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I have just returned from Berlin where I attended a meeting at the Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung. The meeting discussed a forthcoming report on the future of nuclear weapons in Europe. Specifically, it discussed whether now is the time to have a phased and incremental debate on what to do with NATO’s short-range nuclear forces. NATO’s tactical arsenal comprises some 2-300 nuclear gravity bombs deployed in Western Europe.

Does the Alliance need these weapons? Our chief wonk, Jeffrey Lewis, made his point of view reasonably clear back in June (see the entry NATO Nukes Not Secure and the discussion following it). I don’t have a personal opinion on whether tactical nuclear weapons matter for European defence, but it would seem to me that if you do want to get rid of them, now would be a good time.

While some politicians represented at the Foundation meeting seemed to question the utility of having these weapons around, the technocrats stressed the Alliance’s belief that the gravity bombs have a deterrent value. It was said that Alliance members are convinced that it is necessary to keep U.S. nuclear weapons on European soil.

One participant said that it is either “the present force structure or nothing”. Once the U.S. weapons are gone, he said, they won’t come back. And so, there was considerable concern of the proposed forward deployment of Russian weapons. Several argued for retaining the gravity bombs as a political counterweight.

On the other hand, there are discussions here in Britain, and elsewhere in Europe, about whether or not tactical nuclear weapons are “low hanging fruit” ripe to be picked in advance of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. And indeed, recent consultations amongst Alliance members seem to indicate that there that there is considerably less attachment to these weapons than previously assumed. In other words, the member states are not as convinced as the technocrats think.

The problem is that no NATO member is willing to be the first to make the proposal. This came across strongly in the coffee breaks. Presumably, members fear that other parties would interpret such a proposal as a signal of weakening commitment to the Alliance in a time of great military challenges.

And it would need to be an Alliance heavyweight that makes the first move, and preferably one where weapons are presently deployed.

If a member picks up the ball, it would seem to me that NATO’s 2009 summit – which also marks the Alliance’s 60th anniversary – would be the perfect venue to reach a decision. Whether a removal of tactical nuclear weapons from Western Europe would have a significant impact on the 2010 NPT review conference, however, is a matter very much open for debate.

Comment [10]

A Tuesday morning distraction for you. I meant to post this yesterday—a Monday morning distraction would be more usual after all—but then got distracted myself…

The Australian government recently announced that it would convene the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament to help build consensus ahead of the 2010 NPT Review onference.

Under its last Labor government, Australia, of course, launched another high-profile disarmament initiative in the form of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons (its webpage appears to be in the process of being updated).

Of course, it’s fun to speculate who might be tapped. The chairman of the Commission has already been announced as Gareth Evans, former Australian foreign minister. It’s probably safe to assume that the Commission will consist of 10—20 commissioners drawn from a range of nationalities.

So, who do you think the other commissioners should be?

Or, alternatively, who do you think they will be?

Answers in the comment box. For reference, the Canberra Commission consisted of the following:

• Celso Amorim (Brazil)
• Lee Butler (USA)
• Richard Butler (Australia)
• Michael Carver (UK)
• Jacques-Yves Cousteau (France)
• Jayantha Dhanapala (Sri Lanka)
• Rolf Ekeus (Sweden)
• Nabil Elaraby (Egypt)
• Ryukichi Imai (Japan)
• Ronald McCoy (Malaysia)
• Robert McNamara (US)
• Robert O’Neill (UK)
• Qian Jiadong (China)
• Michel Rocard (France)
• Joseph Rotblat (UK)
• Roald Sagdeev (Russia)
• Maj Britt Theorin (Sweden)

Comment [7]

Greetings from Delhi.

Yesterday, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh opened the conference, Towards a World Free of Nuclear Weapons, by lighting a lamp (left) and giving a speech (right).

(I tried to convince George Perkovich to have a lamp lighting ceremony at the 2009 Carnegie Nonproliferation Conference, but I don’t think he bought it.)

Singh’s address to the conference, to commemorate the 20th anniversary of a speech by Rajiv Gandhi, emphasizing the need for disarmament and reiterating existing Indian proposals:

These proposals retain the spirit and substance of the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan. We hope that other states will agree to a dialogue on these proposals, and will join us in committing to nuclear disarmament. That is the critical first step – a commitment, preferably a binding legal commitment through an international instrument, to eliminate nuclear weapons within a time bound framework.

I was almost encouraged until I saw the headline in The Hindu over breakfast — “Can’t Limit Energy Options: PM.”

In fact, these are the headlines from Google News:

Limiting energy options a luxury: PM
The Statesman

N-terrorist a realistic threat, says PM
Economic Times

Nuclear energy the best option
The Hindu (online)

N-deal must for energy needs: Prime Minister
The Times of India

Only VOA headlined the story “Prime Minister Pitches Global Nuclear Disarmament.”

Back to weary cynicism.

Comment [10]

A reader, Paul Carroll, made an important point in commenting on a previous post of mine about verifying the North Korean declaration:

Obviously, when dealing with North Korea and the risk of diversion or concealment we want the uncertainty to be as low as possible. But I would urge us to caution against demanding levels of certainty that may be unattainable, and that could undermine progress on the other aspects of the deal.

Verification in North Korea is tricky because it involves ‘proving a negative’, a perennial problem that is frequently discussed on these pages. It boils down to the following question: How can North Korea demonstrate that it does not have a clandestine Pu stockpile or a uranium enrichment programme?

The IAEA faces this problem on a routine basis when trying to draw its broader conclusion about the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in a state with an additional protocol in force. John Carlson, former chairman of the Agency’s Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation, put it thus

The revolutionary aspect of safeguards development is that judgment is coming to the fore in drawing safeguards conclusions. Conclusions about the absence of something undeclared activities—can never be as definitive as conclusions based on quantitative methods applied to a finite problem—the verification of a declared inventory.

This problem was faced in verifying disarmament in South Africa—and the lessons from this case are worth reflecting on in light of the upcoming verification challenges in North Korea.

South Africa is the only state to have developed nuclear weapons indigenously and then abandoned them. When South Africa acceded to the NPT in 1991, the IAEA was tasked with verifying its initial declaration. Significantly, the results of verification were inconclusive.

To cut a long story short, there was a discrepancy between the amount of HEU South Africa had apparently produced and the amount that was in its stockpile. Such a discrepancy could have had two causes: either it was the result of errors in estimating past production (a tricky business, especially for enrichment plants) or it was indicative of the existence of a clandestine stockpile of HEU. It was impossible to tell on purely ‘technical’ grounds which explanation was correct.

In practice, of course, no-one (or at least very few people) seriously believed that South Africa had a clandestine fissile material stockpile and this raises an interesting question: How did South Africa convince the international community of the veracity of its declaration even though the results of IAEA verification activities were inconclusive?

Part of it, of course, was the broader political context. South Africa was in the process of transitioning from the apartheid system to genuine democracy. It had no security concerns that would have driven it to keep nuclear weapons and was making a concerted effort to reintegrate itself into the international community.

However, I believe that part of it was the way that South Africa built the trust of the inspectors on the ground: namely, by being exceptionally open and transparent. South Africa offered inspectors almost carte blanche to go anywhere, have access to any documents and speak to anyone—and it honoured this promise.

This transparency did not produce new information which explained away all discrepancies in the fissile material accountancy. What it did do was build the confidence of inspectors—and through them the international community—that South Africa had nothing to hide. It was a visceral thing—but no less effective for it.

Perhaps understandably, this is an aspect of the verification process in South Africa that the official history merely hints at rather than dwells upon. But, I think it’s how verification often works in practice.

The lessons from South Africa are particularly salient for North Korea. It seems that North Korea is likely to submit its declaration soon prompting the start of the verification process. If North Korea wants to demonstrate that it does not have an undeclared enrichment programme or a clandestine plutonium stockpile, transparency may be key. To convince the inspectors on the ground, active cooperation is needed; the odd concession given grudgingly within the context of an on-going battle for access won’t suffice.

However, there are also lessons here for the rest of the international community, the US in particular: namely that the results of verification can be ambiguous in a state that has nothing to hide.

Based on the objective results of verification, it might be effectively impossible for the US either to prove North Korea’s declaration is correct or to show that it has lied. If the results are indeed ambiguous, it will be very tempting for the Bush Administration to accuse the North Koreans of cheating in order to avoid a fight with Congress, which has already made noises about the Administration being weak in this area.

The only solution is to pre-empt this potential problem. The US needs to discuss these ‘what ifs’ with both North Korea and the US Congress (if it is not already doing so). It is vital that all parties have a realistic idea of what verification can—and can’t achieve—before it gets going. Otherwise the process may be doomed to fail before it’s started.

Comment [5]