Joshua PollackFrance's Role in the LEU-TRR Deal

Yes, we’ve all had a big helping of TRR lately, but this extra tidbit is just too juicy to pass up. Other topics again soon, I promise.

A friend of the blog who shall go nameless points out that just as the envoys of Iran and the P5+1 were meeting in Geneva on October 1, the website of the French weekly Bakchich Hebdo published a remarkable and authentic-looking document: a French Foreign Ministry strategy paper produced in advance of an earlier meeting in New York between representatives of the P5+1.

Or as the paper calls them, les Six.

That meeting, scheduled for September 23, shortly before the G-20 meeting in Pittsburgh, appears to have ironed out the differences between les Six in advance of the Iran talks. The paper deals with the prospect of a LEUTRR bargain at some length:

4. The Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), for which fuel is made from 19.7% enriched uranium, will run short of fuel in the second half of 2010. The Iranians have therefore asked the IAEA about the possibility of enriching their uranium to this level (Iran’s uranium is currently 3.5% enriched); should the Agency refuse, they [the Iranians] could use this pretext to enrich their uranium [themselves] to 19.7%.

The Americans envision proposing that Iran export 1,200 kg of low-enriched uranium for additional enrichment and conversion to fuel abroad before being returned to Iran. The enrichment would take place in Russia and the fuel fabrication in France (Argentina and France are the only countries whose industries have the necessary expertise).

We have given the United States our agreement for this operation, with conditions. In particular, it seems essential that this operation be integrated with the strategy and the schedule of The Six and that the entire 1,200 kg of uranium leave Iran on a short deadline (Iran should be asked for an answer in principle by the end of October; the uranium should exit before the end of the year).

The paper later adds that “we are not prepared to commit ourselves if the operation involves a lesser quantity of uranium.”

If the claims in this passage are accurate, then an Iranian inquiry, an American idea, and a French technological near-monopoly helped bring about the agreement-in-principle of October 1—the one that Iranian spokesmen have yet to acknowledge publicly. Note, however, that President Ahmadinejad signaled his agreement in the days before the Geneva meeting.

It’s open to question whether continuing to operate TRR is really all that important to Iran; when it comes to Tehran’s motives for doing this deal, you’ll have to draw your own conclusions. For what it’s worth, the same anonymous analyst who spotted this item also observes that the LEU deal seems to combine aspects of past Russian fuel offers with Scott Kemp’s idea that conversion of Iranian LEU to fuel could be an important confidence-building measure.

But Wait, There’s More

Now, as if fuel fabrication weren’t enough of a French role, Mark Hibbs reports in the October 8 Nucleonics Week that it now appears that the LEU from Iran would travel first to France for some cleaning up before heading to Russia for enrichment. The reason? Our friend molybdenum. Mo, for short. (See: Fun with Molybdenum, October 7, 2009; TRR Tradeoffs, October 6, 2009; and most of all, Geneva: The TRR and Enrichment Abroad, October 1, 2009.) Score another one for James Acton.

There are also many other good bits in the paper, which is three pages long and dated September 14. Notably, it depicts the E3 as taking a tougher line with Iran than China, Russia, or the United States. My reasonably adequate(?) translation of the whole thing, faute de mieux, is in the comments.

Comments

  1. Josh (History)

    My translation of the document:

