Yes, we’ve all had a big helping of TRR lately, but this extra tidbit is just too juicy to pass up. Other topics again soon, I promise.
A friend of the blog who shall go nameless points out that just as the envoys of Iran and the P5+1 were meeting in Geneva on October 1, the website of the French weekly Bakchich Hebdo published a remarkable and authentic-looking document: a French Foreign Ministry strategy paper produced in advance of an earlier meeting in New York between representatives of the P5+1.
Or as the paper calls them, les Six.
That meeting, scheduled for September 23, shortly before the G-20 meeting in Pittsburgh, appears to have ironed out the differences between les Six in advance of the Iran talks. The paper deals with the prospect of a LEU–TRR bargain at some length:
4. The Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), for which fuel is made from 19.7% enriched uranium, will run short of fuel in the second half of 2010. The Iranians have therefore asked the IAEA about the possibility of enriching their uranium to this level (Iran’s uranium is currently 3.5% enriched); should the Agency refuse, they [the Iranians] could use this pretext to enrich their uranium [themselves] to 19.7%.
The Americans envision proposing that Iran export 1,200 kg of low-enriched uranium for additional enrichment and conversion to fuel abroad before being returned to Iran. The enrichment would take place in Russia and the fuel fabrication in France (Argentina and France are the only countries whose industries have the necessary expertise).
We have given the United States our agreement for this operation, with conditions. In particular, it seems essential that this operation be integrated with the strategy and the schedule of The Six and that the entire 1,200 kg of uranium leave Iran on a short deadline (Iran should be asked for an answer in principle by the end of October; the uranium should exit before the end of the year).
The paper later adds that “we are not prepared to commit ourselves if the operation involves a lesser quantity of uranium.”
If the claims in this passage are accurate, then an Iranian inquiry, an American idea, and a French technological near-monopoly helped bring about the agreement-in-principle of October 1—the one that Iranian spokesmen have yet to acknowledge publicly. Note, however, that President Ahmadinejad signaled his agreement in the days before the Geneva meeting.
It’s open to question whether continuing to operate TRR is really all that important to Iran; when it comes to Tehran’s motives for doing this deal, you’ll have to draw your own conclusions. For what it’s worth, the same anonymous analyst who spotted this item also observes that the LEU deal seems to combine aspects of past Russian fuel offers with Scott Kemp’s idea that conversion of Iranian LEU to fuel could be an important confidence-building measure.
But Wait, There’s More
Now, as if fuel fabrication weren’t enough of a French role, Mark Hibbs reports in the October 8 Nucleonics Week that it now appears that the LEU from Iran would travel first to France for some cleaning up before heading to Russia for enrichment. The reason? Our friend molybdenum. Mo, for short. (See: Fun with Molybdenum, October 7, 2009; TRR Tradeoffs, October 6, 2009; and most of all, Geneva: The TRR and Enrichment Abroad, October 1, 2009.) Score another one for James Acton.
There are also many other good bits in the paper, which is three pages long and dated September 14. Notably, it depicts the E3 as taking a tougher line with Iran than China, Russia, or the United States. My reasonably adequate(?) translation of the whole thing, faute de mieux, is in the comments.
My translation of the document:
Josh, you’re right in questioning how interested Iran is in the TRR. Recall GOV/2003/75 reports “Iran had decided to replace TRR because, after 35 years of operation, it was reaching the safety limits for which it had been designed and because of its location within what had become the suburbs of the city of Tehran.”
I suspect Iran is only interested in running TRR for a few years overlap with when it plans to have IR-40 in Arak running. So maybe 10 years more fuel at most. If they only plan to run it at the same intensity as since Argentina refueled it (116kg fuel used 1993 to 2010), perhaps because of aging safety concerns, they might well at most only want two reloads at 64kg of 19.7% LEU. By Geoff’s earlier calculations, 64kg of fuel only needs about 600kg of Iran’s current stock of 3.5% LEU.
If so this convenient plan for “1,200 kg of uranium [to] leave Iran” falls.
