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More data is becoming available on Monday’s nuclear test. NORSAR has published the waveform data from two of their stations. The primary wave is very noticeable and sharp, which indicates a man-made explosive event (earthquakes tend to brew a while before really making noise).

The shear-wave seems to come in shortly thereafter, giving a distinct peak. I like to think of the difference between p and s-waves as flash and thunder. The p-wave comes in fast (in air it travels at the speed of sound) whereas the s-wave rumbles in afterwards. Now, I only have these two datasets, and no other forms, but the signal from ARCES looks peculiar to me. About 10 seconds in there is a sharp fluctuation in the peak-to-peak amplitude, which isn’t visible in the NOA readout. I’ve heard that the seismologists at the IMS division is confused about some of the data as well, but I’m not sure if it’s that peculiarity that they’ve focussed on.

When the s-waves hit, you’ll notice some refraction.

If you want to check that these forms match the time of the test, please consult the p-wave travel time image below.

Updated: those interested in antipodal seismometry (see Geoff’s post below) might find the image interesting for other reasons.

Most interestingly, the CTBTO has published the error ellipses and visualised them in Google Earth. As you can see, both error ellipses define a search area well within the 1,000 sq. km. maximum search grid stipulated by the treaty. In other words, if the CTBTO hypothetically were to conduct an OSI, they would have a pretty good idea where to start.

But these are only some of the goodies to come. I got an e-mail from Sean O’Connor this morning, who wrote that he’s found the likely location of at least two additional sites in the area. He’s going to publish his findings on IMINT & Analysis quite soon.

The yield estimate is still highly uncertain, but is likely to be below 4-8 kT range that has been reported in mainstream media so far. But given the discussion in my last thread, I’m attaching this nice Mb – Yield graph for the community to have a look at.

Note that using the NTS hard rock formula puts the yield at 1.6 kT, which fits the assessment of the United States.

Finally, the word is that meteorological conditions at the moment are favourable for a first noble gas hit in South Korea, maybe also in Ussurijsk and later in Japan. But that’s for another post.

Comment [14]

As always when the DPRK tests, I’m in a seminar somewhere else. This time, I was discussing FMCT verification with the good people of SIPRI and the diplomats of the Conference on Disarmament.

The plot is based on the Mb to yield estimates for dry-rock, close coupled, underground nuclear explosions. I’ve used the USGS estimate for the yield calculation. The graph can only be used as a general indication because the exact geological conditions of the area is not known. It is known to have a shallow water table, which could explain why the Russians always get their yield calculations on the high end. We also don’t know how well this test was coupled to the rock.

However, as indicated, today’s North Korean test seems to be significantly bigger than its previous test. What is also interesting is that the centre of today’s test, according to the USGS, is about 5.5 kilometers away from the old test site. The IMS puts the test closer to the first site, but within the USGS margin of error. The USGS sets the error to +/- 3.8 kilometers, which strongly suggest that we’re looking at a second test site in close proximity to the first.

Interestingly, a couple of years ago I learned that the South Koreans were looking for test site preparations on the “northern side of the mountain” relative from the first site. This, to me, means that the second site has been known to the South for some time.

I’m now off to have some dinner.

Comment [18]

Cross-posted from Verification, Implementation and Compliance.

The monitors have been switched off. The cameras are being removed from their mounts, and the seals are broken. The guesthouse just off the main site no longer houses the IAEA three-person team or the four-person US experts group. By now, the equipment is probably being packed into boxes by the former North Korean hosts, after which it will be carefully catalogued and transferred to storage in some building on the sprawling Yongbyon site. There, it will gather dust until the next time inspectors visit the facility. That is, if there will be a next time.

North Korea threatens to restart the facility, and there have been some educated guesses as to how fast this could be done. These guesses range from a couple of weeks, to six months, to possibly longer. Undeniably, it will take a year to get the entire facility back in order again, but some critical processes, such as the reprocessing of spent fuel, might get up and running by the summer of 2009. And this is possibly why the Russian Foreign Minister is about to visit Pyongyang quite soon, and why the Chinese are placing frantic phone calls to Washington DC.

