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Two weeks ago, a story broke involving the arrest in Slovakia of two Hungarians and one Ukrainian for allegedly trying to peddle around 1 pound of weapons-grade highly-enriched uranium.

Days later, the incident was reported as involving 481.4 grams of a substance containing uranium 235, with a Slovak lab technician saying “Preliminary examinations showed it was low-enriched uranium,” which contains U-235 but can’t be used in a bomb. Big difference.

Well, a State Department official confirmed to me yesterday that the material was definitely not HEU.

When the story first broke, I was skeptical of the initial claim by the Slovak police that the level of enrichment was 98.6%. The precision of the number rubbed me the wrong way, given that the bust had just occurred, but it also struck me as a bit high. I’m not a physicist, but my understanding is that to the extent HEU is used in non-weapons applications — such as research reactors, propulsion, and radioisotope production — it is almost always closer to 90% U-235. (I’m sure a reader will correct me if I’ve got this wrong…)

Anyway, this seems to be one of those cases where authorities rush to worst-case judgments to hype their accomplishment. The Slovak police deserve credit for the bust, but crying wolf is never a good thing.

Addendum: And the extraordinary precision of that 98.6% figure? A little birdie told me today that the NRDC’s Tom Cochran had it right two weeks ago when he told the New York Times that the figure is the confidence in the radiation detector measurement, not the [level of] enrichment. Way to go Tom!

David Isenberg has a cool new blog devoted to the nuclear black (and gray) market — and, in particular, you know who …

Check it out.

I’ve kept up an e-mail conversation with Mark Hibbs on-and-off for that past couple of years. So, I was really psyched to meet him in person at this year’s Carnegie Conference. Apparently, I am not the only one. With a huge amount of notoriety from Bill Langewiesche’s Atomic Bazaar, Hibbs finds himself on the dais right now with Joe Cirincione and Matt Bunn.

One of the main themes is how Hibbs managed to get right stories that the rest of the media got wrong.

One of the best of the examples is the 2002 claim by the CIA that the DPRK was constructing a centrifuge facility. Not playing with centrifuges, but building “a plant that could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for two or more nuclear weapons per year when fully operational—which could be as soon as mid-decade.”

[Readers of this blog and Arms Control Today know Paul was also an early skeptic of this claim (more).]

Mark called “bullshit” right away, writing in an October 2002 story:

Intelligence data suggest the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) may not have made needed technical breakthroughs in its secret uranium enrichment effort, and may even have reached a critical impasse leading Pyongyang to effectively terminate the program by disclosing its existence to U.S. officials two weeks ago, Western government officials told Nucleonics Week.

Joe read that paragaph to Mark and asked a simple question: How did you know that?

“I was asking technical questions about what did we know about what the North Koreans were obtaining,” Mark said simply, explaining that North Korea’s purchases simply did not support the conclusion that the program was very far advanced.

Exactly why Mark is the best.

Good morning. This is a Calutron used to enrich uranium in the Iraqi nuclear weapons program.

After the 1991 Gulf War, IAEA inspectors found that the Iraqi’s had set up Calutrons, using dual-use products like oil diffusion pumps (right). Many companies, including Germany’s Oerlikon Leybold Vacuum, had sold such pumps to Iraq, believing they would be used in the oil industry (or not caring how they would be used).

I am staring at pictures of that Calutron and oil diffusion pump in the panel Finding Innovative Ways to Detect and Thwart Illicit Nuclear Trade.

The pictures are in a presentation, not by an academic or an activist, but by Ralf Wirtz, an executive in the export control divison of Oerlikon Leybold Vacuum—makers of vacuum products and other applications that can be used in centrifuges, missiles and production facilities for chemical and biological weapons agents.

(Sadly, he did not say “Despite what you think, our vacuum products don’t suck.”)

Wirtz is telling the story of how Oerlikon set up its division after being implicated in Iraq’s pre-1991 nuclear weapons program and how it now approaches issues related to dual use purchases that seem a little shady.

David Albright, from ISIS, and Matti Tarvainen, from the IAEA, also made great presentations, but really to the point of how the important role that private firms play in combating proliferation networks.

Gadzooks! How did it get to be Friday already? Thanks much to Mr. AC Wonk for the opportunity—I’ll try not to let it go to my head. Without further ado…

Really, when you think about it, is there anything wilder than the intersection of two intergovernmental organizations? (Ok, don’t think about it too hard.) And in this case, not just any two IGOs, but the UN’s 1540 Committee and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Just saying those words all together like that gets you in the mood for some weekend fun, doesn’t it?

Well, it seems as though the Institute of International and Strategic Relations and the Centre for Strategic and International Studies-Jakarta sure thought it did, because a week ago, they organized just such a cross-organizational meeting at CSIS’s facilities in downtown Jakarta, and I got to attend. The subject of the meeting was “Proliferation Challenges: Assessing the Implementation of 1540 Resolution in South Eastern Asia,” which pretty much says it all. It was an interesting two days of discussions among representatives of ASEAN countries, a few other interested parties (US, France, Australia, Slovakia), and some NGOs.