… BTW I’ve found the TRR on Google Earth (kml) . It certainly is in the inner suburbs, about 5.5km (3.5 miles) NNW of the centre of Tehran. You can see why Iran might want it shut down in that location.
Photos of the TRR here, scroll down a little to “Tehran Nuclear Research Center”.
Iran probably consider having a Eurodiff factory processing their Uranium a political victory and a step towards getting back their 10% rights in the concern. One of their stated reasons for entering the enrichment business was to get bargaining leverage over the nuclear suppliers and it seems this was a clever move. Iran’s secret is being very realistic and striving consistently for aims that can be achieved.
Josh, your translation is basically fine (except that it’s “les Six” and not “le Six” – but I’m being pedantic). And I have good reasons to believe that the paper is authentic, thus providing a window into French thinking.
“Iran needs up to 300 kg of nuclear fuel to cover the requirements of a reactor in Tehran for a year and a half, an official was quoted as saying on Saturday. “
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3787903,00.html
Kerbihan:
Pedantry is always welcome here! I’ve made the correction.
I’ve also added the top line of the document to the translation in the comments. I’d left it out by accident.
Why is it that in all the french documents that I have read on this subject 5+1 is refered to as 3+3 ??
Ataune:
Because the first negotiating team (2003-2005) was 3 European countries (FR, UK, GE), hence the “E3”.
3+3 = EU3 (France, Germany, UK) + 3 (China, Russia, US)
Welcome to the story, Washington Post!
Josh:
Rumor has it that this was Iran’s initiative and WaPo is just taking up the story from where Samore et Einhorn got involved. By the way, it looks like these 2 will also represent the American side in the talks on 19th of October.
Regarding 5+1 vs 3+3 denomination, sounds to me that this has more to do with recent subtle political shifts in the positions of the individual 6s than any linguistic and geographical differences in calling them.
The WaPo article quotes a senior official saying wisely that “we want to see if [the TRR scheme] succeeds before we designate paternity here”.
Indeed. Ali Shirzadian from AEOI said on Sat. 10 that if talks do not succeed, Iran will do the enrichment for the TRR itself. Am I the only one to think that this may have been all along a smart trick by Iran to give a public rationale for “experimental” 20% U-235 LEU production? If so, then the Natanz breakout option could possibly (emphasize possibly) make sense after all. The Oct. 18 meeting should give us a clearer sense of where this is going.
Why did this leak? This makes Iran much less likely to accede to French demands.
The French don’t seem too hot on the TRR idea. I guess they really think they have sanctions they can impose that will “put Iran’s back to the wall.”
Probably because it’s mostly not French troops in Iraq and Afghanistan.
It seems very difficult for Western sources to get a handle on exactly how little leverage they have over Iran right now.
The above-referenced story (concerning the AEOI spokesman’s recent statement to the Associated Press) is here. I wouldn’t be too hasty in making judgments about it; these sorts of statements are not necessarily a reliable guide to what the leadership is able or willing to do. After the Qom revelation, the Iranian side has to be feeling the heat concerning the Additional Protocol, and would probably just as soon change the subject. So let’s see what happens at the next meeting, later this month.
So, why did the paper leak? Good question. My best guess is that someone in the French Foreign Ministry wasn’t entirely happy with the compromise negotiating position of the E3+3 / P5+1 and wanted it known that France had preferred a tougher line than what was finally agreed upon. (Note the emphasis on “freeze for freeze” in the paper.) Either that, or they wanted certain audiences to understand that France had an important role in shaping the agreement-in-principle, especially by holding out for 1,200 kg LEU or bust. But again, these are just educated guesses.
To the commenter who is unhappy that his comment wasn’t approved: I didn’t think it added anything. Please don’t take it personally.
This is a fascinating document and once again reminds me why armscontrolwonk is one of my favorite websites. Thank you for highlighting it and providing the translation.
Glenn:
A belated “You’re welcome.” And thanks for reading.
This importing information was little taken back by the French press… Thank you very much for this translation.
De rien!
I realize this is a little late, but here, for reference, is the text of the Ministerial Statement that emerged from the September 23 meeting in New York: