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That was just cooler than the original title of the post, “Nuclear Archeology and Highly Enriched Uranium”—a subject that Frank Von Hippel mentioned during a really interesting meeting organized by Stephen Schwartz and the The Nonproliferation Review.

Frank discussed his article with FAS’ Steven Aftergood entitled the “US HEU declaration, The U.S. Highly Enriched Uranium Declaration: Transparency Deferred But Not Denied.”

The document, which is available on the FAS website, is a fascinating read. Frank and Steve wrenched loose the document, which covers US HEU production from 1946 through 1996, from the clutches of DOE using the Freedom of Information Act.

Frank made a proposal that I think is really interesting. He proposed using the declaration as the basis for a joint verification experiment between US and Russian labs.

I asked about the technical details of such an experiment. Frank mentioned depleted uranium, pointing to Steve Fetter’s article on nuclear archeology, and added “I am sure there are some other good ideas out there.”

Here is the relevant paragraph from Fetter, Nuclear Archaeology: Verifying Declarations of Fissile-Material Production:

Verifying HEU production is more difficult because enrichment facilities have been used to produce uranium of varying enrichments. LEU is unusable for bombs, but almost any facility capable of producing LEU is theoretically capable of producing HEU. If a nation claims to have produced only LEU, one could verify this by measuring the U-235:U-234 ratio in the tails, assuming that the tails are available for inspection and that the composition of the feed is known. The date that the tails were produced can be estimated by measuring the concentration of decay products of uranium isotopes, thus providing additional data that can be used to verify the accuracy of production records.

The National Academies Study on Monitoring Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear-Explosive Materials: An Assessment of Methods and Capabilities (2005), in which Steve participated, was cautious about the challenges of verifying past HEU production, noting that “a comprehensive inventory of depleted uranium stocks of U.S. and Russian would be very difficult and costly, and the resulting estimate of HEU production probably would not be sufficiently accurate to be useful.”

In particular, the National Academies panel pointed to the difficult (but ultimately successful) effort to verify South Africa’s HEU declaration. That process is explained in some detail in Adolf von Baeckmann, Gary Dillon, and Demetrius Perricos, “Nuclear Verification in South Africa,” IAEA Bulletin, 37 (March 1995) full text.

This doesn’t mean, of course, that the joint experiment couldn’t be useful in developing techniques for smaller cases such as South Africa or thinking about transparency requirements for states like Iran that move into the the uranium enrichment business.

Comment

José Maria Sert’s 1934 mural depicting the progress of humankind toward peace.

Wow, the Conference on Disarmament may be moving toward a program of work.

The good folks at Reaching Critical Will report that the CD could take a decision as early as Tuesday to begin negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty:

On behalf of the six Presidents (P6), Sri Lanka presented a proposal for work, and a draft decision (CD/2007/L.1) for the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to endorse that proposal, on Friday, March 23. The draft decision appoints a Coordinator to preside over negotiations on a treaty to ban the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons (FissBan or FM©T). It also appoints Coordinators to preside over substantive discussions on nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war, issues related to the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), and appropriate international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon states against the threat or use of nuclear weapons (NSAs). The P6 intend for the CD to take this decision next week, and if it is adopted, the CD will begin negotiating a new disarmament treaty for the first time in 10 years.

Rumor has it that the United States has finally agreed to substantive discussions on the other issues, including outer space. (Yea!) Unfortunately, China is rumored to be less interested in starting discussions on space than in blocking an FMCT. (Boo.)

India is rumored to be attempting to block the deal. If true, this is a substantial issue: In order to waive certain pertinent sections of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 under Public Law 109-401, the President must certify among other things that “India is working actively with the United States for the early conclusion of a multilateral treaty on the cessation of the production of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”

Fortunately, I am off to Geneva on Friday for a couple of days (Sunday, Monday and Tuesday) for a conference and (now) to do a little reconnaissance.

Local readers interested in grabbing a beer in Geneva on should send me a note at armscontrolwonk [at] gmail.com. Most likely, I’ll be at Mr. Pickwick Pub, knocking back a Boddingtons or two.

Stephen Rademaker (my buddy) has introduced a draft fissile material cut-off treaty at the Conference on Disarmament.

Shorter Rademaker:

Article 1. States Party undertake to kiss my bony ass.

Sadly, this is only vaguely hyperbole.

The treaty, as it were, seems intended to buy the Administration some credibility with Congress on the US-India deal while going nowhere in the Conference on Disarmament—the most most transparently cynical proposal since Caligula made a Senator of his horse.

Think I am being unfair? Read Rademaker’s harrangue where he submits the draft treaty, takes a swipe at the CD and many of its members for “hostage taking,” and then prounces the text frat-boy cool with a demonstrative “it’s all here.” Oh, yeah.

I wonder … Is this how Rademaker proposed to Danielle Pletka?

Michael Krepon at the Stimson Center has attempted to point out the various flaws with more measure and grace than I can muster at the moment.

Comment [2]

Rhianna Tyson, summarizing events in the UN First Committee, notes:

The overwhelming adoption of draft resolution L.34 on a verifiable FMCT, however, demonstrates that the international community is not yet ready to capitulate to the newest US-thrown wrench in the diplomacy cogs. Even though a draft resolution on an FMCT was put to vote for the first time in years, the overwhelming support for a verifiable FMCT illuminates a spark of dissent and courage to stand up to one, unruly superpower.

The vote was 147-1, with two abstentions (United Kingdom and Israel).

