On January 11, 2010, China conducted a test on ground-based midcourse missile interception technology within its territory. The test has achieved the expected objective. The test is defensive in nature and is not targeted at any country. (Xinhua File Photo)
Greetings from Andalo.
China announced that it has conducted a missile defense test. The announcement was very brief:
BEIJING, Jan. 11 (Xinhua) — On January 11, 2010, China conducted a test on ground-based midcourse missile interception technology within its territory. The test has achieved the expected objective. The test is defensive in nature and is not targeted at any country.
The Foreign Ministry Spokesperson made slightly more detailed comments, including noting that “The test would neither produce space debris in orbit nor pose a threat to the safety of orbiting spacecraft.”
That China might move some of its “hit to kill” research into the missile defense arena is hardly surprising — Geoff Forden has a post appropriately titled, Told you so.
I am surprised, however, at how smoothly the Chinese have handled the announcement. China is handling this test completely differently than the January 2007 Chinese anti-satellite test — though it is possible the system is the same. In January 2007, China was silent for nearly two weeks following the test, including five days of awkward silence after word leaked to Arms Control Wonk and Aviation Week and Space Technology.
In the aftermath of that debacle, Gregory Kulacki and I were told, and wrote in the Nonproliferation Review, that China had instituted a new procedure for vetting “future tests of potentially sensitive technologies with significant international consequences”:
In the wake of the test many foreign governments criticized the Chinese government for authorizing the test, for not informing them before hand, for failing to respond to requests for clarification, and for blithely dismissing the potential impacts on the future peaceful use of space. Chinese leaders in both the Foreign Ministry and Central Military Commission have struggled to cope with the intensity of the international reaction and the failure of their subordinates to anticipate and respond effectively to foreign inquiries and concerns, a dysfunction that continued for months. A long-planned conference of the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee, scheduled to be held in Beijing in April 2007, three months after the test, was abruptly canceled without explanation just days before it was scheduled to begin. In retrospect, the Party leadership maintains (and multiple sources confirm as accurate) that the relevant agencies, military and civilian, failed to coordinate well. Somewhere along the line the paper stopped flowing, and responsible individuals at the lower levels of the bureaucracy who had no prior knowledge of the program or the decision to go forward with the test but who did have responsibility for crafting and delivering the post-test message never got their instructions.
[snip]
There seems to be no dispute about the profoundly negative consequences of the Chinese government’s long-delayed response to the unanticipated, intense, and immediate international reaction to the ASAT test. All our sources agree that the delay reflected a significant breakdown in coordination within the Foreign Ministry, and between the Foreign Ministry and the military. In the wake of this failure, according to one source, the leadership will institute a new interagency review process that will be applied to future tests of potentially sensitive technologies with significant international consequences.
It looks like that procedure was in place, and worked very well in this case.
– China announced the test itself, rather than letting the US officials leak the information to Craig Covault at AvWeek.
– China had a prepared Foreign Ministry spokesperson ready to deliver talking points, rather than waiting almost five days to confirm the test with a not very convincing statement.
– China described the test as for missile defense — though it is not clear whether China flew an interceptor against a target — which is very difficult for the United States to criticize, especially in a week in which the US announced the sale PAC-3 interceptors to Taiwan.
– And, for good measure, China made sure to point out that the test “would neither produce space debris in orbit nor pose a threat to the safety of orbiting spacecraft.”
This is progress, though not exactly the sort I had hoped for.
It Might Not Have Been An HQ-9
I suspect this was the same sort of interceptor used in January 2007, though that is simply a guess at this point. (The reference to space debris, however, strikes me as particularly notworthy link to January 2007.)
Xinhua carried the announcement with the above photo — of an HQ-9 air defense missile [of a Chinese air defense missile]. Some colleagues have assumed (quite reasonably) that the test must, therefore, have used [Chinese air defense missile, such as the] HQ-9 missile, which in many ways resembles the Russian S-300 air-defense missile.
I would not/not, however, conclude China used an HQ-9 on the basis of this image. The caption, which I have reproduced with the image, describes it as a “file photo” and the Xinhua photo gallery contains file photos of an HQ-9, an HQ-12 and a DF-21C.