The crux of the issue is that for 3 years now, the 1540 Committee has been working with countries to implement UNSCR Resolution 1540 (which attempts to hold countries more accountable for controls over WMD activity that might be happening inside their borders) and yet there’s a long way to go. Countries are tasked with a list of requirements: submitting national reports, passing relevant domestic implementing legislation, and increasing domestic controls in a variety of ways.

ASEAN countries are of particular interest to the 1540 Committee for a number of reasons. While all 10 countries have taken the initial steps of submitting national reports, there is wild variance in progress on passing implementing legislation, and as well, in putting that legislation into practice. As well, while the ASEAN countries have themselves been the victims of mass terrorism, there are any number of other pressing issues that take priority—public health, economic development, and corruption, to name a few.

Last year, the UN Security Council went a step further and passed a follow-on to 1540: 1673 (they’re such catchy names!), which encouraged countries to seek out help where they might need it, and for others to seek to provide help, with the 1540 Committee acting as a kind of IGO matchmaker. The word is, this has started to happen, but in distressingly low numbers – really only a handful of instances.

A number of NGOs (Stimson Center, Monterey Institute, SIPRI, a few others, and my own org, the Stanley Foundation) have dedicated projects looking to help out—particularly as the 1540 Committee has limited resources. But one of the challenges for NGOs is that much of the most helpful information gathered by the committee—database matrices that indicate countries’ status over a wide range of areas—has not been made public, meaning that oftentimes NGOs have to piece relevant information together themselves (for an excellent example, see Peter Crail’s fine report from the July 2006 Nonproliferation Review).

We often call for transparency, and here’s a fine instance of where it would be really useful, not only for us in the NGO world, but also as a good faith effort to show the progress that’s being made down in the trenches on the nonproliferation front. I have a birthday coming up before too long – how about it, 1540 Committee: if I’m not going to get a shiny new guitar , how about a nice gift-wrapped package of database matrices in my inbox?

In the New York Times this past weekend, Jonathan Raban reviews the new book by William Langewieshe (yes, I’ve been wondering too… it’s long-gah-vee-shuh).

The Atomic Bazaar combines Langewieshe’s pieces from the Atlantic Monthly, one on smuggling nuclear materials from Russia and the others on the A.Q. Khan network (part 1 and part 2).

Raban liked it, noting especially the tone:

The most alarming thing about “The Atomic Bazaar” is its utter lack of alarmism. At every point, Langewiesche stresses the difficulties that confront the determined nuclear terrorist. Between Ozersk and an explosion in an American city lies an epic string of daunting obstacles. The terrorist would need to be gifted with an extraordinary run of luck. But none of these obstacles are, in themselves, insurmountable and, in the nearly lawless parts of the world described by Langewiesche, luck comes easily to anyone with millions in his pocket.

In the original nuclear smuggling article, How to Get a Nuclear Bomb, I remember being disappointed that Langewieshe spent more time on the option of stealing Russian HEU with a commando squad, than on the more serious problem of insider theft. In fact, that article sounded quite alarmist too me.

The NYT review, and a recent NPR interview, seem to suggest that in the book, Langewieshe does focus more on insider threat, and perhaps with a calmer tone.

The review also identifies some flaws, which are mostly structural:

Like its predecessors, “The Atomic Bazaar” comes with the curse of The Atlantic Monthly all too visible on its pages, its chapters like free-standing boxcars, loosely coupled by a large general theme — much as they appeared in separate issues of the magazine between November 2005 and December 2006. Too little work has gone into its translation from journalism to book. Though short, it’s littered with clunky repetitions and recapitulations, as when we’re repeatedly told what H.E.U. is and does, and A. Q. Khan twice falls from public grace.

I am not going to be near a US book store for a bit longer, so if anyone is reading the book, please feel free to chime in.

Reuters and a number of other sources are reporting the arrest of Fortunat Lumu, Commissioner General for Atomic Energy in Democratic Republic of the Congo, over suspected plans to illegally sell uranium.

Basically, this is all the info: a Kinshasa newspaper alleged (no public evidence yet to support the claim, notes BBC) that uranium is missing from the city’s atomic institute, Congolese authorities confirmed the arrest of Lumu and another associate, and Congo’s Minister of Scientific Research Sylvanus Mushi said that there was contact with a criminal network, “a group of people coming from all over the world, from Europe, from South Africa, from the Seychelles.”

Stories on uranium from the Republic of the Congo have been popping up for a while, and like this most recent one, each time seem to lack any details. Global Security Newswire reported on it in June 2004 and July 2006. In November 2006 Reuters quoted unnamed officials on concerns of sales to Iran.

Last August, Jeffrey wrote a post tearing into a Sunday Times of London article which claimed uranium sales from Congo to Iran. Clearly, the AP was not paying attention to Jeffrey’s wisdom (which, by the way, comes up quickly in a google search for the story), and again referenced the Sunday Times report.

