainly these efforts share many assets and resources but they also require their own specialties. Iran has had a very active solid propellant unguided rocket program (think the Zelzal family of rockets) but the Sejil represents their debut, if you will, on the strategic stage. It is impossible to overstate the importance of Iran having these two trained cadres of experts.

2) The Sejil also represents a major advance in indigenous production capability. The Safir, Iran’s most advanced liquid propellant rocket, is clearly dependent on imported Russian technology (the second stage clearly uses Russian engines and turbopumps). Its possible that the only imported components of the Sejil are the jet vanes, and even those might be indigenously produced.

Comment [22]

UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown met with President Obama today and is reported to be pushing a “Global New Deal” to stop the economic slide. A key element of that program would be reforming bank regulation to prevent the sort of scams that created the sub-prime mortgage mess by, among other things, providing increased transparency in banking. I hope they succeed.

Increased transparency is, after all, the only way for governments to regulate tax havens, shadow banks, and things like the subprime mortgage mess. It is but a small step from there to the sorts of transparency needed to fight proliferation. After all, international banking and the financial instruments invented for it are used extensively by proliferators because they provide a certain amount of security that any purchaser needs to help ensure he is not being cheated.

For instance, there are letters of credit that specify the items being bought that must be matched against the bills of lading accompanying the shipment. (See my Arms Control Today article on this for a discussion of the different financial instruments and how they might be used in a new nonproliferation environment.) A recent series of important reports from ISIS also make this case (see the Illicit Trade section of ISIS’s publications web page). One regulatory step that might be taken could be to standardize the description of items shipped on bills of lading/letters of credit to eliminate, or at least greatly reduce, their ambiguity. Another would be to use the full weight of any economic recovery plan to enforce some order on “free trade zones” that are, unfortunately, used as transshipment points where merchandize can get relabeled with a new bill of lading and letter of credit that effectively makes them disappear off the various customs agencies’ radar.

I think this is the perfect time to build important nonproliferation goals into the world’s banking system. I hope Messrs. Obama and Brown take advantage of it.

Comment [4]

Well, well, well. Look who has a website.

Next thing you know, he’ll be blogging.

Comment [15]

Urs Tinner, AQ Khan associate and suspected CIA informant, gave an interview to SF1, a Swiss television station. According to AP’s Frank Jordans, Tinner admits to working for the US intelligence community, in particular for tipping them on the BBC China:

In a documentary airing Thursday on Swiss TV station SF1, Urs Tinner says he tipped off U.S. intelligence about a delivery of centrifuge parts meant for Libya’s nuclear weapons program.

The shipment was seized at the Italian port of Taranto in 2003, forcing Libya to admit and eventually renounce its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons.

[snip]

In the Swiss documentary, Tinner also claims he sabotaged equipment destined for uranium enrichment facilities so it would malfunction on first use. He does not say which country the sabotaged parts were destined for.

The interview airs next Thursday. (For backstory on Tinnner, read one of my earlier posts.)

SF1 has a website with some cool documents and whatnot.

I am sure the documentary will end up on YouTube and the Open Source Center. Comment [8]

Urs Tinner, alleged Khan middleman, is free — according to AP:

A Swiss man suspected of involvement in the world’s biggest nuclear smuggling ring has been released from prison after more than four years of investigative detention, his family said Sunday.

Urs Tinner, 43, was freed several days ago, his mother, Hedwig Tinner, said by telephone from eastern Switzerland.

His brother Marco Tinner, 40, remains in detention while prosecutors appeal his release to the federal criminal court in Bellinzona, she said, declining to comment further.

Pretrial detention is no picnic, but it is shocking to me that not a single one of the alleged Khan middleman has done a day in prison after a conviction — with the possible exception of Gotthard Lerch. That one I am still not sure about.

Comment [3]

Do not worry, Captain Kirk. It’s not that Khan.

Islamabad’s parks, houses, hotels and palaces are poured into the lowland between the Margala Hills. It’s a remarkably organized place with straight avenues, green and leafy side streets, bustling shops and a heavy military presence.

This time of year, the weather is pleasant, and the quicksilver is hovering around 20 degrees Celsius during the day. In summers, however, the heat is stifling. Residents tend to keep the engine running with the air-conditioning on when they stop for short errands. The houses are cool as long as the electricity works, but it’s prone to fail. The country’s power plants cannot keep up with demand. The electricity shortfall stood at some 7000 megawatts last months, and beleaguered residents faced a 30 per cent hike in energy prices before the government backtracked last month.

While Pakistan faces unprecedented financial challenges and a deteriorating security situation, one man is fighting a battle of his own. Abdul Qadeer Khan is now 72 years old and his been battling with poor health over the last couple of years. He’s under house arrest. Arguing that he’s a fall guy for the proliferation sins of previous governments, his been fighting a legal battle in the newly formed Islamabad High Court, trying to get his detention lifted.

His fight began well. On 21 July 2008, the Islamabad High Court gave him right to carry out research work, and to move around within the country after government clearance. This was not without cause. The good doctor had gone on a media offensive, and suddenly seemed to be everywhere. He needed to be silenced.

So, the deal was that Khan keep his mouth shut. Without telling anyone the government also read the 21 July ruling narrowly, not giving clearance as often as Khan would like. Not surprisingly, the Khan household felt that the government was breaking yet another deal.

Two weeks ago, Khan and his South African wife, Henny Khan, filed a petition with the Islamabad High Court asking that they be allowed to appear in person to pursue their case. They argued, amongst other things, that the Pakistani government was not complying with the July decision.

It would seem like the Islamabad High Court dismissed their plea quite quickly, arguing that the matter has already been decided on. Indeed, article 369 of the Pakistani Code of Criminal Procedure stipulates that no court shall ‘alter or review [a decision], except to correct a clerical error.’

Therefore, it would seem like Khan would need to go to the Supreme Court to get the July ruling clarified. Will he do this, however, or will he wait for his friends in government to try to get the house arrest overturned by executive decision?

Khan is very popular in Pakistan. During the first year of his house arrest, he often sat on the balcony of one of his many houses, waving at passing fans. Indeed, there are many in Islamabad who ask themselves what harm this old man can cause if the arrest is lifted.

I think that he’s going to be silently released in the coming year. However, he’s definitely not going to get his passport back any time soon. Pakistan’s powerful Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence is probably very anxious that the good doctor might be snatched should he leave the country.

So what does the Wonk readership think? Will we see the sequel ‘Khan’s back’ or will we have to settle with ‘the wrath of Khan’?

To refresh, have a listen at KRL’s lovely ad (great music):

Comment [14]

[Be careful what (comments) you ask for. Geoff Forden suggests that the premise is mistaken, and the Ashura isn’t necessarily solid-fueled at all. See the comments section below.]

Say we woke up one morning, Gregor Samsa-like, to find that all the liquid-fueled ballistic missiles in the Middle East (spread around the region by good old-fashioned North Korean salesmanship for the past couple of decades) were gone, replaced by solid-fueled missiles. Would this be reason for concern?

Probably. Solid-fueled missiles accelerate more quickly than the liquid-fueled variety, raising questions about the viability of boost-phase defenses, as noted in the 2003 APS study on that subject.

They’re also safer and easier to handle than anything that needs to be filled with a toxic, flammable liquid propellant. They don’t need to be accompanied by the same fleet of support vehicles. And they don’t take the same hours to prepare for launch. So they’re even harder to spot than the ol’ Scud-type missiles, and offer less of a time window for pre-emption.

Maybe that’s stabilizing, actually. But the downside is pretty clear.

The point is, along with the hour of the cruise missile, the hour of the solid-fueled ballistic missile is now upon us, or just about. These systems go some way towards ushering in what has been called (with only some exaggeration) “push-button warfare,” negating some of the advantages of the advanced military powers.

The latest development in the Middle East’s solid-fuel revolution is Iran’s multi-stage, 2,000-km-range “Ashura” missile, announced back in November 2007 by Iranian Defense Minister Mustafa Najjar. According to MDA Director Trey Obering, its appearance was surprising. He also called it “different.” Translation: nothing like that has been tested in North Korea yet.

Where Did It Come From?

Beats me. That’s one of the nice things about this format: nobody expects you to have all the answers.

Let’s consider a few possibilities, shall we?

Iran. In his lengthy review of Iran’s missile programs from 2006, Uzi Rubin mentions a May 2005 statement by Najjar’s predecessor, Ali Shamkhani, describing progress toward a “twin-engine” solid-fueled missile. Rubin seems to take seriously the idea of an indigenous development in this area. He later suggested as much to Peter Crail at Arms Control Today, although Crail also notes the Chinese background to Iran’s solid-propellant technology.

China by way of Pakistan. Others take the idea of an all-Iranian missile with a mine of salt. Norbert Brügge flatly equates the Ashura to Pakistan’s Shaheen-II, a two-stage solid-fueled missile with a range of 2,000 km, allegedly of Chinese origin. Charles Vick sees some differences (three stages for the Ashura?) but also a common heritage.

Under Pakistan, Circumstantial Evidence For, let’s file the display of the Shaheen-II at the biennial IDEAS arms show in Karachi, adorned with a “Not For Sale” sign. Contemporary reports say it first appeared there at the inaugural show, IDEAS 2002… initially without the sign 2000.

India. This 2006 article by Lee Kass hints broadly that Iran may have had access to some of the technologies associated with India’s two-stage, 2,000-km-range, solid-fueled Agni-II missile. Does he know something the rest of us don’t?

Nobody’s pointing fingers at Russia yet.

Commenters, over to you.

Comment [10]

Sorry I’ve been so absent lately. I’ve just been really, really, really busy. Anyway, James and Andy have done a wonderful job in the interim.

The Japanese have raided yet another business — Horkos, based un-ironically in Hiroshima Prefecture — for export control violations. Horkos is accused of exporting machining centers without the proper license. High-end machining centers can be used to manufacture centrifuge components:

A listed item requires approval for export by the minister. Horkos is suspected of falsely declaring more than one such machine tool as of lower caliber that does not require ministerial authorization for exports. The tools are suspected of having been exported to South Korea by ship in 2004.

The buyer is a general company that is not involved in weapons development but the machine tools may have been resold, the police said.

The BBC adds that “Police say the equipment, which was sent to South Korea, could have been sold to North Korea or the Middle East.” Could? Sounds like speculation to me. (AFP and AP are more restrained.)

The Horkos website is still up, by the way — with a helpful list of products. Maybe someone with better technical chops than mine (which is to say, any) would like to figure out which of the machines are controlled. For a reference point, I recall that Urs Tunner bought a Cincinnati Hawk 150 Machining Center for SCOPE.)

Seems to be a lot of this going around in Japan — although this sounds like a coincidence.

Comment [6]

I’m now back from the US, where I had two week’s holiday followed by a conference at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey. Since the conference was under the Chatham House Rule, there’s not much I can say except that it was excellent; the following photo of Monterey’s wildlife will have to substitute for a fuller report.

Anyway, the big nuclear news of the weekend has been the revelation (from David Albright via the WaPo and others) that in 2006 the design for an “advanced nuclear weapon” was discovered on a computer belonging to AQ Khan associate, Urs Tinner.

The article says that “U.N. officials cannot rule out the possibility that the blueprints were shared with others before their discovery.”

However, on BBC Radio this morning IISS’s Mark Fitzpatrick stated that there is evidence that “the Swiss connection… had made copies of at least some designs and sent them to one of Khan’s associates [Tahir] who at that time was in Malaysia…” Intriguingly, Fitzpatrick implies that more than one design was found on the computer.

I want to raise three observations or questions about this story.

The first thing to point out is that this story isn’t quite as new as the media is making out. An AP article, highlighted by Jeffrey almost three weeks ago mentions that “detailed construction plans for nuclear weapons” were found on Tinner’s computer (although it says no more about them).

Second, the physicist in me wonders what type of weapon was involved. A simple fission weapon or a boosted fission weapon? Or both? (Pakistan, whence the designs originated, is believed to possess both so any answer seems plausible.)

This issue is important because any of the states which might have received the designs are likely to find it much easier to build a simple fission weapon than a boosted fission one (not least because to build a boosted fission weapon they would have to develop external initiator technology).

However, most importantly, I want to question how much difference this actually makes at a practical level. On the Radio this morning, Gordon Correra (who I respect enormously) said this:

But that [the design that Libya bought] was an old Chinese design from the 1960s and so it wasn’t much use. But, what we’re learning now is that, from the investigations into those European businessmen who formed Khan’s network, that on a computer of a family in Switzerland were designs for a much more advanced nuclear weapon…

And that’s really worrying because it’s the design for a small powerful nuclear weapon that can be fitted onto a missile. And that really is the holy grail for a county trying to develop a usable bomb.

However, I’m not sure I agree with him. I think the “holy grail” for a proliferator is getting the Bomb in the first place.

North Korea’s bomb (probably technologically no better than a 1945 US design) is already an effective deterrent, even if it can’t be delivered by missile. The threat of delivery by an airplane or container ship works just fine for deterrence purposes.

Similarly, the prospect of military action against Iran will evaporate if it ever gets the Bomb, regardless of whether or not Mark 1 can be fitted onto a missile.

A warhead deliverable by missile might increase North Korea’s or Iran’s ability to execute a first strike, but I think that is very unlikely to start with.

Don’t misunderstand me; I don’t want to underplay the seriousness of Khan selling weapon designs. But, from a proliferators perspective, mounting a warhead on a missile is surely only a modest strategic advantage compared to obtaining the Bomb in the first place.

Comment [18]