One thing I notice about the statement and selection of pictures is that the Chinese government has gone to great lengths to appear to be providing information, but there really is nothing there at all about the interceptor, the objective of the test, and so forth.
China really could have tested anything at all, though my default assumption would be that the missile defense test mirrored the January 2007 ASAT test and its predecessors.
Spread of Hit to Kill Technologies
The event in China is interesting in light of another recent development: India has announced its ABM program will be expanded to include an anti-satellite program.
While China is migrating its anti-satellite research into the missile defense arena, India is doing the opposite. In both cases, however, the technology is fundamentally the same: the development of kinetic energy interceptors — so called “hit-to-kill” technologies that use a bullet to hit a bullet.
In 2007, I tried to make the argument that we were making a mistake to focus on “anti-satellite” weapons — which is a mission. The real danger was the increasing availability of the specific technology — hit-to-kill — that would inevitably spread for both missile defense and anti-satellite applications:
First, once uncommon hit-to-kill technologies are now at the early stages of spreading around the world. Second, the broad focus on space weapons and ASAT technologies, many of which are quite unrealistic and exotic, distracts from the technological challenge posed by the proliferation of hit-to-kill systems. Third, partial arms control measures, such as a ban on kinetic ASAT testing, may mitigate the most threatening aspects of hit-to-kill technology while avoiding some of the difficulties associated with more comprehensive agreements.
I think that is precisely where we are today: The US has pioneered a technology — and encouraged its spread to allies like Israel, Japan and Taiwan among others. Now China and India are racing to join the club. The result, I think, is going to be a significant increase in the vulnerability of space assets.
Upated | 12:49 pm Sean O’Connor, judging by the TEL, suggests that the missile is a Chinese S-300 rather than an HQ-9. Looking at images from the National Day parade and rehearsal, the TEL seems to look different. The most likely candidate is an S-300, but I can’t find a really reliable picture. And, frankly speaking, I haven’t spent much time staring at Chinese air defense missiles, though I suspect that is about to change. Comments are invited.
Picture is probably a really poor photoshop result. The missile does not fit its container.
Midcourse of what kind of trajectory an IRBM or ICBM? If it was an ICBM style trajectory can I say that I smell some rather effective espionage? It took the US 40 years to perfect our system with a huge engineering and public footprint. And then this comes out of almost nowhere. Or have I been missing something over the past decade or three?
The picture shows a Chinese S-300PMU-1 (SA-20A GARGOYLE) 5P85TE TEL firing a 48N6E1 missile. It’s not an HQ-9, which uses a mobile TEL, not a towed unit like the 5P85TE.
The Xinhua press release described the test as of “ground based midcourse missile interception technology.” If that description is accurate, it more likely involved the same interceptor that was used in the exacty 3 years prior ASAT test, or an improved version thereof, than anything involving an air defense missile.
As this test demonstrates, a ban on explicit KE ASAT tests would be fairly meaningless at this point, since the same technology, and even exactly the same weapons, can be adequately tested in this mode as “missile defense.”
Furthermore, for the ASAT mission, other technologies are preferred, precisely to avoid producing space debris. For direct physical interference, maneuvering microsatellites are the frontier and state of the art. Even better, when you can do it, is covert interference in the form of electronic/cyber warfare. High-power ground-based lasers for blinding photoreconn are also useful.
Therefore, a ban on KE ASAT testing, at this point, would not be great for space security. It might even make the situation worse, by implying that the problem was solved, and serving in effect to legitimize the very ASAT technologies that are more likely to be developed and used in the future.
Incidentally, Japan acquired a technology with potential ASAT applications before missile defense. In the late 1990s, the two modules of the Engineering Test Satellite VII became the first unmanned spacecraft to dock with each other by autopilot, and by command through an American Tracking and Data Relay Satellite.
Another reason to believe it was a test of the same interceptor used in 2007 for the ASAT test is that a very senior U.S. government official told me in Sept. of 2009 that China was preparing another ASAT Test.
