Toward Smaller Nuclear Forces

There’s a serious new study by a group of authors in the United States and Russia being published in the coming days that calls for deeper cuts in nuclear weapons—well beyond those envisioned in the New Start treaty pending before the Senate.

The new study is based on extensive computer modeling of a nuclear war, and it suggests strongly that both the United States and Russia could preserve deterrence with fewer warheads and launchers than under New Start. The current treaty calls for 1,550 warheads and 700 active launchers on each side. But the computer modeling showed that further reductions to 1,000 warheads and 500 launchers—or, even lower levels—would not weaken security on either side.

The new study also shows that de-alerting would not erode deterrence. It offers a useful counterpoint to some in the Pentagon, who have argued that a rush to re-alerting in a crisis would create dangerous and destabilizing incentives to strike first.

No doubt the outlook is cloudy, at best, for further nuclear arms reductions by the United States and Russia. Sticking points abound: the asymmetry in arsenals of tactical nuclear weapons; Russian objections to U.S. missile defense plans; and U.S. reserves of non-deployed strategic warheads. On top of that, the political situation in both countries may not be conducive to deeper cuts in the next few years. But this new study ought to inspire the policy-makers and negotiators on both sides to get back to the table. There is clearly room to do more. The authors also call for other countries to begin to ponder lower levels of nuclear weapons along with the United States and Russia.

The conclusions are laid out in an essay in the forthcoming issue of Foreign Affairs.

I think the piece is a welcome reminder, yet again, that Russia and the United States remain locked in a Cold War mindset long after that confrontation expired. They each maintain far larger nuclear arsenals than they need for deterrence. For another perspective which also suggested that the United States could rely on lower levels of weapons, see the article in Strategic Studies Quarterly earlier this year, in which three Air Force thinkers, James Wood Forsyth Jr., Col. B. Chance Saltzman (chief of the Air Force Strategic Plans and Policy Division) and Gary Schaub Jr. concluded that “America’s security can rest easily” on a comparatively small nuclear force. The United States, they wrote, could “draw down its nuclear arsenal to a relatively small number of survivable, reliable weapons dispersed among missile silos, submarines, and airplanes.” They said such a force might number only 311 nuclear weapons.

What’s interesting about the new study in Foreign Affairs is that three of the authors are Russians with extensive experience in Soviet and Russian nuclear forces. Not everyone in the Russian establishment is enthusiastic about deeper cuts; these are voices to be taken seriously.

The three are: Victor Esin, a retired Colonel General, former chief of staff of the Strategic Rocket Forces, and professor at the Institute of the United States and Canada; Valery Yarynich, a retired Colonel who served at the Center for Operational and Strategic Studies of the Russian General Staff, and is now a fellow at the Institute of the United States and Canada; and Pavel Zolotarev, a retired Major General, former section head of the Russian Defense Council, who is deputy director of the Institute of the United States and Canada. The U.S. authors are Bruce Blair, President of the World Security Institute and Co-coordinator of Global Zero, and Matthew McKinzie, a senior scientist at the Natural Resources Defense Council. All the authors are members of the research arm of Global Zero.

The study was supported by the Hewlett Foundation and the Fullerton Family Foundation.

In running their computer models, the authors say they used public estimates of U.S. and Russian forces. For the different scenarios, they ran more than 100 computer simulations of each, in an effort to get the best possible sense of what might happen in a real conflict. They are posting a detailed technical appendix here.

The authors conclude:

Once the New Start agreement is approved by the U.S. Senate, the arms control process between the United States and Russia needs to continue moving  forward. Washington and Moscow could easily reduce their nuclear forces to just 1,000 warheads apiece without any adverse consequences.

They could also de-alert their nuclear forces, diminishing the risk of an accidental or unauthorized launch. Eventually, in concert with other nuclear states and after progress has been made on missile defense cooperation, they should be able to reduce their arsenals to 500 weapons each. Even after these deep cuts, hundreds of cities would still remain at risk of catastrophic destruction in the event of a nuclear war.

Such changes to the nuclear relationship between the United States and Russia should be accompanied by a change in attitude as well as forces: both countries must be more open in assessing nuclear threats and the requirements of deterrence.

Secrecy about safeguards against unauthorized or mistaken launches and about estimates of first- and second strike attacks hamper informed public debate and instill mutual suspicion. Open analysis can help inform the public and policymakers on the best way forward for nuclear policy, elevating the debate above the fray of politics, ideology, and secrecy to a higher plane of objective and transparent analysis. This openness could pave the way toward a safer and more stable world with fewer, and eventually zero, nuclear weapons.