Comment

Despite the recent announcement that the United States supports a fissile material cut-off treaty, the United States is still blocking adoption of a work program that would allow negotiations to begin.

The new President of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, Ambassador U Mya Than of Myanmar, has urged the delegations "not in a position to go along with the A5 proposal" to "explain and make suggestions on ways and means to modify A5" in the upcoming informal plenary on the matter.

That pretty much means us. The United States and France are the only countries not record supporting the A5 proposal.

As I/’ve mentioned before, the sudden announcement that we (still) support the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty was a transparent and cynical election year move.

Disarmament Diplomacy has a nice history of the A5 proposal, with an emphasis on bridging the differences between the United States and China. Regular updates on the CD are available from Rhianna Tyson at the Women/’s International League for Peace and Freedom.

The text of Ambassador Sander/’s speech at the CD reaffirming US support for the FMCT actually represents a step backward for U.S. policy. Now I understand why the State Department sat on the full text for a couple of days. She states:

We believe an FMCT is ripe for negotiations and must have a clean mandate that is not linked to other unrelated proposals for CD Ad Hoc Committees.

A clean mandate is a retreat from consensus, not a move toward it. The previous U.S. position (articulated in February 2002) supported "a comprehensive program of work along the lines proposed by one of your most distinguished predecessors, Ambassador Celso Amorim of Brazil." That proposal was articulated in CD/1624 (August 24, 2000), also called the The Amorim proposal.

Sounds like a summer blockbuster, doesn/’t it? Maybe Andy Garcia will play Celso Amorim.

Anyway, CD/1624 recommended the establishment of four ad hoc committees, including one to negotiate an FMCT and another to "deal with" preventing an arms race in outer space (PAROS). Amorim attached a draft presidential declaration stressing the CD/’s status as a negotiating forum and that the mandates should be viewed in this light.

The Amorim proposal has evolved into CD/1693 (January 23, 2003, revised 1693/Rev.1, June 2003), also called the The A5 initiative. Like Amorim, the A5 proposes four ad hoc committees, including one to negotiate an FMCT and one to "identify and examine" PAROS-related issues.

Sanders/’ call for a "clean" mandate appears incompatible with these proposals, which otherwise enjoy consensus support among the members of the CD.


Will Andy Garcia (left) play Celso Amorim (right) in The Amorim Proposal? Not if Jackie Sanders has anything to say about it ...

Wade Boese, at the Arms Control Association, was kind enough to send along the State Department press guidance regarding the renewed effort for a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty:

Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty Policy

The United States has completed its policy review on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT).

The United States believes that achieving an end to the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons is a desirable goal. As part of our effort to achieve that goal, the U.S. reaffirms our commitment to the negotiation at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. We aim to achieve the objective of an FMCT -- a legally binding ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons -- as soon as possible.

The United States also reaffirms its moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear explosives, and calls on all states that have not done so to make comparable public pledges.

Our extensive review has concluded that there are serious concurs as to whether an "effectively verifiable" FMCT is realistically achievable. Effective verification of an FMCT would require an inspection regime so extensive that it could compromise key signatories/’ core national security interests and so costly that many countries will be hesitant to accept it. Moreover, we have concluded that, even with extensive verification measures, we will not have high confidence in our ability to monitor compliance with an FMCT. The United States delegation in Geneva will want to discuss these concerns in detail with other CD members.

The United States delegation in Geneva will work to have the CD begin negotiating a legally binding FMCT before the CD finishes its deliberations for this year in September.

The Washington Post, focusing on the Administration/’s opposition to verification provisions, reports that "Administration officials said they made the decision after concluding such a system would cost too much, require overly intrusive inspections and wouldn/’t guarantee compliance with the treaty."

If you want to read more about the fissile material cut-off treaty, particularly verification provisions, I suggest Frans Berkhout, Oleg Bukharin, Harold Feiveson and Marvin Miller, "A Cutoff in the Production of Fissile Material," International Security 19:3 (Winter, 1994-1995) 167-202 and Steve Fetter, "Nuclear Archaeology: Verifying Declarations of Fissile-Material Production" Science and Global Security 3: 3-4 (1994) 237-259.

The United States has suddenly announced that we support (again) the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty, which would prohibit the production of fissile materal for nuclear weapons.

And I mean suddenly. The Bush Administration had been reviewing its support for the FMCT, obstructing negotiations in the CD. And then (according to AP) ...

"Without explanation, the administration suddenly decided to put forward its proposal to start negotiations on the treaty. Diplomats from other delegations said they understood that Sanders/’ speech was written overnight and that the session of the conference was delayed about half an hour because of finishing touches to the text.

...

Unusually, the U.S. mission to international organizations in Geneva refused to release a copy of the speech."

AP implied it was a response to Kerry/’s June speech that called for preventing "the creation of new materials that are being produced for nuclear weapons."

Daryl Kimball noted that Sanders expressed "serious concerns" about verification, and concluded the move was "a clever attempt to feign support for negotiations while undermining the chances of success because of the lack of support for verification." ACA put out a statement.

Two things that no one seems to mention: First, supporting the FMCT means pressuring Israel. Do you think Bush will squeeze Sharon/’s beytzah between now and November?

Second, the CD is done for the year on September 10 and won/’t start up until January (after the election). This is cost-free for the Bush Administration, since they don/’t have to make good on it until after the election. Some of the obstructionist states pulled the same move in August 1998, when they agreed to a workplan but then ran out the clock.