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Part Two of a two-part series on the 2010 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community. See Part One.

Well, it’s been a long, snowbound weekend here in the Nation’s Capital and its general vicinity. There’s not much to do while waiting for the Super Bowl commercials — assuming that your home has power this fine evening — so why don’t we take a few minutes to consider the views of the U.S. Intelligence Community on North Korea’s military capabilities?

According to the IC’s Annual Threat Assessment, the North Koreans now have three kinds of weapons: those that no longer work, those that they may or may not have built, and those that they may or may not be working on anymore.

Let’s start with the first sort.

The Conventional Arsenal, Such As It May Be

The ATA contains what must be the toughest assessment on record of the combat readiness of the Korean People’s Army (KPA):

The KPA’s capabilities are limited by an aging weapons inventory, low production of military combat systems, deteriorating physical condition of soldiers, reduced training, and increasing diversion of the military to infrastructure support. Inflexible leadership, corruption, low morale, obsolescent weapons, a weak logistical system, and problems with command and control also constrain the KPA capabilities and readiness.

It’s been said that North Korea has long had the practical equivalent of a nuclear bomb in the form of massed artillery in range of Seoul. But how much of a threat can such a decrepit force pose? Certainly, it doesn’t sound like it could put up much of a fight, which brings us to the next point:

Because the conventional military capabilities gap between North and South Korea [never mind the U.S.! —JP] has become so overwhelmingly great and prospects for reversal of this gap so remote, Pyongyang relies on its nuclear program to deter external attacks on the state and to its regime. Although there are other reasons for the North to pursue its nuclear program, redressing conventional weaknesses is a major factor and one that Kim and his likely successors will not easily dismiss.

Because, as everyone knows, you don’t bring a knife to a gunfight. The implication? That North Korea is unlikely to move too far down the path of nuclear disarmament while it perceives any serious external threat.

But just how far has North Korea moved down the path of nuclear armament?

Which Brings Us To The Nukes

Let’s start with some definition of terms. On page 14, the ATA says:

The North’s October 2006 nuclear test was consistent with our longstanding assessment that it had produced a nuclear device, although we judge the test itself to have been a partial failure based on its less-than-one-kiloton TNT equivalent yield. The North’s probable nuclear test in May 2009 supports its claim that it has been seeking to develop weapons, and with a yield of roughly a few kilotons TNT equivalent, was apparently more successful than the 2006 test. We judge North Korea has tested two nuclear devices, and while we do not know whether the North has produced nuclear weapons, we assess it has the capability to do so.

There are a couple of dichotomies worth examining here.

First, nuclear test vs. probable nuclear test. The difference is radionuclides. In October 2006, ODNI announced that they were found:

Analysis of air samples collected on October 11, 2006 detected radioactive debris which confirms that North Korea conducted an underground nuclear explosion in the vicinity of P’unggye on October 9, 2006. The explosion yield was less than a kiloton.

In June 2009, as discussed previously here and here, the ODNI press release said nothing on this point:

The U.S. Intelligence Community assesses that North Korea probably conducted an underground nuclear explosion in the vicinity of P’unggye on May 25, 2009. The explosion yield was approximately a few kilotons. Analysis of the event continues.

The association of the word “probable” or “probably” with the second test can be traced directly to the silence on radionuclides.

Second, nuclear device vs. nuclear weapon. A device can go “bang” in a test shaft, but a weapon is something built for combat, implying that it would reliably achieve the expected yield, fits within a suitable casing, has a fuze, and so forth. The ATA says that North Korea is now able to make weapons, a possibility discussed recently here. But the text does not make clear whether the IC judges that these weapons could be mated to a suitable delivery system.

Dept. of Revisions and Ambiguities

There are two nagging little spots in the discussion of North Korea’s nuclear R&D. In one place, the IC appears to have tweaked a previous assessment — not a problem in itself, certainly! — but isn’t calling attention to the change. In the other place, it’s unclear whether or not the IC is adhering to a previous judgment. These estimates have a way of shifting around on you, if you don’t watch them carefully.

The first point is the reference to the IC’s “longstanding assessment that [North Korea] had produced a nuclear device,” as opposed to a nuclear weapon. As Jonathan Pollack of the U.S. Naval War College* observed in his memorable 2003 article on the demise of the US-DPRK Agreed Framework, IC assessments during the early years of the George W. Bush administration did claim that North Korea was in possession of nuclear weapons. Previous assessments didn’t go quite so far. For the details, see pages 12 and 13 — I’ll put the excerpt in the comments.

(*Around here, we call him “Pollack the Elder.”)

The ATA’s discussion of North Korean uranium enrichment activity is somewhat vague. Mostly, it’s consistent with the readings of North Korea’s declarations that you could find here and here, and shrugs, “The exact intent of these announcements is unclear, and they do not speak definitively to the technical status of the uranium enrichment program.” Quite so.

So much for the open sources. Does other intelligence shed any light on whether North Korea is actually making any headway on enrichment? The ATA makes reference only to the past:

The Intelligence Community continues to assess with high confidence North Korea has pursued a uranium enrichment capability in the past, which we assess was for weapons.

