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The “Would they? Could they?” debate in regard to nuclear terrorism is an old one. There has been a lot written about whether terrorists want to use nuclear weapons and, if they do, whether they have the technological capability to “make it so”.

A PhD student at King’s, Simen Ellingsen, has come up with what I think is a rather clever way of summarising this debate: in the form of a graph (or, more accurately, a scatter plot). He has given me permission to reproduce this graph here (thanks, Simen).

Obviously, it’s slightly tongue in cheek but what Simen points out (and is worth taking note of) is the reasonably strong correlation. Generally, authors who think terrorists could, think they would (May being the exception).

It’s interesting to speculate about why this is. My guess is that those “terrorism experts” who don’t believe that terrorists want nukes, selectively present evidence that building nukes is hard. In contrast, those “technical experts” who think that building nukes isn’t so hard, tend to assume intent.

Anyway, Simen has an article coming out in next month’s Defense and Security Analysis, about the application of game theory to measures to counter nuclear terrorism, and it’s well worth a read.

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First off, the Syrian video is now public:



Online Videos by Veoh.com

Second, I have one more question to add to Jeffrey’s list: “why now?”

This has been bugging me for the last 24 hours.

Prima facie it makes no sense. The US administration commits to a deal with the North Koreans under which the DPRK is not (yet) required to declare its assistance to Syria (if indeed it occurred). So, why encourage opposition to the deal within the US by showing evidence of said assistance?

I can see three possible reasons (not mutually exclusive), none of which I find entirely satisfactory:

1. Elements within the US administration opposed to the deal have convinced the President that this evidence ought to be shown, in an effort to wreck the deal. I have a slightly hard time believing this because it seems Chris Hill has achieved buy-in for the deal at the very highest levels. But, presumably there is still some strong opposition and such a messy bureaucratic compromise would hardly be unprecedented.

2. The release of the evidence was aimed at increasing pressure on Syria. On balance, I still think this is a bigger part of the reason than others seem to. However, it’s not clear to me what has prompted US desires to pressure the Syrians.

3. The US has been itching to release this evidence all along (see points 1 and 2 above for possible reasons) but hasn’t been able to because it would compromise the source (from Israeli intelligence?) who obtained it. If that source has now been ‘secured’ then the barrier to presenting the evidence would have been lifted. Again, this is also possible but still feels unsatisfactory as an explanation.

“Why now?” still seems like a very interesting question.

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The last week or so has seen an interesting development with regard to North Korea (even if the image above is rather retro now).

As part of the Valentine’s eve agreement, North Korea is required to declare all its nuclear activities. The US has previously insisted that the North Koreans must confess to three programmes: plutonium production, a centrifuge enrichment programme and assistance to Syria.

The ‘draft declaration’, submitted towards the end of last year, only makes mention of the former and the DPRK vehemently denies the existence of the latter two.

And so, in spite of Chris Hill’s world record attempt for accruing airmiles, the process stalled.

Then, last week, it came out that North Korea and the US had reached a tentative agreement on how to proceed. The North Koreans would submit their plutonium declaration ‘officially’ (and allow it to be verified) and “acknowledge” US concerns about their enrichment programme and assistance to Syria.

Since then repeated press reports have added little to this basic picture, except to confirm that Chris Hill has successfully sold the plan to his political masters.

As far as I can see, there are broadly three possible scenarios that are consistent with these recent developments:

Scenario 1: North Korea never had a centrifuge programme or gave nuclear assistance to Syria

This scenario is oddly problematic because, as many have commented before me, it is very hard to prove a negative. If the US is convinced that North Korea has experimented with centrifuges and sold Syria reactor designs, there’s no easy way for the DPRK to demonstrate the contrary.

Thus, in this scenario, North Korean innocence could derail the entire process.

Scenario 2: North Korea won’t admit to its secret activities for fear of loosing face

In this scenario the North Koreans basically did (or even still are still doing) what they are accused of but won’t admit it in public. However, they might be willing to admit it in private. I think Chris Hill may have been hinting at this when he said “North Korea has difficulty saying things publicly.”