But what are the North Korean’s required to do to get the plant up and running again? Despite wishes to the contrary, the agreed minute on disablement was never released to the wider arms control community. However, some details were nevertheless leaked, quite possibly since some involved principals on the US side felt that the disablement steps were wholly inadequate.

The first disablement action was to unload the 5MWe reactor, and transfer spent fuel to the cooling pond. This action does not appear to have been completed. The North Korean’s would now speed up their unloading operations, and transfer the remaining spent fuel rods to the cooling pond. It is possible that they would then ask the director of the Fuel Manufacturing plant to transfer the fresh load of fuel (pictured) to the GCR for reloading.

However, a number of immediate tasks would need to be completed before then. First, the reactor’s director would need to instruct his people to repipe the secondary cooling system and, obviously, rebuild the cooling tower, or jury-rig the system somehow. This is not likely to be completed before summer, so do not expect to see steam rising over Yongbyon until autumn. Naturally, the construction of the tower can be tracked by satellite. The reactor also needs to have its control rod mechanism reconnected.

At the reprocessing facility, work may progress slightly faster. The drive mechanism between the spent fuel receiving building and the hot cells need to be reconnected, and two steam lines would need to be re-attached and pressure-tested. Moreover, the drive mechanism for fuel cask transfers needs to be replaced, as well as some hot-cell doors. After these tasks are completed, the reprocessing facility is mostly ready for action. This can be done fairly soon, possible before July. The start of a reprocessing campaign can be detected through the release of radionuclides into the atmosphere.

The Fuel Fabrication Plant has also undergone some ‘disablement’. In order to get the plant back in operation, the site director needs to reinstall all three uranium ore concentrate dissolver tanks, all seven uranium conversion furnaces, metal casting furnaces and the vacuum system, and eight machining lathes. Again, this is something that can be done in a matter of months.

The pressing question is, of course, what happens next? The ejection of IAEA monitors and US experts will lead to a substantial degradation in knowledge of ground truth. While the North is unlikely to substantially add to its fissile material stockpile in 2009, larger scale production may be likely in the coming year. Of course, a new nuclear test cannot be ruled out. It’s very likely, even, that the test site director has already received instructions to elevate his level of readiness.

Personally, I find it very difficult to see any easy way out of this predicament.

Comment [19]

Cross-posted from Verification, Implementation and Compliance

At the present, I believe that the likelihood of an Iranian break-out is slim. The principal reason for this argument is that Iran’s installed capacity at the uranium enrichment plant in Natanz is still low, and that a break-out would entail significant political and security risks for the country. As long as Agency safeguards are in place at the Iranian sites, the international community is likely to get advance warning of any attempt to divert material or to use the existing facilities for nefarious purposes.

The problem is that not all of the nuclear fuel cycle is under safeguards. Processes downstream from the uranium conversion facility are generally covered. But uranium mining and milling as well as certain nuclear related activities (such as research centres or centrifuge assembly sites) are not monitored. Since this is the case, it is easy for a fairly technologically advanced state to construct a parallel nuclear fuel cycle, using indigenous uranium resources to fuel a clandestine weapons programme.

Figure 1: Safeguards under INFCIRC/153

The most appealing option for the cheater is to divert material where safeguards are not applied, in this case the nuclear ore. Let’s take Iran as an example. At present, Iran’s stockpile of uranium yellowcake is unknown. The only thing that is known, really, is that the country imported 600 metric tonnes from South Africa in the 1970s. If the Iranians have used that material up until January 2009, it would have about 188 tonnes of yellowcake left by now. But again, material accountancy is not carried out, and Iran is under no obligation to give answers if asked.

Status of Iran’s mines
The status of Iran’s two known mines is largely unknown, but the OECD publication Uranium 2007 at least sheds some light on the status of activities. In Saghand, the AEOI is presently engaged in sinking two cylindrical shafts, each having 4 meters in diameter and extending 350 meters in depth, as well as tunnelling (about 620 meters in total). All projects are scheduled to be implemented by the end of 2009. Ore will be excavated using the “room and pillar”, “cut and fill” and “sub-level stoping” methods.