It’s silent on the matter of what North Korea is up to now up to. Joe DeTrani, DNI’s mission manager for North Korea, made a bit of a stir back in March 2007, when he signalled a lack of strong consensus on whether meaningful work continued:

The intelligence in 2002… made possible a high confidence judgment about North Korea’s efforts to acquire a uranium enrichment capability. The Intelligence Community had then, and continues to have, high confidence in its assessment that North Korea has pursued that capability.

We have continued to assess efforts by North Korea since 2002. All Intelligence Community agencies have at least moderate confidence that North Korea’s past efforts to acquire a uranium enrichment capability continue today.

[Update: To avoid confusion, I’ve expanded the quote above.]

An August 2007 IC report (quoted here) put the pieces together like so:

We continue to assess with high confidence that North Korea has pursued efforts to acquire a uranium enrichment capability, which we assess is intended for nuclear weapons. All Intelligence Community agencies judge with at least moderate confidence that this past effort continues. The degree of progress towards producing enriched uranium remains unknown, however.

The February 2008 ATA contained a streamlined version of the statement above. The February 2009 ATA put a different spin on the lack of consensus:

The IC continues to assess North Korea has pursued a uranium enrichment capability in the past. Some in the Intelligence Community have increasing concerns that North Korea has an ongoing covert uranium enrichment program.

So, as you can see, the latest ATA returns to the language of the August 2007 report about the past, but leaves us hanging on the question of the present.

OK, then. You’ve read enough blogs for awhile — go back to shoveling snow, or to shoveling nachos while the Saints pound the Colts in the fleeting moments between commercials in sunny Miami.

Comment [4]

The Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community is out, and it’s official: cyber is the new black.

(The version presented to the Senate is linked above. Here’s the basically identical House version.)

Judging by the many threats ably described in this report, life is short, so let’s skip to the good stuff. Pages 13-15 summarize the IC’s view of missile and nuclear developments in rogue states the Axis of Evil Iran and North Korea. Today’s topic is Iran. Tomorrow — barring the Apocalypse or unforeseen delays — we’ll consider North Korea.

[Update | Feb. 7, 2010. After a Snowpocalypse-induced delay, we have a North Korea post.]

Two areas are especially worth a look: the analysis of the Qom enrichment facility, and the handling of the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iran, a subject of fierce public debate, probably for years to come.

Qom — What is it Good For?

After summarizing what the IAEA reports say about Natanz, we get to Qom, a.k.a. Fordow, a.k.a. FFEP. Let’s focus on a few points of interest:

Second, Iran has been constructing—in secret until last September—a second uranium enrichment plant deep under a mountain near the city of Qom. It is unclear to us whether Iran’s motivations for building this facility go beyond its publicly claimed intent to preserve enrichment know-how if attacked, but the existence of the facility and some of its design features raise our concerns. The facility is too small to produce regular fuel reloads for civilian nuclear power plants, but is large enough for weapons purposes if Iran opts configure it for highly enriched uranium production. It is worth noting that the small size of the facility and the security afforded the site by its construction under a mountain fit nicely with a strategy of keeping the option open to build a nuclear weapon at some future date, if Tehran ever decides to do so.

Deep under a mountain. This echoes the characterization of the senior administration official who spoke to the press on September 25, 2009: “a very heavily protected, very heavily disguised facility.” But as Geoff Forden pointed out shortly thereafter, the available images show a cut-and-cover facility, neither deeply buried nor heavily protected by anything but its camouflage (“very heavily disguised”) and local air defenses. Is there some misunderstanding at work here?

To preserve enrichment know-how if attacked. This is almost what the head of the AEOI, Ali Akbar Salehi, told reporters at the time, but not quite:

“This site is at the base of a mountain and was selected on purpose in a place that would be protected against aerial attack. That’s why the site was chosen adjacent to a military site,” Salehi told a news conference. “It was intended to safeguard our nuclear facilities and reduce the cost of active defense system. If we had chosen another site, we would have had to set up another aerial defense system.”

The stated point, it appears, was to keep centrifuges spinning. The potential non-military application for uranium enrichment (in a hidden location, no less) after declared nuclear facilities have been destroyed is somewhat elusive. Bureaucratic inertia, as some have argued? A desire to prevent the West from imposing a “suspension by other means,” even if it has to be kept a deep secret? Or, as the IC testimony appears to suggest, to keep personnel trained up on centrifuge operations until large-scale operations could resume?

If Iran opts configure it for highly enriched uranium production. On the morning of September 25, President Obama stated flatly that “the size and configuration of this facility is inconsistent with a peaceful program.” It appears that the IC has now walked back the part about configuration, perhaps on the basis of findings from IAEA visits. Does this mean that the President was misinformed or misspoke, or did something change at the site, perhaps in the three weeks that passed before the IAEA’s initial visit? [Update: Peter Crail of ACA points out that the language on this point in the ATA is consistent with a Q&A released last September.]

Keeping the option open. This bit tracks with the September 25 background briefing: “our information is that the Iranians began this facility with the intent that it be secret, and therefore giving them an option of producing weapons-grade uranium without the international community knowing about it.”