    ASD/QA/FA September 14, 2009
    Iranian nuclear: E3+3 ministerial meeting (New York; September 23)
    Context:
    1. The report of the IAEA Director-General released on August 28 confirms that Iran is pursuing uranium enrichment activities, in violation of the resolutions of the Security Council. Iran has, at present, accumulated a stock of low-enriched uranium corresponding to the quantity necessary to fabricate, after further enrichment, a nuclear device.
    It [Iran] persists in not fully cooperating with the IAEA and is violating its safeguards agreement. It continually refuses to answer the Agency’s questions about certain aspects of its nuclear program, particularly concerning activities connected to the design of nuclear weapons.
    At the same time, Iran continues to develop its ballistic-missile capabilities (regular flight tests).
    2. Iran’s responses to the offers of dialogue are unsatisfactory:
    – So far, the Iranians have not responded to various proposals of The Six or to the historic initiatives of the new U.S. administration (the proposal of a direct dialogue with Iran);
    – Also, the Iranians have counterattacked in formulating their own round of proposals of September 9. These, which fall short even in comparison to the May 2008 offer, do not meet our expectations: the Iranians propose discussions on a set of subjects foreign to the nuclear question; the program properly speaking is not addressed.
    3. Following the remit of the Iranian proposal, The Six have proposed a meeting to the Iranians, who have accepted. This meeting should be held in Istanbul 1 October. Our objective will be to get a clear response from the Iranians concerning the conditions demanded by The Six for starting negotiations on their nuclear program.1 But it is unlikely that the Iranian negotiator will make a commitment on this question on October 1.
    4. The Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), for which fuel is made from 19.7% enriched uranium, will run short of fuel in the second half of 2010. The Iranians have therefore asked the IAEA about the possibility of enriching their uranium to this level (Iran’s uranium is currently 3.5% enriched); should the Agency refuse, they [the Iranians] could use this pretext to enrich their uranium [themselves] to 19.7%.
    The Americans envision proposing that Iran export 1,200 kg of low-enriched uranium for additional enrichment and conversion to fuel abroad before being returned to Iran. The enrichment would take place in Russia and the fuel fabrication in France (Argentina and France are the only countries whose industries have the necessary expertise).
    We have given the United States our agreement for this operation, with conditions. In particular, it seems essential that this operation be integrated with the strategy and the schedule of The Six and that the entire 1,200 kg of uranium leave Iran on a short deadline (Iran should be asked for an answer in principle by the end of October; the uranium should exit before the end of the year).
    1 It will be recalled that in 2007, The Six had proposed to the Iranians to prepare for the suspension of sensitive activities and the concomitant opening of negotiations, for a brief period of discussions during which the Iranians would no further develop their sensitive nuclear activities and The Six would no further seek the adoption of new sanctions at the Security Council (“freeze for freeze”).
    Language:
    * The contents of the IAEA DG’s latest report are very worrisome. It emphasizes yet again that Iran continues to accumulate low-enriched uranium and to install centrifuges in large numbers, in violation of Security Council resolutions. Moreover, Iran has still not provided any explanation in response to the Agency’s questions about possible activities linked to the design and manufacture of nuclear weapons.
    * The Iranian document remitted to the E3+3 on September 9 unfortunately contains nothing new. Indeed, it falls short of the offer of May 2008. It does not respond to the concerns of the international community about Iran’s nuclear program, which it does not address directly.
    * We expect from the Iranians at the 1 October meeting a clear response to our proposals to engage in negotiations on the nuclear file (“freeze for freeze”). We expect Iran to show us that it is ready to discuss its sensitive activities seriously. It is up to Iran to restore the international community’s confidence in this regard.
    * In light of the progress of the Iranian program and the growing anxieties in the region, it is our responsibility to act without wasting time. It is unacceptable to let it be concluded that the diplomatic track is hopeless. We cannot accept any more delaying tactics from Iran.
    * Our priority remains negotiation. But we cannot tolerate indefinite slipping of the schedule. We must give the Iranian regime a short deadline to provide a serious answer to our negotiation proposals, ideally by the end of October, and no later than the end of November. We must set a deadline because Iran is continuing to accumulate low-enriched uranium.
    * If it appears that Iran still has no intention of negotiating seriously on the nuclear issue, we will have no other choice, consistent with our two-track approach of dialogue and firmness, but to seek in the coming months a very substantial tightening of international sanctions against Iran. These sanctions must no longer concern only proliferation activities. They must target key areas of Iran’s economy: finance, gas and oil, transportation.
    * We are convinced, in light of Iran’s history, that the regime cannot adopt strategic decisions unless its back is to the wall (cf. Khomeini’s acceptance of the ceasefire in the Iran-Iraq war).
    * France is ready to manufacture the fuel required for the Tehran Research Reactor. But this operation can be carried out only under certain conditions. This arrangement is advantageous only if it permits an early exit from Iran of the 1,200 kg of low-enriched uranium. It is therefore imperative to have an prompt response from the Iranians (by the end of October) and that the uranium leave Iran by the end of the year. Furthermore, we are not prepared to commit ourselves if the operation involves a lesser quantity of uranium.
    Position of the E3+3:
    – France: If Iran does not agree to discuss its program seriously, we must start considering a further package of sanctions to be adopted by the UNSC. The President of the Republic drew a very clear line in his opening speech at the Conference of Ambassadors [on August 26] when he spoke about a “substantial tightening of sanctions.”
    – Germany and the United Kingdom: They take the same position as us, though there remain minor differences about the envisioned sanctions.
    – United States: The United States, which made an unprecedented overture to Iran in the spring, apparently does not intend to review this strategy until the end of the year. Its strategy is a bit more wait-and-see than ours, but it is participating, within the E3+1 [sic], in discussions of new sanctions.
    – Russia and China: Both states very clearly emphasize dialogue and do not wish to raise the idea of further sanctions. The Chinese and Russian [Foreign] Ministers probably will highlight the meeting of The Six with Iran on October 1 to refuse to make any commitments about what should happen next, particularly on the question of sanctions.
    Our objectives:
    This ministerial meeting will provide the opportunity, at the top level, to take stock of Iran’s response; it should also enable The Six to specify the conclusions to be drawn and to define what should happen next.
    The meeting should provide an opportunity to ask Iran to meet, within a short timeframe (ideally by 30 October) the conditions named by The Six for starting negotiations on its nuclear program (“freeze for freeze”). It is necessary to set a deadline for the Iranians. In the case of Russian, Chinese, and surely also US reticence, this deadline could be moved to the end of the year.
    The meeting should also provide the opportunity to broach the possibility of new sanctions and to establish what principles should guide The Six in determining them. From our point of view, the sanctions must be strong and no longer exclusively related to non-proliferation.
    The meeting should provide an opportunity to broach for the first time the question of the Tehran Research Reactor within an E3+3 format and to make known our conditions for participating in this operation, particularly those relative to timing and the quantity of uranium involved (the Iranians could want only part of the 1,200 kg to exit their national territory).
    Finally, this meeting should provide the occasion for a public communique expressing the international community’s profound concern about the Iranian nuclear program, solemnly calling upon Iran to comply with the resolutions of the Security Council, noting the availability of The Six to discuss with Iran its sensitive activities, and setting a deadline on Iran to meet the conditions named by The Six for starting discussions on its nuclear program.

