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The text of the Obama-Medvedev statement is now available. Actually, there are two of them: a long statement on life, the universe and everything and a short statement on strategic arms control.

The arms control statement is pretty vague; presumably it is intended to give the negotiators maximum flexibility (and fair enough). More interesting is the language on this point from the long statement:

As leaders of the two largest nuclear weapons states, we agreed to work together to fulfill our obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and demonstrate leadership in reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world. We committed our two countries to achieving a nuclear free world, while recognizing that this long-term goal will require a new emphasis on arms control and conflict resolution measures, and their full implementation by all concerned nations.

Russians I had spoken to a couple of months ago thought that Medvedev would not be willing to mention a nuclear-weapon-free world (or even the ubiquitous but odd “nuclear free world”) and would instead insist on talking solely and more vaguely about fulfilling article VI. So, the wording used in the statement is perhaps noteworthy. A product maybe of the geronto-diplomacy we have seen recently?

Of course, the START follow-on treaty is most probably only going to contain modest cuts. Nonetheless, look at it this way: If, say, three years ago, you had been told that a young, liberal, black US President and his Russian counterpart had publicly committed their nations to the abolition of nuclear weapons on 1 April, what would you have concluded?

Comment [6]

Last September, George Perkovich and I published an Adelphi Paper, Abolishing Nuclear Weapons, which attempted to identify the challenges of getting to zero and how they might be overcome. Most of all, however, it called for serious international debate on the subject.

We have made an effort to catalyze such debate with our new book Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: A Debate. This book reproduces the original Adelphi Paper, followed by 17 responses from officials, analysts and authors representing 13 countries (nuclear-armed states and non-nuclear-weapon states). The volume ends with a concluding essay by George and me. And, it’s all available free of charge from here!

We made a real effort to have a broad spectrum of opinion with authors including Jonathan Schell, Sir Lawrence Freedman, Frank Miller, Scott Sagan and President Ernesto Zedillo.

As well as a lot of content, there are also some great pieces of writing. Let me share a couple of my favourites.

Sir Lawrence Freedman on the need for greater public engagement:

As things stand now, if governments start dragging their feet, it is hard to imagine vocal demands and public demonstration to get the process back on track. If nationalist politicians start to insist that their country is being duped into putting national security at risk, it is just as likely that demands to slow down would follow. As long as talk of abolition remains the diplomatic equivalent of easy-listening elevator music, and as political leaders remember to assert their belief in a world without war and weapons—and, while they’re at it, no more poverty and disease either—few will pay attention. Only as the talk becomes serious will public debate open up, and properly so. Depending on the political system, dissent from the official line may be vigorous and open or cryptic and furtive. In all cases, the course of the debate will be influenced by the interaction with whatever happens to be on the public agenda at the time and the passing concerns of the moment.

Zia Mian on the problem with framing the disarmament debate in terms of security:

Some arguments that policy makers may advance for abolition will certainly conflict with long-standing official narratives of national security that have served to justify a role for nuclear weapons. These arguments may trigger debates about what, if anything, could fill the nuclear-weapon shaped hole that would result from the abolition of nuclear weapons. The pursuit of disarmament may become tied to the search for reassurance through technological, strategic, and political substitutes for nuclear weapons. Other arguments for abolition may claim that eliminating nuclear weapons would not actually undermine the security calculation of a nuclear-armed state, but would in fact strengthen its position relative to rivals and in the international system. Such an argument could complicate efforts by some other states to make a case for disarming.

In addition, St. Anthony’s International Review has also joined the debate by publishing an excellent critique of our Adelphi Paper by Elbridge Colby and a response by us. Again, all available free of charge and worthwhile too because this exchange really helps crystalize an important aspect of the wider debate, in my opinion.

Enjoy.