Reaffirming the 2007 NIE, Sorta

The ATA states,

Iran’s technical advancement, particularly in uranium enrichment, strengthens our 2007 NIE assessment that Iran has the scientific, technical and industrial capacity to eventually produce nuclear weapons, making the central issue its political will to do so. These advancements lead us to reaffirm our judgment from the 2007 NIE that Iran is technically capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon in the next few years, if it chooses to do so.

But what about the other judgments? This passage does comment directly on the contentious questions of whether Iran A) suspended research on weaponization in late 2003, as the NIE had claimed, and B) later resumed the work, a possibility the NIE considered but did not embrace.

This question was stirred up again by the appearance of the celebrated or infamous uranium deuteride document in the Times of London last December. In early January, the New York Times reported that “top advisers” to the President had reached the conclusion that the NIE had been mistaken about the weaponization question, a view said to be shared in Britain, France, Germany, and Israel. The NYT did not mention the views of the U.S. IC, but a few days later, DIA Director Ronald Burgess told Voice of America something close to a reaffirmation of the contested point, but not quite:

“The bottom line assessments of the NIE still hold true,” he said. “We have not seen indication that the government has made the decision to move ahead with the program. But the fact still remains that we don’t know what we don’t know.”

Newsweek‘s sources claimed that the IC was settling on a view that Iran had resumed research, but not development of nuclear weapons. The Washington Times went further, stating that the IC was poised to walk back the claim that Iran had suspended work in the first place.

The closest that the new ATA comes to remarking on weaponization is this seemingly anodyne observation: “We continue to judge Iran’s nuclear decisionmaking is guided by a cost-benefit approach, which offers the international community opportunities to influence Tehran.” This language echoes the 2007 NIE Key Judgments: “Our assessment that Iran halted the program in 2003 primarily in response to international pressure indicates Tehran’s decisions are guided by a cost-benefit approach rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political, economic, and military costs.”

Readers will have to decide what that really means. After the warm welcome received by the Iran NIE Key Judgments back in December of 2007, we should not expect to see a similar release anytime soon. For clarification, we’ll probably have to settle for the forthcoming Questions for the Record.

Comment [10]

Funny thing about the Bomb: you can’t eat it.

Going by what the North Korean government has said of late, they’re not exactly beating their swords into ploughshares or their spears into pruning hooks. But, we are told, national security goals have made way for economic goals, and a third nuclear test should not be expected.

Dismissive remarks about further nuclear testing have now appeared at least twice in reports about a major industrial achievement. On December 19, 2009, KCNA, the official news service, reported a visit by Kim Jong Il to the Songjin Steel Complex, a.k.a. Songgang, home to a new “Juche-based” method of iron and steel production. After inspecting the facilities, KJI was pleased:

The workers of Songgang completed the steel-making method based on Juche iron by their own efforts and with their own technology, shattering conservatism and mysticism about technology, he noted, adding that this is a historic event of special mention in the development of metallurgical industry and a victory greater than the third successful nuclear test.

On December 25, KCNA reported the visit of a delegation from the steel complex to Pyongyang, where they were greeted with “a joint congratulatory message” from the Powers That Be — the Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party and the National Defense Commission of the DPRK. It concluded:

The above-said spectacular success represents a great victory of the immortal Juche idea and a great demonstration of the national power more striking than the conduct of the third nuclear test.

(Emphasis added in both quotes.)

These statements, attributed to the highest levels, are internal propaganda. That’s what KCNA is for, mostly, and outside of North Korea, who could possibly care about local developments in ferrous metallurgy? It’s hard to avoid the impression that the regime is trying to set public expectations: Don’t stay up waiting all night for more big bangs, folks.

The tougher question is, why? Not knowing won’t stop me from guessing.

A Shift in Priorities

First, we could take Pyongyang at face value.

The January 1, 2010 joint New Year editorial of three North Korean newspapers was titled, “Bring About a Radical Turn in the People’s Standard of Living by Accelerating the Development of Light Industry and Agriculture Once Again This Year That Marks the 65th Anniversary of the Founding of the Workers’ Party of Korea.” (It reads better in the original, for all I know.) The KCNA excerpt describes the past year as one of “dramatic change” and the start of “a decisive turn in the Korean revolution and the building of a thriving nation,” a time of “great revolutionary upsurge” marked by technological and industrial achievements, nay, triumphs — foremost among them the second satellite launch, the second nuclear test, the production of Juche steel, and the “attainment of the cutting edge of CNC technology." The rest of the achievements are purely economic.

The coming year, too, will be “a year of general offensive, when all-Party and nationwide efforts should be concentrated on improving the people’s standard of living on the basis of the laudable victory and achievements of the great revolutionary upsurge.”

So, based on what the government is telling its people, military achievements will take a backseat to economic ones, meaning no nuclear tests to muddy the narrative. Given the new restrictions on open-air markets and the “currency reform” that destroyed virtually all private savings in North Korea in 2009, this prospect must make the average citizen shudder with dread — there’s every reason to expect the further reconsolidation of the command economy.

[Update | Feb. 2. On reflection, the announced shift is away from both military and heavy-industrial priorities, and towards production of food and consumer goods. See the comments for further elaboration.]