If this is the case—and I really am speculating now—maybe the North Koreans have agreed to provide details of the enrichment programme and the Syrian deal to the US secretly. There was a lot of talk a few weeks ago that part of the declaration would be kept secret—so perhaps that’s exactly what happened.

Even though scenario 2 is the most promising, it isn’t entirely rosy.

If the North Koreans admit to a less extensive covert programme that the US believes exists then we’re back to the pantomime problem (US: You did build a pilot scale enrichment plant; DPRK: Oh, no we didn’t; US: Oh, yes you did…an excruciatingly British reference, I’m afraid.)

Scenario 3: North Korea has no intention of complying with the agreement

In this case, the DPRK simply agreed to the 13 February agreement because of the short-term expediency of energy assistance. It has no intention of giving up its nukes, or compromising any of the other, more secret elements of its nuclear programme. Its refusal to confess to its enrichment programme or help to Syria is reflective of this.

In this scenario, the whole deal is doomed… and sooner rather than later.

Crucially, for me, an indicator of which of three scenarios is correct will be the extent to which North Korea allows verification of its plutonium declaration.

The DPRK has declared less Pu than most experts think it has produced. If the North Koreans allow really intrusive measures (such as drilling into the graphite moderator to permit forensics) then that would suggest scenario 3 is wrong. If they don’t, then I’m pretty pessimistic about the fate of the deal.

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Well, not so much self promotion as advertising…

Any of you thinking about doing a Masters starting in the autumn might like to consider King’s College London’s MA in Science and Security or our brand new MA in Nonproliferation and International Security.

I’ll unashamedly add that (i) you get to be in the Department of War Studies (which not only has a great name and is in the heart of London but it is rather good academically); (ii) our students have a very high success rate of going on to get jobs in the field; and (iii) we have studentships of £8,500 to offer!

Plug over.

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I just got back from the States on Friday, and now I’m off to Brussels for a trip to NATO HQ with some students.

Elaine Grossman at Global Security Newswire reported on my talk at the New America Foundation — You can view it here let me warn Hass and FSB that they aren’t going to like it very much.

A[n excruciatingly] British expert is calling on the international community to more effectively discourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons by punishing any and all breaches of agreed safeguards, without first trying to determine intent.

Instead of focusing on those infractions by non-nuclear weapons states that are indisputable — such as engaging in a covert uranium enrichment program and denying access to inspectors — global leaders tend to get mired in futile debates over a violator’s motives, says James Acton of King’s College in London.

An interesting issue that came up along these lines: if you don’t take intent into account, how do you assess the severity of violations? I believe, for example, that running a clandestine centrifuge facility is more serious than diverting a couple of spent fuel pellets for bench-scale reprocessing experiments. It is hard, however, to build up a framework to take these issues into account consistently.

Food for thought…

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We’re just four days away from National Nuclear Technology Day in Iran when no doubt President Ahmadinejad will have another big announcement to make. In preparation, Iran seems to have been installing some more P-2s IR-2s (ooops, sorry). George Jahn and Mark Heinrich have both got stories on this, but their efforts have produced some contradictory findings.

Jahn has spoken to three diplomats.

Diplomat 1 said that Iran has completed two cascades of 176 advanced centrifuges—presumably IR-2s in the FEP (the big underground facility as opposed to much smaller above-ground PFEP). He also said that a third cascade is under construction.

As for diplomat 2:


Asked for confirmation that Iran had assembled IR-2s at its underground site, a senior diplomat briefed on Iran’s enrichment program said “not true” but refused to say whether he was denying that the model was an IR-2 or that the machines were underground.

Diplomat 3 “confirmed that Iran had started linking up advanced centrifuges in a configuration used for enrichment. But he said all remained above ground and none of the machines were running.”