In addition, please keep in mind that this test occurs just five days after Obama authorized another round of arms sales to Taiwan that included batteries of Patriots.
The fact that this test was exactly 3 years ago to the day that China did the ASAT test should be clear that Beijing is trying to tell you that this is a very thinly disguised ASAT test. The technology is after all, the same. I also have doubts that China is interested in developing a capability on the scale of the NMD. I just can’t see ABM systems as particularly useful to China, whereas an operational ASAT system would be marvellously handy in deterring American threats.
The timing of the PAC3 sale to Taiwan or India’s missile program is probably an honest coincidence.
Global Security Newswire quotes Pentagon as saying it was an intercept test, and that the test caught the DOD by surprise:
http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20100112_1311.php
If there is indeed no sizable orbiting debris to track, then there will be no data (at least unclassified ones) to analyze. Unless someone in the US government decides to leak classified data about this Chinese test (which seems very unlikely), the public is doomed to have nothing to know about this test. Judging from the brevity of the Chinese announcement, the picture is totally meaningless. If China does not want to show JL-2 on the Parade, why would it want to show this baby? For Americans to track (and kill)? As for PAC-3 sales to Taiwan, it merely gives China an excuse to test the new toy on the third anniversary of the first ASAT test. If the sale were not announced, China probably would wait after Obama meets His Holiness to show its anger. If United States wants to see more announced tests, it just needs to push these two hot buttons. Otherwise, I suspect that future tests of the touchy kinds would not be announced, certainly not on the anniversary. The Americans would likely be quiet as they don’t want to reveal what they can see.
Following on from Gregory’s comment, the test also occurs on the eve of Secretary Clinton’s tour of the Asia-Pacific, and at the start of a year when many in Washington voice concerns over a more rocky period in Sino-American relations. I’m sure the decision to go ahead with the Taiwanese arms sale has not helped matters (though undoubtedly the test was scheduled long before the Taiwan decision was made), it is but one inauspicious incident out of many.
Andrew,
Here’s an article about the history of China’s missile defense/ASAT research for the last 46 years.
http://www.aladding.com/newsDetail.cfm?postid=486147
Maybe Gregory can translate it so that FBI does not need to be called to find another Wen Ho Lee.
The Pentagon confirms that “We detected two geographically separated missile launch events with an exoatmospheric collision also being observed by space-based sensors.”
http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20100112_1311.php
So this was not an air defense missile. It was most probably a successor to the 2007 ASAT.
They also say that they had no prior notification, but that is not the same as saying they had no clue.
Is the test itself really that significant? If China wants a seat at the table with the big boys – the U.S. and Russia in particular – then having a proven mid-course interceptor may be a block that has to be checked.
Secondly, does a rudimentary defense against ballistic missiles affect strategic stability or reduce the viability of anyone’s nuclear deterrent? Doesn’t seem like it would. India could stand out as an exception though.
Thirdly, the PLA and State Council, through the 863 Program and other sources, have allocated R&D funds for missile defense and its ASAT cousin for a long, long time. Obviously, a major purpose has been developing technical countermeasures to ensure the viability of China’s own nuclear deterrent in the face of U.S. missile defenses.
But an integrated flight test likely had to come sooner or later. If one does even a casual Google/Baidu search in Chinese using the proper euphemisms, such as a “space intercept” (kongjian lanzai), then the level of effort, at least based on published writings of those likely involved in the ASAT/missile defense R&D, should be fairly apparent. Most important is the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) Second Academy, which is probably the lead systems integrator for the ASAT/missile defense interceptor. Engineers from other organizations, such as Harbin Institute of Technology, have made significant contributions as well, primarily in basic research. Sometimes the actual funding source (863, 971, etc) is listed.
Finally, linkages drawn between this test and recent DoD PAC-3 contract announcements would be tenuous at best. Beijing authorities already did the proforma demarches and froze mil/mil relations in response to the Bush administration’s announcement of an intent to Congress sell Taiwan 330 PAC-3 missiles and four new fire units. The Foreign Ministry and others know these contract announcements were routine, bureaucratic, and implementing Bush administration decisions.