Not Necessary or Not Worth It

Second, North Korea may judge its second nuclear test to have been a success, obviating the need for additional testing. They may believe that the second test shows they have a working weapon in the neighborhood of 4 kt yield — what they apparently told the Chinese they were aiming for back in October 2006, before their first test fizzled.

This scenario would fit well with a view of the first test shared by a number of close observers (see: So, Like, Why Didn’t It Work?, October 10, 2006; NORK Nuke Missile?, November 3, 2006).

Third, as Paul Kerr pointed out in these webpages around the same time, the shock value from this sort of thing starts to wear off quickly (see: More Norky Goodness, October 9, 2006). It just may not be worth it, next to how much it would piss off the Chinese, not to mention the further expenditure of limited plutonium stocks (a concern that led many experts to doubt that North Korea would test in 2009).

Not a Good Time

Fourth, let’s recall that the Norks are making nice. Foreign Ministry statements on January 11, 2010 (“DPRK Proposes to Start of Peace Talks”) and January 18 (“DPRK on Reasonable Way for Sept. 19 Joint Statement”) call for replacing the Korean War Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty — Pyongyang’s new condition for denuclearization, or returning to talks on denuclearization, depending on how you read it. A third nuclear test would complicate the charm offensive.

(Incidentally, the latter statement mentions the demolition of the Yongbyon cooling tower in 2008, which I take as an indicator that they’re unlikely to rebuild it while the nice-making persists.)

So take your pick: for some, all, or maybe none of the above reasons, North Korea is letting the man (and traffic lady) on the street know that there are no immediate plans to test again.

Bonus!

As a reward for reading this far — if you skipped down here, scroll right back up, mister! — here’s the video of Steven Bosworth’s January 19, 2010 appearance on the Colbert Report, in which the envoy to North Korea explains why the peace treaty condition isn’t going to fly. No, there’s no astounding impression of an atmospheric nuclear test, but Colbert does manage to leave Bosworth speechless at the end.

Bonus bonus!

You must have been wondering, Hey, just how often does “reasonable” appear in daily KCNA items, anyway?

The answer, according to the invaluable search engine at NK News, is 1,163 times since KCNA went online in January 1996. Which is more than I’d expected, but still two fewer times than “nuclear war,” 88 fewer than “destruction,” 650 fewer than “aggressor,” and 987 fewer than “reactionaries.” Now you know.

Comment [11]

Abraham Kaplan wasn’t addressing national security, but what he wrote in 1964 is broadly applicable and still fresh today:

I call it the law of the instrument, and it may be formulated as follows: Give a small boy a hammer, and he will find that everything he encounters needs pounding.

Transposed to adulthood, that principle might go some distance toward explaining certain mysteries in the story reported by John Markoff, David E. Sanger and Thom Shanker in Tuesday’s New York Times, titled, “In Digital Combat, U.S. Finds No Easy Deterrent.”

The story describes a recent exercise involving “top Pentagon leaders” that simulated their response to “a sophisticated cyberattack aimed at paralyzing the nation’s power grids, its communications systems or its financial networks” — with “dispiriting” results:

The enemy had all the advantages: stealth, anonymity and unpredictability. No one could pinpoint the country from which the attack came, so there was no effective way to deter further damage by threatening retaliation. What’s more, the military commanders noted that they even lacked the legal authority to respond — especially because it was never clear if the attack was an act of vandalism, an attempt at commercial theft or a state-sponsored effort to cripple the United States, perhaps as a prelude to a conventional war.

Thus, we are told, the pursuit of cyber-deterrence has yet to bear fruit.

But Why Deterrence?

A number of points are left unexplained, but let’s consider just two. First, are intrusions into computer systems really capable of shutting down a wide variety of critical physical systems? And second, if this is so, why is a deterrence strategy the preferred response?

If hackers could bring the nation to its knees at any time, one wonders why it hasn’t happened. It’s not as if America wants for unscrupulous, highly motivated, and fairly computer-savvy enemies. We shouldn’t dismiss the idea, since there has long been concern about the potential vulnerabilities of SCADA systems, although this seems more like an “insider” than a “hacker” problem. Regardless, let’s assume for the sake of argument that this is a serious ongoing problem.

So why would the threat of retaliation be the preferred form of protection for the national infrastructure? Even if an attack on the electrical grid could be attributed with high confidence — and the chances of that sound pretty dim — what if the the hacker turned out to be a terrorist, a criminal for hire, or perhaps an amateur bent on mischief on a grand scale? Do we respond by turning out the lights in the perpetrator’s country of residence? I’m guessing not, especially if it’s Canada — or America, for that matter.

But even more basically, if you were a government official, and your best experts told you that a serious national vulnerability existed, wouldn’t your first thought be, “How do we fix that?” If a serious threat exists to computerized control systems linked to critical infrastructure, then some equally serious effort ought to go into securing them, even if that means isolating them from the Internet, just to be safe. Even if that means seeking a new grant of regulatory power. This is a national security matter, right?

Don’t get me wrong; I’m not averse to the idea of deterrence! But hammers are for driving nails, and this problem looks like a bunch of bolts, nuts, and washers.

For further reading: why the “cyber threat” mostly involves espionage — and poisoning relations between major powers.