Yesterday, I blogged about a Mark Hibbs story in Nuclear Fuel about Pakistan’s P4 centrifuge. The P4, Hibbs wrote, was either called SLM or “was based on another centrifuge having that name …” Hibbs seemed a little confused because a URENCO official told him that URENCO’s files didn’t show any centrifuge named “SLM.”

Well, that was last week.

Now other senior URENCO officials “well placed sources” tell Hibbs that, yes, the SLM program existed and became the URENCO TC-10:

This was followed by another six-tube centrifuge called SLM. During its development, SLM became known as TC-10, well-placed sources said. According to one Western analyst, some attributes, including the separative power, of SLM/TC-10 and the Pakistani P-4 were similar.

URENCO developed the TC-10 between 1979-1983 after Khan left for Pakistan. The implication is clear:

If it is confirmed that the P-4 machine is based on TC-10, that would strongly suggest that Pakistan continued to steal design information from the Urenco centrifuge program after 1975.

That is a very interesting piece of information.

(Mark Hibbs, “P-4 centrifuge raised intelligence concerns about post-1975 data theft,” Nuclear Fuel 48:7, February 15, 2007, 1, 13.)

How Many Segments in the P1?

A commenter asked, yesterday, how many rotor segments has the P1?

I skipped over that because the answer isn’t super straightforward and didn’t seem material to me.

But, since you ask, the answer is in: Mark Hibbs, “Iran, Libya Centrifuge Probes Point to Extensive Know-how Theft,” Nuclear Fuel, January 3, 2005, 1.

The P1 is derived from the URENCO SNOR and CNOR centrifuges. SNOR comprises one segment with a total throughput under 1 SWU/yr; CNOR comprises six segements with a total throughput of about 3 SWU/year.

The P-1 in Iran turns out to be have four segments with a total throughput somewhere in between 1 and 3 SWU/year (For calculations on Iran’s P1 performance, see: More Fun With SWU and Iranian Centrifuge Developments).

Mark Hibbs has published specifications for Pakistan’s P3 and P4 centrifuges based on “Western government data.”

I haven’t seen this anywhere else, so here it is (with rough data on the P1 and P2 for comparison):

Source for P3 and P4: Mark Hibbs, “Pakistan developed more powerful centrifuges,” Nuclear Fuel, January 29, 2007, 1, 15-16.

I find it interesting that Pakistan remained committed to maraging steel, rather than carbon fiber, as the material for its centrifuge rotors. Sources told Hibbs that “procurement breakthroughs” were partially responsible for Pakistan obtaining maraging steel with higher tensile strength necessary for the P4 centrifuge.

I am fascinated by procurement networks. Recently, I wrote an article in The Bulletin entitled, “A Crisis of Confidence,” arguing that the principal challenge facing the nonproliferation regime is not a crisis of compliance, but rather confidence among US policymakers about our ability to detect clandestine gas centrifuge programs.

It is my hypothesis that US policymakers were late to recognize the challenge posed by gas centrifuges, and may be over-reacting (ALUMINUM TUBES! THE END IS NIGH!). Despite the understandable panic, options for controlling sensitive components and monitoring national programs may still be feasible, if difficult.

At the very least, it is way too early to conclude that such efforts are futile and throw in the towel.

That argument, by the way, will form the basis of my presentation on Tuesday, February 20 at the Belfer Center on “Gas Centrifuges and the Future of the Nonproliferation Regime.”

Classified GAO reports. I knew they existed, but this is one is one that ought to be declassified, at least summary form:

Nonproliferation: Better Controls Needed to Plan and Manage Proliferation Security Initiative Activities. GAO-06-937C. September 28, 2006.

About the only thing I know are two recommendations, as described in H.R. 1:

(A) The Department of Defense and the Department of State should establish clear PSI roles and responsibilities, policies and procedures, interagency communication mechanisms, documentation requirements, and indicators to measure program results.

(B) The Department of Defense and the Department of State should develop a strategy to work with PSI-participating countries to resolve issues that are impediments to conducting successful PSI interdictions.

I am not surprised the issue of metrics is proving nettlesome—Bush Administration officials can’t even agree on whether the interdiction of the BBC China was the most important PSI operation or was merely conducted within the “framework” of PSI. A year and a half ago, I tried to do my best at guessing the 11 “successful” operations that SECSTATE Rice attributed to PSI.

The bill, H.R. 1, also suggests getting a Security Council resolution to affirm the legality of PSI (not a bad idea) and creating a multilateral organization to implement the treaty (a more complicated case to make).

Not surprisingly, the black helicopter crowd has decided that these ideas constitute “placing PSI under UN control”—which suggest either limited reading comprehension, a total disregard for the facts, or both.

Anyway, someone with neither defect could learn a lot about PSI from Jofi Joseph’s June 2004 article in Arms Control Today, Sharon Squassoni’s September 2006 CRS Report, and various fact sheets, interviews and articles written by Wade Boese.