But could the missile defense test be an attempt to dissuade the Obama administration from the first real Taiwan arms sales action of its administration? The first major Congressional notifications for Taiwan arms since October 2008 should be going forward in the next week or two. If Beijing wanted arms sales to Taiwan to stop, one would think that someone in Zhongnanhai would try something new – like renounce the use of force to resolve differences with Taiwan and reduce its military posture directed against the island.
Both HQ-9 and S-300PMU1 have an altitude ceiling of 30km. Hence both missile launch events can’t be AD missiles but were probably of DF series. In any case, this is a great way to display to the whole world the technological advancement achieved by China in the fields of TT&C.
Chinese timings are simply perfect.
1. Arms sale to Taiwan by US announced.
2. India tested BVRAAM called ASTRA.
3. Indian Defense Secretary is on visit to Beijing.
Just to clarify, the missile system in the photo is an S-300PMU-1. I’m not trying to say that this is what they used in the test, just that Xinhua supplied a generic file photo with the article.
The designator for the interceptor almost certainly wouldn’t be HQ-9, DF-11/15, DF-21, KT-1, or any existing flight vehicle. A mid-course interceptor or direct ascent ASAT may use the same solid motor as one of these, but even this is uncertain. The missile’s kinetic kill vehicle (KKV) would be sufficiently unique to warrant the whole missile having its own designation.
Designations that have been thrown around, based on admittedly speculative Chinese sources, include things like HQ-19 or HQ-409. The “409” is derived from “863-409,” the focus area of the 863 Program that has been dedicated toward development of KKV-related technologies. Other aspects of the interceptor, such as motor or space surveillance, would probably also have been in the 863-4XX series.
There are signs, however, that 863 Program focus area designations (ie., 863-409) changed in the 2002/2003 timeframe.
The HQ-19 designation would be somewhat consistent with the DIA Director’s reference to an “SC-19” ASAT during Senate Armed Services Committee testimony in Feb 08. In this case, the “S” in “SC” likely would be “Shen” (as in “Shenzhou”), a term commonly used for developmental programs.
Regardless, the characteristics of the interceptor probably won’t be known for a while.
Great achievement indeed. This is a new missile not HQ9 nor S300, both of which cannot go above 27km. This inception is in the 100~1000km altitude range, so it must be a new missile, which puts ahead of Russia and maybe even the U.S. Go China!
> The HQ-19 designation would be somewhat consistent with the DIA Director’s reference to an “SC-19” ASAT during Senate Armed Services Committee testimony in Feb 08. In this case, the “S” in “SC” likely would be “Shen” (as in “Shenzhou”), a term commonly used for developmental programs.
My guess on this is that SC-19 is likely to be a test-center designator assigned by the USIC, like TT, KY, PL, etc. If so, SC would presumably stand for Shuang-cheng-tzu, an early US name for what is now called Jiuquan. Embarrassingly, I can’t find any other example of SC-x designators, so this interpretation is a bit shaky. Also, it isn’t clear what association Jiuquan would have with an ASAT/ABM.
Allen:
I can confirm that SC-19 was a reference to Shuang-cheng-tzu aka Jiuquan. I blogged about this a while back.
There is no reason, however, that an HQ and an SC designation would correspond (for instance, the DF-5 is the CSS-4, since we missed the DF-1).
I believe the HQ-19 is an S-400, which would not be the SC-19.
Does this picture look real to the pros?
http://mil.huanqiu.com/Exclusive/2010-01/686908.html
If i understood that right, then ‘SC-19’ and ‘Kaituozhe-1’ are (more or less) the same thing – a DF-21/CSS-5 with an additional 1m-diameter solid third stage; If that is correct, then the new ABM may be something completely different than the ‘old’ ASAT-system, probably something less GBI- and more PAC-3 or SM-3-like.
Isn’t the S-300 considered to be anti-missile-capable in later versions, too? Could the Chinese have gotten their hands on something like that?
Here is the statement from the Chinese Spokesperson on the hit-to-kill test:
That’s rather better than the lame statement that Chris Buckley got out of then-spokesperson Liu Jianchao in 2007: “I can’t say anything about the reports. I really don’t know.”