Comment [14]

Note: Two previously overlooked estimates have been added to the data table, and the “observations” section updated accordingly.

Last week, at an event sponsored by AAAS (depicted above*), I had the privilege of giving a presentation on “Expert Opinion on Iran’s IR-1 Centrifuge.” The session was off the record, but I can share with you, Dear Reader, a data table assembled for the occasion, along with a few observations.

This table is an amended version of the data previously assembled by the Federation of American Scientists (see Table 1 in this report). I’ve tinkered with this dataset before (see: Estimating SWU with Expert Opinion, December 6, 2009). The amended table covers every published estimate of the separative power of the IR-1 centrifuge that I could find, running from March 2003 to December 2009. Explicit repetitions of previous estimates [or estimates explictly derived from earlier estimates] are not included.

(N.B. “Actual” indicates the mean performance of actual devices. “Nominal” indicates the maximum power of the device on paper. Despite some ambiguities, it’s usually apparent from context which type of estimate is intended, when not stated directly. For example, I’ve tagged as “nominal” those estimates that relate to the machines believed by different experts at various points to be ancestors of the IR-1.)

There are 29 31 estimates, although some of the “nominal” estimates from ISIS appear to be repetitions. (More on this point in a few moments.) Here it is: the whole megillah.

Note: Thanks to Scott Kemp for the clarification on his 5/27/08 estimate, which was actually two estimates. Thanks also to Andreas Persbo for the similar observation about his estimate of 2/27/09. I’ve corrected the table to reflect both of these inputs. I’ve also corrected a few minor errors and inconsistencies.

Author(s)	Data source(s)	kg SWU/yr	Estimate of	Date
Hibbs	Official sources	7 to 15	Actual	3/13/03
Hibbs	IAEA sources	12 to 14	Actual	5/12/03
Hibbs	AEOI data	6 to 7	Actual	5/12/03
Albright & Hinderstein (ISIS)	Senior Western officials	2	Actual	9/1/03
Albright & Hinderstein (ISIS)	Senior IAEA officials (stated subsequently)	3	Nominal (based on 4M)	3/1/04
Gilinsky, Miller, & Hubbard	Unclassified sources (and educated guesses)	1 to 3	Actual	10/22/04
Hibbs	IAEA and Western governments	2	Nominal (based on SNOR & CNOR)	1/31/05
Glaser	(not stated)	2	Nominal (estimate of P-1)	6/14/05
Lewis	Rademaker (USDOS) statement	2 < and < 3, closer to 2	Actual	4/15/06
Lewis	Aghazadeh (AEOI) statement	2.3	Actual	4/18/06
“Feynman” via Lewis	Aghazadeh (AEOI) statement	1.46	Actual	5/12/06
“Feynman” via Lewis	Aghazadeh (AEOI) statement	2.3	Nominal	5/12/06
Albright (ISIS)	Aghazadeh (AEOI) statement	1.4 to 2.7	Actual	5/17/06
Albright (ISIS)	(not stated)	2.5 to 3	“the high end of the possible”	7/1/06
Albright & Shire (ISIS)	Level Pakistan is said to have achieved	2	Actual of P-1	11/1/07
Garwin	Aghazadeh (AEOI) statement	1.362	Actual	1/17/08
Glaser	(not stated)	2.5	Nominal (hypothetical max. of P-1)	4/16/08
Kemp via Lewis	Observed efficiency of 42%	1	Actual	5/27/08
Kemp via Lewis	(not stated)	2.5	Nominal	5/27/08
ISIS NuclearIran FAQ	(not stated)	1 to 2	Actual	~9/1/08 (n.d.)
ISIS NuclearIran FAQ	(not stated)	3	Nominal	~9/1/08 (n.d.)
Persbo	Cascades operating between 27 and 36% of total capacity	0.59 to 0.79	Actual	2/27/09
Persbo	(not stated)	2.2	Nominal (based on SNOR)	2/27/09
Salehi (AEOI)	(not stated)	2.1	Unclear; nominal?	9/22/09
Oelrich & Barzashka (FAS)	IAEA reports	0.5	Actual	9/25/09; see also 11/23/09
Wisconsin Project	IAEA reports	0.5	Actual	11/16/09
Albright & Brannan (ISIS)	IAEA reports	1.0 to 1.5	Actual	11/30/09
Albright & Brannan (ISIS)	(not stated)	3	Nominal	11/30/09
Oelrich & Barzashka (FAS)	IAEA reports	0.44 to 0.88 (0.88 is highly unlikely)	Actual	12/1/09
Kemp	IAEA reports	0.6 to 0.9	Actual	12/1/09
Wood via Kemp	Max. of P-1 based on validated hydrodynamic codes from the U.S. program	2.1 to 2.2	Nominal (max. of P-1)	12/1/09

Four Observations

First, as noted previously, the trend of the estimates declines with time. This effect only becomes more pronounced with the inclusion of the estimates reported by Mark Hibbs in NuclearFuel and Nucleonics Week in early 2003: now the trend of the decline is follows an exponential curve. These reports appeared when IAEA inspectors had just put eyes on the IR-1 (then called the P-1 in IAEA reports) for the first time. Their initial frame of reference presumably involved more up-to-date machines, rather than centrifuges whose design heritage extends back to the 1960s.

[Update | 22:54. See Mark Hibbs’ account in the comments below.]

Second, the decline comes in bursts, coinciding with the availability of new information. This effect is loosely similar to the influence of news on stock prices, as documented in event studies. The effect tends to be prompt in finance; a bit less so here.

• From mid-2003 into 2005, which covers the first period of centrifuge operations at PFEP in Natanz, we see the gradual sorting-out of the design heritage of the IR-1.
• The next wave comes in mid-2006, right after AEOI chief Gholamreza Aghazadeh gave some detailed figures during an interview with Iranian TV. Here we start to see some divergence between “actual” and “nominal” estimates, with “actual” figures falling below 2 kg SWU/yr.
• Next come the estimates of late 2007 to early 2009 2008, after the commencement of enrichment work at the FEP in Natanz, whose results were periodically documented in IAEA reports.

• A final burst of estimates, explicitly derived from the ever-accumulating IAEA reports, takes place in late 2009. Here, “actual” estimates fall below 1 kg SWU/yr.

Third, in most cases, a “new entrant” tends to lead the way in pushing “actual” estimates down. That is, someone who wasn’t previously in the game seems to take hold of the new information and bring it to light, with the rest shortly catching up. In 2003 and 2004, it was David Albright and Corey Hinderstein of ISIS. In 2006, it was Jeffrey Lewis and a pseudonymous correspondent here at ACW. In 2009, it was Ivan Oelrich and Ivanka Barzashka of FAS.

[Update | 23:51. In hindsight, Andreas Persbo was the first to present an “actual” estimate below 1, using recent IAEA reports. This contribution may have been overlooked because it was couched as a range of percentages of a nominal figure.]

Fourth, there are lingering differences between experts in both “actual” and “nominal” figures. Much of the basis of the “actual” differences was laid bare in the FAS-ISIS debate of late 2009. The “nominal” differences seem to originate with early reports about the design heritage of the IR-1. In March 2004, ISIS related that the IR-1 was copied from URENCO’s 4M centrifuge; both designs have four aluminum tube rotor segments. In January 2005, Hibbs reported that the IR-1 was derived from URENCO’s SNOR and CNOR machines.

Both 4M and CNOR are said to have been capable of about 3 kg SWU/yr. The CNOR had six segments, each responsible for about 0.5 kg SWU/yr, according to Hibbs. Since the Pakistani P-1 and the Iranian IR-1 have four segments, their nominal output, if they are understood to be CNOR derivatives, is about 2 — or, according to some recent figures, 2.1 or 2.2. Most experts seem to agree with Hibbs, or wind up close to his figure. But Albright and colleagues persist in viewing 3 as the real ceiling.

Should you, Dear Reader, notice any other subtle patterns in the data, well, that’s what the comments feature is for!

*Actually, the picture at the top of this post does not show me giving a presentation.

Comment [10]

Above: The Presidential Palace in Port-au-Prince, after and before. Credit: Lisandro Suero

Here’s how former U.S. President Bill Clinton, in an interview with Esquire, summed up the state of governance in Haiti after last week’s earthquake:

The UN was, in effect, decapitated. The Haitian government was disabled by the destruction of the presidential palace and the president’s offices, and the parliamentary building. There are senior parliamentarians still missing. Members of the cabinet still missing. The prime minister and the president are fine, and they’re setting up shop around the airport. And the U.S. has given them communications equipment.

Haiti’s one small bit of luck at this miserable time is the readiness of the United States, among other countries, to jump to the rescue. The situation of Port-au-Prince at this moment is similar to that of New Orleans in late August and early September 2005: the local authorities were instantly overwhelmed by the disaster, leaving the U.S. federal government to step in.

So what happens when the U.S. federal government itself is the victim of catastrophe and “decapitation”? That’s what we ought to expect in the event of National Planning Scenario #1, a 10-kiloton nuclear ground burst in Washington, DC. With the heart of the federal city in ruins, the U.S. government will have to pull itself up by the bootstraps. So who’s going to lead?

The Haitian case suggests that who lives or dies under these sorts of circumstances is a matter of chance. As mentioned above, President Rene Préval survived the earthquake, although he’s been scarce. Much more damaging to the relief effort was the loss of the top UN officials in Haiti, whose bodies were pulled from the rubble of the Christopher Hotel on Saturday.

So let’s ask, what happens if the President of the U.S. were killed or incapacitated in a citywide disaster of similar magnitude? If this event were to happen tomorrow, Vice President Joe Biden would take over. Unless he had suffered a similar fate, or could not be found — in which case, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi would take the oath of office. Unless she, too, could not be found, which brings us to the President of the Senate Pro Tempore, the Honorable Robert C. Byrd. Here’s the gentleman from West Virginia in a picture from last May:

By longstanding Senate tradition, the ceremonial role of President pro Tempore is bestowed upon the member of the majority party with the longest tenure in office. Over the last several years, that’s often been either Sen. Byrd — who has now served longer than any other Senator in the history of the institution — or the late Sen. Strom Thurmond of South Carolina, who celebrated his 100th birthday while in office.