Mining activities are on-going in the Gchine salt plug near Bandar-Abbas. This is an open-pit mine, and mining operations have been on-going since 2006. Its ore is being transported to Iran’s only operating uranium production centre (the BUP), which is capable of treating 48 tonnes of uranium ore per day. It has a production capacity of 21 tonnes of uranium per year. Iran’s second production facility lies near Ardakan, has a production capacity of 50 tonnes of uranium per year, and is scheduled to go on-stream later in 2009. Iran’s reasonably assured resources of uranium is very low, some 591 tonnes of uranium, and its inferred resources are not much higher, about 1,356 tonnes, most of it in metasomatite rock.

If the OECD’s figures are correct, it is possible to calculate how much ore would be left in the Gchine salt mine by the end of 2010 if the BUP operates as declared. This calculation is visualized in figure 2.

Figure 2: Mining

Consequently, by the end of 2010, about 60 per cent of the deposits at Gchine would be exploited. The mine would be more or less drained by 2014.

It is also possible to estimate the stockpile of domestically produced yellowcake, again if the BUP operates as declared and if it uses the acid leach solvent extraction process.

Figure 3: Milling

By the beginning of 2009, the stockpile would be some 42 metric tonnes of yellowcake. Probability statistics show that the actual stockpile in 2009 is somewhere between 9.2 and 33.8 metric tonnes (obviously the absence of data leads to an enormous uncertainty – and this is again assuming that the OECD has provided accurate information).

As indicated above, with only the comprehensive safeguards agreement in place, it is virtually impossible to keep track of this stockpile.

In order to be enriched, the yellowcake would obviously need to be processed further. And here is the catch if Iran would want to cheat. Safeguards at uranium conversion facilities are generally quite effective, especially if the throughput is low, and this more or less excludes using the uranium conversion facility at Esfahan for processing the yellowcake. Once it gets on the Agency’s books, the material is tracked downstream, and diversion becomes risky business.

Therefore, a state determined to cheat on its non-proliferation obligations would need not only to construct a clandestine uranium enrichment plant, but also a clandestine conversion facility. This facility would not need to be large; a capacity of 10 metric tonnes of uranium per year would be more than sufficient. However, it is an additional investment and it carries with it a risk of overhead or ground detection. The centrifuge facility could be minimal.

About 1,300 IR-1 centrifuges would be able to produce enough highly enriched material for one weapon per year. The cascade hall would require about 520 square meters of space (that’s 23 by 23 meters) so the entire operation could be comfortably hidden in a factory building somewhere (amusingly, old clock factories seem to be the preferred choice). It would not require more electricity than an average workshop, so it cannot be detected by a passive infrared survey.

If Gchine is operational, there is enough unsafeguarded yellowcake for 1-5 weapons stored somewhere in Iran. The potential of this material being used in a parallel fuel cycle is the real cause for concern and not a diversion or break-out scenario using declared and safeguarded facilities.

The importance of the additional protocol
This is why it is critically important that Iran reapplies the additional protocol. This instrument allows the Agency to ask for and receive information on Iran’s mines (as well as several other activities – such as the assembly of centrifuge rotors). This information can be followed up upon by means of complementary access. The scope of the Additional Protocol is best illustrated by figure 4, which I again have borrowed from a friend’s presentation.

Figure 4: Safeguards under INFCIRC/540

It is only through the additional protocol that the Agency can provide some assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities on Iran’s territory. It can do so since it will be able to analyze a much broader array of information. Using this information, they can see whether the flows match up, if only approximately.

The application of the additional protocol will not by itself be able to answer many of the question-marks currently plaguing the Iranian file. For this, transparency measures going beyond the requirement of the additional protocol will be necessary. This is not something the Iranian government seems willing to implement at the moment.

This is unfortunate since for as long as this kind of transparency is not given, the file will never close.

Comment [8]

The International Herald Tribune reported yesterday that Islamabad and New Delhi has exchanged the list of their respective nuclear installations and facilities on New Year’s Day, in accordance with the 1988 Agreement between India & Pakistan on Prohibition of Attack Against Nuclear Installations and Facilities.

According to the agreement, the term ‘nuclear installations and facilities’ includes:

…nuclear power and research reactors, fuel fabrication, uranium enrichment, isotopes separation and reprocessing facilities as well as any other installations with fresh or irradiated nuclear fuel and materials in any form and establishments storing significant quantities of radioactive materials.

Both countries have classified the list, but I learned the approximate numbers today. India has declared 30 facilities while Pakistan has declared “about 20”. The Indian government has put some university sites on the list, presumably because “significant quantities of radioactive materials” are stored there. I cannot give you more specifics than that.

It is, however, encouraging that the list continues to be exchanged despite the heightened tension between the two countries. One day, perhaps, the list will be made public. But don’t hold your breath.

Comment [1]

I have just returned from Berlin where I attended a meeting at the Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung. The meeting discussed a forthcoming report on the future of nuclear weapons in Europe. Specifically, it discussed whether now is the time to have a phased and incremental debate on what to do with NATO’s short-range nuclear forces. NATO’s tactical arsenal comprises some 2-300 nuclear gravity bombs deployed in Western Europe.

Does the Alliance need these weapons? Our chief wonk, Jeffrey Lewis, made his point of view reasonably clear back in June (see the entry NATO Nukes Not Secure and the discussion following it). I don’t have a personal opinion on whether tactical nuclear weapons matter for European defence, but it would seem to me that if you do want to get rid of them, now would be a good time.

While some politicians represented at the Foundation meeting seemed to question the utility of having these weapons around, the technocrats stressed the Alliance’s belief that the gravity bombs have a deterrent value. It was said that Alliance members are convinced that it is necessary to keep U.S. nuclear weapons on European soil.

One participant said that it is either “the present force structure or nothing”. Once the U.S. weapons are gone, he said, they won’t come back. And so, there was considerable concern of the proposed forward deployment of Russian weapons. Several argued for retaining the gravity bombs as a political counterweight.

On the other hand, there are discussions here in Britain, and elsewhere in Europe, about whether or not tactical nuclear weapons are “low hanging fruit” ripe to be picked in advance of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. And indeed, recent consultations amongst Alliance members seem to indicate that there that there is considerably less attachment to these weapons than previously assumed. In other words, the member states are not as convinced as the technocrats think.

The problem is that no NATO member is willing to be the first to make the proposal. This came across strongly in the coffee breaks. Presumably, members fear that other parties would interpret such a proposal as a signal of weakening commitment to the Alliance in a time of great military challenges.

And it would need to be an Alliance heavyweight that makes the first move, and preferably one where weapons are presently deployed.

If a member picks up the ball, it would seem to me that NATO’s 2009 summit – which also marks the Alliance’s 60th anniversary – would be the perfect venue to reach a decision. Whether a removal of tactical nuclear weapons from Western Europe would have a significant impact on the 2010 NPT review conference, however, is a matter very much open for debate.

Comment [10]

In Europe, Britain’s National Audit Office has released a report on the United Kingdom’s Future Nuclear Deterrent Capability. It is an interesting read. The main conclusion is that:

There is a challenging timetable to meet if continuous at sea deterrence is to be maintained. The critical path for provision of a future deterrent capability is the delivery of the nuclear-powered submarine platform in time to meet an in-service date of 2024. But there are also possible time constraints from other areas of the programme. There is currently little scope for incorporating time contingency in the overall programme to deal with slippage in any of these areas.

The Office also says that a replacement cannot be made without the help of the United States, which produces its own sets of challenges. In particular, the project timeline becomes quite inelastic.

Have a read here.

Comment [7]

Do not worry, Captain Kirk. It’s not that Khan.

Islamabad’s parks, houses, hotels and palaces are poured into the lowland between the Margala Hills. It’s a remarkably organized place with straight avenues, green and leafy side streets, bustling shops and a heavy military presence.

This time of year, the weather is pleasant, and the quicksilver is hovering around 20 degrees Celsius during the day. In summers, however, the heat is stifling. Residents tend to keep the engine running with the air-conditioning on when they stop for short errands. The houses are cool as long as the electricity works, but it’s prone to fail. The country’s power plants cannot keep up with demand. The electricity shortfall stood at some 7000 megawatts last months, and beleaguered residents faced a 30 per cent hike in energy prices before the government backtracked last month.

While Pakistan faces unprecedented financial challenges and a deteriorating security situation, one man is fighting a battle of his own. Abdul Qadeer Khan is now 72 years old and his been battling with poor health over the last couple of years. He’s under house arrest. Arguing that he’s a fall guy for the proliferation sins of previous governments, his been fighting a legal battle in the newly formed Islamabad High Court, trying to get his detention lifted.

His fight began well. On 21 July 2008, the Islamabad High Court gave him right to carry out research work, and to move around within the country after government clearance. This was not without cause. The good doctor had gone on a media offensive, and suddenly seemed to be everywhere. He needed to be silenced.

So, the deal was that Khan keep his mouth shut. Without telling anyone the government also read the 21 July ruling narrowly, not giving clearance as often as Khan would like. Not surprisingly, the Khan household felt that the government was breaking yet another deal.

Two weeks ago, Khan and his South African wife, Henny Khan, filed a petition with the Islamabad High Court asking that they be allowed to appear in person to pursue their case. They argued, amongst other things, that the Pakistani government was not complying with the July decision.

It would seem like the Islamabad High Court dismissed their plea quite quickly, arguing that the matter has already been decided on. Indeed, article 369 of the Pakistani Code of Criminal Procedure stipulates that no court shall ‘alter or review [a decision], except to correct a clerical error.’

Therefore, it would seem like Khan would need to go to the Supreme Court to get the July ruling clarified. Will he do this, however, or will he wait for his friends in government to try to get the house arrest overturned by executive decision?

Khan is very popular in Pakistan. During the first year of his house arrest, he often sat on the balcony of one of his many houses, waving at passing fans. Indeed, there are many in Islamabad who ask themselves what harm this old man can cause if the arrest is lifted.

I think that he’s going to be silently released in the coming year. However, he’s definitely not going to get his passport back any time soon. Pakistan’s powerful Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence is probably very anxious that the good doctor might be snatched should he leave the country.

So what does the Wonk readership think? Will we see the sequel ‘Khan’s back’ or will we have to settle with ‘the wrath of Khan’?

To refresh, have a listen at KRL’s lovely ad (great music):

Comment [14]

I apologize deeply for posting without a picture, but it may not arrive for some weeks to come, and this article would then be too old. I’m Andreas Persbo, and I’ve been asked to write a couple of posts once in a while.

Some of you may know me from my blog Verification, Implementation and Compliance. Yet others, like my colleague James Acton, knows me through my work at the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre in London. In a previous life, I used to hang out with UNPROFOR and UNIFIL, and while I forgotten most things about peacekeeping, I still haven’t laid off my deep affection for the Middle East, its lands and its peoples. And for some reason, I really like deserts.

The Syrian desert is a hot, dusty, and surprisingly dirty place. Most visitors expect a serene environment, unsoiled by the boots of man, but are surprised and disappointed at the large amount of junk strewn around the grey sand and hard rock. More often than not, the Syrian desert acts as an improvised landfill. After a September 2007 incursion into Syrian airspace by the Israeli Air Force, one particular patch of Syrian soil was instantly turned into yet another desert junkyard.

Overview of the area (including Tibnah Salt Mine)

We in the open-source community have discussed for some time whether the target on the banks of the Great Euphrates River was or wasn’t a nuclear reactor supplied by the North Koreans. Despite photographs supplied by the US intelligence community, there are many that remains unconvinced by the strength of the evidence. You’ll find skeptics everywhere, on the comment pages of this blog, and even in the Vienna International Center’s staff cafeteria.

The destroyed building by the river bank remains an enigma. In Vienna, the Syrians continues to pretend like nothing has happened. The Israelis themselves keep out of sight whenever the mysterious air-raid is mentioned. The only country that seems to want some closure on the matter is the United States, its diplomats are busy trying to corner and contain the Syrians at the Viennese nuclear court. It is not that difficult. Syria, like its ally Iran, does not have many friends and allies in Vienna. However, many ask what the US have to gain by putting pressure on Damascus at this age of puzzling rapprochement between the Syrian government and its arch-enemies in Jerusalem.