Jeffrey – what do the characters on the berm in the photo translate to?
My Chinese is lousy (really, really lousy) and I don’t have a dictionary handy!
Someone else want to help on the characters on the berm in the lower left-hand corner?
bob and Jeffrey,
It’s a slogan on the berm. I cannot make out the first two characters, the last three roughly mean “seek elite soldiers”. In China, large characters in red ink on any wall, berm, etc., are almost always slogans. The more characters, the more meaningless in general.
First, the blog site or the contributor seems to have borrowed the picture from Jonathon Weng’s China Defense Mash-up site, and added the annotation. The characters are really small, but it looks like some alumni organization (jiaoyoujing?).
Secondly, regarding the “SC” issue, I presumed that DIA would use a true nomenclature, but I could be mistaken. For example, DoD uses true nomenclatures (rather than NATO designations) for Chinese SAMs (e.g., HQ-9) and just about everything except ballistic missiles (with exception to public reference the DF-21D last year). Frankly, I wish the intel community would just use the Chinese designations in order to avoid confusion. Beyond this, I thought the ASAT test was conducted from Xichang, rather than Jiuquan (aka Shuangchengzi). Regardless, DIA’s “SC” designation rather than Chinese would explain why anything resembling “SC” can’t be found (except the “Shen xxx” for other programs).
Finally, despite Jane’s and other Western references, insufficient information exists to determine the relationship between the HQ-19 and S-400, if there is any at all. At least one Chinese analyst who tracks aerospace R&D programs seems to believe that the interceptor, at least for the ASAT, was a three-stage Kaituozhe (KT) derivative. The KT itself is said to be a DF-21 variant, although there are credible sources that indicate the KT solid fueled space launch vehicle program was at least initially funded via sources other than the PLA.
Jeffery:
I’ll put my dunce cap on, and add berm to my vocabulary. Question pertained to the picture embedded on top, not the picture in the link to the Chinese blog that 3.1415 posted.
The full line of characters on both sides isn’t clear enough to make out. Last character on left berm is “bing,” or military. Last two characters on berm to the right are “zhanfa,” or doctrine. Whatever the whole thing is, it’s likely just a slogan.
For 3.1415, the picture in the link ostensibly was taken someone in Urumqi who may have captured the test on his cell phone camera. Explanation is on Jonathon Weng’s website.
The photo is most likely a stock photo of a PRC test of the S-300.
The PRC ASAT/Midcourse interceptor was most likely the KT-409 variant of this small sat launcher. 50kg to leo scales to a nice size interceptor.
!http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/china/images/kt-1.jpg!
The characters on the berm although cant be read properly, are generally motivational idioms for soldiers. Nothing to do with the weapon system in the image or the event.
网络上流传的被称为“反导试验”的图像
Roughly translates to Internet picture of rumored ABM test.
The above is definitely stock photo. A closer cropped photo of the above deployment on the Air Power Australia website as a S-300PMU-2
http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-PLA-IADS-SAMs.html
direct link to image
http://www.ausairpower.net/PLA-5P85TE1-TEL-1S.jpg
It seems that China had (semi-)officially confirmed that it was “an indigenous surface-to-air defense missile”.
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2010-01/14/content_12809916.htm
JK:
The professor who’s commenting is from the PLA’s National Defense University Logistics and Military Technical Equipment Department. I’m not sure how reliable an authority he is.
What type of system do the Chinese weapons engineers and scientists say was used?
Do we have any reliable info on the time-of-day of the test? Reports are now accumulating from Sinkiang of “two colliding UFOs” about 8 PM local time, bringing to mind the Dec 9 ‘Norwegian spiral UFO’ reports that quickly were explained by the Bulava test. Is the Sinkiang sky phenomena just a coincidence or cause-and-effect, I wonder?
One of the first Chinese visual reports on the test came from the Jiuquan City. The observer gave a bearing (NW) and elevation (45°). For me it’s perfectly matches a launch from the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center. Other reports centered about Urumchi.
“FanJi 1
The FanJi 1 was a two-stage, semi-active radar-homing, hypersonic interceptor missile designed to intercept ballistic missile warheads at low- to medium-altitude. The first-stage of the missile used liquid propellant and the second-stage used solid propellant. The missile was 14m in length. Flight tests of two dummy missiles were carried out successfully in August and September of 1979. At the same time, the PLA proposed a missile defence zone around the capital Beijing using the FanJi 1. However, the development programme was cancelled by the Chinese government in March 1980 due to financial and political reasons.
FanJi 2
Between October 1971 and April 1972, the 2nd Academy tested six flight tests of a 1:5 scaled model of the FanJi 2 low-altitude ABM, with five of them being successful. The development programme was cancelled in 1973.
FanJi 3
The FanJi 3 high-altitude ABM system was proposed by the 2nd Academy in 1974, but the development stopped in 1977.”
http://www.sinodefence.com/special/airdefence/project640.asp
Reports of unknown reliability indicate the interceptor was launched from the Korla area, target vehicle (either DF-3 or DF-21) launched from Taiyuan, and intercept taking place somewhere near the Xinjiang/Gansu border.
Jiuquan makes more sense due to the established infrastructure, but who knows.
As an aside, at least one Chinese analyst believes the test was supported by a new phased array radar in the Korla area. A relatively new radar with a single rotating 16.5 meter face can be seen on Google Earth at the following geocoords:
+41° 38’ 28.17”, +86° 14’ 11.98”
Looks like it was under construction as of October 2004. The Korla radar appears to be operated by the 63610 Unit, which reports to the PLA General Armaments Department (GAD) 20 Base.
>As an aside, at least one Chinese analyst believes the test was supported by a new phased array radar in the Korla area. A relatively new radar with a single rotating 16.5 meter face can be seen on Google Earth at the following geocoords:
Hmm. In the GE picture, the radar’s face appears to be boresighted along an azimuth of something like 293 degrees. Extending this line runs across Sary Shagan and the Baykonur (aka Tyuratam) cosmodrome. I wonder whether we aren’t looking at the modern manifestation of the joint PRC/CIA SIGINT site that reportedly was built near Korla starting in the late 1970s. (http://china.notspecial.org/archives/2008/08/index.html)
And, of course, Baykonur provides a reliable supply of free targets for the radar to observe for purposes of testing, calibration, algorithm development, etc.
Sorry to be a bit tardy with this, but I’ve been away from my main computer since the holidays.
Anyway, there’s some stuff in GE at the following coordinates that might be associated with anti-aircraft or anti-missile activity. Comments are solicited.
40.908 N, 95.312 E
40.898 N, 95.316 E
40.892 N, 95.312 E
And this one, which seems to have a readable slogan on a hillside in the 7 April 2007 picture. (It’s there in the 25 April 2007 image but not as distinct). Unfortunately, I can’t read Chinese:
40.893 N, 95.326 E
@Allen Thomson
Its Liuyuan SAM training range.
>Its Liuyuan SAM training range.
Thanks. I see there’s a bit of information on it at:
http://geimint.blogspot.com/2008/01/sam-test-and-training-ranges-in-russia.html
This source also describes the Shuangchengzi SAM development center, which might help explain the SC in SC-19.
Dude. The hard-Kill happen EXO-ATMOSPHERICALLY!!!!!!!
And it is the Pentagon that confirms that two object collided EXO-ATMOSPHERICALLY!!!
How, in Hell, can any S-300 system EVER deliver a missile 700+ kms from the surface!!! Dont be Brainless!
Dear James:
It can’t. I don’t think anyone thinks an S-300 was used. The question was which system is pictured.
The post was skeptical that an S-300 was used — when various people were inferring that based on the photograph. We didn’t have the Pentagon’s confirmation that the intercept was outside the atmosphere until later, which as you point out eliminates the possibility that an S-300 was used.
Later posts, by Geoff Forden, are quite detailed and focus on different missile systems:
Chinese BMD Eyewitness: Real or Not? January 22, 2010
Chinese BMD Test: Illuminated by the Sun?, January 23, 2010.