Leadership is pretty important in times of crisis. Given the advanced age and uncertain condition of the most senior Senators, the current setup gives Murphy’s Law too much of an opportunity to parlay a grand national tragedy into a threat to the constitutional form of government itself. One way or another, that really ought to change.

Comment [3]

The recent essay on declaratory policy by ACW’s own Jeff Lewis is one of those rare writings that brings the reader to think about a well-trodden subject anew. Jeff is onto something when he says that the representatives of a nuclear weapons state — America, China, or any other — shouldn’t even try to answer what-if questions meant to exhume sinister contradictions in their declaratory policy. That’s so whether the policy is no-first-use, “sole purpose,” or some other formula that sends the same basic message with the necessary clarity.

As Jeff says, we really ought to get this one right. U.S. declaratory policy was crafted with the Soviet Union in mind. Although change is 20 years overdue, it still could not come at a much better time than in the months before the May 2010 NPT Review Conference. I’ve already raised this point in two columns for the Bulletin, first in October 2009, and again last week, but let’s have one more stab at it.

Declaratory Policy and Nonproliferation

Perhaps the most important reason to change U.S. declaratory policy has little to do with deterrence requirements. When it comes to nuclear deterrence, our cup runneth over. But when it comes to nonproliferation, we’re experiencing some challenges.

The stated role of nuclear weapons illuminates the role of nonproliferation. If the U.S. nuclear arsenal is meant to coerce future opponents, then nonproliferation becomes an adjunct to global American power, which is already considerable. If, on the other hand, nuclear weapons play a strictly defensive role for the United States and its allies, then nonproliferation can be a matter of broadly common interest.

Come this May at the RevCon, when Washington puts forward its proposals to strengthen the NPT, both Washington and Tehran will be courting the votes of some of the same countries. These include states that are neither enemies nor fully-fledged allies of the United States, and perhaps hold some reservations about the idea of a unipolar world. In this situation, the Nuclear Posture Review can deal cards into the hand of the U.S. delegation, or take them away.

So let’s recognize declaratory policy for what it is, first and foremost: an instrument of diplomacy. And let’s also recognize that “deter enemies” and “assure allies” is not the whole of diplomatic endeavor. The United States aspires to lead the international community, which is not the same thing as leading NATO. The RevCon will put that aspiration to the test.

Comment [1]

The work of the JASON defense advisory panel — better known as “the JASONs” — tends to be taken quite seriously. Certainly, the conclusions of JASON’s scientists on issues related to nuclear warheads are followed closely in the arms control community. For local examples, see here, here, and here.

Fairly or not, JASON is seen differently than, say, the Defense Science Board. It only seems right to ask why. After all, the same U.S. defense establishment (broadly speaking) foots the bill. And if it were just a matter of having a snappy name, then “The Legion of Science” presumably would have been taken already. (Then again, maybe it already has been.)

One answer, which appeared in the letters pages of the 17 December 2009 issue of Nature, is given by Steven M. Block, Professor of Biology and Applied Physics at Stanford. Critiquing a proposal for a new scientific defense advisory body in Britain, Block points to four (missing) ingredients that he considers essential to JASON’s success.

First, JASON members have security clearances. Without them, Block writes, “Controversial conclusions of reports could be dismissed by government officials with the all-too-familiar refrain: ‘You wouldn’t advise that if you knew what we know.’”

Second, the JASON members’ own research at their home institutions isn’t funded by the sponsoring organization, which helps to avoid conflicts of interest.

Third, the group chooses its own members. Block doesn’t mention it, but back in 2002, JASON parted ways with its then-sponsoring agency, DARPA, over this principle.

Fourth, there has been considerable continuity of membership over the years, creating a strong “corporate memory.”

Block concludes,

As an organization, the JASONs have earned credibility on a wide range of security-related topics over the years. The long-standing working relationships forged among the JASON members rank among its most significant strengths. The lack of direct professional ties to government sponsors fosters impartiality. The collective experience gained from working on so many different kinds of problem, combined with the individual credentials of its scientifically diverse membership, make the JASONs one of the few government advisory groups that can plausibly be called independent.

But of course, the name doesn’t hurt, either!

Comment [2]

What better occasion than Christmas to ponder nuclear terrorism?

According to a Dec. 19 story by Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt in the New York Times, the forthcoming Nuclear Posture review will be just as much about preventing nuclear terrorism as about nuclear deterrence.

It’s a good idea, and — in hindsight — a perfectly natural one after the last decade’s worth of discussions of the role of “non-state actors.” But there’s a difficulty in the mismatch between counterterrorism and the notions that ordinarily fall under the rubric of nuclear posture: weapons systems, platforms, bases, stockpiles, alert rates, infrastructure, and so forth. So, the Times reports, the idea will translate to more support for intelligence and forensics.

Oddly, though, the story doesn’t mention the one “core” area of nuclear posture that does relate directly to the threat of terrorism, and always has: the security of U.S. nuclear weapons.

To get a sense of how much a chestnut this is — there’s the holiday, again! — look no further than the latest release in the Foreign Relations of the United States series, Documents on Global Issues, 1973–1976. Steven Aftergood of FAS Secrecy News helpfully points out the most interesting item — at least for readers of this blog — an Intelligence Community report from 1976 on the threat of nuclear terrorism.

The authors concluded that terrorist groups were unlikely to try to acquire nuclear weapons in the near future, mainly for reasons that no longer apply in 2009 — most importantly, the “internally generated limits to the level of violence they are willing to inflict.” Apparently for the same reason, the authors saw the residual nuclear terrorist threat mainly through the lens of Thunderball-type blackmail scenarios, a view that most terrorism experts probably don’t share today:

By the nature of terrorist behavior patterns, we believe that some form of indirect use of nuclear explosives is more probable than direct use. Specifically, a major motivation for terrorist seizure of a nuclear weapon would be to acquire a credible threat for blackmail and/or publicity. It is judged that most terrorist groups attempting to seize a weapon would do so without the specific intention of detonating it. In an extreme situation, however, some might attempt a detonation.

But never mind. Just where would the terrorists get their nefarious device, assuming they were to try to seize a complete weapon? After consulting a playbook found in the stateroom of the Disco Volante, why, the answer is “NATO,” of course:

If an attempt at seizure of a weapon was made, the one targeted would probably be a US weapon deployed abroad…. This is true not only because of the wide deployment of such weapons but, more importantly, because of the great political importance assigned by terrorists to targets involving the US presence abroad…. We note that all US weapons deployed abroad have control devices of varying degrees of sophistication that are designed to insure weapon safety or to preclude unauthorized use and that would require time and effort to overcome.

PALs are your friends, but not a panacea. And as Bob van der Zwaan and Tom Sauer recently reminded us in the Bulletin, security at some NATO facilities that store nuclear weapons isn’t up to snuff.

The precise implications of this concern for a Nuclear Posture Review focused on preventing nuclear terrorism are left as an exercise for the reader.

In the meantime, happy holidays! Here’s a little something for your enjoyment.

Comment [4]

[Maybe you had to be there.]

After a day-long stopover in Seoul, U.S. special envoy Stephen Bosworth is now in Pyongyang for the first time in his official capacity. It’s a three-day trip, so it looks pretty serious. Is there much chance that he’ll win North Korea’s reaffirmation of the denuclearization commitments it accepted in September 2005 and thereafter? Hard to say. It may be a step forward, at least.

In sizing up how substantive this trip is, though, the one obvious thing to watch for is who meets with Bosworth. That’s the standard by which these visits — official or private — are generally measured: by the amount of face time that one’s interlocutors are presumed to get with Kim Jong Il.

If the most senior official he sees is Li Gun, Director-General of the North American Affairs Bureau of the Foreign Ministry, it would not be a good sign. Li visited New York recently, so meeting at the same level would not imply much progress on the “seriousness” scale.

By way of illustration, there have been a number of private visits lately by U.S. experts. Jack Pritchard’s group late last month apparently went no higher than Li, and here’s how he summed it up: “We carried no messages to the North Koreans from the US Government. We did not receive any specific messages.” Not very exciting, but on the other hand, Pritchard may have added as many as two Air Koryo air sickness bags to his personal collection.

Better than this would be meetings with Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye Gwan, probably the most senior North Korean official who meets with foreign envoys with much regularity. If memory serves, Kim usually (always?) represented North Korea in the Six-Party Talks.

Better still would be Senior Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju, who has played the leading role in North Korean nuclear diplomacy over the years. Kang is widely remembered here for a remark during a fateful meeting in October 2002 that the American side interpreted as an admission of the intention to seek nuclear weapons. But his presence really ought to be considered a mark of seriousness.

Best of all, of course, would be Dear Leader.

Bosworth alluded to this hierarchy of is-it-worth-my-time back in March in an interview with Glenn Kessler of the Washington Post:

“I will not be the day-to-day representative in the six-party negotiations,” Bosworth said, adding that he will focus more on broader policy issues, including bilateral negotiations with North Korea. “Ideally one would like to meet with the leader,” Kim Jong Il, he said. “I would like to reach higher in the foreign ministry than we have been able to.”

On that latter point, at least, he should be good to go. The Nelson Report claims that Bosworth has received “informal” assurances that he’ll be seeing Kang. And the South Korean press has been reporting an upcoming Bosworth-Kang meeting for about a month now — more or less since the Li Gun visit to New York, come to think of it. Whether those assurances were a condition for making the trip, I don’t know, but I wouldn’t be surprised. Let’s see now if they are fulfilled, and where the meetings lead.

Update | Dec. 10. As expected, Bosworth met with Kang. As for what was achieved, we can let the man speak for himself.

Update | Dec. 13. Here’s the official English translation of the North Korean account of the trip:

At the meeting and talks both sides had a long exhaustive and candid discussion on wide-ranging issues including the conclusion of a peace agreement, the normalization of the bilateral relations, economic and energy assistance and the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Through working and frank discussion the two sides deepened the mutual understanding, narrowed their differences and found not a few common points. They also reached a series of common understandings of the need to resume the six-party talks and the importance of implementing the September 19 Joint Statement.

Both sides agreed to continue to cooperate with each other in the future to narrow down the remaining differences.

The substance remains obscure, so the tone is the message. Not a “brigandish” in sight.

Comment [4]