Heinrich has also spoken to diplomats (plural) who say that Iran has installed more than 300 centrifuges in two cascades, and quotes one diplomat who says:


One of the two cascades is using the advanced model, the other the older one. There are more machines in the advanced cascade than the set of 164 typically used for the (older model)…

Iran may not have had enough of the advanced one ready yet to put into two cascades. But they wanted to show the world they could go beyond the threshold of 3,000 now enriching at Natanz (despite international pressure) to stop.

What do we learn from this? There’s broad agreement that Iran has added at least two cascades, and that at least some of new machines are IR-2s. Interestingly, it also seems that IR-2 cascades house more machines than P-1 cascades. It’s not clear, however, whether the machines are in the PFEP or FEP and whether they are all IR-2s.

The PFEP was designed to accommodate six cascades of 164-machines. The Agency’s most recent report on Iran suggests that space for 2 cascades is occupied. One space is filled by a cascade of 164 P-1 machines and the other space is taken up by a single IR-2 machine and a 10-machine IR-2 cascade (where some small P-1 cascades used to be). Although the four spaces that remain were designed to accommodate 164 centrifuges, it presumably wouldn’t be too hard to fit 176 in—if you’re prepared to replumb.

Equally, there is space in the FEP and GOV/2008/4 also said that “installation work, including equipment and sub-hearer pipes, is continuing for other cascade areas [i.e. away from the 18 cascades that have already been installed]”. Moreover, installing the new cascades in the FEP might make it easier for Ahmadinejad to claim that Iran was pushing ahead with “industrial-scale” enrichment.

But even if they’re in the PFEP that’s not going to stop him, of course. Ahmadinejad is pretty much certain to make some grandiose claim about Iran’s enrichment efforts in the next few days. With National Nuclear Technology Day just ahead, and a new Security Council Resolution just behind, he’ll be in a defiant mood and keen to convince the Security Council to U-turn because Iran’s not for turning (to paraphrase Mrs T). But, whatever he says, treat it with a cellar of salt. After all, we still have no idea how good the IR-2s actually are yet.

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I’m off to DC next week. I’m going to be appearing at the American Enterprise Institute on Tuesday and the New America Foundation on Wednesday. It’s what you call a bipartisan approach.

At AEI I’m a panellist at a one-day conference entitled The Crisis in Nonproliferation: Meeting the Challenge.

At New America (bet you can’t guess who’s hosting me there), I’ll be giving a talk on Nuclear Mind Reading: Iran’s Nuclear Intentions and the IAEA.

Just thought I’d share.

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Here as promised is Tom Shea’s Notional convention on nuclear power.

Two other nuclear power factoids I heard recently that may interest…

First, the UAE has announced its intention not to acquire enrichment or reprocessing technology as part of its nuclear power programme.

This is significant but the question is: is it a one-off? I suspect it says more about that country’s desire to maintain good relations with the ‘West’ than it does about on-going attempts to prevent the spread of fuel cycle technology.

Second, some of the delays at Finland’s Olkiluoto 3, the EPR that is being built by Siemens and AREVA, have been caused by an inability to pour concrete correctly. Apparently the contractors (AREVA and Siemens) have been letting it fall through too great a height thus compromising its quality. I’ve often heard it said that the French have forgotten how to build reactors in the last 20 years—this is apparently one of the consequences.

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Just over a week ago I arrived in Paris for a weekend away, went to my hotel and (while my room was being prepared) went to use the lobby ‘facilities’. On the wall was Le Figaro with the headline ‘Sarkozy to relaunch nuclear disarmament’. You could have knocked me over with a feather. I was not expecting it at all. Jeffrey has already discussed the speech; I (somewhat tardily) want to talk a bit about the background.

France was the last weapon state to join the NPT in August 1992. I was trying to find some good background on what prompted this French volte-face, but can find remarkably little about it. (Yes, I know the end of the Cold War was not unrelated but I want to know about the domestic politics of the decision—can any Wonk readers point me in the right direction?) Anyway, at the 2000 Review Conference, France very reluctantly signed onto the 13 Steps Agreement (their ambassador apparently became persona non grata in Paris as a result) and, like the other weapon states, was happy to step back from it subsequently.