Comment [23]

I recently heard a funny story about the negotiations for the START II treaty. It turns out that when the US START II treaty negotiators tried to explain to their Russian counterparts the need for a “strategic reserve” of nuclear warheads, they called it a hedge. The Russian interpreters alternately translated that as either “cheat” or “shrub”. No matter what you call it, however, the US decided to keep a strategic reserve of many thousands of nuclear warheads that could be quickly uploaded to Minuteman III or Trident missile systems. Both of these missile systems have had their numbers of warheads considerably reduced according to START II levels. These US warheads have been, if you will, “de-altered” but now is the time to deactivate them.

Asymmetries
This US strategic reserve is apparently not paralleled in Russian stockpiles. In fact, I’ve been told that Russia only keeps a very small number of warheads assembled to replace those that are judged inoperable. This seems to be consistent with other reports that Russia recycles its fissile material to manufacture new warheads. If such an asymmetry really does exist, and I have no reason to doubt that it doesn’t, the US strategic reserve represents a significant barrier to the drastic reductions in nuclear weapons proposed by the so-called Four Horsemen: Secretaries Shultz, Perry, Kissinger, and Sen. Nunn. On the other hand, there are other potential asymmetries that might make it difficult for the US to dismantle its strategic reserve.

Chief among these difficulties in reducing the US stockpile of strategic reserve warheads is the belief that US warheads are far more difficult and time-consuming to make than Russian warheads. For instance, the unclassified time it takes to produce a US pit is six months with a similar time given for the production of a secondary. The production lines of these can, of course, be run in parallel and multiple pits and multiple secondaries can be worked on at the same time. So the number of warheads the US could eventually produce could be quite large but there would be a significant time delay. But if Russian warheads are produced with a considerably smaller start up time, the US could quite legitimately feel threatened. (Of course, a fissile material cut off treaty and a permanent disposal of warhead materials is the ultimate goal, but I’m talking about the near term and not letting it get in the way of major reductions.)

Confidence Building Measures
It seems to me a good first step in increasing confidence between the US and Russia should be to increase the transparency associated with the time it takes to produce warheads. At the same time, neither side should be asked to give away design secrets. (I don’t really want to get into an argument about whether or not there are any true secrets between the US and Russia about their nuclear weapon designs, they just won’t want to do it.) But it shouldn’t really be necessary to give away design secrets in order to verify the time it takes to produce them. Historical production records, such as orders to begin production of such and such a warhead type, orders to transfer warheads from one facility to another, perhaps even the so-called Russian “passports,” if they are redacted of any secret information, might be useful.

As a gesture of goodwill, the United States could simply hand the Russians a list of the titles of documents associated with the production of warheads. It doesn’t even have to be an exhaustive list if some of the titles are classified. If the Russians reciprocated, these lists could be a starting point for discussions of confidence building measures that might eventually result in a reduction or elimination of the strategic reserves of nuclear weapons. Strangely enough, both Russia and the US have had considerable shared experience with this documentary forensics from their days of cooperating with the inspection process in Iraq. Let’s build on that!

Comment [17]

I have just returned from Berlin where I attended a meeting at the Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung. The meeting discussed a forthcoming report on the future of nuclear weapons in Europe. Specifically, it discussed whether now is the time to have a phased and incremental debate on what to do with NATO’s short-range nuclear forces. NATO’s tactical arsenal comprises some 2-300 nuclear gravity bombs deployed in Western Europe.

Does the Alliance need these weapons? Our chief wonk, Jeffrey Lewis, made his point of view reasonably clear back in June (see the entry NATO Nukes Not Secure and the discussion following it). I don’t have a personal opinion on whether tactical nuclear weapons matter for European defence, but it would seem to me that if you do want to get rid of them, now would be a good time.

While some politicians represented at the Foundation meeting seemed to question the utility of having these weapons around, the technocrats stressed the Alliance’s belief that the gravity bombs have a deterrent value. It was said that Alliance members are convinced that it is necessary to keep U.S. nuclear weapons on European soil.

One participant said that it is either “the present force structure or nothing”. Once the U.S. weapons are gone, he said, they won’t come back. And so, there was considerable concern of the proposed forward deployment of Russian weapons. Several argued for retaining the gravity bombs as a political counterweight.

On the other hand, there are discussions here in Britain, and elsewhere in Europe, about whether or not tactical nuclear weapons are “low hanging fruit” ripe to be picked in advance of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. And indeed, recent consultations amongst Alliance members seem to indicate that there that there is considerably less attachment to these weapons than previously assumed. In other words, the member states are not as convinced as the technocrats think.

The problem is that no NATO member is willing to be the first to make the proposal. This came across strongly in the coffee breaks. Presumably, members fear that other parties would interpret such a proposal as a signal of weakening commitment to the Alliance in a time of great military challenges.

And it would need to be an Alliance heavyweight that makes the first move, and preferably one where weapons are presently deployed.

If a member picks up the ball, it would seem to me that NATO’s 2009 summit – which also marks the Alliance’s 60th anniversary – would be the perfect venue to reach a decision. Whether a removal of tactical nuclear weapons from Western Europe would have a significant impact on the 2010 NPT review conference, however, is a matter very much open for debate.

Comment [10]

A Tuesday morning distraction for you. I meant to post this yesterday—a Monday morning distraction would be more usual after all—but then got distracted myself…

The Australian government recently announced that it would convene the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament to help build consensus ahead of the 2010 NPT Review onference.

Under its last Labor government, Australia, of course, launched another high-profile disarmament initiative in the form of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons (its webpage appears to be in the process of being updated).

Of course, it’s fun to speculate who might be tapped. The chairman of the Commission has already been announced as Gareth Evans, former Australian foreign minister. It’s probably safe to assume that the Commission will consist of 10—20 commissioners drawn from a range of nationalities.

So, who do you think the other commissioners should be?

Or, alternatively, who do you think they will be?

Answers in the comment box. For reference, the Canberra Commission consisted of the following:

• Celso Amorim (Brazil)
• Lee Butler (USA)
• Richard Butler (Australia)
• Michael Carver (UK)
• Jacques-Yves Cousteau (France)
• Jayantha Dhanapala (Sri Lanka)
• Rolf Ekeus (Sweden)
• Nabil Elaraby (Egypt)
• Ryukichi Imai (Japan)
• Ronald McCoy (Malaysia)
• Robert McNamara (US)
• Robert O’Neill (UK)
• Qian Jiadong (China)
• Michel Rocard (France)
• Joseph Rotblat (UK)
• Roald Sagdeev (Russia)
• Maj Britt Theorin (Sweden)

Comment [7]

Greetings from Delhi.

Yesterday, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh opened the conference, Towards a World Free of Nuclear Weapons, by lighting a lamp (left) and giving a speech (right).

(I tried to convince George Perkovich to have a lamp lighting ceremony at the 2009 Carnegie Nonproliferation Conference, but I don’t think he bought it.)

Singh’s address to the conference, to commemorate the 20th anniversary of a speech by Rajiv Gandhi, emphasizing the need for disarmament and reiterating existing Indian proposals:

These proposals retain the spirit and substance of the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan. We hope that other states will agree to a dialogue on these proposals, and will join us in committing to nuclear disarmament. That is the critical first step – a commitment, preferably a binding legal commitment through an international instrument, to eliminate nuclear weapons within a time bound framework.

I was almost encouraged until I saw the headline in The Hindu over breakfast — “Can’t Limit Energy Options: PM.”

In fact, these are the headlines from Google News:

Limiting energy options a luxury: PM
The Statesman

N-terrorist a realistic threat, says PM
Economic Times

Nuclear energy the best option
The Hindu (online)

N-deal must for energy needs: Prime Minister
The Times of India

Only VOA headlined the story “Prime Minister Pitches Global Nuclear Disarmament.”

Back to weary cynicism.