  2. Rwendland (History)

    Josh, you’re right in questioning how interested Iran is in the TRR. Recall GOV/2003/75 reports “Iran had decided to replace TRR because, after 35 years of operation, it was reaching the safety limits for which it had been designed and because of its location within what had become the suburbs of the city of Tehran.”

    I suspect Iran is only interested in running TRR for a few years overlap with when it plans to have IR-40 in Arak running. So maybe 10 years more fuel at most. If they only plan to run it at the same intensity as since Argentina refueled it (116kg fuel used 1993 to 2010), perhaps because of aging safety concerns, they might well at most only want two reloads at 64kg of 19.7% LEU. By Geoff’s earlier calculations, 64kg of fuel only needs about 600kg of Iran’s current stock of 3.5% LEU.

    If so this convenient plan for “1,200 kg of uranium [to] leave Iran” falls.

  3. Rwendland (History)

    … BTW I’ve found the TRR on Google Earth (kml) . It certainly is in the inner suburbs, about 5.5km (3.5 miles) NNW of the centre of Tehran. You can see why Iran might want it shut down in that location.

    Photos of the TRR here, scroll down a little to “Tehran Nuclear Research Center”.

  4. Yossi

    Iran probably consider having a Eurodiff factory processing their Uranium a political victory and a step towards getting back their 10% rights in the concern. One of their stated reasons for entering the enrichment business was to get bargaining leverage over the nuclear suppliers and it seems this was a clever move. Iran’s secret is being very realistic and striving consistently for aims that can be achieved.

  5. kerbihan

    Josh, your translation is basically fine (except that it’s “les Six” and not “le Six” – but I’m being pedantic). And I have good reasons to believe that the paper is authentic, thus providing a window into French thinking.

  6. pop eye

    “Iran needs up to 300 kg of nuclear fuel to cover the requirements of a reactor in Tehran for a year and a half, an official was quoted as saying on Saturday. “

    http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3787903,00.html

  7. Josh (History)

    Kerbihan:

    Pedantry is always welcome here! I’ve made the correction.

    I’ve also added the top line of the document to the translation in the comments. I’d left it out by accident.

  8. Ataune (History)

    Why is it that in all the french documents that I have read on this subject 5+1 is refered to as 3+3 ??

  9. kerbihan

    Ataune:

    Because the first negotiating team (2003-2005) was 3 European countries (FR, UK, GE), hence the “E3”.

  10. Crispy Duck (History)

    3+3 = EU3 (France, Germany, UK) + 3 (China, Russia, US)

  11. Josh (History)

    Welcome to the story, Washington Post!

  12. Ataune (History)

    Josh:

    Rumor has it that this was Iran’s initiative and WaPo is just taking up the story from where Samore et Einhorn got involved. By the way, it looks like these 2 will also represent the American side in the talks on 19th of October.

    Regarding 5+1 vs 3+3 denomination, sounds to me that this has more to do with recent subtle political shifts in the positions of the individual 6s than any linguistic and geographical differences in calling them.

  13. kerbihan

    The WaPo article quotes a senior official saying wisely that “we want to see if [the TRR scheme] succeeds before we designate paternity here”.

    Indeed. Ali Shirzadian from AEOI said on Sat. 10 that if talks do not succeed, Iran will do the enrichment for the TRR itself. Am I the only one to think that this may have been all along a smart trick by Iran to give a public rationale for “experimental” 20% U-235 LEU production? If so, then the Natanz breakout option could possibly (emphasize possibly) make sense after all. The Oct. 18 meeting should give us a clearer sense of where this is going.

  14. Arnold Evans (History)

    Why did this leak? This makes Iran much less likely to accede to French demands.

    The French don’t seem too hot on the TRR idea. I guess they really think they have sanctions they can impose that will “put Iran’s back to the wall.”

    Probably because it’s mostly not French troops in Iraq and Afghanistan.

    It seems very difficult for Western sources to get a handle on exactly how little leverage they have over Iran right now.

  15. Josh (History)

    The above-referenced story (concerning the AEOI spokesman’s recent statement to the Associated Press) is here. I wouldn’t be too hasty in making judgments about it; these sorts of statements are not necessarily a reliable guide to what the leadership is able or willing to do. After the Qom revelation, the Iranian side has to be feeling the heat concerning the Additional Protocol, and would probably just as soon change the subject. So let’s see what happens at the next meeting, later this month.

    So, why did the paper leak? Good question. My best guess is that someone in the French Foreign Ministry wasn’t entirely happy with the compromise negotiating position of the E3+3 / P5+1 and wanted it known that France had preferred a tougher line than what was finally agreed upon. (Note the emphasis on “freeze for freeze” in the paper.) Either that, or they wanted certain audiences to understand that France had an important role in shaping the agreement-in-principle, especially by holding out for 1,200 kg LEU or bust. But again, these are just educated guesses.

    To the commenter who is unhappy that his comment wasn’t approved: I didn’t think it added anything. Please don’t take it personally.

  16. Glenn Kessler (History)

    This is a fascinating document and once again reminds me why armscontrolwonk is one of my favorite websites. Thank you for highlighting it and providing the translation.

  17. Josh (History)

    Glenn:

    A belated “You’re welcome.” And thanks for reading.

  18. Bakchich

    This importing information was little taken back by the French press… Thank you very much for this translation.

  19. Josh (History)

    De rien!

  20. Josh (History)

    I realize this is a little late, but here, for reference, is the text of the Ministerial Statement that emerged from the September 23 meeting in New York:

    E3+3 MINISTERIAL STATEMENT, SEPTEMBER 23, 2009
    Iran’s nuclear programme remains a matter of serious concern to the international community as set out in UNSC Resolutions 1696, 1737, 1747, 1803 and 1835. We acknowledge the recent measures taken by Iran regarding its cooperation with the IAEA and encourage Iran to cooperate further with the IAEA to resolve the remaining issues which need to be clarified to exclude the possibility of military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. We urge Iran to implement all measures required by the IAEA and the UN Security Council to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme at the earliest possible date.
    We have consistently stated that we want to negotiate a comprehensive long-term agreement to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue. But this can only be achieved if both sides are willing to approach these matters in a spirit of mutual respect and are committed to looking for solutions going forward.
    This has been the objective of our dual track policy since June 2006, to which we remain firmly committed. We recall the meeting between Dr Saeed Jalili, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, and Dr Javier Solana, the European Union’s High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, accompanied by representatives from the E3+3, in Geneva in July 2008, at which proposals from the E3+3 and Iran were discussed.
    The other members of the group warmly welcomed the new direction of US policy towards Iran and their decision to participate fully in the E3+3 process and join in any future meetings with representatives of Iran.
    On 8 April 2009 we called on Iran once again to meet us to discuss the proposal we made in June 2008. We note that on 9 September Iran made a proposal for a discussion covering a wide range of issues. We stress the importance and urgency of taking practical steps to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue. We reaffirm our proposals of June 2008 which will offer substantial opportunities for political, security and economic benefits to Iran and to the region.
    We reiterate that we recognise Iran’s rights under the international treaties to which it is a signatory. But with those rights come a responsibility to the international community.
    We are united in our willingness to work with Iran on these matters. The meeting on 1 October will provide an opportunity to seek a comprehensive, long-term and appropriate solution to the Iranian nuclear issue through dialogue and negotiation. We expect a serious response from Iran and will decide, in the context of our dual track approach, as a result of the meeting, on our next steps.