Let’s fast forward to last year’s Carnegie Conference and Margaret Beckett’s speech. Suffice to say that the French (like the Americans) were not happy. Actually, I’m not sure ‘unhappy’ is the right word. It might be more accurate to say that some corners of the French civil service thought their British cousins had gone insane. The French were worried that by playing up disarmament and raising expectations, more stress would be placed on the NPT later when those expectations went unfulfilled. Moreover, I believe the French were less convinced than the British that non-nuclear weapon states’ position on disarmament reflects a genuine grievance rather than a negotiating position.

Anyway, last year Sarkozy commissioned a new livre blanc (white paper) on defence. It’s being written by a fairly small circle centred on Jean-Claude Mallet and there is genuine uncertainty about what it will contain (Jeffrey has found the same thing). However, I had been warned repeatedly not to expect France to embrace the ‘disarmament agenda’. Hence my surprise about the following (it seems worth quoting the whole of the relevant section):


I would now like to address disarmament. It is a subject I would like to discuss with realism and clear-sightedness. When international security improves, France draws the consequences. It did so with the end of the Cold War.

Rather than making speeches and promises that are not translated into deeds, France acts. We respect our international commitments, and notably the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. France has an exemplary record, unique in the world, with respect to nuclear disarmament. France was the first State, with the United Kingdom, to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; the first State to decide to shut down and dismantle its facilities for the production of fissile materials for explosive purposes; the only State to have transparently dismantled its nuclear testing facility in the Pacific; the only State to have dismantled its ground-launched nuclear missiles; the only State to have voluntarily reduced the number of its nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines by a third.

France has never engaged in the arms race. France never manufactured all the types of weapons that it was technologically capable of designing. France applies a principle of strict sufficiency: It maintains its arsenal at the lowest possible level compatible with the strategic context. I am dedicated to this principle. As soon as I assumed my duties, I asked for this strict sufficiency to be reassessed.

This has led me to decide on a new measure of disarmament. With respect to the airborne component, the number of nuclear weapons, missiles and aircraft will be reduced by one-third.

I have also decided that France could and should be more transparent with respect to its nuclear arsenal than anyone ever has been.

After this reduction, I can tell you that our arsenal will include fewer than 300 nuclear warheads. That is half of the maximum number of warheads we had during the Cold War.

In giving this information, France is completely transparent because it has no other weapons beside those in its operational stockpile.

Furthermore, I can confirm that none of our weapons are targeted against anyone.

Finally, I have decided to invite international experts to observe the dismantlement of our Pierrelatte and Marcoule military fissile material production facilities.

But let us not be naïve; the very basis of collective security and disarmament is reciprocity.

Today, eight nations in the world have declared they have conducted nuclear tests. I am proposing to the international community an action plan to which I call on the nuclear powers to resolutely commit by the 2010 NPT Conference.

Thus I invite all countries to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, beginning with China and the United States, who signed it in 1996. It is time for it to be ratified.

I urge the nuclear powers to dismantle all their nuclear testing sites in a manner that is transparent and open to the international community;

I call for the immediate launching of negotiations on a treaty to ban the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons purposes, and to establish without delay a moratorium on the production of such materials;

I invite the five nuclear weapon States recognized by the NPT to agree on transparency measures;

I propose opening negotiations on a treaty banning short- and intermediate-range surface-to-surface missiles;

I ask all nations to accede to and implement the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, as France has done.

At the same time, the entire international community must mobilize in all other fields of disarmament. Here too, France will make its contribution.

The crucial point about this speech is not any of the specific measures announced by Mr Sarkozy (welcome as they are). It is the fact that a French President is talking publicly using the ‘D word’ in this way. French policy has undergone a very significant shift.

Part of it, I suspect, is frustration that the UK has been getting a lot of credit for its disarmament initiative and France, not unreasonably, wants a piece of the action (especially as French disarmament credentials are, in relative terms at least, pretty strong). Indeed, a number of the comments made by Monsieur le President are clearly (friendly-ish) digs towards the UK and the US.

I also wonder whether the British-French nuclear deal has anything to do with it. There has undoubtedly been a lot of high-level nuclear diplomacy across the Channel in recent weeks and it’s possible (though not all that likely) that the UK indicated it would feel more comfortable buying reactors off a state that was promoting all aspects of the NPT (not, of course, that the UK has decided which reactors to buy yet… oh no.)

As for the policies themselves, China will make it clear very shortly (if it has not already done so) that confidence-building measures are OK but transparency is a non-non. The missile control proposal is pretty bold but ties in with Russian interest in expanding the INF. However, most interesting for me is Sarkozy’s promise that France will allow inspectors into Pierrelatte and Marcoule (I wonder if this is a rather subtle dig at the Americans over FMCT verification). It’ll be interesting to see who these international inspectors are (Euratom? IAEA?) and what kind of access they’re given.

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I’ve been away for the last week or so—hence the absence of any posting from me. Ironically, a long weekend in Paris precluded me from blogging about Sarkozy’s remarks on disarmament—but more about that (the background specifically) tomorrow or Monday.

Following Paris, I spent an interesting day in Vienna at a workshop organized by SIPRI and the Carnegie Moscow Centre entitled Seminar on Multinational Nuclear Arrangements: Government, Commercial and Public-Private Approaches. MNAs are very much in vogue at the moment; the idea being that states will choose not to develop enrichment or reprocessing capabilities if they are extended a guaranteed supply of nuclear fuel. There are numerous models for MNAs on the table ranging from physical fuel banks to multinationally-owned enrichment plants. For a slightly-dated but still excellent summary see Oliver Meier’s ACT article. There is also a good overview in the March 2008 edition of the IAEA’s Bulletin, which will appear here when put online.

Anyway, here are some of the best nuggets from the day:

It’s the recipients stupid! There is a growing realisation that, if MNAs are to go anywhere, states offering them need to sit down with potential recipients and discuss how the guarantees can be made credible. D’oh.

Fuel fabrication This is an overlooked problem, especially for the physical fuel bank concept (intended as a supply of last resort should a state’s flow of reactor fuel be disrupted for political reasons). Because there is little standardisation in reactor fuel design, a physical fuel bank would actually be a bank of low enriched hex. Before being delivered the hex would have to be fabricated into fuel assemblies. The problem is where. Any given type of fuel is, in general, only manufactured by a small number of facilities. If a state is facing a fuel shortage because its primary supplier has reneged on a contract, it will need to find a fuel fabrication facility located outside the territory of its primary supplier that has the capacity to manufacture fuel at short notice. This may prove tricky, although Pierre Goldschmidt has some ideas.

The Forden-Thomson Plan There was much discussion of this plan, which aims to facilitate a compromise with Iran around the concept of a jointly-owned enrichment facility on Iranian territory. The FT Plan has been mentioned on the Wonk before but I’m not sure their key argument has been discussed here. It is that the main proliferation threat from Iran is an undeclared programme (as opposed to breakout or diversion from a declared facility). Having international technicians in Iran, working closely with their Iranian counterparts, would, according to F and T, be an awfully effective way to sniff out any clandestine activity. I won’t launch into a long analysis of its pros and cons except to say that, if you are interested, you can read more about it here.

Notional Convention on Fuel Supply and Spent Fuel Disposition World Nuclear University’s Tom Shea is currently developing a draft treaty to facilitate the spread of nuclear power (anyone who likes writing treaties in his spare time is the Wonk’s kind of guy—he is doing this for fun, not part of his job). It’s based around the idea that any given state may be able to supply some fuel cycle services but may need to purchase others and so, for each part of the fuel cycle, there’s a need to match suppliers with purchasers. Anyway, I’m delighted to say that he is willing to let me post his paper here (as soon as he gets back from his latest travels and can send me the pdf).

Oh, next time you’re in Vienna, you got to check out this bar. Awesome.

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