Following up on James’s post about the proposed NSG exemption for India, the Arms Control Association has the full text of the document.
If you haven’t been reading Siddharth Varadarajan’s commentary at Reality, One Bite At A Time and in The Hindu, you are really missing out.
Can someone explain to me how the modified NPT regime for India should not apply equally to Iran, Israel, Syria, Japan, South Korea, Pakistan, etc.?
Lao, haven’t a clue. Jeff?
LTR,
there are different rules for the friends of the West versus the enemies of the West.
It helps that India wants to buy all manner of arms from the US — Hyde will be thrown by the wayside when the senators see the $$$$$$.
When Iran was a friend of the West in 1970s the US was pushing U enrichment technology and even Pu processing plants down Iran’s throat.
So, it’s just like in the ‘hood — except there is more legalese, suits, Evian, and high-level meetings, less cool cars, definitely no sneakers, and (most likely, though I cannot confirm) less crack smoked.
Just like the NPT regime does not apply equally between USA, China, UK, Russia, France and Iran, Israel, Syria, Japan, South Korea, Pakistan etc.
Rhetoric but true 🙂
Arg. Very annoying when I am put in the position that seems to suggest I am defending the US-India deal (for the record, I am opposed to it), but. . . First of all, there is no “modified NPT regime”. It may be appropriate to say there is a change to the nonproliferation regime and it is certainly appropriate to say there is a change in US policy toward the NSG (again, for the record, I do not think any of these things are good). The distinction between the NPT and other elements of the broader nonproliferation regime brings me to my second point. There is a very good reason that the policy changes represented by the US-India deal should not apply to Iran, Syria, Japan, or South Korea: they signed the NPT. Like or dislike the India deal (again . . .), it is an approach to a country that is not part of the NPT and for whom there is no prospect of becoming part of the NPT. The central distinction is being a signatory to the treaty, not being a “friend of the West.” I’d challenge readers to offer a way to bring non-NPT states into the regime in a way that is a) satisfactory and b) they will accept. It’s harder than you might think.
Suppose Russia / Georgia’s dust up is the proximate cause of a return of Russia to great power politics in a big way….
Would it not be logical that India would return to its longstanding and stable position as Russia’s ally?
What does that do to the U.S. -India deal?
We are talking of one of the closest non-Allied military relationships in the world, with Russia leasing 2 nuclear attack submarines to India.
xxx—
the US also signed the NPT, and the NPT forbids US nuclear assistance to non-signatories. Thus, the US has violated the NPT. Note that India’s vote against Iran at the IAEA was bought this way. So on one had we’re demanding that Iran do MORE than what the NPT requires of it (give up enrichment) while we violate the NPT ourselves. Yes, thats a great precedent.
Oh and inidentally, not only does carving out this “exception” for India constitute a violation of the NPT, but using the NSG and other such informal groups to place restrictions on the sharing of nuclear technology with NPT signatories in good standing (such as Iran) also constitutes a violation of the same NPT that you mention. This is not just an Iranian position — just witness the prepcoms.