Comment [10]

A reader, Paul Carroll, made an important point in commenting on a previous post of mine about verifying the North Korean declaration:

Obviously, when dealing with North Korea and the risk of diversion or concealment we want the uncertainty to be as low as possible. But I would urge us to caution against demanding levels of certainty that may be unattainable, and that could undermine progress on the other aspects of the deal.

Verification in North Korea is tricky because it involves ‘proving a negative’, a perennial problem that is frequently discussed on these pages. It boils down to the following question: How can North Korea demonstrate that it does not have a clandestine Pu stockpile or a uranium enrichment programme?

The IAEA faces this problem on a routine basis when trying to draw its broader conclusion about the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in a state with an additional protocol in force. John Carlson, former chairman of the Agency’s Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation, put it thus

The revolutionary aspect of safeguards development is that judgment is coming to the fore in drawing safeguards conclusions. Conclusions about the absence of something undeclared activities—can never be as definitive as conclusions based on quantitative methods applied to a finite problem—the verification of a declared inventory.

This problem was faced in verifying disarmament in South Africa—and the lessons from this case are worth reflecting on in light of the upcoming verification challenges in North Korea.

South Africa is the only state to have developed nuclear weapons indigenously and then abandoned them. When South Africa acceded to the NPT in 1991, the IAEA was tasked with verifying its initial declaration. Significantly, the results of verification were inconclusive.

To cut a long story short, there was a discrepancy between the amount of HEU South Africa had apparently produced and the amount that was in its stockpile. Such a discrepancy could have had two causes: either it was the result of errors in estimating past production (a tricky business, especially for enrichment plants) or it was indicative of the existence of a clandestine stockpile of HEU. It was impossible to tell on purely ‘technical’ grounds which explanation was correct.

In practice, of course, no-one (or at least very few people) seriously believed that South Africa had a clandestine fissile material stockpile and this raises an interesting question: How did South Africa convince the international community of the veracity of its declaration even though the results of IAEA verification activities were inconclusive?

Part of it, of course, was the broader political context. South Africa was in the process of transitioning from the apartheid system to genuine democracy. It had no security concerns that would have driven it to keep nuclear weapons and was making a concerted effort to reintegrate itself into the international community.

However, I believe that part of it was the way that South Africa built the trust of the inspectors on the ground: namely, by being exceptionally open and transparent. South Africa offered inspectors almost carte blanche to go anywhere, have access to any documents and speak to anyone—and it honoured this promise.

This transparency did not produce new information which explained away all discrepancies in the fissile material accountancy. What it did do was build the confidence of inspectors—and through them the international community—that South Africa had nothing to hide. It was a visceral thing—but no less effective for it.

Perhaps understandably, this is an aspect of the verification process in South Africa that the official history merely hints at rather than dwells upon. But, I think it’s how verification often works in practice.

The lessons from South Africa are particularly salient for North Korea. It seems that North Korea is likely to submit its declaration soon prompting the start of the verification process. If North Korea wants to demonstrate that it does not have an undeclared enrichment programme or a clandestine plutonium stockpile, transparency may be key. To convince the inspectors on the ground, active cooperation is needed; the odd concession given grudgingly within the context of an on-going battle for access won’t suffice.

However, there are also lessons here for the rest of the international community, the US in particular: namely that the results of verification can be ambiguous in a state that has nothing to hide.

Based on the objective results of verification, it might be effectively impossible for the US either to prove North Korea’s declaration is correct or to show that it has lied. If the results are indeed ambiguous, it will be very tempting for the Bush Administration to accuse the North Koreans of cheating in order to avoid a fight with Congress, which has already made noises about the Administration being weak in this area.

The only solution is to pre-empt this potential problem. The US needs to discuss these ‘what ifs’ with both North Korea and the US Congress (if it is not already doing so). It is vital that all parties have a realistic idea of what verification can—and can’t achieve—before it gets going. Otherwise the process may be doomed to fail before it’s started.

Comment [5]