Clearly, Syria wants this thing to disappear. However, it doesn’t want to expose itself too much while covering up its tracks. Indeed, the Syrian statement to the IAEA General Conference this year regretted some of the calls for more transparency and cooperation from their part. It held that its government was, and would continue to be, totally cooperative with the Agency but cautioned that, ‘this cooperation will under no circumstances be on the account of exposing our military positions and of threatening our national security.’

There are strong rumors about a report on Syria being prepared for the next meeting of the IAEA’s Board of Governors, set to convene in Vienna on 27 November 2008. There has been some discussion about whether the report will reveal the presence of nuclear-grade graphite at the site (see, for instance, Mark Hibbs, ‘Evidence from IAEA graphite probe not critical to Syria reactor case,’ Nuclear Fuel, 20 October 2008). The IAEA accumulated experience looking for this type of material during its verification activities in North Korea. However, for any meaningful analysis, the sample has to be large. So far, the IAEA investigation in Al-Kibar has reportedly turned up very little.

A while back, sitting down over a cup of coffee with a friend in Vienna, I heard how the Agency had structured its investigations. Keen to avoid leakage to the wider community and the press, the probe is handled by a small and tight-lipped group of people within the Department of Safeguard’s Middle East Division. Indeed, the Syria analysts keep to themselves, and do not share or discuss their findings with the rest of the division. This has caused disgruntlement amongst some within the Agency, who argue that there are risks with keeping information tight. Eventually the group sees what it want to see.

While there are skeptics in Vienna, the majority view within the Department of Safeguards is reportedly that the facility was a reactor. A recent report in the associated press quotes two diplomats saying that the Agency would press for more visits to Syria. This might be due to some ambiguous results from environmental sampling, but also because the department did not get access to all the sites it wished to visit. The press reports point to three military sites, but the Agency may also want to visit some civilian facilities closer to Al-Kibar itself.

Mining activities abound
While there certainly seems to be no reprocessing facilities around, there are mining activities in the area, including the Tibnah Salt Mine, which is located some 17 kilometers south of the destroyed facility (you’ll find the mine at 35°33’9.72“N 39°48’41.60“E). The Syrian General Company for Phosphates and Mines operates the salt mine, which has been known to operate in the area for years, not least because an Australian firm did the field mission and basic engineering survey for a mine expansion back in 1985.

SGCPM map of mineral assets

There are also some signs of mined materials being transported on the railway line that runs just west of the destroyed facility. It’s likely that the region, which is relatively rich in certain types of minerals, is home to some open-pit mining activities as well.

Why should this facility be interesting from a safeguards perspective? Well, the mines owners have started to think about ways to make alternative use of its 150 meter deep shafts and sprawling tunnels. One idea has been to study the geology of the site, as well as its hydrological, tectonic and geological settings to find out whether the site could be used for radioactive waste disposal. It goes further than that: a preliminary report on the matter has been produced and published by the Syrian Atomic Energy Commission.

Presumably, the site was assessed for disposal of Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials (NORM), which are some waste products resulting from oil and gas exploration. Syria has had problems with this type of waste, and the Atomic Energy Commission of Syria has been trying to grapple with this issue for years. Burying it in a disused salt mine makes sense.

Despite the presence of this facility, known to the Agency for some time, inspectors did not visit the site during its assessment of Al-Kibar. Surely the IAEA must have asked for access to the facility?

No, it did not. Allegedly, the Department of Safeguards did not even mention the facility during discussions with the Syrians. In my mind, it would have been a perfectly reasonable request to visit, if nothing else but to find out whether the bombed building was associated, in some manner, with the local mining industry. What would the IAEA have found? Probably nothing much. However, it is part of a wise search logic to look around the inspected area, and pay special attention to activities that may be related, even if the connection is far fetched. And the mine is just a short car ride away.

A visit to a salt mine would surely not threaten Syria’s military interests, now, would it?

Comment [15]